# Chang

> District Court, D. Maryland · June 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11357538

## Case

- **Full name:** Richard E. Chang, Jr. v. Warden William Bailey, Capt. Foxwell, Lt. Gattis, COII Parker, and C/M Ms. Brown
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** June 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11357538

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RICHARD E. CHANG, JR., *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. DKC-25-1330

WARDEN WILLIAM BAILEY, *
CAPT. FOXWELL,
LT. GATTIS, *
COII PARKER, and
C/M MS. BROWN, *

Defendants. *
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Richard Chang filed this civil suit against Warden William Bailey, Captain Lucas
Foxwell, Lieutenant Patricia Gattis, COII Melissa Parker, and Danielle Brown alleging that he was
fired retaliatorily from his job assignment and blocked from pursuing other job opportunities while
he was incarcerated at Eastern Correctional Institution (“ECI”).1 ECF No. 6. Now pending are
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 16), Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 25),2 and Mr. Chang’s Motion to Appoint Counsel
(ECF No. 27). Mr. Chang opposes Defendants’ dispositive motion. ECF No. 18. No hearing is

1 The Clerk will be directed to amend the docket to reflect Defendants’ full names and titles.

2 Defendants ask the court to strike the correspondence submitted by Mr. Chang on
November 17, 2025 (ECF No. 24), asserting that it is an unauthorized surreply. ECF No. 25. No
party is entitled to file a surreply unless otherwise ordered by the court. See Local Rule 105.2(a)
(D. Md. 2025). A surreply is most often permitted when the moving party must respond to matters
raised for the first time in a reply. See Lewis v. Rumsfeld, 154 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D.D.C. 2001).
Mr. Chang did not seek permission from the court to file a surreply nor were any new matters
raised in Defendants’ reply. (ECF No. 22). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Chang submitted this
correspondence as a surreply, Defendants’ motion will be granted, and the correspondence
stricken.
necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion
will be granted.
BACKGROUND
A. Amended Complaint Allegations

Mr. Chang alleges that on the morning of March 4, 2025, he was working at ECI as an
Inmate Observation Aide (“IOA”) when another inmate, Mason, approached him and “was clearly
trying to get a rise out of [Mr. Chang].” ECF No. 6 at 5. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Chang’s shift
ended. He approached COII Parker to report the interaction that he had with the other inmate and
requested to return to his original shift to avoid the hostility. Id. at 6. COII Parker stated that it
was Captain Foxwell who had the ability to change his schedule. Id. Mr. Chang returned to his
housing unit and filed an informal complaint against COII Parker for retaliation and
discrimination. Id. Later that afternoon, Mr. Chang was called to the classification area where he
spoke with Assistant Warden Brittingham about the issue. She told him not to report for work the
next day but assured him he would not be fired while she investigated the situation. Id.

On March 6, 2025, Mr. Chang attended a meeting for all IOA workers together with COII
Parker, Captain Foxwell, Lt. Gattis, and Case Manager Brown. ECF No. 6 at 7. Mr. Chang alleges
that Captain Foxwell told the group, “like at other meeting COII Parker and I/I Mason were not
going anywhere” and that “he would fire every I.O.A. worker before he would move either of
them.” Id. Mr. Chang was directed to stay after the meeting, and he went to an office to meet with
Captain Foxwell, COII Parker, and Case Manager Brown where he was required to explain his
issue despite COII Parker’s presence. Id. Captain Foxwell then terminated Mr. Chang from his
job assignment and advised him not to contact Assistant Warden Brittingham, because it would not
change the decision. Id. Mr. Chang contends that his termination was in retaliation for filing the
informal complaint against COII Parker. Id. at 8. According to Mr. Chang, the retaliation is
ongoing because he has since been rejected from four different jobs by Captain Foxwell, Lt. Gattis,
and COII Parker. Id. These included positions in the lock up unit, maintenance department,
education department, and housing maintenance. Id.

Mr. Chang seeks his back pay and damages for violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. ECF No. 6 at 9.
B. Job Assignment History
According to Defendants’ motion, in November 2023, Mr. Chang was assigned to be an
IOA, which requires him to constantly monitor inmates at risk of suicide. See ECF No. 16-2 at 6-
8. COII Parker avers in her declaration that on March 6, 2025, based on her own observations and
other officers’ reports, it appeared that several IOAs, including Mr. Chang, “were involved in
misconduct, poor job performance, and behavior that was not sanctioned for IOAs.” ECF No. 16-
3 at ¶ 2, pg. 3. COII Parker recommended that these IOAs be moved from the night shift to the
day shift so they could be more closely monitored. Id. at ¶ 2. Mr. Chang expressed his

dissatisfaction with the change, stating that working the day shift prevented him from doing other
jobs on his tier, even though he was only being paid for his IOA work. Id. Therefore, COII Parker
recommended that he be reclassified to a different job. Id. After her recommendation was
approved, COII Parker was not involved in any further job assignment decisions. Id. at ¶ 3.
Mr. Chang first sought relief through an Informal Complaint against COII Parker. ECF
No. 16-2 at 13. Case management decisions are governed by the Division of Correction Case
Management Manual, and job assignments and reclassifications fall specifically under
DOC.100.0002 § 5. ECF No. 16-4 at 5-14. Therefore, when Case Manager Brown received the
reclassification recommendation from COII Parker, she processed it through a Case Management
Assignment Sheet. ECF No. 16-2 at 11-12; see ECF No. 16-4 at 5 (DOC.100.0002 § 5.A(1)(a).
The Sheet was then forwarded to a Case Management Supervisor for review and then to Assistant
Warden Brittingham, who approved the reclassification. ECF No. 16-2 at 12; see ECF No. 16-4
at 5-6 (DOC.100.0002 § 5.A, 5.D-E(1)). Mr. Chang was simultaneously added to the “Job Bank”

for a sanitation position. ECF No. 16-2 at 12. The Job Bank is a chronological list of inmates
eligible for job or program assignments. Positions are assigned first to those inmates who have
been waiting the longest. ECF No. 16-4 at 4 (DOC.100.0002 § 2(34)), 12 (§ 5.I).
C. Administrative Remedy Procedure
Mr. Chang also filed a Request for Administrative Remedy (known as an “ARP”)
contending that his termination from his IOA position was discriminatory and retaliatory. ECF
No. 16-2 at 14. The ARP was dismissed pursuant to Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.04.B(1), because
the ARP is not the avenue through which inmates can challenge case management decisions. Id.
Mr. Chang appealed the dismissal to the Commissioner of Correction, but it was dismissed on the
same basis. Id. at 15. IIGO Director F. Todd Taylor, Jr. attests that Mr. Chang did not file any

grievances with the IIGO before May 22, 2025, the date Mr. Chang filed his Amended Complaint.
ECF No. 16-5 at ¶ 2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the complaint in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Lab'ys, Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir.
1997). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming
Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325–26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.
506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of
Rule 8(a)).

The Supreme Court of the United States explained that a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need
“detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 555. Instead, “once a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader
is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Defendants’ dispositive motion is also filed in the alternative as a motion for summary
judgment. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any
factual dispute will defeat the motion: “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in
original).

“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d
514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to … the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her
favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia
Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). The court must, however, also abide
by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and
defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)).
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate “where the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637
F.3d 435, 448–49 (4th Cir. 2011); see Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023); Putney
v. Likin, 656 F. App'x 632, 638–39 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); McCray v. Maryland Dep't of
Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). However, “the party opposing summary judgment
‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has
made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.’”
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans
v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants seek dismissal of the Amended Complaint or that summary judgment be

granted in their favor because 1) they are immune from suit in their official capacities; 2) Mr.
Chang fails to state a claim against Warden Bailey; 3) Mr. Chang failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies; 4) Mr. Chang’s job reclassification does not state a claim; 5) Mr. Chang
fails to state a claim for retaliation; 6) there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; and 7) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 16-1. Mr. Chang responds
that he did exhaust his administrative remedies and generally opposes Defendants’ motions. ECF
No. 18 at 1. Other than conclusory assertions, he produces no evidence.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Mr. Chang’s Amended Complaint does not state the capacity in which he sues Defendants,
but to the extent they are sued in their official capacities, those claims must be dismissed. Under

the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and its
departments are immune from suits in federal court brought by its citizens or the citizens of another
state unless the state consents. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984). While the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases
brought in state courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-202(a), it has not waived its immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court. Claims against state employees acting in
their official capacities are also subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity because a suit against
the state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state itself. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–
72 (1985). Accordingly, any claims against Defendants in their official capacities must be
dismissed.
B. Warden William Bailey
The court must also dismiss the Amended Complaint against Warden Bailey in his

individual capacity. Other than naming him in the caption of the pleading and the list of
defendants, Mr. Chang does not make any allegations against Warden Bailey. Nor does he plead
any facts showing that Warden Bailey personally participated in any of the alleged wrongdoing.
As liability under § 1983 attaches only upon personal participation in a constitutional violation,
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001), Warden Bailey must be dismissed from this
suit.
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The remaining Defendants argue that Mr. Chang’s claims regarding his retaliatory job
reclassification should be dismissed because he did not exhaust the available administrative
remedies. ECF No. 16-1 at 11. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “[n]o action shall

be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Although exhaustion
under § 1997e is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, a plaintiff must nonetheless exhaust before this
court hears the claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215–16 (2007); Anderson v. XYZ Corr.
Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005). Because the court may not consider an
unexhausted claim, exhaustion prior to federal suit is mandatory. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639
(2016). Therefore, a court ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. Id. (citing Miller v.
French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (explaining “[t]he mandatory ‘shall’ … normally creates an
obligation impervious to judicial discretion”)).
Exhaustion requires an inmate to complete “the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 88, 93 (2006). Importantly, however, the court must ensure that “any defects in exhaustion
were not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell,
478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). An
inmate need only exhaust “available” remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Ross, 578 U.S. at 636.
An administrative remedy is not “available” where the prisoner, “through no fault of [their] own,
was prevented from availing [themself] of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir.
2008) (citing Aquilar-Avellaveda, 478 F.3d at 1225); Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684.
In Maryland prisons, for complaints about prison conditions, the Administrative Remedy
Procedure (“ARP”) is the administrative process that must be exhausted. See generally Md. Code
Ann., Corr. Servs. §§ 10–201 to 10–210 (LexisNexis 2017); Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.02(B)(1)

(2022) (defining the ARP). First, a prisoner must file a grievance, known as an ARP, with the
warden of the prison within 30 days of the incident or when the prisoner gains knowledge of the
injury giving rise to the complaint. See Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.09(B), 12.02.28.05(D). Second,
if the ARP is denied, a prisoner must file an appeal with the Commissioner of Correction within
30 days. Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.14. If the appeal is denied, the prisoner must appeal within 30
days to the Incarcerated Individual Grievance Office (“IIGO”). See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs.
§ 10–206; Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.18, 12.07.01.05. Inmates may seek judicial review of the
IIGO’s final determinations in a Maryland circuit court. Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 10–210.
Separately, Maryland prisoners complaining about case management matters such as
housing, transfers, and job assignments may initiate their grievance directly with the IIGO,
bypassing review by their Warden and the Commissioner. Md. Code Regs. 12.02.24.02.E and G.
Issues such as these cannot be resolved through the ARP. Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.04.B(1).

Because Mr. Chang’s complaint concerns his job assignment as an IOA, it falls under the
category of a case management decision. To challenge that decision and raise the alleged
discrimination and retaliation as the basis for his termination, Mr. Chang was required to file a
grievance with the IIGO directly. The record before the court establishes that he did not do so
before filing this action. Nevertheless, Defendants have not met their burden to show that the
correct administrative remedy process was available to Mr. Chang. Nothing in the record
establishes that Mr. Chang was ever made aware of the separate requirements for case management
appeals, as opposed to the ARP procedure he attempted to utilize for his complaint. See Ross, 578
U.S. at 643-44 (holding that if a remedy is essentially “unknowable” it is so opaque as being
incapable of use and is unavailable). The Ross Court specified that “[g]rievance procedures are

unavailable ... if the correctional facility’s staff misled the inmate as to the existence or rules of the
grievance process so as to cause the inmate to fail to exhaust such process.” Id. at 644 n.3 (citing
Davis v. Hernandez, 798 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2015) “The responses to his complaints state that he
may not use the ARP for his type of claim but does not inform him that he should be sending his
grievance directly to the IIGO. See ECF No. 16-2 at 14-15. With no evidence establishing that
Mr. Chang was made aware of the alternative procedure, the issue of whether such a remedy was
available to him remains. See Gowen v. Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2025) (finding that
regardless of its existence, a remedy was unavailable where an officer told the plaintiff he could
not appeal a classification decision). It is therefore not appropriate to grant summary judgment on
this basis. The court will turn to the merits of Mr. Chang’s claim that his termination was
retaliatory.
D. Termination and Retaliation
As a preliminary matter, inmates generally do not have a constitutional right to work while
incarcerated. Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 1978)); Blankumsee v. Galley, No.

CA PWG-15-837, 2016 WL 270073, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The courts have held that there is no liberty interest in prison job programs
entitling him to protection under the Due Process Clause absent a showing of significant hardship
and that removal from work assignments is discretionary and does not violate the Eight
Amendment. Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 187 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that prisoners do not
enjoy a liberty interest in work release); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (holding that
a valid conviction deprives an inmate of their liberty “to the extent that the State may confine him
and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not
otherwise violate the Constitution”); Clark v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 316

F. App’x 279, 281 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming that termination from a prison job does not constitute
and Eighth Amendment violation). Therefore, Mr. Chang cannot maintain either an Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment claim based on his termination. However, if his termination was
retaliatory in nature, Mr. Chang may be protected under the First Amendment.
To state a claim of retaliation for exercising a First Amendment right, a plaintiff must allege
that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected First Amendment activity; (2) the defendant took some
action that adversely affected the First Amendment rights; and (3) there was a causal relationship
between the protected activity and the defendant’s conduct. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors
of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005); cf. Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54
F.4th 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2022) (outlining elements of a Title VII retaliation claim).
A plaintiff may establish retaliatory conduct if the defendant took an action against the
plaintiff that “would likely deter ‘a person of ordinary firmness’ from the exercise of First

Amendment rights.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). A plaintiff must also demonstrate a causal connection between his First
Amendment activity and the alleged retaliatory action. See Constantine, 411 F.3d at 501. The
showing can be based on circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the defendant was aware
of the First Amendment activity, and that the retaliatory act was temporally proximate to that
activity. Id.
In the prison context, courts “treat [claims of retaliation] with skepticism because ‘every
act of discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly
to prisoner misconduct.’” Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994)). As such, an inmate cannot simply assert a generalized

retaliatory animus but must allege facts that support the claim of retaliation. White v. White, 886
F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1989). Moreover, a retaliation claim fails if there is a legitimate reason for
the alleged retaliatory action. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
Defendants do not contest that Mr. Chang’s filed grievances are protected First Amendment
activity. However, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Chang, he fails to
establish that his First Amendment rights were affected by his reclassification or that the filing of
his grievance caused Defendants to terminate him from his IOA position. Nothing in the record
suggests that his termination and reclassification deterred Mr. Chang from exercising his rights.
Rather, after an unsuccessful informal complaint, Mr. Chang pursued a formal complaint through
the ARP process and initiated this lawsuit. Furthermore, Defendants have presented a legitimate
explanation for why Mr. Chang was removed from his job assignment. Mr. Chang and other IOAs
had been observed engaging in prohibited conduct and poorly performing their duties. This would

have been sufficient grounds to reclassify Mr. Chang. Instead, he and the others were given a
second chance on the day shift which allowed for more supervision. Mr. Chang refused the
opportunity because it interfered with activities he wanted to do during the day. His ultimate
reclassification was the result of his own refusal to perform the duties of an IOA. No retaliatory
animus has been demonstrated on the part of any Defendant. Moreover, none of the Defendants
were the final decisionmaker; final approval was given by the Assistant Warden. Finally, Lt. Gattis
had no authority to decide where Mr. Chang would be reclassified; by regulation that falls to Case
Management. Mr. Chang cannot show that Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances
and therefore Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. The court need not address
Defendants’ remaining arguments.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment, construed as a motion for summary judgment, will be granted. Mr. Chang’s Motion to
Appoint Counsel will be denied. A separate Order follows.

June 18, 2026 /s/
Date DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11357538. Public record. Not legal advice.