# Valdez

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · May 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356930

## Case

- **Full name:** Narciso Valdez v. Felipe Martinez, Jr.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** May 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

NARCISO VALDEZ DOCKET NO. 2:23-cv-01398
REG. # 19199-078 SECTION P

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

FELIPE MARTINEZ, JR. MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
by pro se petitioner Narciso Valdez on October 3, 2023. Doc. 1. At the time of filing, Valdez was
an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Center at Oakdale, Louisiana (“FCIO”). He has since been released from BOP custody.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the reasons set forth
below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus should be DENIED AND
DISMISSED because petitioner’s claims are MOOT.
I.
BACKGROUND

Valdez filed the instant petition challenging his detention. Doc. 1. He claimed that the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied the application of earned time credits despite the fact that he did
not have a final order of removal. Doc. 1, p. 1. On March 14, 2024, BOP released/transferred
Petitioner to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. See doc. 12-1, p. 2,
Declaration of Jessica Ivey, Attachment 1, Inmate Profile (redacted).
II.
LAW & APPLICATION

Petitioner’s release from custody during the pendency of this proceeding renders his claim
moot. See Belasco v. Warden, 156 F. App'x 671 (5th Cir. 2005). Although an action “is not moot
simply because a § 2241 petitioner is no longer in custody,” it is rendered moot “when the court
cannot grant the relief requested by the moving party.” Salgado v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 220 Fed.
App'x 256, 2007 WL 627580, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007) (citing Brown v. Resor, 407 F.2d 281,
283 (5th Cir. 1969)); Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987). The issue of
whether a case is moot presents a jurisdictional matter because it implicates the Article III
requirement that an actual controversy exist at all stages of federal court proceedings. Bailey, 821
F.2d at 278. A moot case “presents no Article III case or controversy, and a court has no
constitutional jurisdiction to resolve the issues it presents.” Adair v. Dretke, 150 Fed. Appx. 329,
2005 WL 2473569, at * (5th Cir. Oct.6, 2005) (citation omitted).
Because petitioner has been released to ICE custody, the Court can no longer provide him
with the relief requested. Dismissal on that basis is recommended.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus should be DENIED AND
DISMISSED because petitioner’s claims are MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that any pending motions, including Defendant’s
Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss [doc. 14] seeking dismissal on the grounds herein addressed, be
DENIED as MOOT.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved
by this recommendation have fourteen (14) business days from service of this report and
recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond
to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any
objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal
conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the
date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved
party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District
Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile
Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 18th day of May, 2026.

UNITED S ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356930. Public record. Not legal advice.