# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · June 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356800

## Case

- **Full name:** Eddie Lee Johnson v. Marion Correctional Institution (Commissary)
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Eddie Lee Johnson, Case No. 3:25-cv-1118

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Marion Correctional Institution (Commissary),

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Eddie Lee Johnson, currently incarcerated at Marion Correctional Institution
(“MCI”), filed this civil rights action against the Marion Correctional Institution (Commissary)
alleging an unfair distribution of inmate funds. (Doc. No. 1). For the following reasons, I dismiss
this action.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s brief complaint claims that MCI’s Commissary unfairly distributes inmates’ funds.
(Id. at 3). Plaintiff states that when he uses the commissary every month, he is charged a tax on his
purchases. (Id.). He claims that the commissary taxes only those individuals “with money,” and “if
you don’t have [anything] but your state pay, you don’t have to [pay] taxes.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff
alleges this “unfair distribution” is unconstitutional. (Id. at 3). He requests reimbursement from the
commissary, and he requests that the court review the “inmate taxing system” and return all taxes
taken from inmate accounts. (Id. at 5).
III. STANDARD
Pro se complaints are generally liberally construed and held to more lenient standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982), but the lenient
treatment generally accorded pro se pleadings “has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts
are not required to conjure allegations or construct claims on their behalf. See Martin v. Overton, 391

F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004); Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to screen all in
forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that
the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for determining a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissal for failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B). Hill, 630 F.3d at 471. To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. The
allegations in the pleading “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .
on the assumption that all the allegations . . . are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555.

IV. ANALYSIS
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured
by the constitution by a person acting under color of state law. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988) (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, state prisons like MCI are not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983
and, therefore, they are not capable of being sued. See, e.g., Smith v. Trumbull Corr. Inst., No. 4:23 CV
355, 2023 WL 2664294, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2023) (citing cases).
Moreover, MCI, including its commissary, is a prison facility operated by the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). ODRC is an agency of the State of Ohio
and immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, because the State of Ohio has not

waived its sovereign immunity or consented to be sued in federal court. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 71 (1989); Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999).
Because Defendant is not sui juris and the ODRC is immune from suit, Plaintiff fails to state
a plausible § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted, and this action is dismissed pursuant to
Section 1915A.
Additionally, even if Plaintiff had named a proper party, Plaintiff’s claim would fail. While
pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,. El Bey
v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008), the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants
has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se
litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989). Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the
defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they

rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Scheid v. Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints must contain either direct
or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal
notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic pleading
standard, as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing that
[Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s mere assertion that he is “suing
for violation of certain constitutional rights: unfair distribution of inmates funds,” (Doc. No. 1 at 3),
is insufficient. See Poole v. Stubblefield, No. 4:05-CV-1005-TCM, 2005 WL 2290450, *5 (E.D. Mo
2005) (“Plaintiff has no constitutionally protected interest in commissary privileges or commissary

prices and, certainly, no legal basis for demanding that he be offered commissary items tax-free.”)
(citing Bennett v. Sheahan, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16339, 1999 WL 967534 *4 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (sua
sponte dismissing a prisoner’s challenge to taxes on the prison’s commissary items)). Plaintiff fails to
state a plausible claim for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Further, I
certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in
good faith.

So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356800. Public record. Not legal advice.