# Stancil

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356682

## Case

- **Full name:** Jerome Curtis Stancil v. United States of America
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JEROME CURTIS STANCIL,

Petitioner,

v. Case Nos.: 3:22-cv-1291-TJC-PDB
3:18-cr-55-TJC-PDB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner Jerome Curtis Stancil moves under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate
his conviction and sentence. See Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civ. Doc. 1);
Memorandum of Law (Civ. Doc. 3).1 Following a bench trial in January 2019, at
which Petitioner was represented by trial attorney Susan Good Yazgi,
Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of possession of a firearm and ammunition by
a convicted felon. The Court sentenced him to a 180-month term of
imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to be followed by
a 5-year term of supervised release. In the Motion, Petitioner raises five

1 Citations to the record in the criminal case, United States v. Stancil, No. 3:18-cr-55-
TJC-PDB, will be denoted “Crim. Doc. __.” Citations to the record in the civil § 2255 case, No.
3:22-cv-1291-TJC-PDB, will be denoted “Civ. Doc. __.”
grounds challenging his conviction and sentence. The Government responded
in opposition to all five of Petitioner’s claims (Civ. Doc. 4). And Petitioner replied

(Civ. Doc. 10). This case is ripe for review.2
II. Background
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the facts and
procedural history of the case:

Sergeant Adam Ardizzoni of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office
was running laser radar one night when he clocked a car traveling
at 15 miles per hour over the speed limit. He radioed nearby Officer
Rafael Lugo with an alert about the vehicle’s speed. Officer Lugo
pulled the car over, and while he was running the tag, he saw the
driver reach down several times. Under cover of his spotlight,
Officer Lugo approached the passenger side of the car—where he
saw that the driver was still reaching down. He radioed for backup,
which arrived in the form of Sergeant Ardizzoni and another officer,
Patrick Ivey.

No longer alone, Officer Lugo approached the driver’s side
window and made his first contact with the driver, Jerome Stancil.
When Stancil lowered the window, Officer Lugo asked for his
driver’s license, but he also noticed something inside Stancil’s car—
the smell of marijuana. It was a familiar smell to Officer Lugo, who
estimated that he had encountered it more than 20 times before in
earlier traffic stops. The smell was also familiar to Sergeant
Ardizzoni, who had received narcotics training and similarly
testified to smelling marijuana when Stancil’s window came down.
Officer Lugo asked Stancil to step out of his car and ran Stancil’s
driver’s license. That check revealed that Stancil was a convicted
felon on probation.

2 Under Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, the Court
has determined that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to decide the Motion. See
Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714–15 (11th Cir. 2002) (an evidentiary hearing
on a § 2255 petition is not required when the petitioner asserts allegations that are
affirmatively contradicted by the record or patently frivolous, or if in assuming that
the facts he alleges are true, he still would not be entitled to any relief).
While Officer Lugo checked Stancil’s license, Officer Ivey
searched the car. His apparent suspicion that he would find
contraband was correct; he discovered a Taurus .40 caliber pistol
loaded with ten rounds of ammunition under the driver’s side floor
mat. Officer Lugo handcuffed Stancil and walked him over to the
backseat of the police car. After hearing the Miranda[3] warning,
Stancil decided to talk and admitted that the firearm was his.

A grand jury charged Stancil with being a felon in possession
of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Stancil moved to suppress the firearm and ammunition, arguing
that they were the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The
motion was referred to a magistrate judge, who conducted an
evidentiary hearing where Officer Lugo, Sergeant Ardizzoni, and
Stancil’s son—who had arrived at the scene after the arrest—
testified. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion
to suppress, and the district court adopted that recommendation.

Stancil waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a
stipulated bench trial, though he preserved his right to appeal the
suppression decision. Among other things, Stancil stipulated that
he was a convicted felon, that he knowingly possessed a pistol, that
his pistol was manufactured in Brazil, and that his pistol qualified
as a “firearm” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). Those
stipulations were decisive for the district court, which found Stancil
guilty.

Next came Stancil’s sentencing hearing. The government
presented three of Stancil’s prior convictions, all of which came
under Virginia Code § 18.2-248. The conduct underlying those
convictions occurred in 1996, 1997, and 2004; the first two
convictions were for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
and the most recent was for manufacture, sale, distribution, or
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. The district
court found that all three qualified as serious drug offenses under
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which meant
that Stancil was subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years. The
court sentenced him to that minimum term of imprisonment.

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193 (11th Cir. 2021) (footnote omitted).
On direct appeal, Petitioner, with help from appellate counsel, argued
that the district court erred in: (1) sentencing Petitioner as an armed career
criminal because his Virgina convictions were not serious drug offenses; (2)

denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress; and (3) failing to determine that the
prior offenses occurred on different occasions. He also argued that 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. Civ. Doc. 4-1. In a published opinion, the Eleventh
Circuit found no error in the district court’s judgment and affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence. Stancil, 4 F.4th at 1195. This § 2255 proceeding
followed.
III. Law
a. 28 U.S.C. § 2255

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a person in federal custody may move to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence. Section 2255 authorizes a district court to
grant relief on four grounds: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to

impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Only jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims, and claims of error that are so
fundamental as to cause a complete miscarriage of justice will warrant relief
through collateral attack. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-86
(1979); Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

A § 2255 movant “bears the burden to prove the claims in his § 2255
motion.” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015); see also
Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221-23 (11th Cir. 2017). If “‘the
evidence does not clearly explain what happened . . . the party with the burden

loses.’” Beeman, 871 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1357
(11th Cir. 2001)). A § 2255 movant will not be entitled to relief, or an evidentiary
hearing, “when his claims are merely ‘conclusory allegations unsupported by
specifics’ or ‘contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.’”

Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“[A] collateral attack is the preferred vehicle for an ineffective-assistance
claim.” United States v. Padgett, 917 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019). To

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a § 2255 petitioner must show both:
(1) that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and (2) that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662,

667 (11th Cir. 2020). In determining whether counsel was deficient, “[t]he
standard for effective assistance of counsel is reasonableness, not perfection.”
Brewster v. Hetzel, 913 F.3d 1042, 1056 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687). “In the light of the ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s actions [fell]
within the wide range of constitutionally adequate assistance, a movant ‘must

establish that no competent counsel would have taken the [challenged] action.’”
Khan v. United States, 928 F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Chandler
v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). To
establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable likelihood that the

result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s error.
Martin, 949 F.3d at 667 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010)).
The Court considers the totality of the evidence in determining whether a
petitioner has established deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 695. However, because both prongs are necessary, “there is no reason
for a court . . . to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
one.” Id. at 697.

IV. Discussion
a. Ground One
Petitioner argues that his conviction violates Rehaif v. United States, 588
U.S. 225 (2019). See Civ. Doc. 1 at 4; Civ. Doc. 3 at 1-8. The Supreme Court

decided Rehaif on June 21, 2019, a month after this Court sentenced Petitioner,
but more than two years before the Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and
sentence.
In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that to convict a defendant for
unlawful possession of a firearm, the government must prove not only “that the

defendant knew he possessed a firearm,” but also that he knew he belonged to
one of the nine categories of persons that § 922(g)4 prohibits from possessing a
firearm. 588 U.S. at 227, 237. In doing so, the Supreme Court overturned
Eleventh Circuit (and several others) law, which held that the government did

not have to prove the defendant knew of his prohibited status. See, e.g., United
States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court
reasoned that since § 924(a)(2) provides that anyone who “knowingly violates”
§ 922(g) will be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years, the word “knowingly”

applies to the status element, not merely the possession element. Rehaif, 588
U.S. at 227, 228-29. But the Supreme Court also reasoned that a basic principle
of criminal law is that a scienter requirement applies to each element that goes
to the wrongfulness of an offense (except for minor regulatory offenses). Id. at

230-41. And for § 922(g), the status element goes to the heart of what makes
the act of possessing a firearm a crime, because merely possessing a gun is
otherwise lawful. Id. at 232.

4 Section 922(g)(1) makes it “unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted
in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . .
. to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Section 924(a)(2) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly violates subsection . .
. (g) . . . of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
Here, the January 2018 Indictment charged that Petitioner “having been
previously convicted . . . of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year . . . did knowingly possess, in and affecting interstate and
foreign commerce, a firearm, that is, a Taurus, .40 caliber pistol, and
ammunition, that is 10 rounds of Smith & Wesson, .40 caliber.” See Crim. Doc.
1 at 1. The charge cited 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e) (the ACCA provision).

Id. at 1, 2. But the Indictment neither alleged that Petitioner knew he was a
felon nor cited § 924(a)(2). Because the Indictment did not allege that Petitioner
knew of his status as a felon, it contained a Rehaif error.
Petitioner argues that the Indictment was invalid as it failed to give

notice of the charged offense when it did not cite § 924(a)(2) and did not charge
that he knowingly violate every element of § 924(g)(1). Civ. Doc. 3 at 1-3. He
also argues that the Court was without jurisdiction to hold a trial because this
faulty Indictment resulted in a jurisdictional defect – it “alleg[ed] only a non-

offense” and a “stand-alone violation of [§] 922(g)(1)” is not a prosecutable
offense.” Id. at 4-5. Citing Rehaif, Petitioner also claims to be actually innocent
of violating § 922(g)(1). See Civ. Doc. 10 at 6.
Respondent counters that Petitioner procedurally defaulted these claims

because he failed to raise them on direct appeal. See Civ. Doc. 4 at 4-10. But the
Court need not decide whether Petitioner procedurally defaulted his Rehaif
claims or whether he can overcome the default. Even if the claims are not
defaulted, they fail on the merits under the harmless error standard applicable
on collateral review. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993);

see also United States v. Arthurs, 823 F. App’x 692, 696-97 (10th Cir. 2020)
(applying Brecht’s harmless error standard to a Rehaif claim raised in a § 2255
motion).
On collateral review, the harmless error standard mandates that
“relief is proper only if the . . . court has grave doubt about whether
a trial error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict. There must be more
than a reasonable possibility that the error was harmful.” Davis v.
Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267-68 (2015) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); Ross v. United States, 289 F.3d 677, 682 (11th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (applying this standard to a § 2255 motion).
Put another way, the court may order relief only if the error
“resulted in actual prejudice.” [Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637] (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

Granda v. United States, 990 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2021). Notably, “[t]he
burden of demonstrating in a collateral proceeding that an [error] violated the
petitioner’s due process rights is ‘greater than the showing required to establish
plain error on direct appeal.’” Galvan v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Therefore, if a
claim would fail under plain error review, it would necessarily fail under
Brecht’s harmless error standard.
A Rehaif error does not warrant a presumption of prejudice. Following
Rehaif, the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have clarified that a Rehaif
error – whether in the indictment, jury instructions, or a plea colloquy – is a
nonstructural error subject to plain error review on direct appeal (if
unpreserved) or harmless error review (if preserved). Greer v. United States,

593 U.S. 503, 511-13 (2021); United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1144 (11th
Cir. 2021).5 The Supreme Court also held that in determining whether a Rehaif
error affected a defendant’s substantial rights under plain error review, a court
may examine the entire record, not just the trial record. Greer, 593 U.S. at 510;

see also United States v. Reed, 941 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2019) (“As the
‘reviewing court[, we] may consult the whole record when considering the effect
of any error on [the petitioner’s] substantial rights.’” (quoting United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002))).

Petitioner argues that the Indictment failed to give notice of the charged
offense because it did not allege that he knew he was a felon. The Eleventh
Circuit has held, on similar facts, that such an error did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights under plain error review. See, e.g., United States

v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1082-84 (11th Cir. 2020); Reed, 941 F.3d at 1020-

5 “Under the plain error standard, ‘there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and
(3) that affects [the defendant’s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if
(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.’” United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted).
Under the more defendant-friendly harmless error standard, which applies to
errors that were preserved in the trial court, “the government bears the burden of
showing that an error was ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Leonard, 4 F.4th at
1144 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
22. Here, Petitioner cannot “prov[e] a reasonable probability that he would have
obtained a different result but for” the Indictment’s failure to allege that he

knew he was a felon “because circumstantial evidence establishes that [he]
knew of his felon status.” Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1082 (internal citation omitted).
At his bench trial, Petitioner stipulated that before the January 2018
charged offense occurred, he was a convicted felon. See Crim Doc. 67 at 11-12.

And “someone who has been convicted of felonies repeatedly is especially likely
to know he is a felon.” Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1082 (citation omitted). Petitioner
had 3 felony convictions before this case: a 1996 conviction for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute; a 1997 conviction for possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute; and a 2004 conviction for manufacture, sale, distribution,
or possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin.6 See Stancil, 4 F.4th
at 1196. Also, “serving more than a year in prison provides circumstantial
evidence of knowledge of felon status.” Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1083 (citations

omitted). And here, Petitioner served a five-year term of incarceration for his
1996 conviction. See Crim. Doc. 53 at 7-8.
Likewise, Petitioner “behaved in a way that suggested he knew he was
not allowed to possess a gun.” Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1083. The stipulated facts

6 During sentencing, the government presented evidence of only these three
prior convictions. See Crim. Doc. 68 at 4-5. But the Indictment lists additional
convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of heroin. Crim. Doc. 1 at 1-2.
showed that when officers pulled over Petitioner and searched his vehicle,
officers located the firearm under the driver’s side floor mat. See Crim Doc. 67

at 15. Attempting to hide the firearm from police is circumstantial evidence that
Petitioner knew he was a felon and knew he was not supposed to have a firearm.
Indeed, Petitioner never alleges that he did not know he was a felon. See
generally Civ. Docs. 1; 3. Petitioner cannot show plain error, let alone “actual

prejudice,” based on the Indictment’s failure to allege that Petitioner knew he
was a felon.
Petitioner also argues that the Indictment did not charge a federal
offense, thereby depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, because it

neither cited § 924(a)(2) nor alleged that he knew he was a felon. The Eleventh
Circuit has repeatedly rejected the same argument. Leonard, 4 F.4th at 1142-
43; United States v. Morales, 987 F.3d 966, 978-79 (11th Cir. 2021); Innocent,
977 F.3d at 1084; United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1336-37 (11th Cir.

2020). Section 922(g) is a complete, self-contained offense, such that an
indictment’s failure to cite § 924(a)(2) does not mean it has failed to charge a
federal crime. Leonard, 4 F.4th at 1142-43; Morales, 987 F.3d at 979. Further,
omitting an element from an indictment, such as failing to charge that the

defendant knew he was a convicted felon, is a non-jurisdictional defect.
Leonard, 4 F.4th at 1142, 1143; Morales, 987 F.3d at 978-79; Moore, 954 F.3d
at 1336-37. Here, while the Indictment did not allege that Petitioner knew he
was a felon, it was sufficient to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction over “all offenses
against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231; Leonard, 4 F.4th at

1142-43; Moore, 954 F.3d at 1332-33.
To the extent Petitioner argues he is “actually innocent” of the offense
based on the Rehaif error, that argument is meritless too. The actual innocence
exception “is exceedingly narrow in scope as it concerns a petitioner’s ‘actual’

innocence rather than his ‘legal’ innocence.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d
1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “To show actual innocence of the
crime of conviction, a movant ‘must show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’ in

light of the new evidence of innocence.” McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190,
1196 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This
exception is supposed to “remain ‘rare’ and . . . only be applied in the
‘extraordinary case.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. As shown above, the stipulated

evidence shows Petitioner knew he was a felon. The Rehaif error in the
Indictment does not render Petitioner actually innocent. The Rehaif error here
was harmless and thus Ground One is denied.
b. Ground Two

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the Indictment because it did not meet the requirements of Rehaif
and because it did not charge 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) in conjunction with 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). Civ. Docs. 1 at 5, 3 at 8-9.
Rehaif was decided a month after the Court sentenced Petitioner. See

Crim. Doc. 68. Indeed, when the government issued the Indictment and at the
time Petitioner was sentenced, binding Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed
the argument that the government must plead and prove a defendant’s
knowledge of his status as a felon. See United States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226,

1229 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a defendant does not have to know of his
status as a felon to be convicted of knowingly possessing a firearm after a felony
conviction). Trial counsel is not required to predict changes in the law. United
States v. Finley, 805 F. App’x 823, 827 (11th Cir. 2020) (“This Court’s precedent

clearly forecloses an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on failure to
raise an objection that would not succeed under current law, but which could
succeed depending on a forthcoming Supreme Court decision.”). Therefore,
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective in the manner Petitioner suggests.

Also, to the extent Petitioner argues counsel failed to challenge the
Indictment because it failed to mention § 924(a)(2), that claim also fails.
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit has held that Ҥ 922(g) itself contains the
requirement that the defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of

persons when he possessed the firearm.” United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th
1134, 1143 (11th Cir. 2021). And even after Rehaif, an Indictment that charges
a defendant with violating § 922(g), is “enough to charge an offense against the
United States.” Id. Here, the Indictment tracked the text of § 922(g). See Crim.
Doc. 1 at 1-2 (“JEROME CURTIS STANCIL, having been previously convicted

in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . did knowingly possess, in and affecting interstate and foreign
commerce, a firearm . . . and ammunition . . . [i]n violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1) and 924(e).”). To that end, the Indictment sufficiently charged

Petitioner with a crime against the United States, and thus counsel cannot be
deemed deficient for failing to challenge it. See United States v. Morales, 987
F.3d 966, 979 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[A]n indictment that tracks [the] text [of §
922(g)] sufficiently states a crime against the United States.”). Ground Two is

denied.
c. Ground Three
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge Petitioner’s prior Viginia convictions used to support the Court’s
imposition of an ACCA sentencing enhancement. Civ. Doc. 1 at 6.

Under the ACCA, any person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who has
three or more prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or
both, committed on occasions different from one another” is subject to a 15-year
mandatory minimum prison sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The term “serious

drug offense” means:
(i) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import
and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705
of title 46 for which a maximum term of imprisonment
of ten years or more is prescribed by law; or

(ii) an offense under State law, involving
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent
to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.

Id. § 924(e)(2)(A).
“In determining whether a conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense,
courts generally apply a categorical approach, looking ‘only to the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense, instead of the actual
facts underlying the defendant’s prior conviction.’” United States v. Simmons,
820 F. App’x 923, 925 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 583
F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009)). If the statute of conviction contains
alternative elements, the sentencing court may consult Shepard-approved7
sources, such as a charging document or the judgment, to discern the nature of
the conviction. Simmons, 820 F. App’x at 925–26.
Here, to support the enhancement, the government relied on three prior
convictions: (1) a 1996 Virginia conviction involving possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute as an accommodation; (2) a 1997 Virginia conviction

7 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
involving possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (second or subsequent
offense); and (3) a 2004 Virginia conviction involving the manufacture, sale,

distribution, or possession with intent – cocaine and heroin. See Crim. Doc. 68
at 4-5. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in trial counsel’s sentencing
memorandum, see Crim. Doc. 54, and during Petitioner’s sentencing hearing,
see Crim. Doc. 68 at 5-13, trial counsel zealously argued that these convictions

did not meet the qualifications for an ACCA enhancement. Nevertheless, the
Court ultimately determined that each of those prior Virgina convictions were
qualifying offenses under the ACCA.8 Id. at 27-33. Petitioner, with help from
appellate counsel, then challenged this determination, but the Eleventh Circuit

agreed that Petitioner’s three prior convictions qualified for an ACCA
enhancement and affirmed Petitioner’s judgment and sentence. Stancil, 4 F.th
at 1198.

8 In 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued Erlinger v. United States,
602 U.S. 821 (2024), holding that, in compliance with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury, not a judge, to
determine whether a defendant’s predicate offenses under ACCA were committed on
separate occasions. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834-35. Although Petitioner does not
challenge his ACCA enhancement under Erlinger, the Court notes that even if he did,
that claim would be without merit because the procedural rule announced in Erlinger
is not retroactive on collateral review. See Erlinger, 602 U.S. 821, 859 n.3 (2024)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“For any case that is already final, the Teague [v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989),] rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising [Erlinger’s]
new rule in collateral proceedings.”); see also Owens v. United States, No. 3:22-cv-549-
MMH-PDB, 2025 WL 2687335, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2025) (applying the test set
forth in Teague and finding that Erlinger is not retroactive on collateral review).
Considering this record, the Court cannot find that trial counsel was
ineffective under Strickland. The fact that trial counsel’s argument was

unsuccessful does not mean she rendered deficient performance. See Chandler,
218 F.3d at 1314 (finding that while a particular defense was not successful it
did not prove ineffective assistance). Thus, Ground Three is denied.
d. Ground Four

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel failed to argue that he does not
qualify for an ACCA enhancement because of Section 4019 of the First Step Act.
Civ. Doc. 1 at 7. He also asserts that trial counsel failed to argue that the
decision in Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), renders his ACCA

designation invalid and but for counsel’s failure, he would have received a
maximum ten-year term of incarceration. Civ. Doc. 3 at 15-17.
Initially, the First Step Act and Section 401 reduced the statutory
minimum applicable to recidivist drug offenders and amended the Controlled

Substances Act, including sentencing enhancements under 21 U.S.C. § 851. See
United States v. Smith, 798 F. App’x 473, 475 (11th Cir. 2020). Here,
Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced under § 924(e). See Crim. Doc. 1; Crim. Doc.
68 at 28. Section 401 and the First Step Act do not apply to 18 U.S.C. § 924 and

9 In his § 2255 Motion, Petitioner cites to Section 403 of the Act, Civ. Doc. 1 at
7, but his memorandum discusses Section 401, Civ. Doc. 3 at 15-17. Section 403
modified the “stacking” of multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 403
does not apply to Petitioner because he was not charged with violating § 924(c).
the ACCA. Smith, 798 F. App’x at 476 (“[T]he district court did not err in
concluding that § 401(a)(1) of the F[irst] S[tep] A[ct] did not amend 18 U.S.C. §

924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s definition of a ‘serious drug offense’ because the plain and
unambiguous language of § 401(a)(1) amends only the [Controlled Substances
Act].”). Thus, trial counsel cannot be deficient for failing to make this meritless
argument.

Likewise, in Wooden, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the
“different occasions” clause of § 924(e). The Court concluded that ten burglaries,
all of which occurred “on a single night, in a single uninterrupted course of
conduct,” all within the same one-building storage facility, were not committed

on occasions different from one another. Wooden, 595 U.S. at 370. Rather, the
Court concluded that “Wooden’s ten burglary convictions were for offenses
committed on a single occasion.” Id. at 376. The Supreme Court thus held that
the defendant did not have three or more prior convictions for a violent felony

“committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of § 924(e)
and vacated his ACCA sentence. To that end, Wooden merely clarified the
proper application of the ACCA’s different-occasions clause. Wooden, 595 U.S.
at 384 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“We took this case hoping to bring some clarity

to at least this particular corner of the ACCA.”)).
Here, as stated above, the government relied on three separate prior
Virginia convictions to argue for the imposition of an ACCA enhancement. See
Crim. Doc. 68 at 4-5. During his sentencing hearing, the government explained
that Petitioner obtained two qualifying convictions in 2004, but since it “[could

not] prove that they occurred on dates different from one another,” it conceded
that the Court must only consider one of those 2004 convictions to support the
enhancement. Crim. Doc. 68 at 4. The Court agreed, and using certified copies
of the convictions, ultimately treated the two 2004 convictions as one valid prior

conviction supporting an ACCA enhancement. Id. at 28-29. And after also
considering the 1996 and 1997 convictions, it imposed an ACCA sentencing
enhancement under § 924(e)(1). On direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
considered each of the three prior convictions and found no error in this Court’s

sentence. See Stancil, 4 F.4th at 1198. As such, Petitioner cannot show that but
for counsel’s alleged error the outcome would have been different. Ground Four
is denied.
e. Gound Five

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
subpoena Officer Ivey to testify during his motion to suppress hearing or
request a continuance of the hearing until Officer Ivey was available. Civ. Doc.
3 at 17-18.10 According to Petitioner, while Officers Lugo and Ardizzoni testified

at the hearing, Ivey conducted the actual search of Petitioner’s vehicle, thus his

10 Petitioner does not include Ground Five in his Petition but rather sets out
that Ground in his Memorandum. See generally Civ. Doc. 1; Civ. Doc. 3 at 17.
testimony was necessary to prove the legality of the search and the location of
the alleged “odor” of marijuana that the officers used to justify the search. Id.

“Complaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored, because the
presentation of testimonial evidence is a matter of trial strategy and because
allegations of what a witness would have testified [to] are largely

speculative.” Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1978).
Even if counsel’s failure to call a witness “appears to have been unwise in
retrospect, the decision will be held to have been ineffective assistance only if
it was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen

it.” Dingle v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quotations omitted). Thus, “[t]he mere fact that other witnesses might have
been available . . . is not a sufficient ground to prove ineffectiveness of
counsel.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1995).

Additionally, “evidence about the testimony of a putative witness must
generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness or on
affidavit.

Here, Petitioner provides no affidavit or proffer of alleged testimony that
Officer Ivey would have provided. To that end, Petitioner has offered no
evidence that, even if Officer Ivey had testified, his testimony would have
affected the outcome of the suppression hearing. Instead, Petitioner only
contends that Officer Ivey conducted the search, so his testimony “was
crucial.” Civ. Doc. 3 at 17. He also maintains that Ivey would have testified

to the location of the officers and to the alleged “odor” of marijuana. Id. But
“speculation that the missing witnesses would have been helpful” “is
‘insufficient to carry the burden of a habeas corpus petitioner.’” Johnson v.
Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Aldrich v.

Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630, 636 (11th Cir. 1985)). Because Petitioner’s “self-
serving speculation” that Officer Ivey’s testimony would have been favorable
“will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim,” Ashimi, 932 F.2d at 650,
Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s failure to call him was deficient or

prejudicial under Strickland.
Indeed, during Petitioner’s suppression hearing, the government
presented testimony from Officers Lugo and Ardizzoni who both testified to the
location of each officer and the “odor” of marijuana. According to Lugo and

Ardizzoni, when they approached Petitioner’s vehicle during the traffic stop,
they smelled marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. Crim. Doc. 29 at 20-21,
22. Both officers had experience with the odor of marijuana, and Officer Lugo
testified that he advised Officer Ivey about the smell. Id. at 64-65. Officer Lugo

explained that it was the strong odor of marijuana that gave them probable
cause to search the vehicle and Ivey conducted the search of the vehicle because
the other two officers needed his assistance. Id. at 64-65. Indeed, Officer Ivey
conducted the search while Officer Ardizzoni was tasked with monitoring
Petitioner and Officer Lugo was running Petitioner’s license. Id. at 29-30. Both

officers stayed within close proximity of Ivey as he conducted the search, and
throughout the search Ivey communicated with them and immediately advised
Lugo and Ardizzoni when he discovered the firearm. Id. at 33-35, 94. Since it
was the smell of marijuana that provided Officers Lugo and Ardizzoni with the

probable cause to search, testimony from Officer Ivey about finding the firearm
during that search would be irrelevant to the motion to suppress. As such, the
Court finds that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to call Officer Ivey as
a witness during the suppression hearing and Ground Five is denied.

Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Petitioner’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. 1) is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED with

prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending
motions, and close this file.
3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate of

appealability (COA). Because this Court has determined that a COA is not
warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any
motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such
termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.!!
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 5th day of March
2026.

& Cimotbeg g. Corrig on
Wy. TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
Senior United States District Judge

Jax-7
C: Jerome Curtis Stancil, #70340-018
Counsel of record

11 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if Petitioner makes
“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36
(2003) (quoting Barefoot _v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after
consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
24

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356682. Public record. Not legal advice.