# DiStefano

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356592

## Case

- **Full name:** William D. Jr. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM D. Jr., : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff :
v. :
:
FRANK BISIGNANO, :
Commissioner of the Social Security :
Administration, :
Defendant : NO. 25-5563

MEMORANDUM

CAROL SANDRA MOORE WELLS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE March 23, 2026

William D. Jr. (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the Commissioner”),
denying his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security
Act. Plaintiff has filed a brief in support of his request for review, and the Commissioner has
responded to it. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s request for review is denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging that his disability commenced on
August 4, 2020. R. 17. His claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. Hence, he
requested an administrative hearing. Id. On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff appeared for a video
hearing, before Regina L. Warren, Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”); Plaintiff, represented
by an attorney and vocational expert Tricia Muth, (“the VE”), testified at the hearing. R. 43-68.
On February 14, 2025, the ALJ, using the sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) for disability,2

1 The court has reviewed and considered the following documents in analyzing this case: Plaintiff’s Brief and
Statement of Issues in Support of Request for Review (“Pl. Br.”), the Defendant’s Response to Request for Review
of Plaintiff (“Resp.”), Plaintiff’s Reply Brief (“Reply”), and the administrative record. (“R.”).
2 The Social Security Regulations provide the following five-step sequential evaluation for determining whether an
adult claimant is disabled:
issued an unfavorable decision. R. 17-30. Plaintiff presently seeks judicial review; the parties
have consented to this court’s jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Personal History

Plaintiff worked as a chef for many years. He testified that his hand problems have made
it impossible for him to continue in that profession. R. 60.
B. Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the January 21, 2025 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified about his limitations,
which primarily involve both hands.3 R. 43-61. His Dupuytren’s contractures have worsened over
the years, preventing him from working. R. 43, 60. Plaintiff has undergone surgery on both hands,
his left first; he is right-handed. R. 47-48. Despite surgery, Plaintiff can no longer grip with his
dominant hand. R. 53. Repetitive hand motion causes pain and locking of his fingers bilaterally.
R. 59. On a good day, Plaintiff’s hand pain is three out of ten; on a bad day, it is eight to nine out
of ten. R. 56. He stated that he has no problems with sustained standing, walking or sitting. R.

1. If the claimant is working, doing substantial gainful activity, a finding of not
disabled is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 2. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

2. If the claimant is found not to have a severe impairment which significantly
limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activity, a finding of not
disabled is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 3. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

3. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals criteria for a listed impairment or
impairments in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of 20 C.F.R., a finding of
disabled is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 4. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

4. If the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant
work, a finding of not disabled is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 5. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

5. The Commissioner will determine whether, given the claimant’s residual
functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience in conjunction with
criteria listed in Appendix 2, she is or is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(g).
3 The ALJ did not ask Plaintiff to limit his testimony to his condition as of his date last insured.
51-52.
C. Vocational Testimony
The VE characterized Plaintiff’s past chef job as skilled4 work typically performed at the
light level5 but performed by him at the medium6 level. R. 64. The ALJ asked the VE to consider

a person having Plaintiff’s age, education and work experience, capable of light work, with the
following restrictions: able to stand and walk for 6 hours, sit for 6 hours; able to frequently push
and pull with the bilateral upper and lower extremities; capable of frequent overhead reaching,
grasping, fine fingering, and feeling with the bilateral upper extremities; capable of occasional
crawling; incapable of climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and needing to avoid exposure to cold,
vibration, unprotected heights, and hazards. R. 64-65. The VE responded that this individual
could perform Plaintiff’s past work, as is typically performed. R. 65. The VE also identified other
jobs this person could perform. R. 65. The ALJ then asked the VE to consider the same individual
with the following distinct limitations: unable to push and pull with the upper extremities;
frequently able to push and pull with the lower extremities; occasionally able to use the upper

extremities for reaching in all directions, including overhead and for grasping, fine fingering and
feeling. R. 66. The VE opined that this person could not perform Plaintiff’s past work or any
other work. R. 66.
III. THE ALJ’s FINDINGS
In his decision, the ALJ issued the following findings:
1. [Plaintiff] last met the insured status requirements of the

4 “Skilled work requires qualifications in which a person uses judgment to determine the machine and manual
operations to be performed in order to obtain the proper form, quality, or quantity of material to be produced. …
Other skilled jobs may require dealing with people, facts, or figures or abstract ideas at a high level of complexity.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(c).
5 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
6 “Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).
Social Security Act on March 31, 2023.

2. [Plaintiff] did not engage in substantial gainful activity
during the period from his alleged onset date of August 4,
2020 though his date last insured of March 31, 2023 (20 CFR
404.1571 et seq.).

3. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] has Dupuytren’s
contractures and Peyronie’s disease as severe impairments
(20 CFR 404.1520(c)).

4. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20
CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526)

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that,
through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] had the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) except: can stand and walk 6 hours; sit 6
hours; frequent pushing and pulling with the bilateral upper
and lower extremities; frequent overhead reaching, grasping,
fine fingering, and feeling with the bilateral upper
extremities; occasional crawling; no climbing ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds; and avoiding exposure to cold, vibration,
unprotected heights, and hazards.

6. Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] was capable of
generally performing past relevant work as a chef. This
work did not require the performance of work-related
activities precluded by [his] residual functional capacity (20
CFR 404.1565).

7. [Plaintiff] was not under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, at any time from August 4, 2020, the alleged
onset date, through March 31, 2023, the date last insured (20
CFR 404.1520(f)).

R. 19-20, 25-26.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is as follows. The Commissioner’s
findings of fact will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Poulos v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is not “a large or considerable amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation
omitted). While it is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103
(2019), it may amount to less than an evidentiary preponderance. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d
34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988). Overall, this test is
deferential to the ALJ, and the court should affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, even when the court, acting de novo, might have reached a different
conclusion. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987). Indeed, the court is not permitted to weigh the record evidence itself.
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). By contrast, the Commissioner’s legal
conclusions are subject to de novo review. Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91; Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431.

B. Burden of Proof in Disability Proceedings
To be found “disabled” under the Act, Plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
demonstrating that he is unable to engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1505(a). Plaintiff may establish a disability through: (1) medical evidence meeting one or
more of the serious impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; or (2)
proof that the impairment is severe enough that Plaintiff cannot engage in any type of “substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460
(1983); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Under the first method, Plaintiff is considered per se disabled by meeting one of the “listed”
impairments. Heckler, 461 U.S. at 460. Under the second method, Plaintiff must initially
demonstrate that a medically determinable impairment prevents him from returning to his past

employment. See Brown, 845 F.2d at 1214. If Plaintiff proves that his impairment results in
functional limitations to performing his past relevant work, then the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner to prove that work does in fact exist in the national economy which Plaintiff can
perform given his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. See Hess v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2019); Poulos, 474 F.3d at 92.
C. Review of the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could
perform his past relevant work, and, hence, was not disabled. R. 17-27. Plaintiff disputes the
ALJ’s decision, arguing that the ALJ: (1) failed to reasonably assess the opinions of his treating
surgeon, Dr. A. Lee Osterman; and (2) failed to allow Plaintiff to file a post-hearing brief

concerning the application of Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 24-3p. Pl. Br. at 5-7. The
Commissioner denies Plaintiff’s arguments. Resp. at 1-9. The court finds that Plaintiff’s
arguments lack merit.
1. Dr. Osterman
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ could not assess the opinions of Dr. Osterman and that, when
doing so, the ALJ erred. Pl. Br. at 5-7. This assertion lacks merit.
First, an ALJ is required to evaluate medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Hence,
the ALJ was entitled to assess the persuasiveness of any medical opinion in the record when she
evaluated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
Next, Plaintiff fails to cite any of Dr. Osterman’s specific opinions or identify where in the
record they could be found. This court has no duty to search through the record for Plaintiff, who
is represented by an attorney.
Finally, the ALJ was allowed to accept the opinions of Drs. Linda Myers and Edith Hooper,

because he applied the governing regulations, which Plaintiff fails to cite, and found the doctors’
opinions persuasive. R. 25. That is, she found them persuasive, because these doctors’ opinions
were supported and consistent with other evidence in the record. Id. The regulations require this
approach. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). In short, there is no basis to find ALJ error.
2. Post-Hearing Briefing Concerning SSR 24-3p
Next, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred because she refused his request to file a post-
hearing brief to address possible erosion of the job base the VE identified at the hearing; he further
asserts that SSR 24-3p indicates that the ALJ should have allowed this request. Pl. Br. at 7. This
unsupported argument lacks merit.7
SSR 24-3p rescinds and replaces SSR 00-4p and addresses how a VE can provide evidence

concerning the number of available jobs. One aspect of the new ruling is eliminating SSR 00-4p’s
requirement that a VE’s testimony be consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”). SSR 24-3p, 2024 WL 5256890, *2. The new ruling also explains that VEs are in the
best position to decide what sources to use to estimate the number of available jobs. Id. at *4. If
the sources a VE uses describe jobs in a manner different from the DOT, or other traditional
sources, the VE is expected to inform the ALJ of the discrepancy. Id. As pertinent herein, the
ruling also states that, when a claimant is represented at the hearing, it is expected that the
representative will pose appropriate questions at the hearing to assist the ALJ. Id. The ruling

7 Plaintiff cites no case law to support his assertion that the ALJ had a duty to allow him to file a post-hearing brief.
See Pl. Br. at 7.
makes no mention of post-hearing briefing. Id.
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the hearing. After the VE completed her
testimony, Plaintiff’s attorney requested the opportunity to file a post-hearing brief to challenge
the VE’s testimony about the number of jobs available in response to the first hypothetical

question. R. 69. Instead, the ALJ suggested that Plaintiff question the VE to challenge the number
of jobs. R. 69. After considering that option, Plaintiff’s attorney declined to pose additional
questions. R. 70.
SSR 24-3p places no requirement on the ALJ to allow a claimant to file a post-hearing brief
in order to challenge the VE’s testimony about the number of available jobs. Instead, the ruling
states the expectation that a claimant’s representative will develop such testimony at the hearing
by questioning the VE. SSR 24-3p, 2024 WL 5256890, *4. The ALJ provided Plaintiff’s attorney
with this opportunity at the hearing, R. 69, and Plaintiff’s attorney declined. R. 70. Inasmuch as
the ALJ complied with the plain text of SSR 24-3p, there is no basis to find error.
Implementing and judgment orders follow.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356592. Public record. Not legal advice.