# Farrell

> District Court, N.D. New York · June 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356412

## Case

- **Full name:** Brigid "Bridie" Farrell v. The United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee, a Business Entity of Form Unknown; US Speedskating, a Business Entity of Form Unknown; The Saratoga Winter Club, a Business Entity of Form Unknown; and Andrew "Andy" Gabel, an individual
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________

BRIGID "BRIDIE" FARRELL,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:20-CV-1178
(FJS/PJE)
THE UNITED STATES OLYMPIC &
PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, a Business
Entity of Form Unknown; US SPEEDSKATING,
a Business Entity of Form Unknown; THE
SARATOGA WINTER CLUB, a Business
Entity of Form Unknown; and ANDREW
"ANDY" GABEL, an individual,

Defendants.
______________________________________________

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

BARNES & THORNBURG LLP AMY E. TRYON, ESQ.
222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1200 CHARLES G. LA BELLA, ESQ.
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 JAMES F. MURDICA, ESQ.
-and- JOSEPH G. EATON, ESQ.
655 West Broadway, Suite 1300 MICHAEL A. BATTLE, ESQ.
San Diego, California 92101 MICHELLE BRADFORD, ESQ.
-and-
390 Madison Avenue, Suite 12th Floor
New York, New York 10017-2509
-and-
11 South Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
-and-
555 12th Street, N.W., Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MOJDEHI GALVIN REGO LLP ANDREW J. GALVIN, ESQ.
2550 Fifth Avenue, Suite 910
San Diego, California 92103
Attorneys for Plaintiff
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP LINDSEY C. BARNHART, ESQ.
3000 El Camino Real SARA J. DENNIS, ESQ.
5 Palo Alto Square
Palo Alto, California 94306
-and-
30 Hudson Yards
New York, New York 10001
Attorneys for Defendant The
United States Olympic &
Paralympic Committee

LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD L. JACOBS KATLIN FREEMAN, ESQ.
31111 Agoura Road, Suite 225 HOWARD JACOBS, ESQ.”
Westlake Village, California 91361
Attorneys for Defendant US Speedskating

COFFEY LAW PLLC DANIEL W. COFFEY, ESQ.
17 Elk Street
Albany, New York 12207
Attorneys for Defendant US Speedskating

MCGIVNEY KLUGER CLARK & MEAGAN E. DEAN, ESQ.
INTOCCIA, P.C.
100 Madison Street, Suite 1640
Syracuse, New York 13202
Attorneys for Defendant The
Saratoga Winter Club

AIDALA BERTUNA & KAMINS PC IMRAN H. ANSARI, ESQ.
546 Fifth Avene, Suite 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036
Attorneys for Defendant Andrew
"Andy" Gabel

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on July 30, 2020, see Dkt. No. 2, Complaint,
seeking compensatory damages and punitive damages pursuant to the Child Victims Act. See id.
at ¶ 5 (citing 22 NYCRR 202.72) (other citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gabel
groomed and sexually abused her from June 1997 to January 1998. See id. at ¶ 6. As a result of
that alleged abuse, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) negligence against
Defendants United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee ("USOPC"), U.S. Speedskating
("USS"), and The Saratoga Winter Club ("SWC"), see id. at ¶¶ 90-101; (2) assault and battery

against Defendant Gabel, see id. at ¶¶ 102-107; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress
against all Defendants, see id. at ¶¶ 108-112; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress
against all Defendants. See id. at ¶¶ 113-117.
Pending before the Court is Defendant USOPC's motion to exclude the expert testimony
of Dr. Paul Ballas pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Dkt. No. 248.
Plaintiff opposes this motion. See Dkt. No. 311. Defendant USOPC also filed a related motion
to strike paragraphs 7-25 of Dr. Ballas's Declaration, see Dkt. No. 311-3, which Plaintiff included
in the papers she filed in opposition to Defendant USOPC's motion to exclude Dr. Ballas's expert
testimony, see Dkt. No. 325-2. Plaintiff opposes this motion and requests that the Court strike
the motion. See Dkt. No. 336-1.

II. DISCUSSION1
A. Defendant USOPC's motion to exclude parts of Dr. Paul Ballas's expert testimony2
1. Defendant USOPC's position
Defendant USOPC argues that the Court should exclude three of the opinions Dr. Ballas
offers. See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's Memorandum of Law, at 7 (citing Amorgianos

1 References to page numbers of documents in the record are to the page numbers that the Court's
Electronic Case Filing system generates, which are located in the top right corner of those pages.

2 Defendants USS, SWC, and Andrew Gabel join in Defendant USOPC's motion. See Dkt. No.
248, Notice of Motion, at 3.
v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir. 2002)). Defendant USOPC takes issue
with Dr. Ballas's opinions that Plaintiff developed psychiatric symptoms because of Defendant
Gabel's abuse, that Defendant Gabel's abuse impacted her employment capacity, and the cost of
Plaintiff's psychiatric treatment. See id. at 6-7. Defendant USOPC seeks to exclude these

portions of Dr. Ballas's testimony on the ground that Dr. Ballas applied unreliable methods in
reaching each of these conclusions. See generally id.
Specifically, Defendant USOPC requests that the Court exclude Dr. Ballas from testify
about the following:
(1) his causation opinions, namely, that "Ms. Farrell experienced
the onset of severe psychiatric symptoms following the sexual
abuse that occurred from 1997-1998" and that "Ms. Farrell
developed a depressive disorder in addition to PTSD as a
consequence of the serious trauma inflicted upon her by Andy
Gable [sic] from 1997-1998. . . ." See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant
USOPC's Memorandum of Law, at 29 (quoting Ex. 1 (Ballas Rpt.)
at 16).

(2) his vocational functioning opinions, namely, that "the sexual
and emotional abuse that occurred from 1997-1998 had an impact
on [P]laintiff's future ability to function in her employment
capacity. . . ." See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's
Memorandum of Law at 29 (quoting [Ex. 1 (Ballas Rpt.) at 16]).

(3) his opinions regarding Plaintiff's past and future medical costs
attributable to the alleged abuse. See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant
USOPC's Memorandum of Law at 29 (quoting [Ex. 1 (Ballas Rpt.)
at 16-17]).

2. Plaintiff's position
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Ballas reliably determined that she developed psychiatric
symptoms because of the alleged abuse she suffered as a teenager. See Dkt. No. 311-4, Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law, at 5. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ballas did so accurately, identifying this
abuse as the "index" event and ruling out other potential causes of her trauma and concluding
that these symptoms clearly impact her relationships and vocational functioning. See id.
Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ballas is qualified to estimate future medical costs "based
on his . . . experience with medication management and evaluating treatment plans, including for
insurance companies, for patients with the same kind of psychiatric injuries and the resulting

costs and that his testimony is based on sufficient facts, thereby satisfying Rule 702 and Daubert.
See id. at 8.

3. Analysis
"Trial courts serve as gatekeepers for expert evidence and are responsible for 'ensuring
that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.'"
Goldstein v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 22-CV-6723 (AT) (RFT), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931,
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). "'The party seeking to
introduce the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the proffered testimony is admissible.'" Id. (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v.

Yorkville Advisors, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 3d 486, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 592)). "Although a district court has 'broad discretion to carry out this gatekeeping function,' .
. . 'exclusion remains the exception rather than the rule.'" Id. (quoting Navigators Ins. Co. v.
Goyard, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d 44, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); In re AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. COI
Litig., 595 F. Supp. 3d 196, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), on reconsideration in part, No. 16-CV-0740
(JMF), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135303, 2022 WL 3018104 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2022)).
"Rule 702 requires that 'expert testimony rest on knowledge, a term that connotes more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.'" Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931,
at *13 (quoting In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 531, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590)). "In assessing the admissibility of expert testimony under
Rule 702, courts consider three factors: '(1) the qualifications of the expert to testify as to a
particular matter, (2) the reliability of the methodology and underlying data employed by the
expert, and (3) the relevance of the expert's testimony (i.e., whether the expert's testimony as to a

particular matter will assist the trier of fact).'" Id. (quoting Bocoum v. Daimler Trucks N. Am.
LLC, No. 17-CV-7636 (JPC) (BCM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56020, 2022 WL 902465, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (quoting Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396-97 (2d Cir.
2005))).
The Court will address each of these factors in turn.
(i) Qualifications
"'To determine whether a witness qualifies as an expert, courts compare the area in which
the witness has superior knowledge, education, experience, or skill with the subject matter of the
proffered testimony.'" Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931, at *13 (quoting United States
v. Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 40 (2d Cir. 2004)). "'If an expert's training and experience are in a

field closely related to the subject matter of the proposed testimony, that showing may be
sufficient to meet Rule 702's qualification standards in appropriate circumstances.'" Id. at *13-
*14 (quoting In re M/V MSC Flaminia, No. 12-CV-8892 (KBF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119146,
2017 WL 3208598, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2017)).
There is no dispute that Dr. Ballas, a trained psychiatrist with Board Certifications in
Child, Adolescent, and Adult Psychiatry, is qualified to testify about causation. See Dkt.. No.
248-3, Ballas Report, at 3.
(ii) Relevance
"After concluding that a witness is qualified as an expert, a court then examines whether
'the expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.'"

Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931, at *14 (quoting Washington v. Kellwood Co., 105 F.
Supp. 3d 293, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597)). "Testimony will be
relevant if it 'assist[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.'"
United States v. Taylor, 18 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
There is no dispute that Dr. Ballas's causation testimony is relevant. See generally Dkt.
No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's Memorandum of Law.

(iii) Reliability
"'An expert opinion requires some explanation as to how the expert came to his
conclusion and what methodologies or evidence substantiate that conclusion.'" Goldstein, 2025

U.S. Dist LEXIS 188931, at *14 (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir.
2006)). "Expert opinions should be excluded when the flaw in the expert's reasoning or
methodology is 'large enough that the expert lacks good grounds for his or her conclusions.'" Id.
(quoting Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002)) (other
citation omitted). "Courts 'must focus on the principles and methodology employed by the
expert, without regard to the conclusions the expert has reached.'" Id. at 14-15 (quoting
Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266). However, "'conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct
from one another'; 'nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district
court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert,' and a court may exclude expert testimony if it determines that 'there is simply too great
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.'" Id. at 15 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997)).
"The flexible Daubert inquiry gives the district court the discretion needed to ensure that

the courtroom door remains closed to junk science while admitting reliable expert testimony that
will assist the trier of fact." Amorgianos v. Amtrak, 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002). "To
warrant admissibility, however, it is critical that an expert's analysis be reliable at every step."
Id. "[T]he Daubert 'requirement that the expert testify to scientific knowledge -- conclusions
supported by good grounds for each step in the analysis -- means that any step that renders the
analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the expert's testimony inadmissible.'" Id.
(quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)) (other citation
omitted).
"In deciding whether a step in an expert's analysis is unreliable, the district court should
undertake a rigorous examination of the facts on which the expert relies, the method by which

the expert draws an opinion from those facts, and how the expert applies the facts and methods to
the case at hand." Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 267. "A minor flaw in an expert's reasoning or a
slight modification of an otherwise reliable method will not render an expert's opinion per se
inadmissible." Id. "'The judge should only exclude the evidence if the flaw is large enough that
the expert lacks "good grounds" for his or her conclusions.'" Id. (quoting In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at
746) (other citation omitted). "This limitation on when evidence should be excluded accords
with the liberal admissibility standards of the federal rules and recognizes that our adversary
system provides the necessary tools for challenging reliable, albeit debatable, expert testimony."
Id. Accordingly, "'vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence.'" Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)) (other citation omitted).
Furthermore, "'[a]s the Second Circuit has noted, district courts should presume expert
evidence is reliable.'" Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931, at *15 (quoting UMG

Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, 531 F. Supp. 2d 453, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Borawick v. Shay,
68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995))). "'[D]oubts about whether an expert's testimony will be useful
should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility . . . .'" Id. (quoting In re Zyprexa, 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 285 (quoting United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 797 (2d Cir. 1992))).
"Although it establishes a 'gatekeeper' function for expert testimony, the Daubert test is
nonetheless 'a liberal' and 'permissive' standard of admissibility." Phelps v. CBS Corp., No. 17-
cv-8361 (AJN), 2020 US Dist. LEXIS 223300, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (quoting Nimely v.
City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2005)). Thus, "[e]xpert testimony should be
excluded only 'if it is speculative or conjectural or based on assumptions that are so unrealistic
and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison.'"

Id. (quoting Restivo, 846 F.3d at 577 (quoting Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore
Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2009))). "Absent this degree of unreliability, any 'other
contentions that the assumptions are unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the
testimony.'" Id. (quoting [Restivo, 846 F.3d at 577] (quoting Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor
Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996))).

(a) Causation opinion
Defendant USOPC argues that Dr. Ballas's causation opinion lacks a foundation and
proffers speculative opinions. See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's Memorandum of Law,
at 12 (quoting Vale v. United States, 673 F. App'x 114, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2016)). Defendant
USOPC also asserts that Dr. Ballas's testimony is unreliable because he failed to rule out
potential alternate causes of Plaintiff's mental injuries. See id. (quoting Munafo v. Metro Transp.
Auth., Nos. 98-CV-742 (ERK), 00-CV-0134 (ERK), 2003 WL 21799913, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

22, 2003)) (other citations omitted).
Defendant USOPC contends that, contrary to Dr. Ballas's claim, Plaintiff's lack of
documented functional impairment prior to the alleged abuse cannot be used to establish a
demarcation of psychiatric symptoms because there is a lack of impairment after the alleged
abuse as well. See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's Memorandum of Law, at 13.
Defendant USOPC claims that the psychiatric symptoms Dr. Ballas could identify manifested a
decade after the alleged abuse. See id. at 14 (citing Ex. 3 (Ballas Dep.) at 254:13-256:18,
270:04-272:02). Defendant USOPC argues that Dr. Ballas's pointing to Plaintiff's visits with her
high school counselor as evidence of mental distress is speculation because Dr. Ballas does not
know what was discussed at those meetings, and Plaintiff testified that she never discussed the

abuse with her counselor. See id. (citing Ex. 5 (Farrell Dep. Day 2) at 468:23-471:09).
Furthermore, Defendant USOPC contends that, because Dr. Ballas failed to rule out other
traumatic events as potential causes of Plaintiff's symptoms, his opinion should be excluded. See
Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's Memorandum of Law, at 16. Defendant USOPC argues
that, although Plaintiff was assaulted and raped closer in time to the onset of depression and
PTSD, Dr. Ballas failed to consider these instances in assessing the cause of Plaintiff's mental
injuries. See id. at 16-17. Defendant USOPC claims that Dr. Ballas also failed to consider other
significant stressors in Plaintiff's life such as potentially abusive behavior by her father, the
pressures of competing, and multiple physical injuries and surgeries. See id. at 17 (citing Ex. 5
(Farrell Dep. Vol. 2) at 365:19-367:19, 384:17-387:02, 388:22-389:19, 485:11-487:09).
In addition, Defendant USOPC contends that, although Dr. Ballas acknowledges in his
rebuttal report that these factors could have contributed to Plaintiff's symptomology, he

summarily concludes that Plaintiff's PTSD was not caused by these events. See id. (citing [Ex. 2
(Ballas Reb. Rpt.) at 13]). Defendant USOPC also argues that this conclusion is without merit
because Dr. Ballas cites only the treatment records of Dr. Maloutas and adopting the opinion of
another expert is not permissible. See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's Memorandum of
Law, at 17-18 (citing [Ex. 2 (Ballas Reb. Rpt.) at 13; Quiles v. Bradford-White Corp., No. 10-
CV-747, 2012 WL 1355262, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2012) (parenthetical omitted)) (other
citations omitted). Defendant USOPC therefore argues that, by failing to rule out alternative
causes, Dr. Ballas's opinion is speculative and unreliable. See id. at 19 (citing Tardif [v. City of
New York], 344 F. Supp. 3d [579,] 601 [S.D.N.Y. 2018)] (parenthetical omitted)) (other citations
omitted).

To the contrary, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ballas's causation opinion is reliable because he
considered the fact that, shortly after the alleged abuse, Plaintiff began attending therapy and
taking psychiatric medication, noting that she had not received either of these treatment methods
prior to the dates of the alleged abuse. See Dkt. No. 311-4, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at
13 (citing Dkt. 248-3, Ballas Rep. at 16; Dkt. 248-7, Deposition of Plaintiff Bridie Farrell Vol. 2
("Plaintiff Dep." Vol. 2), at 470:1-6; Dkt. 248-5, Ballas Dep. at 294:14-302:11). Plaintiff further
asserts that Dr. Ballas did consider alternative causes including other instances of sexual assault,
family history, and other stressors. See id. (citing Dkt. 248-3, Ballas Rep. at 3,7; Dkt. 248-5,
Ballas Dep. at 289:4-7; 292:6-12; 363:16-365:4). Plaintiff contends that, after considering
potential alternative causes of her symptoms, Dr. Ballas concluded that Defendant Gabel's abuse
was the index event, meaning that it played more of a role in causing her symptoms and
increased her chances of being victimized again in the future. See id. at 13-14 (citing Dkt. 248-5,
Ballas Dep. at 368:16-369:21, Dkt. 248-4, Ballas Rebuttal at 11-12).

Plaintiff further argues that, although Defendant USOPC claims that Dr. Ballas has no
basis to opine on causation, Dr. Ballas considered the dates when she began to attend therapy and
was prescribed medication to support his opinion that the alleged abuse caused her psychiatric
symptoms. See Dkt. No. 311-4, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 14 (citing Dkt. 248-5, Ballas
Dep. at 254:17-20, 294:14-302:11). Plaintiff contends that this conclusion is not "'so unrealistic
and contradictory as to suggest bad faith,' [and] therefore[,] 'contentions that the assumptions are
unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.'" See id. (quoting In re: Gen.
Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 2015 WL 9480448, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2015)). Plaintiff
adds that courts have admitted expert testimony where experts relied on the temporal connection
between an accident and an injury to establish causation. See id. (citing Figueroa v. Bos. Sci.

Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (collecting cases) (parenthetical omitted)).
Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Ballas did, in fact, consider alternative causes of her
psychiatric conditions. See Dkt. No. 311-4, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 18. Plaintiff
asserts that Dr. Ballas explained that alternative causes will typically follow the index incident.
See id. (quoting Dkt. 248-5, Ballas Dep. at 228:21-229:7). Plaintiff states that Dr. Ballas
concluded that the index event for her was Defendant Gable's sexual abuse, which caused her
psychological issues to form. See id. (citing Dkt. 248-5, Ballas Dep. at 368:16-369:21[;] Ballas
Decl., ¶ 12).
Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that, although Defendant USOPC complains that Dr. Ballas
did not ask about other traumatic events she experienced, he explained that doing so to a victim
of sexual abuse can be detrimental to their treatment and so he avoided doing so. See Dkt. No.
311-4, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 20 (quoting [Dkt. 248-5, Ballas Dep.] at 226:24-

227:14). Plaintiff notes that Dr. Ballas explained that it is not necessary to have "complete
information" on all traumatic events in order to diagnose PTSD or identify potential causes. See
id. (quoting [Dkt. 248-5, Ballas Dep.] at 227:22-228:2). Moreover, Plaintiff argues that Dr.
Ballas explained that, where someone is sexually abused as a child, they are more likely to be
abused again and that, therefore, this initial abuse led to the subsequent instances of abuse which
could have exacerbated Plaintiff's PTSD. See id. (citing [Dkt. 248-5, Ballas Dep.] at 274:3-
276:2).
Finally, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Ballas applied "proper methodology" by relying on Dr.
Maloutas's treatment records in "forming the basis of his opinion." See Dkt. No. 311-4,
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 23 (citing Qube Films Ltd. v. Padell, 2016 WL 888791, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016) (parenthetical omitted)). Plaintiff argues that consulting the records of
her treating psychiatrist demonstrates that Dr. Ballas relied on sufficient facts in reaching his
opinion. See id. (quoting [Qube Films Ltd. v. Padell, 2016 WL 888791, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
2016)]; citing Ballas Decl., ¶ 10). Finally, Plaintiff asserts that any critique Defendant USOPC
may have goes to the weight of Dr. Ballas's testimony, not its admissibility. See id. (citing Fed.
R. Evid. 702 Advisory Comm.'s Notes to 2023 Amendments).
In response to Plaintiff's arguments, Defendant USOPC argues that Dr. Ballas's "clear
demarcation" basis for his causation opinion is premised on speculation. See Dkt. No. 329-1,
Defendant USOPC's Reply, at 4 (quoting [Dkt. No. 248-3] Mot. Ex. 1 (Ballas Rpt.) at 16); (citing
Opp'n at 9-10 (reiterating that this was the basis for Dr. Ballas's causation opinion)). Defendant
USOPC contends that, although Plaintiff claims that Dr. Ballas's "clear demarcation" theory is
supported by the fact that she saw her high school counselor shortly after the alleged abuse in
1998, he does not know why she chose to do so. See Dkt. No. 329-1, Defendant USOPC's Reply,

at 5 (quoting [Dkt. No. 248-5] Mot. Ex. 3 (Ballas Dep.) at 273:02-06). Defendant USOPC
argues that Plaintiff could not remember what she and her counselor discussed but that they did
not discuss the alleged abuse and, therefore, there is no evidence that these visits pertained to the
alleged abuse. See id. (citing [Dkt. No. 248-7] Mot. Ex. 5 (Farrell Dep. Day 2) at 468:23-
471:09). Similarly, Defendant USOPC contends that Plaintiff's 2000 sertraline prescription does
not provide a basis for the clear demarcation theory because Dr. Ballas does not know why this
medication was prescribed." See id. (citing [Dkt. No. 248-5] Mot. Ex. 3 (Ballas Dep. at 245:5-
247:8, 326:11-327:4) (parenthetical omitted) (internal footnote omitted). Finally, Defendant
USOPC contends that Dr. Ballas's reliance on Plaintiff's contemporaneous diary entries does not
support his clear demarcation theory because he cannot point to any diary entry that displays a

change in symptoms around the time of the alleged abuse. See id. at 6 (citing [ECF 311,
Plaintiff's] Opp'n[,] at 11).
Furthermore, Defendant USOPC contends that, even if there were grounds to support Dr.
Ballas's clear demarcation theory, courts reject causation opinions that are based only on a
temporal connection. See Dkt. No. 329-1, Defendant USOPC's Reply, at 6 (citing [Dkt. No. 248-
3] Mot. Ex. 1 (Ballas Rpt.) at 16 (parenthetical omitted); Baker v. Anschustz Expl. Corp., 68 F.
Supp. 3d 368, 383 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (parenthetical omitted)) (other citation omitted) (footnote
omitted). Defendant USOPC contends that, although Plaintiff claims that Dr. Ballas was
working with significantly more information, he did not have any other information on Plaintiff's
symptoms until 2009, almost a decade after the alleged abuse and after Plaintiff had suffered
other instances of abuse in the interim. See id. at 7 (quoting [[Dkt. No. 248-3] Mot. Ex. 1 (Ballas
Rpt.)] at 2-14 and [Dkt. No. 248-4] Mot. Ex. 2 (Ballas Reb. Rpt.) at 4-11 (parenthetical
omitted)). Therefore, Defendant USOPC argues that Dr. Ballas could only point to symptoms

Plaintiff began to experience long after the alleged abuse in support of his position. See id.
(citing [Dkt. No. 248-1] Mot. at 8-9) (footnote omitted).
In addition, Defendant USOPC contends that Dr. Ballas's failure to rule out other
potential causes of Plaintiff's symptoms renders his opinion unreliable. See Dkt. No. 329-1,
Defendant USOPC's Reply, at 7. Defendant USOPC claims that Dr. Ballas did not follow up
with Plaintiff regarding other traumatic events because he had already decided that Defendant
Gabel's abuse was the primary cause of her symptoms. See id. (citing [Dkt. No. 248-5] Mot. Ex.
3 (Ballas Dep.) at 226:08-230:19). Defendant USOPC contends that Dr. Ballas also engaged in
circular logic in reasoning that the primary cause was the index event which was the most
important event. See id. (quoting [[Dkt. No. 248-5] Mot. Ex. 3 (Ballas Dep.)] at 228:15-232:02).

Defendant USOPC argues that Plaintiff cannot explain why Dr. Ballas ruled out the other
potential causes. See id. at 8. Defendant USOPC asserts that, unlike the expert in Lane v.
American Airlines, Dr. Ballas failed to explain how Defendant Gabel's alleged abuse contributed
to Plaintiff's mental health issues. See id. at 9 (citing [Lane v. American Airlines,] 2024 WL
1200074, *24 [(E.D.N.Y. 2024)]).
Finally, Defendant USOPC contends that Dr. Ballas's reliance on the report of Dr.
Maloutas does not cure his failure to rule out other potential causes. See Dkt. No. 329-1,
Defendant USOPC's Reply, at 9 (footnote omitted). Defendant USOPC argues that an expert
cannot rely on the causation testimony of a treating physician to overcome deficiencies in their
own causation opinions. See id. (quoting Quiles v. Bradford-White Corp., 2012 WL 1355262, at
*7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr 18, 2012); Mallozzi v. EcoSMART Techs., Inc., 2013 WL 2415677, at *13 n.8
(E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2013)) (footnote omitted).
Dr. Ballas opined that Plaintiff developed psychiatric symptoms because of Defendant

Gabel's alleged abuse. See Dkt. No. 248-3, Ballas Report, at 21-22. Dr. Ballas stated in his
report that, "[w]ith regard to trauma related disorders, there is a clear demarcation of psychiatric
symptoms before and after the inciting trauma, and this occurred with [Plaintiff]." See id. at 22.
Dr. Ballas explained that "Ms. Farrell had not experienced any documented functional
impairment prior to 1997, had no history of being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder or
experience[d] psychiatric symptoms severe enough to impact her functioning or access to
medical or educational support." See id. Dr. Ballas added that "[Plaintiff] first began receiving
mental health services starting in 1998, after the period of sexual abuse ended and [Defendant
Gabel] left Saratoga Springs, [Plaintiff's] hometown." See id. Dr. Ballas acknowledged that,
"[i]n people who develop psychiatric disorders it is often difficult to identify the proximate cause

of how the disorders develop." See id. However, Dr. Ballas maintained that "[i]t appears that
Ms. Farrell experienced the onset of severe psychiatric symptoms following the sexual abuse that
occurred from 1997-1998." See id.
By explaining that Plaintiff only began to experience psychiatric symptoms after
Defendant Gabel's alleged abuse, Dr. Ballas provided "some explanation as to how [he] came to
his conclusion and what methodologies or evidence substantiate that conclusion.'" Goldstein,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931, at *14 (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 127 (2d
Cir. 2006)). Defendant USOPC takes issue with this causation opinion, arguing that, "[g]iven the
lack of any evidence or data suggesting that Plaintiff's psychiatric symptoms developed
immediately after her alleged abuse by Defendant Gabel, Dr. Ballas's opinion that there was a
'clear demarcation of symptoms before and after the alleged abuse -- and thus that the alleged
abuse caused Mr. Farrell's psychiatric symptoms and conditions -- is speculative and should be
excluded." See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's Memorandum of Law, at 15 (citing Tardif

v. City of New York, 344 F. Supp. 3d 579, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (parenthetical omitted)) (other
citations omitted). However, the Court finds that, even if this was a flaw in Dr. Ballas's
reasoning or methodology, this flaw is not "'large enough that [Dr. Ballas] lacks good grounds for
his . . . conclusions.'" Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931, at *14 (quoting Amorgianos v.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002)) (other citation omitted).
Moreover, the Court concludes that Dr. Ballas's opinion that, because of a traumatic experience
as a child, Plaintiff later in life developed psychiatric conditions that did not exist prior to the
traumatic experience is not the type of testimony which "'is speculative or conjectural or based
on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in
essence an apples and oranges comparison.'" Phelps v. CBC Corp., No. 17-cv-8361 (AJN), 2020

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223300, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (quoting Restivo, 846 F.3d at 577
(quoting Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 214 (2d
Cir. 2009))).
Defendant USOPC also criticizes the reliability of Dr. Ballas's report by arguing that his
"failure to consider and rule out other likely causes of Plaintiff's alleged injuries constitutes an
independent and additional reason to exclude his causation opinions." See Dkt. No. 329-1,
Defendant USOPC's Reply, at 7. However, Dr. Ballas does acknowledge other traumas in his
report. See Dkt. No. 248-3, Ballas Report, at 14. Dr. Ballas explained that, although other
traumatic incidents have occurred, the abuse by Defendant Gabel was the first, making it the
"index event" in causing Plaintiff's trauma. See Dkt. No. 248-5, Ballas Deposition, at 228:15-
229:9. Moreover, Dr. Ballas is not required to eliminate every potential alternative cause of
Plaintiff's trauma for the Court to deem his report reliable. See Phelps, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
223300, at *9 (explaining that, when construing Daubert, courts should apply "'a liberal' and

"permissive' standard of admissibility" (citing Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395-96
(2d Cir. 2005))); see also Loiseau v. Bozzuto's Inc., No. 3:22-CV-01485 (JCH), 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 166830, *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2025) (explaining in the context of a regression analysis
that an expert's decision not to consider potential alternate explanations "impact[s] the probative
weight, not the admissibility, of expert evidence"). Defendant USOPC is welcome to attack Dr.
Ballas's report on cross-examination and raise potential alternative causes of Plaintiff's injuries.
See Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 267 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596) (other citation omitted).
The existence of potential other causes, however, goes to the weight of the testimony, not its
admissibility. See Phelps, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223300, *9 (quoting Restivo, 846 F.3d at 577
(quoting Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996))); see also Loiseau,

2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166830, at *6.
Finally, Defendant USOPC takes issue with the Ballas report to the extent that Dr. Ballas
relied on Dr. Maloutas's conclusions. See Dkt. No. 329-1, Defendant USOPC's Reply, at 9.
However, an expert's reliance on a plaintiff's treatment record will not bar this expert's testimony
from being admitted. See Betts v. Sixty Lower E. Side, LLC, No. 20 Civ. 4772 (NRB), 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 124176, *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2025). In fact, in Betts, the court found that the
expert's "review of plaintiff's medical records spanning approximately eight years, in conjunction
with his own evaluation is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 702(a)." Id. (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89 (the Federal Rules of Evidence take a "general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to opinion testimony [that] counsel in favor of admissibility") (quotations
and citations omitted)).
For all the above-stated reasons, the Court concludes that the methodology that Dr. Ballas
used to reach his conclusions about the cause of Plaintiff's psychological injuries is reasonable

and, therefore, the Court denies Defendant USOP's motion to exclude Dr. Ballas from testifying
as an expert regarding the cause of Plaintiff's injuries.

(b) Dr. Ballas's opinion regarding Plaintiff's vocational capacity
Dr. Ballas opines that Plaintiff's "ongoing symptoms are clearly affecting her
relationships and vocational functioning." See Dkt. No. 248-3, Ballas Report, at 22.
Furthermore, Dr. Ballas opines that, "[i]n [his] opinion, the sexual and emotional abuse that
occurred from 1997-1998 had an impact on [Plaintiff's] future ability to function in her
employment capacity, since her PTSD, anxiety, [and] depressive symptoms were directly related
to this abuse." See id. As it did with regard to Dr. Ballas's causation opinion, the Court finds that

this conclusion is not "'speculative or conjectural or based on assumptions that are unrealistic and
contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison.'"
Phelps, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223300, at *9 (quoting Restivo, 846 F.3d at 577 (quoting Zerega
Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2009))). Dr.
Ballas, a trained psychiatrist, opines that the severe psychological symptoms Plaintiff is
experiencing impacted her ability to function in her career. This application of Dr. Ballas's
training and experience does not contain a "flaw in [his expert] reasoning or methodology [that]
is 'large enough that [he] lacks good ground for his . . . conclusions.'" Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 188931, at *14 (quoting Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267
(2d Cir. 2002)) (other citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that Dr. Ballas's opinion
regarding Plaintiff's vocational capacity is reliable and, therefore, denies Defendant USOPC's
motion to exclude Dr. Ballas from testifying regarding this issue.

(c) Dr. Ballas's medical cost opinions
Defendant USOPC contends that, although Dr. Ballas purportedly calculated Plaintiff's
medical costs stemming from the alleged abuse, his methods for calculating those costs are
unreliable and should not be considered. See Dkt. No. 248-18, Defendant USOPC's
Memorandum of Law, at 24-25. With regard to past costs, Defendant USOPC argues that Dr.
Ballas's estimate is contradicted by the record and does not reflect the costs Plaintiff actually
incurred. See id. at 25. Regarding future costs, Defendant USOPC asserts that Dr. Ballas's
estimate is flawed because it assumes that Plaintiff will live and require treatment for 40 more
years. See id.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ballas's opinions regarding the costs of her

psychiatric treatment are reliable. See Dkt. No. 311-4, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 27.
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Ballas has experience in managing medication and has worked for
insurance companies to determine whether a certain medication is necessary and has also done so
for the purposes of litigation. See id. at 28 (citing Dkt. 248-5, Ballas Dep. at 27:16-20; 43:7-25;
47:24-48:19). In addition, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Ballas's experience also pertains to
individuals who have suffered from childhood sexual abuse. See id. (citing [Dkt. 248-5, Ballas
Dep.] at 70:21-72:10).
With regard to the issue of past medical costs, Dr. Ballas estimates that "the financial cost
of [Plaintiff's] therapy and psychiatric visits since 2014 was approximately $40,000." See Dkt.
No. 248-3, Ballas Report, at 23. An expert's testimony must "'both rest[] on a reliable foundation
and [be] relevant to the task at hand.'" Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931, at *14
(quoting Washington v. Kellwood Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 293, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597)). In this case, Dr. Ballas's estimate of past medical expenses is not

reliable. Plaintiff's past expenses stemming from the alleged abuse can be calculated with
specificity based on her actual treatment records. There is no need for an expert to estimate what
those costs were. Furthermore, Dr. Ballas's estimate of past treatment costs is unreliable because
it includes costs that Plaintiff never incurred because, during certain periods, she received no
treatment and, thus did not incur any costs. Therefore, the Court finds that Dr. Ballas may not
testify about Plaintiff's past medical costs because any such testimony would be neither reliable
nor necessary.
With regard to future medical expenses, Dr. Ballas opines that Plaintiff will require
mental health treatment "for at least an additional 40 years. . . ." See Dkt. No. 248-3, Ballas
Report, at 23. As noted, when determining whether to admit expert testimony, a court must

consider the qualifications of an expert to testify as to a particular matter. See Goldstein, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188931, at *13 (quoting Bocoum v. Daimer Trucks N. Am. LLC, No. 17-CV-
7636 (JPC) (BCM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56020, 2022 WL 902465, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
2022) (quoting Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2005))). In this case,
Dr. Ballas has not provided any information that suggests that he is qualified to testify about an
individual's life expectancy or that he has any actuarial experience. See generally Dkt. No. 248-
3, Ballas Report. Therefore, the Court finds that Dr. Ballas lacks the base level qualifications
that Rule 702 requires to opine on Plaintiff's life expectancy. See Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 188931, at *13 (quoting Bocoum v. Daimler Trucks N. Am. LLC, No. 17-CV-7636 (JPC)
(BCM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56020, 2022 WL 902465, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022)
(quoting Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2005))). Accordingly, the
Court finds that Dr. Ballas's life expectancy calculation is not reliable; and, therefore, the Court
precludes Dr. Ballas from testifying about his opinion as to Plaintiff's life expectancy. However,

he may testify, based on his training and experience as a trained psychiatrist and his interviews
with Plaintiff, that she will require further psychological care for much of the remainder of her
life. See Dkt. No. 248-3, Ballas Report, at 23.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Dr. Ballas is qualified to testify regarding his opinion
about Plaintiff's yearly medical costs. In this regard, Dr. Ballas states that, "[w]ith regards to
estimates of projections of future therapy, psychiatric visits, medication management, and
EMDR [(eye movement desensitization and reprocessing)] treatment[,] . . . going forward the
cost of Ms. Farrell's psychiatric disorders will be approximately $5[,]000/year for therapy and
psychiatric visits, medication management will cost approximately $269/year and at least one
full trial of EMDR will cost $2[,]000." See Dkt. No. 248-3, Ballas Report, at 23. This approach

does not contain a "flaw in the expert's reasoning or methodology [which] is 'large enough that
the expert lacks good grounds for his or her conclusions.'" Goldstein, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
188931, at *14 (quoting Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir.
2002)) (other citation omitted). For all these reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Ballas's estimate of
Plaintiff's yearly medical costs is reliable based on Dr. Ballas's experience as a treating
psychiatrist. Therefore, the Court finds that Dr. Ballas may testify as to his expert opinion
regarding the yearly costs of Plaintiff's medical needs and his opinion that she will require
further psychological care for much of the remainder of her life; however, he may not testify as
to his opinion regarding Plaintiff's life-expectancy.
The Court also finds that Dr. Ballas's opinion regarding Plaintiff's future medical cost is
relevant because it will assist the trier of fact in tabulating any damages to which the trier of fact
concludes Plaintiff is entitled.
Therefore, the Court grants Defendant USOPC's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr.

Ballas as it pertains to past medical costs and Plaintiff's life expectancy but denies that motion to
the extent it pertains to Dr. Ballas's opinion regarding Plaintiff's future yearly medical expenses
and that she will require further psychological care for much of the remainder of her life.

B. Defendant USOPC's motion to strike Dr. Ballas's May 30, 2024 Declaration
Defendant USOPC contends that the Declaration of Dr. Ballas that Plaintiff filed in
support of her opposition to its motion to exclude Dr. Ballas's testimony contains new opinions
asserted after the close of discovery and contains improper legal arguments. See Dkt. No. 325-2
at 4. Accordingly, Defendant USOPC argues that the Court should strike paragraphs 7-25 of that
Declaration. See id.

In response, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ballas does not assert new opinions nor does he
make improper legal arguments in his May 30, 2024 Declaration and that, therefore, the Court
should strike Defendant USOPC's motion to strike because it is nothing more than an improper
attempt to extend its page limitations pertaining to its motion to exclude Dr. Ballas's testimony.
See generally Dkt. No. 336-1.
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) . . . requires that an expert's report contain 'a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor . . . .'" Com. Data
Servers, Inc. v. IBM, 262 F. Supp. 2d 50, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). "It is essential that the expert's
opinions be known to the other party, so that they may properly prepare their opposition." Id.
"As a result, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) . . ., 'a party that without substantial justification fails
to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure is harmless,
permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not
so disclosed.'" Id. However, where a subsequent declaration is substantially similar to an initial

expert report, such a declaration is permitted to be considered at trial. See id.
"In determining whether supplemental evidence submitted after discovery deadlines
should be excluded, courts follow a set of guiding principles." Alan L. Frank Law Assocs., P.C.
v. OOO Rm Invest, No. 17-CV-1338 (NGG) (ARL), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90390, *13
(E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2021). "On one hand, courts 'must exclude' 'expert declarations filed in
response to a Daubert motion' when they 'expound[] a wholly new and complex approach
designed to fill a significant and logical gap in the first report.'" Id. (quoting Phoenix Light, 2019
WL 5957221, at *2). "On the other hand, 'courts may consider evidentiary details that a
declaration provides in support of opinions already expressed in the expert's report' when such
details 'merely amplify and provide more support for' the previously expressed opinions." Id.

(quoting [Phoenix Light, 2019 WL 5957221, at *2]).
"When a Daubert motion invokes concerns about the reliability and application of the
expert's methodology, declarations that are responsive to such concerns are generally seen as
supplying a permissible form of support." Alan L. Frank Law Assocs., P.C., 2021 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 90390, *13 (citing [Phoenix Light, 2019 WL 5957221, at *2]; Advanced Analytics, Inc. v.
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 301 F.R.D. 31, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). "'The key issue is whether the
expert's declaration is sufficiently within the scope of the initial expert report, so that an
opposing party is not sandbagged with new evidence.'" Id. at 13-14 (quoting Phoenix Light,
2019 WL 5957221, at *2).
Where a declaration "offers . . . opinions on an entirely different topic than the one
discussed in [the] Rule 26 report," this can be grounds to strike the declaration. Com. Data
Servers, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d at 61. However, even in such circumstances, "failure to comply
with Rule 26(a) does not always provide a basis for sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1)." Id. at 62.

"[T]he text of Rule 37(c)(1) provides that the evidence should be precluded only if the party that
failed to disclose the information is 'without substantial justification' and if the failure is not
'harmless.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(c)(1)). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has
"considered imposition of sanctions under Rule 37 a 'drastic remedy' that should only be applied
'in those rare cases where a party's conduct represents flagrant bad faith and callous disregard' of
the Federal Rules." Id. (quoting Johnson Elec. N. Am. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 77 F. Supp.
2d 446, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Sterling v. Interlake Industries, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 579, 587
(E.D.N.Y. 1994)).
The Court has reviewed the information contained in Dr. Ballas's May 30, 2024
Declaration and finds that it is related to the initial Ballas report. For example, in this

declaration, Dr. Ballas reaffirms much of what he has already stated or is responding to
Defendant USOPC's criticisms of his report. See generally Dkt. No. 311-3. For example,
Defendant USOPC takes issue with Dr. Ballas connecting Defendant Gabel's alleged abuse with
Plaintiff's career path. See Dkt. No. 325-2 at 4. However, in his expert report, Dr. Ballas opines
that Defendant Gabel's abuse had an impact on Plaintiff's employment capacity. See Dkt. No.
248-3 at 22. Accordingly, reaffirming this belief in his declaration is "within the scope of [his]
initial expert report;" and he is not sandbagging Defendant USOPC by doing so. Furthermore,
other than USOPC's complaint regarding Plaintiff's career path, Defendant USOPC fails to
identify other specific portions of the Ballas Declaration that are outside the scope of Dr. Ballas's
initial report. See generally Dkt. No. 325-2.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Defendant USOPC's argument that Dr. Ballas is making
improper legal arguments in his May 30, 2024 Declaration is without merit. In all the paragraphs

that Defendant USOPC cites as alleging impermissible legal arguments, no such arguments are
made. See Dkt. No. 325-2 at 7-9. Rather, Dr. Ballas is permissibly responding to the criticisms
of his expert report that Defendant USOPC made in its motion to exclude those reports. See
Alan L. Frank Law Assocs., P.C. v. OOO Rm Invest, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90390, *13
(E.D.N.Y. 2021) ("When a Daubert motion invokes concerns about the reliability and application
of the expert's methodology, declarations that are responsive to such concerns are generally seen
as supplying a permissible form of support"). In fact, in several paragraphs of his May 30, 2024
Declaration, Dr. Ballas addresses a particular concern or criticism that Defendant USOPC raised.
In addition, the Second Circuit has made clear that there is a high standard to strike such
a declaration, deeming it a "drastic remedy." See Com. Data Servers, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d at 62

(citing Johnson Elec. N. Am. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); Sterling v. Interlake Industries, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 579, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)). In this case,
it does not appear that Plaintiff was acting in bad faith when she submitted Dr. Ballas's May 30,
2024 Declaration or attempting to impermissibly further additional legal arguments. See
generally Dkt. No. 311-3. Rather, most of that declaration responds to criticisms Defendant
USOPC raised. See generally id. This does not rise to the level of "flagrant bad faith and callous
disregard of the Federal Rules," which would merit striking the declaration. Com. Data Servers,
Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (citing Johnson Elec. N. Am. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 77 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Sterling v. Interlake Industries, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 579, 587
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal quotations omitted)).
For all of the above-stated reasons, the Court denies Defendant USOPC's motion to strike
Dr. Ballas's May 30, 2024 Declaration.

Finally, in addition to opposing Defendant USOPC's motion to strike Dr. Ballas's May 30,
2024 Declaration, Plaintiff also moves to strike Defendant USOPC's motion to strike that
Declaration on the ground that such motion impermissibly increased Defendant USOPC's page
limit with regard to its reply in support of its motion to exclude Dr. Ballas's testimony. See Dkt.
No. 336-1 at 10. The Court denies Plaintiff's motion finding that it borders on the frivolous.

III. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the entire file in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable
law, the Court hereby
ORDERS that, to the extent that Defendant USOPC's motion, see Dkt. No. 248, seeks to

exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Ballas with respect to (1) causation, (2) vocational capacity,
and (3) future yearly medical costs, the motion is DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that, to the extent that Defendant USOPC's motion, see Dkt. 248, seeks to
exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Ballas regarding (1) Plaintiff's past medical costs and (2) her
life expectancy, the motion is GRANTED. There is no need for an expert to testify about
Plaintiff's past medical costs and Dr. Ballas lacks any qualifications that would enable him to
calculate Plaintiff's life expectancy; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant USOPC's motion to strike Dr. Ballas' May 30, 2024
Declaration, see Dkt. No. 325-2, is DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant USOPC’s motion to strike Dr.
Ballas's May 30, 2024 Declaration, see Dkt. No. 336-1, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: ane 22, Ne York Freder& J Boultin Jr.
YTACUSE, NEW FOF Senior United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356412. Public record. Not legal advice.