# Sugiharto

> District Court, N.D. California · February 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356281

## Case

- **Full name:** Carolina S. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** February 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROLINA S., Case No. 25-cv-05105-RFL

Plaintiff,
ORDER REMANDING CASE
v.
Re: Dkt. No. 8
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

Plaintiff appeals from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, who
denied her application for disability insurance benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the case
is REMANDED.1
I. BACKGROUND
On September 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed an application for Title II disability insurance
benefits, alleging a disability onset date of May 25, 2015. (See AR 219.) The Commissioner
denied Plaintiff’s claim on December 9, 2019, and request for reconsideration of that denial on
May 4, 2020. (See AR 73-88, 90-106.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to reassess her claim. (See AR 125-26.) She appeared for an
in-person hearing before an ALJ on May 26, 2022. (See AR 34-72.) The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s
claim on August 29, 2022. (See AR 12-33.) Plaintiff subsequently requested that the Appeals
Council review the ALJ’s decision, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request. (See AR

1 The Administrative Record is available at Dkt. No. 5. All citations to page numbers in filings
on the docket, with the exception of citations to the Administrative Record, refer to ECF page
numbers.
1-6.) She then sought judicial review in this District. (See AR 2196-98.) Upon stipulation of
the parties, Judge Trina Thompson remanded the case for further administrative proceedings.
(See AR 2202-04.)
On remand, Plaintiff appeared for a video hearing before an ALJ on February 6, 2025.
(See AR 2159-73.) The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim on March 10, 2025. (See AR 2125-54.) He
found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the
cervical spine, the residual effects of a papillary thyroid carcinoma with bilateral lobectomy and
post-surgical hypothyroidism, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, asthma, a depressive
disorder, an anxiety disorder, a trauma-related disorder, and an attention-deficit disorder.” (See
AR 2131-33.) He also found that these impairments (both individually and in combination) do
not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R.
Section 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “Listings”). (See AR 2133-36.) He then found that
Plaintiff maintains a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform light work” but with
certain limitations. (See AR 2136-45.) Finally, he found that “there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] could have performed” during the
relevant period. (See AR 2145-46.) In light of these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
“was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time” during the
relevant period. (See AR 2146.)
Plaintiff now again seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The
parties have filed briefs pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions under 42
U.S.C. Section 405(g), and the dispute is ready for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. Supp. Soc. Sec. R. 5.
II. ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff presents the following issues for review:
1. Did the ALJ err in concluding that Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or medically equal
the requirements of any of the Listings?
2. Did the ALJ err in determining Plaintiff’s RFC?
3. Did the ALJ err in discounting certain medical opinions?
4. Assuming the ALJ committed error, should the case be remanded for: (1) further
administrative proceedings; or (2) with instructions to award benefits?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
District courts are authorized to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny disability
benefits, but “a federal court’s review of Social Security determinations is quite limited.”
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Federal courts “leave it to the ALJ to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony,
and resolve ambiguities in the record.” See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citation omitted). A
court’s limited role instead allows it to disturb an ALJ’s decision only if that decision is: (1) not
supported by substantial evidence; or (2) based on the application of improper legal standards.
See id.
Not Supported by Substantial Evidence. “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a
court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t]
evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations,” and this threshold “is not
high.” See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019) (citation omitted). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, and must be more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.”
Rounds v. Comm’r SSA, 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). A court “must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that
supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” See id. (citation
omitted). But where “the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [a
court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from
the record.” See id. (citation omitted).
Application of Improper Legal Standards. Even if an ALJ commits legal error, a court
will uphold the ALJ’s decision if the error is harmless. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. But
“[a] reviewing court may not make independent findings based on the evidence before the ALJ
to conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless” and is instead “constrained to review the reasons
the ALJ asserts.” See id. (citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Issue One: The ALJ Erred in Evaluating the Listings
At Step Three of the five-step process to evaluate a claim of disability, an ALJ evaluates
whether the claimant “ha[s] an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of” the Listings. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Here, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff met the requirements of
Listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.11, and 12.15, and he found that she did not. (See AR 2134.) Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she did not meet the requirements of Listings 12.04
(depressive, bipolar, and related disorders), 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders),
and 12.15 (trauma- and stressor-related disorders). To satisfy those requirements, Plaintiff must
meet either the: (1) Paragraph A and B criteria of those conditions; or (2) Paragraph A and C
criteria of those conditions. See Listings § 12.00(A)(2). The ALJ addressed only the Paragraph
B and C criteria and did not address the Paragraph A criteria. (See AR 2133-36.) This Order
concludes that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the Paragraph C criteria.2
1. Paragraph C
A claimant satisfies the requirements of Paragraph C if they can show a

medically documented history of the existence of the disorder [in question] over a
period of at least 2 years, and there is evidence of both: [1] Medical treatment,
mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s)
that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your mental
disorder; and [2] Marginal adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to adapt
to changes in your environment or to demands that are not already part of your
daily life.
See Listings §§ 12.04, 12.06, 12.15 (citations omitted). The ALJ did not address whether
Plaintiff had a medically documented history of the disorders in question over a period of at least
two years, and the Commissioner does not dispute Plaintiff’s position that she does. (See Dkt.

2 This Order does not address whether the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the Paragraph B criteria.
No. 8 at 7, 20.) The record also contains medically documented histories for at least two of
Plaintiff’s disorders over a sufficiently long period: (1) depression under Listing 12.04 (see AR
407, 846 (October 2016 and November 2019)); and (2) anxiety under Listing 12.06 (see AR 398,
846 (October 2017 and November 2019)). The analysis, therefore, turns on whether the ALJ
erred in concluding that Plaintiff did not meet either of the Paragraph C1 or C2 criteria with
respect to these disorders.
a. Paragraph C1
“The criterion in C1 is satisfied when the evidence shows that [a claimant relies], on an
ongoing basis, upon [1] medical treatment, [2] mental health therapy, [3] psychosocial
support(s), or [4] a highly structured setting(s), to diminish the symptoms and signs of [their]
mental disorder.” Listings § 12.00(G)(2)(b) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, evidence
of Plaintiff’s reliance on any of the four C1 categories of care to diminish the symptoms and
signs of her disorders will satisfy the Paragraph C1 requirement. The ALJ focused solely on a
purported lack of evidence of Plaintiff’s reliance on psychosocial support and highly structured
settings. (See AR 2135-36.) But the record contains evidence of Plaintiff’s continual reliance on
medical treatment through prescribed medication to treat her symptoms: (1) medication for
depression (see AR 405, 430 (February 2017 and September 2019)); and (2) medication for
anxiety (see AR 398, 845 (October 2017 and November 2019)). Thus, the Paragraph C1
requirement is met.
b. Paragraph C2
“The criterion in C2 is satisfied when the evidence shows that, despite [the claimant’s]
diminished symptoms and signs, [they] have achieved only marginal adjustment. ‘Marginal
adjustment’ means that [their] adaptation to the requirements of daily life is fragile; that is, [they]
have minimal capacity to adapt to changes in [their] environment or to demands that are not
already part of [their] daily life.” Listings § 12.00(G)(2)(c). The record contains ample support
for Plaintiff’s position that she severely struggled to adapt to changes in her environment or new
demands during the relevant period:
• In a February 2017 progress note, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Rudnick, recounted
that Plaintiff reported that she had a “low threshold for irritibility [sic]” and that Plaintiff
described an incident where she “screamed at her kids, . . . left the house for a hotel,
[and] made a suicidal statement [without an] intent/plan[,] [but she] later called [her]
husband and reconciled.” (See AR 405.)
• In a subsequent February 2017 progress note, Dr. Rudnick recounted that Plaintiff
reported that, despite improvement, she continued to experience “situational anger.” (See
AR 404.)
• In a March 2017 progress note, Dr. Rudnick recounted that Plaintiff reported that, despite
improvement, she continued to experience “outbursts.” (See AR 403.)
• In an October 2017 progress note, Dr. Rudnick recounted that Plaintiff “cite[d] [a]
tendency for reactive anxiety when unexpectedly required to multitask.” (See AR 398.)
• In November 2019 form, Plaintiff reported that she only leaves her home by herself if
there will be “no interaction[s] with stranger[s].” (See AR 305.)
• In the same form, Plaintiff reported that she does not spend time with anyone outside of
her family, that she has trouble “getting along” and socializing with others because of her
anxiety, and that when she does interact with others she is “always” with her husband.
(See AR 306-07.)
• In a November 2019 progress note, Dr. Rudnick recounted that Plaintiff’s husband
confirmed that her ability to function and tolerate “stress/distress and ability to multitask
have all worsened since identified trauma of daughter being born premature.” (See AR
845-46.)
• In an April 2021 progress note, a physician recounted that Plaintiff reported that she
“[f]eels like she gets annoyed or irritated easily.”3 (See AR 1841.)

3 Plaintiff’s date last insured is December 31, 2020. (See AR 254; see also AR 2129.) Evidence
after this date is relevant to the disability analysis. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028,
1033 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007).
• In a September 2021 progress note, Dr. Rudnick reported that Plaintiff “often
[experiences] difficulty coping/communicating.” (See AR 1668.)
• In a November 2021 progress note, Dr. Rudnick recounted that Plaintiff reported that she
“[l]ash[es] out less but [is] still easily frustrated/distracted.” (See AR 1659.)
The ALJ did not address this evidence and instead pointed to other evidence that, in his
view, supported the conclusion that Plaintiff’s “ability to adjust to stresses or environmental
changes . . . was not minimal or marginal [] such that it would satisfy the” Paragraph C2 criteria.
(See AR 2135-36.) First, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff traveled to Europe and Asia and on a
one-month road trip and “did not decompensate” or “report to providers upon her return from
travel any significant changes to mental function that she experienced while away.” (See AR
2135 (citing AR 399, 433, 464).) This ignores evidence of Plaintiff’s poor ability to function
while on her trips. Though she did describe herself as enjoying the road trip and trip to Asia and
said that her child “noticed that she became angry . . . without yelling” during the road trip, she
also described having had an “outburst” during the road trip. (See AR 399, 464.) She also
testified that she had panic attacks two or three times per week while in Europe because she was
“always try[ing] to stay away from other people.” (See AR 53-54 (Plaintiff’s testimony during
May 2022 hearing).) Also during her trip to Europe, she often wanted to stay behind and refused
to go anywhere with her family. (See AR 66-67 (Plaintiff’s husband’s testimony during May
2022 hearing).) Her husband also stated in a February 2025 declaration that on trips, Plaintiff is
often “not willing to participate,” isolates herself and stays behind, and is otherwise just being
“dragg[ed]” along. (See AR 2352.)
Second, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff remained “mentally stable” following her
husband’s 2016 surgery. (See AR 2135 (citing AR 407, 413).) The cited portions of the record
are progress notes from April and October 2016 and do not appear to support the ALJ’s position.
The April note recounts that Plaintiff reported “increased stress re having more responsibility at
home s/p husbadn’s [sic] leg surgery last week” and a “short fuse,” and otherwise observes that
Plaintiff was “tearful as [she] discussed [the] overwhelming factors of situation[s] today.” (See
AR 413.) The October note does not discuss the surgery and recounts that Plaintiff reported a
“recent conflict with husband” and that she was “tearful.” (See AR 407.)
Third, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff bought a one-way ticket to Indonesia after a fight
with her husband but decided not to go and “was able to process this in therapy.” (See AR 2135
(citing AR 449).) The ALJ does not explain how this incident supports the conclusion that
Plaintiff could successfully adapt to changes during the relevant period. If anything, it suggests
the opposite conclusion, as Plaintiff responded to a stressful situation by almost leaving the
country.
Fourth, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff did not decompensate after repeat thyroid
surgeries to treat cancer, and “[b]eing faced with cancer and making treatment decisions and then
being comfortable with the outcome is evidence of intact adaptive function and not a marginal
ability to adjust.” (See AR 2135-36 (citing AR 837).) Again, however, it is not clear how this
evidence demonstrates Plaintiff’s ability to adapt to changes. As Plaintiff notes in her brief,
“[b]eing convinced that having had cancerous cells removed was a good idea does not indicate
that [Plaintiff] is mentally stable.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 22.) Moreover, in the very same progress note
cited by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s treating physician observed that “[d]uring 24 hrs prior to procedure,
[Plaintiff] did have panic/depression/crying” and that Plaintiff “often [has] difficulty
coping/communicating and w/mental acuity, most recently in crisis surrounding acute medical
condition.” (See AR 837-38.)
Fifth, the ALJ explained that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff was able to focus
on exercises and breathing to manage her conditions. (See AR 2136 (citing AR 874).) But the
cited progress report merely notes that Plaintiff “[a]greed for now to focus on preventive
measures” regarding her various conditions and symptoms, including “brief but daily exercise
and/or breathing.” (See AR 874.) It says nothing about whether these practices were effective.
Thus, the ALJ both ignored relevant evidence and relied primarily on evidence that did
not actually support his conclusion. That was error. See Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877
(9th Cir. 2016) (ALJ may not “cherry pick” evidence (citing Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734 (7th
Cir. 2011))). Because the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff severely struggled to adapt to
changes in her environment or new demands during the relevant period, the Paragraph C2
requirement is met.
2. Paragraph A
Because Plaintiff satisfies the Paragraph C criteria, she must be found disabled at Step
Three if she also satisfies the Paragraph A criteria. “Paragraph A of each listing (except 12.05)
includes the medical criteria that must be present in [a claimant’s] medical evidence.” Listing §
12.00(A)(2)(a). The ALJ did not evaluate whether Plaintiff satisfies the Paragraph A criteria.
The ALJ must do so in the first instance on remand. See, e.g., Martinez v. Comm’r of SSA, No.
22-cv-00504-TUC, 2023 WL 5346033, at *6-7, *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2023) (where ALJ failed to
discuss evidence or make particular findings in evaluating Paragraph C criteria, remanding for
ALJ to evaluate Paragraph C criteria “in the first instance”).
Plaintiff presumes that the ALJ found that she satisfies the Paragraph A criteria, “as he
only considered whether the paragraph B or C criteria were met.” (See Dkt. No. 8 at 13.) That is
not a reasonable presumption. The ALJ considered the Paragraph B and C criteria and
concluded that Plaintiff did not satisfy either. That conclusion dispensed with the need to
consider the Paragraph A criteria, because failure to satisfy both the Paragraph B and C criteria
results in a claimant failing to meet the requirements of Listings 12.04 and 12.06.
B. Issue Three: The ALJ Erred in Evaluating Certain Medical Opinions
An ALJ evaluates medical evidence along five factors: (1) supportability; (2)
consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) “other factors.” See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (c). The two “most important factors” are supportability and
consistency, and while the regulations require an ALJ to expressly discuss these factors in their
decision, they do not require an ALJ to expressly discuss the remaining factors. See id. §
404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability concerns the relevance of “the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source [] to support his or her medical
opinion(s).” See id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency, in turn, concerns the consistency between a
medical opinion and “the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources.” See id.
§ 404.1520c(c)(2).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the opinions of Dr. Peterson,
Judith Frendo, and Dr. Rudnick. In analyzing the opinion of Dr. Peterson, the ALJ focused his
discussion on Dr. Peterson’s opinion that Plaintiff satisfies the Paragraph C criteria. (See AR
2143-44.) Because Plaintiff satisfies the Paragraph C criteria as discussed above, it is not
necessary to address whether the ALJ also erred in his review of Dr. Peterson’s opinions.
Accordingly, this Order addresses only the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinions of Frendo and Dr.
Rudnick.
1. Frendo
Frendo is a marriage and family therapist. (See AR 2141.) The ALJ focused on a July
2016 report in which she conducted a “mental status examination” of Plaintiff. (See AR 2141-42
(citing AR 374-385).) She opined, among other things, that Plaintiff maintained either a “fair” or
“poor” ability to engage in certain mental activities in light of her conditions. (See AR 384.)
The ALJ primarily discounted Frendo’s findings because she appeared to base her conclusions
on Plaintiff’s “own statements as opposed to [her] trained opinion.” (See AR 2141; see also id.
(“The remainder of Ms. Frendo’s form appears to parrot [Plaintiff’s] self-reporting.”).) That was
error.
“If a treating provider’s opinions are based to a large extent on an applicant’s self-reports
and not on clinical evidence, and the ALJ finds the applicant not credible, the ALJ may discount
the treating provider’s opinion. However, when an opinion is not more heavily based on a
patient’s self-reports than on clinical observations, there is no evidentiary basis for rejecting the
opinion.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, “the rule allowing an ALJ to reject opinions based on self-reports does not
apply in the same manner to opinions regarding mental illness.” See Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d
1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).
In light of these standards, the ALJ erred in several respects in discrediting Frendo’s
opinions. First, the ALJ does not identify a basis for concluding that Frendo’s findings were
“more heavily based on [Plaintiff’s] self-reports than on clinical observations.” Indeed, the
report reflects that, as of the date Frendo examined Plaintiff, she had been treating Plaintiff for
about 11 months, and the form expressly notes that it could “be used only when a prior
evaluation and chart notes are available.” (See AR 382; see also AR 2138 (ALJ explaining that
Plaintiff had been “seeing a therapist weekly” in 2016).) Presumably, then, Frendo relied on her
prior treatment of Plaintiff in preparing the report. A review of the report also confirms that
Frendo conducted a mental status examination that involved rendering clinical observations of
Plaintiff’s condition. (See AR 378, 382-83.) Second, the ALJ made no findings about Plaintiff’s
credibility, so he could not properly discount Frendo’s opinion based on her reliance on
Plaintiff’s own statements about her condition.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to discount the opinions of Frendo is not supported by
substantial evidence. Instead, the relevant factors indicate that her opinions are highly
persuasive. Her opinions are supported, as they are based on her prior treatment of Plaintiff, her
clinical observations, and her mental status examination. See, e.g., Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049 (“Dr.
Kenderdine also conducted a clinical interview and a mental status evaluation. These are
objective measures and cannot be discounted as a ‘self-report.’”). They are consistent with other
medical opinions in the record, particularly the opinions of Dr. Rudnick (discussed below). And
they are offered by a professional who specializes in therapy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(4).
2. Dr. Rudnick
Dr. Rudnick is Plaintiff’s treating physician. (See AR 2142.) The ALJ focused on two
reports that he issued. (See AR 2142-43 (citing AR 717-22, 1631-36).) The first report is from
November 2019, and there, Dr. Rudnick opined, among other things, that Plaintiff maintained
either a “good” or “fair” ability to engage in certain mental activities in light of her conditions.
(See AR 721.) The ALJ credited this portion of Dr. Rudnick’s opinion, but he did not credit the
opinion to the extent that it “assesse[d] any marked limitations.” (See AR 2142.) The second
report is from March 2021, and there, Dr. Rudnick opined that Plaintiff suffered from “marked”
or “moderate” impairments in various areas of mental functioning. (See AR 1632-34.) He also
opined that her condition would require her to take 15-minute breaks every two hours, that she
would likely “be absent from work as a result of [her] impairments” more than four days each
month, and that “even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in the environment
would be predicted to cause [Plaintiff] to decompensate.” (See AR 1634-35.) The ALJ rejected
these findings of marked or moderate limitations in the two opinions for various reasons, each of
which is unsupported by substantial evidence.
First, the ALJ explained that the opinions “lack[ed] support from any reference to
objective tests of function or to specific treatment notes.” (See AR 2143.) That is insufficient
here, where Dr. Rudnick had been treating Plaintiff for years by the time he issued his reports
and had been routinely documenting her condition in his progress notes. It is improper to
discount his opinion for lacking express citations to those notes, and in any event, Dr. Rudnick’s
documentation was in the record and was consistent with his November 2019 and March 2021
reports. (See, e.g., Section IV.A.1.b, supra (enumerating progress notes from Dr. Rudnick).)
After all, “a physician, unlike an ALJ, is not required to provide specific citation for each
opinion, particularly those supported by the record as a whole.” Sahlberg v. Comm’r of SSA, No.
15-cv-01815-PHX, 2017 WL 1130365, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2017) (citation omitted); see also
Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The primary function of medical records is to
promote communication and recordkeeping for health care personnel—not to provide evidence
for disability determinations. We therefore do not require that a medical condition be mentioned
in every report to conclude that a physician’s opinion is supported by the record.”).
Second, the ALJ explained that the March 2021 report was inconsistent with Dr.
Rudnick’s prior observations. He noted that in several reports from 2019 through 2022, Dr.
Rudnick had noted Plaintiff’s appropriate dress, cooperative attitude, good eye contact, and
organized thought process, among other similar benign findings. (See AR 2143.) But “[t]he
conditions of a medical appointment are not similar to those of a working environment,” so it is
not clear why Plaintiff’s presentation in such an innocuous setting should reflect on her mental
functioning in a work setting. Jacquelyn B.T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-cv-01126-TLF,
2022 WL 986286, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2022); see, e.g., A.L. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-02245-
VKD, 2021 WL 5771143, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2021) (accepting claimant’s position that
“[her] ability to maintain her personal hygiene or wear appropriate attire to a medical
appointment with a familiar and trusted doctor does not translate to an ability to respond
appropriately to supervisors in a work setting or to manage unexpected changes in
the work setting without serious worsening of her symptoms”). The conclusions of the March
2021 report are also not inconsistent with the conclusions of the November 2019 report. The
2019 report defines “fair” to mean “that the individual’s capacity to perform the activity is
impaired, but the degree/extent of the impairment needs to be further described.” (See AR 721.)
The 2021 report, in turn, defines a “moderate” limitation as one that is “moderate[,] . . . but the
individual is still able to function satisfactorily (off task 20% of the time),” and a “marked”
limitation as one that is “serious,” such that there “is substantial loss in the ability to effectively
function (off task 30% or more of the time).” (See AR 1632.) Under these definitions, a
finding of “fair” functioning in 2019 is not inconsistent with findings of “moderate” or “marked”
limitations in 2021.
Third, the ALJ explained that Dr. Rudnick’s opinions were not consistent “with the
opinions of doctors who reviewed the record.” (See AR 2143 (citing AR 82, 98).) Yet later in
his decision, he reached the opposite result: “The opinions [in question] are also grossly
consistent with the 2019 opinion of Dr. Rudnick if not his later opinion offered after these were
issued.” (See AR 2144-45.) In relevant part, these doctors opined that Plaintiff experienced a
“mild to moderate” severity of symptoms, “mild/mod” limitations based on her mental status
examination, a “mild/mod impaired” memory, and “mild/mod limitations” suggested by her
activities of daily living. (See AR 82, 98.) The ALJ rejected any findings of moderate
limitations “in interacting with others” based on Plaintiff’s “episodic” irritability, “normal
speech,” “intermittent eye contact,” and ability to travel to Europe and Asia. (See AR 2145.) As
discussed above, however, the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff severely struggled to interact
with others during the relevant period, her speech and eye contact during medical exams are of
limited relevance, and her performance during her Europe and Asia trips demonstrated a poor
ability to function when outside her usual environment.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to discount the opinions of Dr. Rudnick is not supported
by substantial evidence. Instead, the relevant factors indicate that his opinions are highly
persuasive. His opinions are supported, as Dr. Rudnick’s years of progress notes demonstrate
Plaintiff’s severe impairments. They are consistent with other medical opinions in the record, as
acknowledged by the ALJ. They are the product of a years-long relationship involving frequent
examinations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)(i)-(ii), (v). And they are offered by a doctor
who specializes in psychiatry. (See AR 2139 (ALJ identifying Dr. Rudnick as “treating
psychiatrist”).)
C. Remaining Issues
This Order does not reach Issue Two (the RFC determination) because the ALJ will need
to reassess Plaintiff’s RFC on remand. In previously evaluating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ
expressly considered his Step Three finding that Plaintiff did not meet the Paragraph C criteria.
(See AR 2143-44.) As discussed above, that Step Three finding was erroneous. Accordingly, a
revised evaluation on remand of Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety at Step Three will necessarily
implicate her RFC. Specifically, the ALJ will have to consider the impact on Plaintiff’s RFC of
her severe struggles to adapt, during the relevant period, to changes in her environment or new
demands. Remand will also involve further administrative proceedings and not an immediate
award of benefits (Issue Four) because further proceedings are required to determine whether
Plaintiff is disabled. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand to
award benefits is appropriate only where, among other things, “further administrative
proceedings would serve no useful purpose”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the case is REMANDED. On remand, the Commissioner
must expressly: (1) address whether Plaintiff satisfies the Paragraph A criteria of Listings 12.04
and 12.06 at Step Three; (2) if Plaintiffis not found disabled at Step Three, explain how
Plaintiff's severe struggles to adapt, during the relevant period, to changes in her environment or
new demands impacted her RFC; (3) credit as highly persuasive the opinions of Frendo and
Dr. Rudnick; and (4) address any other issues in the five-step process implicated by his revised
findings on remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 3, 2026

RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356281. Public record. Not legal advice.