# Brown

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · April 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356004

## Case

- **Full name:** Tramaine A. Brown v. Pine Bluff School District
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** April 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION

TRAMAINE A. BROWN PLAINTIFF

V. 4:24CV00467 JM

PINE BLUFF SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANT

ORDER

Plaintiff Tramaine A. Brown (“Brown”) a former teacher with the Pine Bluff School
District (“the district”) alleges that his rights were violated under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Specifically, Brown alleges that his termination was based on race in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., (“Title VII”). Brown also alleges that he
was subject to retaliation for having exercised his right of free speech under the United States
Constitution. Brown seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and for declaratory judgment.
The district has moved for summary judgment. (Docket # 18).
Brown, an African American male, was employed as a teacher by the district from 2021
until the 2023 school year. On Friday, August 18, 2023, an African American student (“minor
student”) in Brown’s classroom was using his cellphone and exclaimed to Brown, “yeah n***a,
we have already gone over this!” Brown made an office referral for the minor student for
disruptive behavior, excessive talking, rude and disrespectful behavior and violation of the
cellphone policy. Brown called the student’s mother that same day and reported the event. The
district claims that the student was issued a warning for the offense, but Brown does not believe
the student suffered any consequences for this incident. The student returned to Brown’s
classroom on Monday, August 21.
On August 31, 2023 the minor student and another student were talking about boxing,
began arguing and became loud and disruptive to the class. Brown intervened. While Brown
was walking back to his desk, the minor student jumped in front of him, with his hands up in a
boxing posture and stance, and asked Brown if he wanted to box. Brown stated that boxing has
weight classifications, and he (Brown) was too big for the minor student. The minor student then

said, “I’m not scared, let’s box.” Brown responded, “Boy, it’s not about being scared; I could
beat you up and eat you.” The minor student then said, “Come on. I fight adults. I’m not
scared.” Brown told the minor student to sit down, but the student kept insisting that they box.
Brown made several unsuccessful attempts to get minor student to sit down. Brown then
grabbed the minor student, picked him up, bear hugged him, and “pretended” to eat him by
“nibbling” on the minor student’s shirt. Thereafter, the bell rang, and the minor student left
Brown’s class.
That evening, the minor student’s mother called Brown and said that the student had a
bruise on his chest. Brown denies that he caused the bruise. The next day the minor student’s

mother came to the school and reported the incident between her son and Brown to the school
principal, Arnold Robertson, an African American. Principal Robertson asked Brown what had
occurred on the previous day, and Brown related his version of events. Brown contends that the
mother had informed Principal Robertson that the incident was “playful” and that she did not
want Brown to get in trouble. Principal Robertson stated that he would recommend a three (3)
day suspension for Brown beginning September 5, 2023.
On September 1, 2023, Principal Robertson sent a letter to Superintendent Jennifer
Barbaree advising her of the situation and recommending a three (3) day suspension for Brown.
Principal Robertson advised Brown that he would have to discuss the matter with Superintendent
Barbaree. Superintendent Barbaree is a Caucasian female who was appointed to be the
Superintendent of the district when it was placed under the control of the state. Late on
September 1, 2023, Principal Robertson informed Brown that he was being issued a reprimand
and was suspended for three days without pay for the incident. Brown served the suspension
September 4-7.

On September 4, 2023, Brown emailed Principal Robertson, Superintendent Barbaree as
well as Kelvin Gragg, Phillip Carlock, and Michael Anthony, all management officials with the
district. In the email Brown stated that he was taking full responsibility for his actions; that he
had had to endure multiple incidents with the minor student, who was unremorseful for his
behavior; that he did had not received sufficient support from the district with respect to the
minor student and that he was being punished for a situation that he did not initiate. Brown
returned to work on September 11, 2023.
The district claims that on September 12, 2023, the minor student’s mother contacted Dr.
Barbaree by email. The email contained photographs allegedly depicting the minor child’s chest

revealing a bruise. Brown denies that this email exists. As a result of the email, Dr. Barbaree,
who is a mandatory reporter, filed a hotline report to the Arkansas Child Abuse Hotline in
addition to an allegation of violation form with the Arkansas Department of Educational
Professional Licensure Standards Board. On the same day, Principal Robertson informed Brown
that he was being placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation into the minor
student incident.
In October, Brown became aware that the Arkansas Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) was conducting a child-maltreatment investigation into the incident between him and
the minor student. On November 18, 2023, Brown received a letter stating that a true finding
had been made against him for child maltreatment. On December 1, 2023, Brown received a
letter from Dr. Barbaree advising him that he needed to be at the next school board meeting
because she was going to recommend his termination from the district. On December 18, 2023,
the district conducted a hearing regarding Brown’s employment and the school board members
unanimously voted to terminate his employment contract. All of the board members that were a

part of the hearing were African American.
On February 21, 2024, Brown filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. On
March 29, 2024, DHS withdrew the true finding of abuse as unsubstantiated. The licensing
board placed Brown on probation for one year as a result of the ethics complaint.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so
that the dispute may be decided solely on legal grounds. Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874
(8th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The Supreme Court has established guidelines to assist trial

courts in determining whether this standard has been met:
The inquiry is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
a need for trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that summary judgment should be
invoked carefully so that no person will be improperly deprived of a trial of disputed factual
issues. Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 991 (1979). The Eighth Circuit set out the burden of the parties in connection with a
summary judgment motion in Counts v. M.K. Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1988):
[T]he burden on the moving party for summary judgment is only to
demonstrate, i.e.,”[to] point out to the District Court,” that the
record does not disclose a genuine dispute on a material fact. It is
enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the record does not
contain such an issue and to identify that part of the record which
bears out his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged,
and, if the record in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute
exists on any material fact, it is then the respondent’s burden to set
forth affirmative evidence, specific facts, showing that there is a
genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry that
burden, summary judgment should be granted.

Id. at 1339 (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-274 (8th
Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (brackets in original)). Only disputes over facts that may affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “There is no ‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of
summary judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to determine whether any case, including one
alleging discrimination, merits a trial.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th
Cir.2011) (en banc).
Discussion
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual “because of
such individual's race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). A plaintiff may defeat summary judgment
by either offering direct evidence or creating an inference of unlawful discrimination. Torgerson,
643 F.3d at 1044, applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973). Brown has
not identified any direct evidence of discrimination. Accordingly, the Court will consider the
case under the burden shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas. Under
McDonnell Douglas, Brown must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If he does, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. See Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n,
685 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir.2012). If the employer meets this burden, the “presumption of
discrimination disappears, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the proffered justification is
merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
A prima facie case of race discrimination requires that the plaintiff prove he “(1) is a
member of a protected group; (2) was meeting the legitimate expectations of the employer; (3)

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) suffered under circumstances permitting an
inference of discrimination.” Id.
Brown failed to present a prima facie case of race discrimination. He fails to present
sufficient probative evidence that demonstrates that he was meeting the legitimate expectation of
his employer or that he was terminated under circumstances permitting an inference of
discrimination. Further, even if Brown could be found to have presented a prima facie case he
cannot establish that the district’s articulated reason for his termination was pretext for unlawful
discrimination.
The district contends that it terminated Brown due to the incident involving the minor

student. Although Brown denies that he bit the student, it is undisputed that Brown engaged in
“playful” behavior with the student and that he “pretended to eat him” by “nibbling” at his shirt.
The student’s mother reported the incident to school personnel and relayed that Brown’s conduct
resulted in a bruise on the student’s chest. It is also undisputed that DHS investigated the
incident and issued a true finding of child maltreatment. Further, the Licensing Board placed
Brown on probation for one year as a result of the ethics complaint.
Brown denies that he bit the student and argues that the student participated in boxing
which could have been the cause of the bruise. Brown also complains that although the school
maintains video cameras in the hallways of the school, the district did not require the principal of
the school to retain a copy of any video that may exist. However, Brown’s unsupported self-
serving allegations are insufficient to support a finding in his favor. Brown has failed to
substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence as required to overcome summary
judgment. Smith v. International Paper, Co., 523 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2008).
Brown attempts to demonstrate circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination and pretext by pointing to alleged comparators who engaged in similar behavior
but were not terminated. Brown alleges that he was treated less favorably than Bill Gibbs, Gayla
Case and Rita Porter. “[T]he test for whether someone is sufficiently similarly situated, as to be
of use for comparison, is rigorous.” Beasley v. Warren Unilube, Inc., 933 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir.
2019). It is undisputed, however, that no other teacher engaged in behavior that resulted in a
finding of child maltreatment by DHS. Although that finding was reversed in March 2024, at the
time of his termination, in December 2023, the true finding was in force prohibiting Brown from
remaining employed. (ECF 37-1).
The critical inquiry in discrimination cases like this one is not whether the employee

actually engaged in the conduct for which he was terminated, but whether the employer in good
faith believed that the employee was guilty of the conduct justifying discharge. McCullough v.
Univ. of Arkansas for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 861–62 (8th Cir. 2009). The district has offered
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Brown’s termination and Brown has not offered
evidence demonstrating pretext. Wilking v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir.
1998)(To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to demonstrate both
“that the employer's articulated reason for the adverse employment action was false and that
discrimination was the real reason.”).
To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, Brown must show: “(1) that he
engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant took adverse action against
him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity; and (3) that
the adverse action was motivated in part by [the] exercise of his constitutional rights.”
Humphrey v. Fulk, No. 4:20CV001158 JM, 2021 WL 4200903, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 15,
2021)(citations omitted). A public employee's constitutional protections from employer
discipline based on the employee's speech are limited to statements the employee makes (1) as a
citizen (2) on matters of public concern. /d. Here, Brown’s September 4, 2023 email related to
the incident with the minor student were not protected by the First Amendment. The statements
were made as a teacher objecting to his suspension and voicing his objection with the support of
the district. No part of the email addressed matters of public concern.
For these reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.18) is
GRANTED. A separate judgment will be entered dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED 1* day of April, 2026.

United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11356004. Public record. Not legal advice.