# Oakley

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355994

## Case

- **Full name:** Dawn Oakley v. Polk County Board of County Commissioners
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

DAWN OAKLEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-120-VMC-NHA

POLK COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,

Defendant.
/

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Polk County Board of County Commissioners’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. # 30), filed on November 24, 2025, seeking
summary judgment on all claims in this Florida Civil Rights
Act (“FCRA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
case. Plaintiff Dawn Oakley responded on December 22, 2025.
(Doc. # 33). The County replied on January 12, 2026. (Doc. #
36). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
I. Background
A. Parties and County Policies
The Polk County Board of County Commissioners (“the
County”) is the governing body for Polk County, Florida. (Joe
Decl. at ¶ 2). Polk County Fire Rescue (“PCFR”) provides
countywide ambulance transport and fire rescue services to
the unincorporated parts of the county. (Id. at ¶ 3). PCFR
employees are trained and certified by the State of Florida
as firefighters, emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”), or
paramedics, or they can be dual certified as a
firefighter/paramedic or firefighter/EMT. (Id. at ¶ 4).
In 2003, PCFR hired Ms. Oakley, a white woman, to work
as an EMT. (Pl. Depo. at 12:4-8, 33:11-13). In 2018, Ms.

Oakley obtained her firefighter certification and became a
firefighter/EMT. She held this position in 2022. (Id. at
12:12-17, 14:24-25). Ms. Oakley was a member of the Polk
County Professional Firefighters, IAFF - Local 3531 (the
“Union”). (Id. at 14:3-9; Joe Decl. at ¶ 12). As such, she
was subject to the collective bargaining agreement between
the Union and the County, including its provisions about drug
testing. (Pl. Depo. at 71:1-12; Joe Decl. at ¶ 12, Ex. 3 at
4-5). Ms. Oakley was also subject to the County’s Employee
Handbook and required to comply with PCFR’s Code of Conduct.
(Pl. Depo. at 71:8-10, 95:15-21; Joe Decl. at ¶ 11).
B. Drug Testing

Florida classifies firefighters and EMTs as safety
sensitive positions and, as such, they are subject to drug
and alcohol testing procedures. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 5). The County
maintains a drug free workplace policy, which includes
procedures for conducting random drug testing of employees in
safety sensitive positions. (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 at 11). Thus,
employees in safety sensitive positions throughout the
County, including PCFR, are obligated to undergo random drug
testing. (Pl. Depo. at 118:5-11; Joe Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11, Ex.
1 at 11, Ex. 2 at 2-3). The drug free workplace guidelines
are designed to protect the County from employees’ use of

illegal drugs, abuse of prescription drugs or alcohol at any
time, as well as employees reporting for work or performing
work under the influence of a non-prescribed substance,
illegal drug, or alcohol. (Joe Decl. at ¶¶ 9, 11, Ex. 1 at 5,
Ex. 2 at 2-3). PCFR employees must “strictly adhere” to the
County’s drug free workplace policies. (Id. at ¶ 11, Ex. 2 at
2-3). Randomly selected employees must submit to a
breathalyzer test and provide a urine sample if selected for
a random drug test. (Id. at ¶ 13).
The County’s employee wellness center analyzes the
breathalyzer test, and an independent third-party testing

facility analyzes the urine sample. (Id. at ¶ 14). These tests
are reviewed by a licensed physician who serves as the Medical
Review Officer (“MRO”), and who applies federal regulations
established by the United States Department of Transportation
(“DOT”). (Id.; Berry Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4, 9).
On March 28, 2022, Ms. Oakley was selected to undergo a
random drug test. (Pl. Depo. at 55:23–56:21; Joe Decl. at ¶
18). Before she drove to Bartow where the test would be
administered, Ms. Oakley took two pills from her to-go pill
bottle that she believed were Tylenol to alleviate her back
pain. (Pl. Depo. at 55:21–57:2, 101:1-20). But Ms. Oakley
accidentally ingested her husband’s Vyvanse, which she

mistook for Tylenol. (Id. at 55:21–57:2, 58:6-8, 64:1-7,
75:9-18, 99:10-24, 101:1-20). The weekend before her drug
test, Ms. Oakley put one of her husband’s Vyvanse pills in
her to-go pill bottle in case they decided to spend the night
in Orlando after a concert. (Id. at 58:6–60:18). Ms. Oakley
had forgotten about her husband’s Vyvanse, failing to remove
it from her to-go bottle. (Id. at 62:2–63:11). Ms. Oakley
completed a breathalyzer test and provided a urine sample.
(Id. at 56:14-17, Ex. 1).
On May 3, 2022, Ms. Oakley received an e-mail from
Lashana Joe, the County’s Employee Relations Manager,

notifying her that she needed to speak with the MRO about her
drug test. (Id. at 96:19-24; Joe Decl. at ¶ 21). That same
day, Ms. Oakley spoke with a nurse from the MRO’s office.
(Pl. Depo. at 57:6–58:8). The nurse asked if Ms. Oakley had
a prescription for Vyvanse or Adderall because there may have
been a “false positive” for amphetamines. (Id.). Because Ms.
Oakley did not have a prescription for either drug, the nurse
advised her that the MRO would call her. (Id. at 98:4–99:9).
Ms. Oakley spoke with MRO, Dr. Bruce Berry, MD, later
that same day. (Id. at 99:6-24). Dr. Berry notified Ms. Oakley
that she tested positive for amphetamines, and that he would
send the results to the County. (Id. at 99:10-24). Ms. Oakley

notified Dr. Berry that she could have taken Sudafed, and she
may have mistakenly taken her husband’s Vyvanse on the day of
the test because she had confused it with Tylenol. (Id. at
99:10-24, 100:10-20).
Dr. Berry does not consider an individual’s mistaken
ingestion of a medication to be a basis to negate a drug test
result. Rather, it qualifies as a positive drug test. (Berry
Decl. at ¶ 12). DOT regulations do not authorize an MRO to
consider an individual’s explanations of a confirmed positive
drug test result. (Id. at ¶ 10-12). Pursuant to the DOT
regulations, an individual cannot claim that they mistakenly

or unknowingly ingested a drug to avoid confirmation of a
positive drug test. (Id.). When an individual tests positive
for a drug, Dr. Berry classifies accidental ingestion of
medication as a failed drug test. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12).
Ms. Oakley admitted to taking 70 milligrams of Vyvanse,
and, although she did not feel any effects from the
medication, she was still under its influence during her
shift. (Pl. Depo. at 55:21–58:8, 64:1-7, 83:23–84:2, 126:19–
128:7, 140:19–141:7). While Ms. Oakley was responsible for
knowing what medication she took, she asserted PCFR should
have provided her with a second chance to pass the drug test

because she made a mistake. (Id. at 82:13-20; Joe Decl. at ¶¶
27-28).
C. Termination
On May 6, 2022, Ms. Joe and Deputy Fire Chief, Richard
Parnell, met with Ms. Oakley and her Union representative to
notify Ms. Oakley that Dr. Berry confirmed her positive drug
test. (Pl. Depo. at 92:18–93:22; Joe Decl. at ¶ 25).
Ms. Joe notified Ms. Oakley that she would be terminated
from her employment with PCFR, pursuant to its drug testing
policies and procedures. (Pl. Depo. at 93:15–94:25; Joe Decl.
at ¶ 26). Ms. Joe also advised Ms. Oakley that she could file

a grievance through her Union or proceed through the employee
Appeals Council if she wanted to challenge her termination.
(Pl. Depo. at 29:16-25, 93:15–94:25; Joe Decl. at ¶ 30). Ms.
Oakley told Ms. Joe she mistakenly took the medication and
“begged for a retest.” (Pl. Depo. at 48:18-21, 93:23–94:12,
124:4-9).
During the meeting, Ms. Joe heard Ms. Oakley’s
explanation for the positive drug test; however, in
accordance with the DOT standards and regulations, the County
does not consider an individual’s accidental or mistaken
ingestion of another person’s prescription medication to be

a valid reason for overturning a positive test result or
authorizing a retest. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 29; Berry Decl. at ¶¶
10-12). Allowing an individual to retest on this basis defeats
the purpose of the drug free workplace program. (Joe Decl. at
¶ 29).
Ms. Oakley appealed the termination decision to the
Appeals Council. (Pl. Depo. at 93:24–94:25, Ex. 7 at 1). The
Appeals Council consists of four County employees appointed
by the County Manager. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 31, Ex. 6 at 1-2). The
Council hears employees’ appeals of disciplinary actions and
communicates its findings to the County Manager. (Id.).

Through the appeal, Ms. Oakley presented her case and
submitted a written statement explaining her positive drug
test. (Pl. Depo. at 107:8-10, 129:1-5, Ex. 6, Ex. 7).
Following the hearing, the Appeals Council upheld Ms.
Oakley’s termination, ending her employment with the County.
(Id. at 104:6-11, 107:16-22).
D. John Doe and Other County Employees
Ms. Oakley asserts the County discriminated against her
because she is a white female. (Id. at 33:8-13, 34:1-4, 43:1-
6). Ms. Oakley believes this because the County allowed John
Doe, an African American man and PCFR employee, to retake

his drug test after failing his first test. (Id. at 17:3-
14, 33:8–34:15, 43:13-19, 132:3–134:9). But Ms. Oakley was
not allowed to retake her drug test — a decision she
attributes to discrimination. (Id.). Ms. Oakley does not
allege the County discriminated against her in any other
way. (Id. at 53:6–54:4).
In April 2022, Mr. Doe was selected for a random drug
test. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 36). The County received notice that
he tested positive for amphetamines on June 2, 2022. Upon
receipt of this notice, the County’s Human Resources
department notified Mr. Doe of the results and its intent to

move forward with his termination. (Id. at ¶ 37).
The County allowed Mr. Doe to address the test results.
(Id. at ¶ 38). Mr. Doe presented a list of his prescribed
medications and asserted he did not ingest anything else
that could have resulted in the positive test. (Id.). He
explained the medication was part of a weight loss program.
(Id.). At no point during the meeting did Mr. Doe admit to
taking illegal drugs or prescription medication that was not
prescribed to him. (Id. at ¶ 39). Based upon the information
Mr. Doe provided, the County authorized a second drug test.
(Id. at ¶ 40). Mr. Doe passed his second test and was allowed
to remain employed by PCFR. (Id.).

Ms. Oakley does not have any direct knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding Mr. Doe’s drug testing or his
employment with PCFR. (Pl. Depo. at 19:24–20:4, 22:3-14,
23:1-9, 40:21–41:1, 131:15-18, 136:4-9). She testified that
she only heard that the County allowed Mr. Doe to retake an
initial failed drug test from unnamed individuals at PCFR.
(Id. at 133:15–135:10). Ms. Oakley assumes Kandis Baker-
Buford, the Director of Equity and Human Resources, approved
Mr. Doe’s retest because he is part of a “diversity program.”
(Id. at 18:2-7, 19:5-8, 27:3-7). Further, Ms. Oakley
believes Mr. Doe “has been put on a pedestal” and “he’s been

coddled,” being “basically [Ms.] Baker-Buford’s sidekick for
years.” (Id. at 66:23–67:11). Ms. Oakley believes the County
did not terminate Mr. Doe because he is an African American
male and was a member of the County’s diversity program.
(Id. at 17:3-14, 18:2-7, 27:3-7; 34:16-21, 41:1-19, 134:14-
21). Ms. Oakley does not know if the County terminated any
African American firefighter/EMTs or male employees in
general for failing a random drug test. (Id. at 39:24-40:12).
But she did admit that every case concerning discipline of
employees is different. (Id. at 66:7-22).
Polk County applies the MRO’s findings and conclusions
regarding a drug test pursuant to its corresponding policies

and procedures. (Joe Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16, Ex. 1). Specifically,
if the MRO reports a positive test result for an individual,
the County applies the disciplinary standards from its drug
free workplace policy. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-18, Ex. 1 at 14). In
doing so, it provides each employee an opportunity to explain
or contest the test results. (Id. at ¶ 16).
The County has consistently terminated firefighter/EMTs
and any other individuals in safety sensitive positions who
fail a drug test. (Id. at ¶ 33). It does not issue less
severe discipline following an unexcused, positive drug
test. (Id.). From January 2015 through December 2023, Polk

County either terminated or allowed resignation in lieu of
termination for 14 employees after positive random drug
tests. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, Ex. 7). Eight of these employees,
including Ms. Oakley, worked for PCFR. (Id. at ¶ 34). The
group included two African American males, one Hispanic
male, and one white male. (Id.). The fifth male did not
disclose his racial identity, so that remains unknown.
(Id.). In addition to Ms. Oakley, two white females have
also been terminated for positive drug tests. (Id.). Four
white males and two Hispanic males who worked in the County’s
other divisions also lost their jobs after positive drug
tests. (Id.).

E. Procedural History
Ms. Oakley initiated this action against the County in
January 2025. (Doc. # 1). In her complaint, Ms. Oakley asserts
the following claims: (1) gender discrimination in violation
of the FCRA (Count One); (2) race discrimination in violation
of the FCRA (Count Two); (3) gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII (Count Three); and race discrimination
in violation of Title VII. (Id.). The County answered the
complaint (Doc. # 18), and the case proceeded through
discovery.
The County now seeks summary judgment on all claims.

(Doc. # 30). Ms. Oakley has responded (Doc. # 33), and the
County has replied. (Doc. # 36). The Motion is ripe for
review.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude

a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are

no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)).
“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-
moving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ and by its
own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th
Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the Court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s
response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his

conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034
(11th Cir. 1981).
III. Analysis
A. Failure to Dispute the County’s Statement of
Material Facts
As an initial matter, Ms. Oakley’s response violates the
Court’s requirements for summary judgment briefing, as laid
out in a February 21, 2025 order. (Doc. # 23). The Court
requires every response to a summary judgment motion to
include a section titled “Response to Statement of
Material Facts.” The opposing party’s response must
mirror the statement of material facts by admitting
and/or denying each of the moving party’s
assertions in matching numbered paragraphs. Each
denial must set forth a pinpoint citation to the
record where the fact is disputed. Although the
opposing party’s response must correspond with the
paragraph scheme used in the statement of material
facts, the response need not repeat the text of the
moving party’s paragraphs. In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the Court will deem admitted any
fact in the statement of material facts that the
opposing party does not specifically controvert,
provided record evidence supports the moving
party’s statement.
(Id. at 2-3).
Ms. Oakley’s response does not respond at all to the
County’s statement of material facts in its Motion. (Doc. #
33). Ms. Oakley, thus, has failed to dispute any of the
County’s numerous statements of material fact. Therefore,
provided the record evidence cited by the County supports
each statement, the Court deems admitted all facts in the
Motion’s statement of material facts.
B. The Merits
In its Motion, the County argues that Ms. Oakley’s claims
fail under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In response, Ms. Oakley
argues that her claims survive summary judgment under either
the McDonnell Douglas framework or the convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence approach. (Doc. # 33 at 3-9).

“In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff
alleging intentional discrimination must present sufficient
facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.” Lewis v. City
of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019). “One way
that she can do so is by satisfying the burden-shifting
framework set out in” McDonnell Douglas. Id. “When proceeding
under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
by showing (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2)
that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3)
that she was qualified to perform the job in question, and

(4) that her employer treated ‘similarly situated’ employees
outside her class more favorably.” Id. at 1220-21. “If the
plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. at 1221.
“Finally, should the defendant carry its burden, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s
proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful
discrimination, an obligation that ‘merges with the
[plaintiff’s] ultimate burden of persuading the [factfinder]
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.’”
Id. (citation omitted).

However, “establishing the elements of the McDonnell
Douglas framework is not, and never was intended to be, the
sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment
motion in an employment discrimination case.” Smith v.
Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
Alternatively, “[a] ‘convincing mosaic’ may be shown by
evidence that demonstrates, among other things, (1)
‘suspicious timing, ambiguous statements . . . , and other
bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory
intent might be drawn,’ (2) systematically better treatment
of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the employer’s

justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City,
934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019). The convincing mosaic
approach “is not more forgiving than the [McDonnell Douglas
framework] on the final question, which is whether a
reasonable jury could infer illegal discrimination.”
McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335 (11th Cir.
2024).
Here, Ms. Oakley’s gender and race discrimination claims
fail under either the McDonnell Douglas framework or the
convincing mosaic approach. No reasonable jury could conclude
that the County discriminated against Ms. Oakley based on her
race or gender. Ms. Oakley does not dispute that she was

randomly selected for drug testing and that she tested
positive for a drug that she was not prescribed and,
therefore, had unlawfully (albeit accidentally) taken. See
Pears v. Mobile Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1090 (S.D. Ala.
2009) (noting that “a positive drug test” “unquestionably”
qualifies as “a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” to
discharge an employee). The evidence that Ms. Oakley relies
on to create a genuine dispute of material fact about
discrimination includes: (1) Mr. Doe’s being allowed to take
a second drug test when Ms. Oakley was not, and (2) the
severity of terminating a long-time employee with no other

disciplinary history, rather than allowing her to retest.
(Doc. # 33 at 7).
First, John Doe is not a sufficient comparator to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas or support a convincing mosaic of
discrimination. “[A] plaintiff asserting an intentional-
discrimination claim under McDonnell Douglas must demonstrate
that she and her proffered comparators were ‘similarly
situated in all material respects.’” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218.
“A plaintiff needn’t prove . . . that she and her comparators
are identical save for their race or gender.” Id. at 1227.
“Nor is it necessary for a plaintiff to prove purely formal

similarities — e.g., that she and her comparators had
precisely the same title.” Id. A similarly situated
comparator, however, ordinarily “will have engaged in the
same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff”; “will
have been subject to the same employment policy, guideline,
or rule as the plaintiff”; “will ordinarily (although not
invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same
supervisor as the plaintiff”; and “will share the plaintiff’s
employment or disciplinary history.” Id. at 1227-28. “[A]
plaintiff and her comparators must be sufficiently similar,
in an objective sense, that they ‘cannot reasonably be

distinguished.’” Id. at 1228 (citation omitted).
Here, Mr. Doe was not similarly situated in all material
respects to Ms. Oakley. Ms. Oakley admitted that she took her
husband’s prescription medication, which caused her positive
drug test. She did not argue that the drug test was a false
positive; rather, she argued her inappropriate use of
another’s prescription medication was accidental. But
accidental ingestion of another person’s prescription
medication is still considered a positive drug test under the
DOT regulations. (Berry Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11). Dr. Berry, the
MRO working for the company contracted by the County to
perform drug testing, averred that he does “not consider an

individual’s claim that she mistakenly took another person’s
prescription medication to be a reason to negate a positive
drug test.” (Id. at ¶ 12). Likewise, Ms. Joe averred that the
County “does not consider a person’s accidental or mistaken
ingestion of illegal drugs or another person’s prescription
medication to be a valid reason to overturn a positive drug
test or to allow a retest” because doing so “would defeat the
purpose of the drug free workplace program.” (Joe Decl. at ¶
29). Thus, in the County’s eyes, Ms. Oakley admitted she had
engaged in misconduct and her positive drug test was
considered “unexcused.”

In sharp contrast, Mr. Doe denied taking any illegal
drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. (Id. at ¶¶
38-39). That is, he admitted no wrongdoing. See Abel v.
Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that
plaintiff who “freely admitted having taken $10.00 from the
cash register” was not similarly situated to other employee
who “never confessed to taking county funds for personal
use”). Mr. Doe instead presented a list of his prescription
medications, including a medication prescribed for weight
loss, presumably to show his positive drug test was a false
positive caused by his prescription medication. (Id.).1 As a
result of this explanation, the County considered Mr. Doe’s

positive drug test “excused,” which led to Mr. Doe being
allowed to take a second drug test that was negative. (Id. at
¶ 40). Thus, Ms. Oakley and Mr. Doe did not engage in the
same conduct, rendering them materially dissimilar.
Even aside from considering him a true comparator, the
decision not to fire Mr. Doe could not persuade a reasonable
jury that discrimination was the reason for Ms. Oakley’s
termination. Ms. Oakley’s testimony that Mr. Doe was a
favorite of HR because of his participation in the County’s
diversity program, (Pl. Depo. at 18:2-7, 19:5-8, 27:3-7,
66:23–67:11), was speculation not based on personal

1 In her response, Ms. Oakley states that she disputes that
Mr. Doe “presented prescriptions and therefore warranted a
retest.” (Doc. # 33 at 5). However, Ms. Oakley asserts this
“dispute” without citation to any record evidence. Therefore,
Ms. Joe’s declaration regarding the circumstances of Mr.
Doe’s positive drug test and retest is undisputed.
knowledge. Likewise, Ms. Oakley had no personal knowledge
about why Mr. Doe was allowed a retest beyond rumors she
heard. (Id. at 19:24–20:4, 22:3-14, 23:1-9, 40:21–41:8,
131:15-18, 136:4-9). Nevertheless, Ms. Oakley insists that
disregarding her speculative testimony is equivalent to
“improperly weigh[ing] credibility.” (Doc. # 33 at 6). Not
so. “[I]nferences in favor of a plaintiff can be based only

on evidence — not on speculation.” Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt.
Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1058 (11th Cir. 2020). “Even on
summary judgment, a court is not obliged to take as true
testimony that is not based on personal knowledge.” Citizens
Concerned About Our Child. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 193
F.3d 1285, 1295 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999).
Additionally, there is undisputed evidence that multiple
County employees of different races and genders were also
terminated or forced to resign after positive drug tests.
These include eleven men of various races, including two
African American men and three Hispanic men. (Joe Decl. at ¶¶

34-35). Besides Mr. Doe, there is no evidence that other men
or non-white employees who tested positive for drug use kept
their jobs. See Crawford v. Newport News Indus. Corp., No.
4:14-cv-130, 2018 WL 4561671, at *53 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2018)
(granting summary judgment on race discrimination claim where
a plaintiff “failed to identify a single white employee who
was not terminated after a positive drug test,” and, in fact,
there was a white employee who was likewise “required to
submit to drug testing, and upon a positive result, was
terminated”), report and recommendation adopted in part, No.
4:14-cv-130, 2018 WL 2943445 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2018). And
Ms. Oakley has not presented evidence of any statements

evincing discriminatory animus by her superiors or the
decisionmakers for her termination. Given the number of men
of various races whose employment ended after positive drug
tests and the County’s undisputed explanation that it
considered Mr. Doe’s positive drug test “excused,” the single
example of an African American man being allowed to retake
his drug test does not raise a reasonable inference of race
or gender discrimination.
True, “[p]roof that an employer failed to follow its
established policies in reaching an employment decision may
be evidence of pretext.” Harley v. The Health Ctr. of Coconut

Creek, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2006). But
here, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Ms.
Oakley, the County did follow its policy on discipline after
a positive drug test for both Ms. Oakley and Mr. Doe.
According to Ms. Joe, it is the County’s policy to “provide
each employee an opportunity to explain or contest the test
results” after a positive drug test. (Joe Decl. at ¶ 16). It
is undisputed that the County gave both Ms. Oakley and Mr.
Doe an opportunity to explain their positive drug tests. Ms.
Oakley and Mr. Doe gave different explanations for their
positive drug tests. The County determined that only Mr. Doe’s
explanation sufficiently “excused” his positive test and

warranted a retest. Because the County considered Ms.
Oakley’s positive test “unexcused,” the County followed its
policy of ending the employment of those with unexcused
positive drug tests when it terminated Ms. Oakley, as it had
also done with numerous other employees. (Id. at ¶ 34). Thus,
the County did follow its policy as to both Ms. Oakley and
Mr. Doe.
Ms. Oakley’s other arguments are also unavailing. First,
she cites no record evidence for her assertion that she “had
an unblemished 19-year record as a firefighter/EMT.” (Doc. #
33 at 8). Ms. Oakley did not include her lack of prior

discipline in her own statement of material facts (Id. at 2-
3), and does not cite any record evidence for this alleged
fact elsewhere in her response. More fundamentally, even
assuming she had no disciplinary history, the decision to
fire a long-time employee for testing positive for drugs not
prescribed to her does not raise the specter of pretext. In
an undisputed declaration, Ms. Joe explained that she was
“not aware of the County issuing less severe discipline to
any employee following an unexcused, positive random drug
test.” (Joe Decl. at ¶ 33) (emphasis added).
Ms. Oakley argues that termination was a draconian
punishment for a good employee who made a mistake. The Court

tends to agree and has sympathy for Ms. Oakley. But this Court
cannot second guess whether the County’s decision was
“prudent or fair.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla.,
Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Dent v.
Fed. Mogul Corp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1315 (N.D. Ala. 2001)
(“Although termination may, to some, seem a draconian
response given the level of Plaintiff’s offense, the
reasonableness of Defendant’s disciplinary policies is not a
consideration in determining whether Plaintiff has produced
sufficient evidence to prevail on his claims of race and sex
discrimination.”).

This Court does “not sit as a super-personnel department
that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. No matter how
medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its
decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s
managers, [Title VII] does not interfere.” Elrod v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted). “[A]n employer may fire an employee for a good
reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or
for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a
discriminatory reason.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v.
STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted). While it may have been fairer for the County to

retest Ms. Oakley rather than terminate her, Ms. Oakley has
not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the County’s decision was discriminatory based on her
race or gender.
The Motion is granted on all claims.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendant Polk County Board of County Commissioners’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 30) is GRANTED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant Polk County Board of County Commissioners and

against Plaintiff Dawn Oakley on all counts of the
complaint.
(3) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to terminate all
pending deadlines and CLOSE the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 4th
day of March, 2026.
fan Hunaby (mei¥h
VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

26

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355994. Public record. Not legal advice.