# KONOPKA

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355872

## Case

- **Full name:** Brittany K. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRITTANY K.,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-04136 (GC)
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Brittany K.’s1 appeal from the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)2 denying
Plaintiff’s application for Social Security Disability (SSD) under Title II of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. (ECF Nos. 1, 6.) The Commissioner opposed, and Plaintiff replied.
(ECF Nos. 10, 11.) After careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire
Administrative Record, the Court decides this matter without oral argument in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set
forth below, and other good cause shown, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision.

1 Plaintiff is identified by first name and last initial. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.
2 Frank Bisignano became Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on May 7,
2025. This change has no bearing on the instant matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action
instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the
person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff has a high school education and was 28 years old on her date last insured of June
30, 2021.3 (AR 38.)4 On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for SSD, alleging that
she became disabled as of November 27, 2018.5 (Id. at 21, 484-493.) Plaintiff alleged that she
could not work due to “[b]lind or low vision,” diabetes, anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, post-

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), schizophrenia, “[h]ands lacking a 3rd knuckle in fingers,”
“[d]islocated tendon in right[](dominant elbow,” and “[b]ack problems.” (Id. at 693.) This
application was denied on June 6, 2022. (Id. at 21, 281-285.) Upon reconsideration, Plaintiff’s
claim was denied again on September 10, 2022. (Id. at 21, 293-297.) On September 26, 2022,
Claimant filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Id. at 21, 303-
304.) That hearing took place on May 7, 2024. (Id. at 21, 51-87.)
On June 14, 2024, the ALJ issued Plaintiff an unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff not
disabled. (Id. at 18-50.) On August 7, 2024, Plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ’s decision

3 The relevant time period for SSD is the alleged onset date of disability through the date
last insured. The “date last insured” refers to a status requirement for entitlement to disability
benefits as defined under the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1). “You are
entitled to disability benefits while disabled before attaining full retirement age . . . if . . . [y]ou
have enough social security earnings to be insured for disability[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.315(a)(1).
Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s representation of the relevant time period in this case.
4 “AR” refers to the Administrative Record, available at ECF No. 5. This Opinion cites the
internal page numbers when referring to the Administrative Record. Page numbers for all other
docket citations refer to the page numbers stamped by the Court’s e-filing system and not the
internal pagination of the parties.
5 Plaintiff previously filed an application for SSD on March 18, 2019, alleging she became
disabled on December 1, 2018. (AR 21.) That application was denied by an ALJ and that decision
was upheld by the Appeals Council. (Id.) The ALJ noted that because the listings for impairments
have since changed, res judicata does not apply in this case. (Id.)
before the Appeals Council, (id. at 469-470), and on April 16, 2025, the Appeals Council denied
Claimant’s request for review, (id. at 1-6). The ALJ’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s
final decision. (Id.)
On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF
No. 1.) Plaintiff raises two arguments. First, Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s residual functional

capacity (RFC)6 finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 6 at 10-18.)7 Second,
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could engage in alternative work at step five
of the RFC analysis was unsupported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 18-21.)
B. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ used the requisite five-step sequential evaluation process to determine that
Claimant was not disabled. (AR 22-23.) See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (describing the five-
step process).
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through June 30, 2021, and “did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the
period from her alleged onset date of November 27, 2018 through her date last insured of June 30,

2021[.]” (AR 24.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “had the following severe impairments: congenital
deformities in the bilateral hands and feet and the right upper extremity; depressive disorder;
personality disorder; and learning disorder/borderline intellectual functioning[.]” (Id.) The ALJ
concluded that these medically determinable, severe impairments “significantly limit the

6 Residual functional capacity (RFC) is defined as “the most you can still do despite your
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
7 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work activities[.]” (Id.) The ALJ noted that “the undersigned
has fully considered the nature and extent of the claimant’s psychiatric symptoms, regardless of
the specific diagnosis.” (Id.) The ALJ also found that there was evidence Plaintiff’s body mass
index (BMI) fell in the range of obesity and Plaintiff “was also diagnosed with myopic astigmatism
in the bilateral eyes;” however, the ALJ found that these impairments were non-severe. (Id.)

Lastly, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s allegations of disability due to low back pain and knee pain
and migraine headaches, but the ALJ concluded “these alleged impairments were not medically
determinable.” (Id. at 24-25.)
At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments nor any combination of
impairments met or medically equaled the severity of any of the impairments listed in the
applicable regulation. (Id. at 25-28.) See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a) (regulation pointing ALJs
to “appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 of this chapter”).
At step four, the ALJ conducted an RFC assessment to determine what work Plaintiff was
capable of. (AR 28-38.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff:

had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she could never climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds; she could perform other postural activities on an
occasional basis; she could never be exposed to unprotected heights,
dangerous moving machinery, or excessive vibration (such as that
found in hand-held power tools); and she could occasionally reach
overhead with the right, dominant upper extremity. She could
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and
perform simple tasks for two-hour blocks of time throughout the
workday consistent with regularly scheduled breaks and lunch; she
needed an environment with no more than incidental contact with
the general public, meaning dealing with the public could not be part
of job duties, but she could tolerate very brief encounters, such as
passing someone in the hallway; she needed an environment where
tasks were performed in a solitary manner, but she could hand off
products or objects to coworkers; she could interact with supervisors
on routine matters on an occasional basis; and she could adapt to
occasional, routine changes.
(Id. at 28.) To arrive at this conclusion, the ALJ stated that she “considered all symptoms and the
extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective
medical evidence and other evidence[.]” (Id. at 28-29 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and Social
Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p (Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims), 2017 WL 5180304
(Oct. 25, 2017)).) The ALJ also considered “the medical opinion(s) and prior administrative

medical finding(s) in accordance with the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1520c.” (Id. at 29.)
In considering Claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ stated that she must follow a two-step
process. (Id.) First, the ALJ must determine whether “there is an underlying medically
determinable physical or mental impairment . . . that could reasonably be expected to produce the
claimant’s pain or other symptoms.” (Id.) Second, if there is such an impairment, the ALJ must
evaluate “the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of the symptoms “to determine the extent
to which they limit the claimant’s work-related activities.” (Id.)
Applying these standards, the ALJ reviewed the record and found step one satisfied. (Id.
at 29-30.) The ALJ then proceeded to step two and found that “the claimant’s statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id. at 30.)
The ALJ then discussed Plaintiff’s statements about her symptoms and the objective
medical evidence the ALJ considered in her RFC assessment. (Id. at 30-35.) The ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were
inconsistent because “the record reflects that the claimant’s mental health symptoms were largely
stable on medications and with individual therapy during the relevant period.” (Id. at 30.)
Subsequently, the ALJ discussed the role that opinion evidence played in her RFC assessment. (Id.
at 35-38.) The ALJ found the prior administrative findings of stage agency psychological
consultants Dr. Cormier and Dr. Conger and state agency medical consultant Dr. Shahinian,
“generally persuasive[.]” (Id. at 35-36, 36-37.) The ALJ found the opinion of psychiatrist Dr.
Knox unpersuasive “because Dr. Knox did not offer an opinion as to functional limitations despite
indicating that the claimant was not capable of managing her own funds due to symptoms and
despite assessing . . . moderate symptoms and/or limitations.” (Id. at 36.) The ALJ found the prior

administrative findings of state agency psychological consultants Drs. Teissy Meza, Fred Eisner,
and J. Patrick Peterson unpersuasive because their findings were not supported by the record. (Id.)
The ALJ found prior administrative findings of state agency medical consultants Drs. R. James
Mabry, Algernon Phillips, Isaac Moore, and Dennis Pacl unpersuasive because they were not fully
supported by medical evidence and inconsistent with other opinions in the record. (Id. at 37.) The
ALJ found the opinion of consultative medical examiner Dr. Chase Foy unpersuasive because it
was vague. (Id.) Lastly, the ALJ found a third-party function report from Plaintiff’s mother was
unpersuasive because, like Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, it was not fully consistent with the
evidence. (Id. at 37-38.)

The ALJ based her RFC assessment on the above considerations and noted that Plaintiff
had no past relevant work. (Id. at 38.) Finally, at step five, the ALJ considered whether jobs exist
in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform given her age, education, work experience,
and RFC. (Id. at 38-39.) Based on hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ, a vocational expert
testified that Plaintiff could perform jobs such as “mail clerk,” “domestic laundry worker,” and
“housekeeping cleaner.” (Id. at 38-39.) The ALJ determined that the vocational expert’s testimony
was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). (Id. at 39.) Therefore, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff “was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that existed
in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id.) As a result, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was not disabled for SSD purposes. (Id. at 39-40.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of Review
The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). In conducting this review, the Court is “not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose

[its] own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted). Instead, the Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether
the conclusions reached are rational” and “supported by substantial evidence.” Gober v. Matthews,
574 F.2d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
Substantial evidence is “defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla’; it means ‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’” Hagans v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d
287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)). Evidence
is not substantial “if it is overwhelmed by other evidence—particularly certain types of evidence
(e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion.” Nazario v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Kent v.

Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence,” the Court is “bound by those findings, even if [it] would have decided the
factual inquiry differently.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Legal issues, in contrast, are subject to a
plenary or de novo review. See Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 208 n.10 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“We exercise plenary review over legal conclusions reached by the Commissioner . . . .”) (quoting
Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359).
B. Determining Disability
To be eligible for SSD due to disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must
establish that they are “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The individual’s impairment must be severe to the point that the
individual cannot engage in his or her previous work or in “any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy,” i.e., work that exists in significant numbers either in
the region where the individual lives or in several regions of the country. 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(B); Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427-28. A physical or mental impairment is one that “results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Disability determinations are made individually “based on evidence adduced at a hearing.” Sykes
v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).
C. Sequential Evaluation
The Social Security Administration has developed a sequential, five-step process for

evaluating disability claims. The process considers whether the claimant:
(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an
impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”; (3)
suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her
past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
McCrea v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-
(f), 416.920(a)-(f)). “The evaluation will continue through each step unless it can be determined
at any point that the claimant is or is not disabled.” Rios v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 444 F. App’x 532,
534 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of
proof at the first four steps, at which point the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step.
See Hess, 931 F.3d at 201 (“The burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five,
where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.”).
III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of her appeal. First, she argues that the ALJ’s
assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, and closely related
to the first argument, Plaintiff contends that the work the ALJ found Plaintiff could engage in at
step five of the analysis was not supported by substantial evidence. On review of the ALJ’s
decision (see AR 18-50) and the Administrative Record (see generally ECF No. 5), the Court finds
good cause to affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
A. The ALJ’s RFC Determination
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence and
did not appropriately account for Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations. (ECF No. 6 at 10-
18.) Plaintiff contends that despite finding that Plaintiff had congenital deformities of the hands,
feet, and right arm, the ALJ did not include “meaningful restriction at all in the ability [of Plaintiff]

to use her hands or arms” and otherwise discounted Plaintiff’s physical limitations. (Id. at 12.)
Regarding mental limitations, Plaintiff asserts that the RFC does not appropriately account for
those limitations but instead “the ALJ both cherry picks times when [Plaintiff] was doing better”
and improperly disregards evidence. (Id. at 14-16.) Lastly, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ also
fails to articulate in any meaningful way the significan[ce] of [Plaintiff’s] learning disability.” (Id.
at 17.) Defendant responds that the ALJ’s RFC is consistent with the evidence in the record, and
Plaintiff’s argument “amounts to a request to re-weigh the evidence to reach a different
conclusion,” which is not permissible. (ECF No. 10 at 7-10.)
A claimant’s RFC is the most that the claimant can do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(1). When conducting an RFC assessment, the ALJ is not required to provide a “written
analysis about how [the ALJ] considered each piece of evidence[.]” Joseph P. v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec., Civ. No. 21-13524, 2023 WL 1929945, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2023) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg.

5844, 5858 (Jan. 18, 2017)). Instead, regulations reflect a “reasonable articulation standard” in
which the “decision need only ‘allow a subsequent reviewer . . . to trace the path of an adjudicator’s
reasoning.’ ” Id. (quoting 82 Fed. Reg. at 5858). In tracing this path, “[a]n ALJ ‘must give some
indication of the evidence which [s]he rejects and h[er] reason(s) for discounting such evidence.’”
Tedesco v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 833 F. App’x 957, 961 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). But “the
ALJ is not required to supply a comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most
cases, a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482
(3d Cir. 1981). Further, an ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular
format in conducting [the] analysis.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).

Here, the ALJ properly considered and addressed Plaintiff’s impairments in the RFC. The
Court considers Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the consideration of her physical and mental
limitations in turn.

Regarding physical limitations, Plaintiff contends that although the ALJ found at step two
that Plaintiff’s congenital deformities in the bilateral hands and feet and the right upper extremity
were a severe impairment, the ALJ imposed no “meaningful restriction at all in [Plaintiff’s] ability
to use her hands or arms” in the RFC. (ECF No. 6 at 12.) Plaintiff refers the court to photographs
of Plaintiff’s hands in the record as evidence that Plaintiff requires additional physical limitations.
(Id. (citing AR 1546-1547); ECF No. 11 at 6.)
However, “no incantations are required at step[] four . . . simply because a particular finding
has been made at step[] two[.]” Hess, 931 F.3d at 209. The ALJ must only explain how the RFC
reflects what a claimant can do despite the identified limitations, id. at 209-10, and the ALJ did as
much here. The RFC includes several physical limitations, including that Plaintiff “could never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she could perform other postural activities on an occasional

basis; she could never be exposed to unprotected heights, dangerous moving machinery, or
excessive vibration (such as that found in hand-held power tools); and she could occasionally reach
overhead with the right, dominant upper extremity.” (AR 28.) To reach this conclusion, the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s own testimony as to her hands and feet, medical evidence from physical
examinations in 2017, 2018, 2019, and, and the prior administrative findings of a doctor in
determining the RFC. (Id. at 29-30, 33, 35, 36-37.)
Regarding the photographs cited by Plaintiffs, the ALJ acknowledged them and noted:
“pictures of the claimant’s bilateral hands are in the record; however, as the undersigned is not a
medical provider or specialist, the undersigned cannot comment further on these pictures.” (Id. at

34.) This was appropriate, as an “ALJ is not a doctor and must not substitute her own judgment
as to medical issues for actual medical evidence.” LaMontagne v. Colvin, Civ. No. 14-916, 2015
WL 1811681, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2015); George-Jellison v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 08-
0359, 2009 WL 331418, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2009) (quoting Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317-
18 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“An ALJ ‘may not make speculative inferences from medical reports’ and
cannot make decisions about medical evidence based on ‘his or her own credibility judgments,
speculation, or lay opinion.’”). And “it is not for this [c]ourt, upon review, to decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment to decide whether a claimant is or is
not disabled.” Wilson v. Apfel, Civ. No. 98-6511, 1999 WL 993723, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999),
aff’d, 225 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s physical limitations because the
ALJ found that Plaintiff can play video games. (See ECF No. 6 at 13.) This is incorrect; playing
video games was one example of many regarding Plaintiff’s capabilities that the ALJ relied on in

formulating the RFC. The ALJ also noted that, apart from playing video games, Plaintiff could
engage in other activities despite her limitations, including: “car[ing] for her cat, prepar[ing]
simple meals, perform[ing] chores when told to by her mother, shop[ing] by computer,
socializ[ing] with others on occasion, and play[ing] video games.” (AR 30 (citing AR 783-793).)
The ALJ also noted that despite her congenital deformities, “the claimant did not have evidence of
manipulative or gait deficits on physical exams during the relevant period.” (Id. (citing AR 1233-
1274, 1585-1587); see also id. at 37 (citing AR 670-687, 783-793, 1136-1167).) This is consistent
with the medical evidence in the record.8 “In order to qualify for benefits, a person must be
disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and its accompanying regulations as of his date last

insured.” Corley v. Barnhart, 102 F. App’x 752, 754 (3d Cir. 2004). While Plaintiff did testify at
the hearing in 2024 that she stopped playing video games “[v]ery recently. Like a couple months
ago. Because the pain has just gotten too bad[,]” (id. at 73), and medical evidence showed Plaintiff
sought treatment for chronic pain affecting her knees, low back, neck, right elbow, and fingers in
October 2021 and September 2022, (id. at 34-35), this evidence post-dates the relevant period for

8 In further support of her argument that the ALJ ignored the impact of Plaintiff’s physical
impairments, Plaintiff cites to testimony from the vocational expert in which the expert agreed that
“if the individual’s ability to use their hands and fingers for handling and fingering was decreased
to no more than occasional,” the jobs the vocational expert identified “would be precluded with
that restriction in mind.” (AR 82-83; see also ECF No. 6 at 13-14.) However, this ignores the fact
that the ALJ found, after considering medical and opinion evidence in the record, that Plaintiff’s
physical impairments did not require such a limitation.
this disability decision, which is from November 27, 2018 through June 30, 2021, (id. at 21). As
such, the ALJ was not required to consider this evidence. See, e.g., Mease v. Berryhill, Civ. No.
17-2327, 2018 WL 6521830, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2018) (“In assessing whether a claimant
[became disabled on or before the date last insured], an ALJ is not required to consider any medical
evidence or treatment notes that post-date when a claimant was last insured.”); Greco v. O’Malley,

Civ. No. 23-445, 2024 WL 1195707, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2024) (“While an ALJ can
consider evidence after a claimant’s date last insured, such evidence is relevant only so far as it
pertains to the claimant’s condition during the relevant period [prior to the date last insured].”).

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ did not adequately account for Plaintiff’s mental limitations
in formulating the RFC, including failing to account for Plaintiff’s intellectual deficits and
difficulties relating to other people. (ECF No. 6 at 16.) Plaintiff cites to prior consultative
examinations in the record in support of her argument that Plaintiff has a long history of mental
health challenges, and contends the ALJ “cherry picks times when [Plaintiff] was doing better[.]”
(Id. at 15.) Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly found “all of the reports going back to

2008 [in the administrative record] are not persuasive because they relate to periods either before
or after the period before [the ALJ].” (Id. at 16.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s mental limitations in the RFC, the ALJ found that:
[Plaintiff] could understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions and perform simple tasks for two-hour blocks of time
throughout the workday consistent with regularly scheduled breaks
and lunch; she needed an environment with no more than incidental
contact with the general public, meaning dealing with the public
could not be part of job duties, but she could tolerate very brief
encounters, such as passing someone in the hallway; she needed an
environment where tasks were performed in a solitary manner, but
she could hand off products or objects to coworkers; she could
interact with supervisors on routine matters on an occasional basis;
and she could adapt to occasional, routine changes.
(AR 28.) This is consistent with the medical evidence. The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s subjective
testimony, medical evidence, consultative exam notes, and medical opinion evidence. (Id. at 29-
33, 35-38.) The ALJ noted that although “the record documents longstanding mental health
symptoms,” the record evidence also “reflects that the claimant’s mental health symptoms were
largely stable on medications and with individual therapy during the relevant period” and

“[t]reating providers also regularly described the claimant as stable with treatment and as
presenting with average intellectual functioning.” (Id. at 30-31 (citing AR 1136-1167, 1233-1361.)
The ALJ’s decision is only required to include “sufficient development of the record and
explanation of findings to permit meaningful review,” and the ALJ satisfied that standard here.
Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. As previously discussed, “‘[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ discuss
in [her] opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.’” Bruce T. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No.
21-20289, 2022 WL 10025372, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2022) (first alteration in original) (quoting
Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Further, while the ALJ does acknowledge evidence indicating that Plaintiff was “doing

better” during the relevant time period, the ALJ also considered medical evidence documenting
fluctuations in Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms. (AR 31-32.) The ALJ found that medical
evidence indicated “the claimant presented with intact memory, concentration, and ability to
interact with the consulting provider,” before beginning mental health treatment. (Id. at 30 (citing
AR 1588-1594).) Once Plaintiff began treatment, “[t]reating providers also regularly described
the claimant as stable with treatment and as presenting with average intellectual functioning.” (Id.
(citing AR 1136-1167, 1233-1361).) The ALJ acknowledged that although medical evidence
indicated Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms worsened at times during the relevant time period,
the evidence also indicated that “the claimant did not require emergency treatment or a higher level
of care to address mental health symptom exacerbations during the relevant period.” (Id.) The
Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ “cherry picked” evidence to support her
RFC determination. (ECF No. 6 at 13, 15.) The ALJ relied upon a variety of evidence to inform
the RFC, and as other courts have held:
upon review of the record in its entirety, the [c]ourt does not find
that certain evidence was obviously “cherry-picked” because it was
helpful while other important evidence was conveniently
overlooked, nor does the [c]ourt find that consideration of all the
evidence clearly would have led to a finding of disability. Although
[the p]laintiff may feel that the ALJ did not properly weigh all the
appropriate evidence in reaching conclusions, the ALJ was simply
not required to consider and discuss every piece of evidence in the
[extensive] record. Moreover, the Court cannot now choose to re-
weigh the evidence simply because Plaintiff does not agree with the
ALJ’s decision.
Brisbine v. Saul, Civ. No. 19-1038, 2020 WL 5759959, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2020) (citation
omitted); see also Candace D. v. Kijakazi, No. Civ. No. 23-01151, 2024 WL 913218, at *8 (D.N.J.
Mar. 4, 2024) (“It is well-established that an ALJ’s decision may not be overturned simply because
the Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence.”).
Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s determination that, because certain medical evidence pre-
or post-dated the relevant period of disability, that evidence was unpersuasive. (ECF No. 6 at 16,
17.) But “[a]n ALJ may reject evidence that predates the relevant period and, therefore, may limit
her analysis to the medical evidence in the record that follows [the p]laintiff’s alleged onset date.”
Courtney W. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 23-22865, 2024 WL 5244299, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
2024) (quoting Gonzalez v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1463990, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2016)); see also Rosa
P. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 20-12284, 2022 WL 2532838, at *4 (D.N.J. July 7, 2022) (“While
an ALJ should consider a claimant’s history prior to the relevant period to inform a conclusion as
to whether or not the claimant is disabled, the crux is whether there is evidence of a disability
during the relevant period.”). The ALJ did not err here by finding these medical opinions
“unpersuasive because they do not pertain to the claimant’s functioning during the relevant
period.” (AR 37.)
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “fails to articulate in any meaningful way the
significan[ce] of [Plaintiff’s] learning disability.” (ECF No. 6 at 17.) The Court disagrees. “In
the [RFC], the ALJ must include a claimant’s credibly established limitations only, not all

limitations a claimant alleges.” Ayesha L. v. Dudek, Civ. No. 24-04410, 2025 WL 3079291, at *8
(D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2025). At step two of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the “severe
impairment” of a “learning disorder/borderline intellectual functioning.” (AR 24.) But again, a
finding at step two does not require any specific limitation in the RFC; the ALJ must only explain
how the RFC reflects what a claimant can do despite those identified limitations. Hess, 931 F.3d
at 209-10. Based on the requirements identified in the relevant listing, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of any of the
impairments listed in the applicable regulation. (AR 27-28.) The ALJ further noted that the RFC
was informed by the evidence that treating providers described the Plaintiff “as presenting with

average intellectual functioning.” (Id. at 30 (citing AR 1136-1167, 1233-1361).) The “[o]bjective
testing” that found Plaintiff to have an IQ of 79, a limitation that Plaintiff argues was not properly
incorporated into the RFC, (ECF No. 6 at 17, 19-21; ECF No. 11 at 7-9), took place in 2023, after
the relevant period of time considered here, (AR 33 (citing 1783-1786 (medical evidence regarding
2023 IQ testing))). As previously discussed, an ALJ is not required to consider evidence outside
of the relevant period of disability. See, e.g., Mease, 2018 WL 6521830, at *5; Greco, 2024 WL
1195707, at *1 n.2. Regardless, the ALJ considered this evidence, explaining that:
In consideration for this evidence, the undersigned also found
support for a moderate limitation in understanding, remembering,
and applying information. Marked and extreme limitations in this
domain are not supported considering the claimant’s generally intact
activities of daily living as well as observations from her treating
providers during the relevant period that she appeared to have
average intelligence and did not appear to have cognitive deficits.
(AR 36 (citing AR 1136-1167, 1233-1361, 1783-1786).) The ALJ’s decision “may not be
overturned simply because the [p]laintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence.”
Candace D., 2024 WL 913218, at *8.
At bottom, “an ALJ does not need to use particular language or adhere to a particular format
in conducting [her] RFC analysis” but rather “must merely ‘articulate how the evidence in the
record supports the RFC determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained work-
related activities, and explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in the record.’” Maria A. v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 21-19431, 2025 WL 88349, at *14 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2025) (citations
omitted). The ALJ’s determination satisfies this standard here, as she considered a myriad of
evidence regarding Plaintiff’s asserted mental limitations and explained her reasoning for the RFC.
B. The ALJ’s Step Five Determination
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s determination at step five—that Plaintiff could perform
work existing in significant numbers in the national economy—was not based on substantial
evidence. (ECF No. 6 at 18-21.) Plaintiff asserts that because she “lacked the capacity found [in

the RFC], then the finding that she could perform any work at the substantial gainful work activity
level, past or alternative, cannot be sustained.” (Id. at 19.) Defendant responds that “[t]hese
arguments largely re-package [Plaintiff’s] assertion that her impairments required greater
workplace limitations.” (ECF No. 10 at 11.) Because Plaintiff concedes that “Defendant is correct
that the argument as to Step Five being invalid largely relies on the finding that the residual
functional capacity upon which it is based is unsupported by substantial evidence,” (ECF No. 11
at 9), and the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence, this argument
necessarily fails.
However, even if the Court were to consider this argument, the Court finds that the ALJ
did not err in determining that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff could have performed. Plaintiff centers her argument on her contention that
the ALJ refused to consider how Plaintiff’s IQ could impact her work ability. (See ECF No. 6 at
19-21; ECF No. 11 at 9-13.) But as the Court previously discussed, the ALJ was not required to

consider this evidence that post-dated the disability period, although the ALJ did still acknowledge
Plaintiff’s IQ testing from 2023. (AR 36 (citing AR 1783-1786).) See, e.g., Mease, 2018 WL
6521830, at *5; Greco, 2024 WL 1195707, at *1 n.2.
Even if the ALJ were required to consider the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s IQ,
any such analysis she did was proper. Plaintiff argues that she did not have the “general learning
ability” (GLA)9 to perform the jobs suggested by the vocational expert due to her IQ. (See ECF
No. 6 at 19-21.) But, as Defendant argues, a plaintiff’s IQ does not correlate to a job’s GLA level.
(ECF No. 10 at 13.) See, e.g., Griffith v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 582 F. App’x 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“[The plaintiff] improperly conflates I.Q. with General Learning Ability[.]”); Christopher F. v.

Kijakazi, Civ. No. 21-516, 2022 WL 9169835, at *18 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2022) (holding that the
plaintiff’s assertion that he could not perform at a certain GLA level was conclusory, speculative,
and not supported by the record evidence which included his IQ score). Plaintiff offers no response
to this argument beyond a conclusory assertion that these cases are “wrong.” (ECF No. 11 at 12.)
When asked by Plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing, the vocational expert also testified that IQ is

9 “General Learning Ability refers to aptitude ability or [t]he ability to catch on or understand
instructions and underlying principles; the ability to reason and make judgments. The [DOT],
which is commonly relied upon by ALJs in evaluating whether a claimant can perform other work,
indicates the General Learning Ability that is required for each job.” Griffith v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.,
582 F. App’x 555, 565 n.6 (6th Cir. 2014) (first alteration in original) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
“separate and different” from general learning ability and IQ can “be used as part of a disability
determination outside of the purview of Social Security.” (Ud. at 84 (emphasis added).) The ALJ
permissibly relied upon the vocational expert’s testimony that was consistent with the DOT and
found, based on the limitations the ALJ found were established, Plaintiff could successfully
perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Ud. at 78-79.) Sanabria v.
Comim’r Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 15-8963, 2017 WL 436253, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2017) (finding Step
Five analysis was supported by substantial evidence because “‘[a] vocational expert may rely on
the DOT, and the ALJ may rely on the [vocational expert’s] testimony to the extent it is consistent
with the DOT”) (quoting Estevez v. Comm’r Soc. See., Ctv. No. 14-6337, 2016 WL 3381227, at
*7 (D.N.J, June 8, 2016)).
As previously discussed, the ALJ considered and referenced evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
mental abilities. (See supra Section IJI.A.2.) Thus, the ALJ sufficiently articulated how the
evidence in the record supported the RFC determination. See Maria A., 2025 WL 88349, at *14.
[court cannot now choose to re-weigh the evidence simply because Plaintiff does not agree
with the ALJ’s decision.” Brisbine, 2020 WL. 5759959, at *1 n.1.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and other good cause shown, the Commissioner's final decision
is AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: March 3!, 2026 f } et. fh a f.
GHORGHTTE CASTNER □
/ Unrrep STATES District JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355872. Public record. Not legal advice.