# Opinion

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355690

## Case

- **Full name:** Ashley N. Schmidt Robertson v. K1 Investment Management LLC and Trackforce, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ASHLEY N. SCHMIDT ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-3117 (ES) (JSA)
v.
OPINION
K1 INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
LLC, and TRACKFORCE, INC.,

Defendants.

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (D.E.
No. 5 (“Amended Complaint” or “Am. Compl.”)), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (D.E. No. 7 (“Motion”)).1 The Court has carefully reviewed the Amended
Complaint and the parties’ submissions in support of and in opposition to the Motion (see generally
D.E. No. 7-1 (“Mov. Br.”); D.E. No. 13 (“Opp. Br.”); D.E. No. 14 (“Reply Br.”)), and decides the
matter without oral argument, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
I. BACKGROUND2
According to the Amended Complaint, on or about September 21, 2019, Plaintiff accepted
an employment offer from Trackforce and worked “in sales” for the “Corporate Defendants” until

1 Defendants include Trackforce, Inc., “a subsidiary of Trackforce Top Co., d/b/a Trackforce Valiant”
(“Trackforce”) and K1 Investment Management LLC (“K1,” together with Trackforce, “Defendants”). (Am. Compl.
at 1). Although Plaintiff purports to name “Trackforce Top Co.” as a defendant in the opening paragraph of the
Amended Complaint, the case caption and docket reflect otherwise, as noted above. (See id.). On March 17, 2026,
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendant Douglas Pierce from this action. (D.E. No. 27).
2 For purposes of the instant Motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true and draws all inferences
in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The
her employment ended on August 9, 2024. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1 & 6). In November 2021, Plaintiff
received a promotion to “Team Leader/Account Executive,” including a 36% base salary increase
to $125,000 with a “variable compensation target of $250,000.00 at 100% of plan achievement.”
(Id. ¶ 8).

Sometime in January 2023, Plaintiff attended a company-sponsored conference in Orlando,
Florida at the “Kinetic /Crowne Plaza Universal.” (Id. ¶¶ 10–11). In the late evening on January
25, 2023, Trackforce’s then-Chief Revenue Officer (“CRO”) caught up with Plaintiff and her co-
workers in the “Lobby/Restaurant table.” (Id. ¶ 11). The CRO “bought a round [of drinks] for the
table and retired to his room.” (Id.). Then, Trackforce’s “C.O.O.”—which the Amended
Complaint refers to as the “Executive”—arrived “inebriated” and “integrated with other
employees,” including Plaintiff, Jimmy Lorenzo, Nolan Schutzer, and others. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12).
Plaintiff alleges that the Executive kissed her on the cheek, hung all over her, brushed his hands
against her chest, touched her buttocks, and placed his hands in her sweatshirt pockets such that
they rested on her private area. (Id. ¶ 12). All of this took place in front of Plaintiff’s co-workers

and superiors. (Id.). The Executive continued these actions as the group went into an elevator and
ceased when James Grimes stood in between Plaintiff and the Executive. (Id.). The next morning,
following the last conference meeting, the Executive offered Plaintiff a bottle of champagne noting
how she “really need[ed] a drink.” (Id. ¶ 13).
Witnesses and co-workers reported the January 25, 2023 incident, presumably to
Trackforce’s seniority and/or its Human Resources Department. (See id. ¶ 14). In addition,

Court makes certain observations herein regarding factual gaps that would benefit from further clarity in an amended
pleading. Because many of the allegations are difficult to decipher, the Court parses through the allegations as best
as possible under such circumstances.
2
Plaintiff alleges that she reported the alleged sexual harassment “in detail . . . to several high-
ranking officials within the Corporate Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 23). “Within the next day,”3 Plaintiff’s
direct report required Plaintiff to give a statement regarding the incident—first to him and then to
the Vice President. (Id. ¶ 14). The Human Resources Department also requested that Plaintiff

provide a statement via Facetime. (Id.).
On February 1, 2023, the Executive was terminated. (Id. ¶ 15). On February 3, 2023,
Trackforce’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) reached out to Plaintiff “to see if [she] was OK.”
(Id. ¶ 16). Similarly, on February 6, 2023, the Chief Financial Officer reached out to Plaintiff.
(Id.). On February 21, 2023, Jimmy Lorenzo and Nolan Schutzer—two employees present during
the alleged sexual assault in Florida—were terminated. (Id. ¶ 17).
Plaintiff claims that the Executive sexually harassed her by engaging in “a pattern and
practice of molesting [her].” (Id. ¶ 23). She further maintains that after she reported the
Executive’s behavior from the evening of January 25, 2023, the “Corporate Defendants embarked
in a pattern of retaliation that culminated in the termination of her employment.” (Id.). Plaintiff

also claims that the “Corporate Defendants” knew or should have known about the Executive’s
“predilection for sexual harassment” and “hostility toward those that decline his advances.” (Id. ¶
40). She maintains that the “Corporate Defendants could have easily performed a background
check” to uncover the Executive’s prior behavior with other employers. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that she continued to do “exceptional work”—she earned both “pay raises
and increased sales commissions.” (Id. ¶ 18). Over a year after the alleged harassment, on

3 It is unclear whether the “next day” refers to the day after the alleged incident or after the alleged reporting
of the incident. It is also unclear whether the alleged reporting occurred on the day of the incident or sometime
thereafter.
3
February 8, 2024, Plaintiff signed a “Sales Compensation Plan” dated January 1, 2024 to
December 31, 2024. (Id. ¶ 19; see id. ¶ 7 (alleging that Plaintiff received a salary and earned
commissions under a “written Commission Agreement dated January 1, 2024” to “December 31,
2024”)). Although not explicitly alleged as a second promotion, Plaintiff maintains that her

“impressive performance as a Senior Strategic Sales Representative continued” such that she “she
received a 20% additional increase in base salary, $150,000.00 with Car Allowance ($3,323) which
became effective May 1, 2024.” (Id. ¶ 9).
On July 1, 2024, Kyell Vyncke, a new manager, gave Plaintiff a “Performance
Improvement Plan” or “PIP.” (Id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff alleges that she received the PIP two months
after she received a salary increase and car allowance as directed by the CEO. (Id.). She further
maintains that “[o]n information and belief” Kyell Vyncke “was positioned to terminate” Plaintiff.
(Id.). On August 9, 2024, Plaintiff “was terminated from employment with the Corporate
Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 21).
According to the Amended Complaint, the “Corporate Defendants failed to perform” their

“contractual and statutory obligations prior to and after the termination of Plaintiff Robertson’s
employment on August 9, 2024.” (Id. ¶ 28). Specifically, she claims that Defendants failed “to
remit [c]ommissions earned” in breach of the parties’ contract. (Id. ¶ 29). In addition, she alleges
that Defendants “received the benefit” of Plaintiff’s services without payment to Plaintiff for
commissions owed. (Id. ¶ 42). Thus, Plaintiff claims the “Corporate Defendants have been
unjustly enriched” to her detriment and asserts that they “breached the Implied Covenant [of good
faith and fair dealing].” (Id. ¶¶ 44 & 48).
“Upon information and belief” Plaintiff maintains that the “Corporate Defendants set forth
a plan to amend, change, edit, the Commission Agreement [that was the] subject of Plaintiff
4
Robertson’s employment.” (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff “reasonably relied” on the representations in the
Commission Agreement. (Id. ¶ 36). She claims that CRO Chris Schwartz “met with others within
the Corporate Defendants’ control” such as Kyell Vyncke and “sought a method to plan, agree,
and scheme to defraud Plaintiff Robertson for Defendants’ gain” by terminating her employment

before “remitting payment for the [c]ommissions owed” to her. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34; see id. ¶ 35 (alleging
that Schwartz and Vyncke “took the actions of unilaterally attempting to change the Commission
Agreement” before terminating Plaintiff’s employment)). The “Corporate Defendants” allegedly
perpetrated these “fraudulent acts . . . to defraud Plaintiff Robertson of monies owed.” (Id. ¶ 34).
Furthermore, Defendants purportedly “made material [mis]representations by claiming in its
August 9, 2024 termination [notice]” that an unspecified total “was the amount of [ ] [c]ommission
owed [to] Plaintiff Robertson.” (Id. ¶ 36).
Finally, Plaintiff maintains that she was “protected” under the New Jersey Wage Payment
Law (“NJWPL”) “and where applicable New York Labor Law § 191 (1) (c).”4 (Id. ¶ 7). Without
additional context, Plaintiff alleges that the “Corporate Defendants failed to abide by the

[NJWPL].” (Id. ¶ 52). Plaintiff also “made several disclosures to Defendants’ professionals that
there were violations of said act and demanded payment of same.” (Id.).
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff raises seven counts in the Amended Complaint,
including: (i) violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), specifically

4 The pleading makes two passing references to the purported applicability of New York state law. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 7 & 48). Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 1). Defendants are, upon information and
belief, corporations organized under the laws of the State of California with “its principal place of business” in
Manhattan Beach, California. (Id. ¶ 2 (emphasis added)). Based on these, and all other allegations in the Amended
Complaint, the Court cannot identify any facts that connect the parties or their respective activities to New York. (See
generally id.). For these reasons, the Court declines to analyze Plaintiff’s claims under New York law. To the extent
Plaintiff files an amended pleading, she shall adequately allege facts that connect how New York Labor Law and other
unspecified “statutory rights” under “New York state law” apply to her case. (See id. ¶¶ 7 & 48).
5
“gender discrimination, hostile work environment, & gender discrimination”5 (Count I); (ii) breach
of contract (Count II); (iii) “fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud” (Count III); (iv) “retaliation
for making protected communications” under the NJLAD, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq. (Count
IV); (v) unjust enrichment (Count V); (vi) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing (Count VI); and (vii) violations of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law (“NJWPL”)
pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-1 et seq. (Count VII). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–53).
On August 11, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (See
generally Mov. Br.). Plaintiff opposed the Motion (see generally Opp. Br.) and Defendants replied
(see generally Reply Br.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations; it does, however, demand “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). In addition, the plaintiff’s short and plain statement of
the claim must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when “the plaintiff

5 The second reference to “gender discrimination” is duplicative.
6
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements” are all disregarded.
City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878–79 (3d Cir. 2018)

(quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012)). Further, a complaint
may be considered frivolous where it relies on an “‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a
‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,
530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Must Dismiss Defendant K1
At the outset, Defendants argue that the Could should dismiss all claims against K1 because
Plaintiff fails to allege a single allegation as to K1 individually. (Mov. Br. at 5). Defendants assert
that Plaintiff alleges her prior employer was defendant Trackforce and they further maintain that
she improperly group pleads both Defendants collectively as the “Corporate Defendants.” (Id.).

In opposition, Plaintiff makes several factual assertions regarding K1 that are absent from the
Amended Complaint. For example, Plaintiff asserts that “K1’s personal involvement would be K-
1 deciding and granting compensation in the form of Stock Options of K-1 to Plaintiff Robertson
(i.e. compensation which was withheld) to the naming of K-1 Board Member Trevor Camption . .
. for [a] period of two (2) years during the time complained of.” (Opp. Br. at 1). Plaintiff also
claims it is “ironic” that the same attorney represents both Defendants. (Id. at 3). As set forth
below, the Court agrees with Defendants.
As noted above, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain
“sufficient facts to put the proper defendants on notice so that they can frame an answer” to the
7
plaintiff’s allegations. See Dist. Council 47, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL–CIO
by Cronin v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1986). Importantly, vague group pleadings
“undermine[ ] the notice pleading regime of Rule 8.” Japhet v. Francis E. Parker Mem’l Home,
Inc., No. 14-1206, 2014 WL 3809173, at *2 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014). “‘Taken together,’ Rules 8(a)

and 8(d)(1) ‘underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.’”
Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting In re
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also 5 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac.
& Proc. Civ. § 1217 (3d ed.).
Here, the Amended Complaint is “anything but ‘simple, concise, and direct.’” See Binsack,
438 F. App’x at 160 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1)). Indeed, the Amended Complaint contains
no specific allegations regarding K1 and refers to both Defendants collectively as the “Corporate
Defendants” over two dozen times without distinguishing the alleged conduct of either party. (See
generally Am. Compl.). The use of such vague group pleading “undermines the notice pleading
regime of Rule 8,” since it improperly seeks to make all defendants liable for all conduct alleged

in the complaint. See, e.g., Japhet, 2014 WL 3809173, at *2; Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell, No.
14-0855, 2015 WL 3613499, at *5 (D.N.J. June 9, 2015) (“[T]o the extent [p]laintiff seeks to lump
several defendants together without setting forth what each particular defendant is alleged to have
done, he has engaged in impermissibly vague group pleading.”).
Finally, the Court cannot consider any factual assertions regarding K1 in Plaintiff’s
opposition brief that are absent from her Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel.
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint
may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” (citation modified)).
Accordingly, defendant K1 is DISMISSED from this action.
8
B. The Court Must Dismiss Plaintiff’s NJLAD Claims (Counts I & IV)
i. Plaintiff’s Hostile Work Environment Claim is Time-Barred
(Count I)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s NJLAD hostile work environment claim based on her
gender should be dismissed as time-barred. (Mov. Br. at 6). They claim that the alleged “touching
incident” at issue occurred on January 25, 2023, and that a two-year statute of limitations applies
to Plaintiff’s claim. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim expired on January
25, 2025. (Id.). Plaintiff filed this action three months later, on April 23, 2025. (See D.E. No. 1
(“Compl.”)).
Plaintiff’s opposition focuses on alleged conduct that occurred shortly before her
termination. (Opp. Br. at 5–6 (claiming that “the actions of discrimination, hostility, [and]
retaliation led up to the August 9, 2024 termination”)). As best as this Court can decipher, Plaintiff
asserts that she filed a “notice [of claim]” for “hostile work environment and retaliation” on May
17, 2024. (Opp. Br. at 5; see also id. at 6 (arguing that “Defendants were formally advised of her
legal representation on or about May 17, 2024”)). Less than three months later, on July 1, 2024,
Plaintiff received the PIP from a new manager. (Id. at 6). On August 9, 2024, Defendants
terminated Plaintiff. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff invokes the continuing violations doctrine arguing that
she may “pursue a claim for discriminatory conduct if she can demonstrate that each asserted act
[by] Defendants is part of a pattern and at least one of those acts occurred within the statutory

limitations period.” (Id.).
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s NJLAD hostile work environment claim based on the
January 25, 2023 incident is time-barred. “The [NJ]LAD is [ ] controlled by a two-year statute of
limitations, which begins to run on the date of the final act of harassment.” Rowen v. City of
9
Bayonne, No. 07-4237, 2009 WL 1470424, at *5 (D.N.J. May 26, 2009) (citing Montells v.
Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 658–60 (N.J. 1993)); see also Rutledge v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n AFL-
CIO, 701 F. App’x 156, 162 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017). Relevant here, the only allegations of harassment
occurred on January 25, 2023—the day the Executive allegedly touched Plaintiff while at a work

event in Florida. (See generally Am. Compl.). Plaintiff asserts that on February 1, 2023, seven
days after the incident, the Executed was fired. (See id. ¶ 15). She does not allege that any other
individual inappropriately touched or harassed her after January 25, 2023. (See generally Am.
Compl.). Accordingly, under the NJLAD’s two-year limitations period, Plaintiff had until January
25, 2025, to file her hostile work environment claim. However, she filed the original complaint in
this matter nearly three months later, on April 23, 2025.6 (See Compl.). Furthermore, Defendants
correctly note that Plaintiff’s opposition “conflates her hostile work environment claim with her
retaliation claim.” (Reply Br. at 5). Indeed, Defendants make clear that they do not seek dismissal
of Plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claim under the statute of limitations. (See Mov. Br. at 6; Reply
Br. at 5). For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the continuing violations doctrine
is unavailing.7

Thus, the Court DISMISSES Count I, specifically Plaintiff’s NJLAD hostile work
environment claim, without prejudice as time barred under the two-year statute of limitations.

6 While not dispositive, Plaintiff asserts that she filed this action on April 4, 2025. (Opp Br. at 5). However,
the docket reflects that Plaintiff filed this action on April 23, 2025. (Compl.). Moreover, the original complaint is
signed and dated April 23, 2025. (Id. at 13).
7 In addition, Plaintiff does not plead allegations that reflect a “notice [of claim]” to Defendants dated May 17,
2024. (See Opp. Br. at 5). This fact appears for the first time in Plaintiff’s opposition brief, and, as noted above,
Plaintiff cannot amend her pleading in opposition to Defendant’s Motion. See Com. of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman, 836
F.2d at 181. Furthermore, Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s Motion to dismiss her retaliation claim by citing the three-
year statute of limitations for sexual assault under a Florida criminal statute. (See Opp. Br. at 2 & n.1). However,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not clearly set forth a separate claim under Florida law—nor has Plaintiff
established a private right of action under Florida’s criminal statute.
10
Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s NJLAD hostile work environment claim is time barred,
it need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments.8
ii. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Retaliation Claim (Count IV)
With regards to Plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claim, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has

failed to plead any connection between her alleged sexual assault and termination. (See Mov. Br.
at 7 (“Plaintiff has not pled a single fact that would even remotely suggest a connection between
Plaintiff reporting the incident in January 2023—to which Plaintiff admits the Company responded
immediately and fired the employee in question within days—and her eventual separation twenty
months later in August of 2024.”)). By contrast, the Amended Complaint reflects that for over a
year after the alleged incident in January 2023, Plaintiff received promotions, salary increases, and
additional benefits. (Id.). At bottom, Defendants argue that while Plaintiff’s termination is an
adverse employment action, it occurred over one year after Plaintiff’s reporting of the incident
“with intervening positive actions taken towards [her]” in the interim. (Id. at 9). As such, Plaintiff
“cannot, as a matter of law, meet th[e] standard to state a claim for retaliation.” (Id. (collecting

8 Placing the statute of limitations aside, the Court doubts whether Plaintiff has, at this stage, alleged a prima
facie claim for hostile work environment under the NJLAD. A claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment
has four elements: The plaintiff “must show that the complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the
employee’s protected status, and was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable person believe that (4)
the conditions of employment have been altered and that the working environment is hostile or abusive.” Shepherd
v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 625 (N.J. 2002).

The first element does not appear to be in dispute. See Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 454 (“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges
that she has been subjected to sexual touchings . . . , she has established that the harassment occurred because of her
sex.”). However, Defendants seem to argue that the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment were not altered by severe
or pervasive conduct because (i) the Executive was fired shortly after the incident and (ii) Plaintiff allegedly settled
her claims against the Executive separately. Regardless of any separate claims Plaintiff resolved with the Executive
individually, it remains true, based on operative pleading, that the touching incident was reported quickly and handled
by senior personnel. Thereafter, Plaintiff received promotions and salary increases following the alleged incident.
Furthermore, as noted above, Plaintiff does not allege that she experienced any additional severe or pervasive conduct
after the January 25, 2023 incident. For these reasons, the Court doubts whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that
the severe or pervasive conduct would make a reasonable person believe that the conditions of her employment were
altered.
11
cases)).
In opposing Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff’s theory of retaliation shifts. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is replete with allegations that Defendants retaliated against her based on
Plaintiff’s reporting of the alleged incident in or around the time it occurred in late January 2023.

(See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 23). Now, however, Plaintiff appears to argue that the retaliation occurred
after her counsel sent Defendants “a notice [of claim]” for her “hostile work environment and
retaliation claims” on May 17, 2024. (Opp. Br. at 5; see id. at 6 (arguing that “Defendants were
formally advised of her legal representation on or about May 17, 2024”)). Plaintiff asserts that
forty-four days later, on July 1, 2024, she received a PIP. (Id. at 6). And on August 9, 2024,
eighty-three days after the May 17, 2024 notice, Plaintiff was terminated. (Id.).
Under the NJLAD, an employer may not retaliate against an employee because that
employee “has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under [NJLAD] or because that person has
. . . filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [NJLAD].” N.J. Stat. Ann. §
10:5-12(d); see also Cortes v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 391 F. Supp. 2d 298, 314 (D.N.J.

2005). “To state a prima facie case for retaliation under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that
she (1) engaged in protected activity, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)
that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.” Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 605 (D.N.J. 2016). To constitute
protected activity, the complaint must be specific enough to notify the employer of the type of
discrimination at issue. Sanchez v. SunGard Availability Servs. LP, 362 F. App’x 283, 288 (3d
Cir. 2010). Moreover, “causation may be inferred from temporal proximity: i.e., protected conduct
that is closely followed by the adverse action.” Maddox v. City of Newark, 50 F. Supp. 3d 606,
623 (D.N.J. 2014) (first citing House v. Carter–Wallace, 556 A.2d 353 (N.J. 1989); and then citing
12
Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 644 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1986) (citation modified)).
However, to allege an inference of discrimination, “temporal proximity . . . must be ‘very close.’”
Id. at 623–24 (quoting Clark Cnty Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)).
As noted above, the operative pleading does not allege any conduct, notice, or other

communication that occurred on May 17, 2024, and Plaintiff cannot amend her complaint in
opposition to Defendant’s Motion. (See generally Am. Compl.). Thus, based on the Amended
Complaint, the only protected activity is Plaintiff’s alleged “reporting [of the Executive’s]
lascivious behavior during a Company Event.” (See id. ¶ 23). Although Plaintiff does not specify
when she reported the alleged incident, a plausible reading of the Amended Complaint suggests
that it occurred shortly after the incident occurred on January 25, 2023. Indeed, it was Plaintiff’s
(and others’) alleged reporting of the incident that culminated in the Executive’s termination on
February 1, 2023; the same reporting also prompted multiple other executives to check-in with
Plaintiff regarding her well-being. (See id. ¶¶ 14–16 & 23).
Because Plaintiff’s alleged reporting of the January 25, 2023 incident occurred over a year

before her termination on August 9, 2024, she has not established a causal connection between her
protected activity and termination. See, e.g., Maddox, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 624 (finding that the
termination “did not ‘closely follow’ the protected activity” because “it occurred 15 months later”
(collecting cases)); see also Mercer v. SEPTA, 608 F. App’x 60, 65 (3d Cir. 2015) (stating, under
Title VII’s framework that is equally applicable to NJLAD, that “[t]he adverse action must occur
within days, not months, of the protected activity”). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Count
IV, specifically Plaintiff’s NJLAD retaliation claim, without prejudice for failure to state a claim.9

9 The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim with prejudice. (See Reply Br. at 6 n.4 (arguing
that amendment would be futile because Plaintiff’s counsel now knows that she “voluntarily resigned and was not
13
iii. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Gender Discrimination Claim (Count I)
Although difficult to discern whether Plaintiff intended to pursue a separate claim for
gender discrimination under the NJLAD (indeed, Defendants do not move on this potential claim),
the Court sua sponte assesses this possible claim for judicial economy and completeness. See

Malat v. Borough of Magnolia, No. 19-14841, 2020 WL 2553858, at *2 n.3 (D.N.J. May 20, 2020)
(“District courts may dismiss claims that do not state causes of action sua sponte.” (citing Bintliff–
Ritchie v. Am. Reinsurance Co., 285 F. App’x 940, 943 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The District Court has the
power to dismiss claims sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6).”))).
To state a claim for gender discrimination under the NJLAD, “a plaintiff must allege that
she (1) is a member of a designated protected class; (2) was qualified for and performing the
essential functions of the job; (3) suffered termination or adverse employment action; and (4)
others not in the protected class did not suffer similar adverse employment decisions.” Gross v.
City of Jersey City, No. 18-9802, 2019 WL 2120312, at *4 (D.N.J. May 15, 2019) (citing Victor
v. State, 4 A.3d 126, 141 (N.J. 2010)). The Third Circuit has noted that “an adverse employment

action is one which is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.” Id. (quoting Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263
(3d Cir. 2001)). “Harassment alone is not enough.” Id. (quoting Ivan v. Cnty of Middlesex, 595
F. Supp. 2d 425, 470 (D.N.J. 2009)).
Here, the word “gender” appears in the Amended Complaint twice—solely in Count I’s
title/header. (Am. Compl. at 6; see also Opp. Br. at 5 (noting that on May 17, 2024, Plaintiff’s
counsel notified Defendants of her “claims of gender discrimination, hostility, disparate

terminated”)). Defendants’ argument, much like Plaintiff’s opposition brief, rests on information outside the four
corners of the Amended Compliant.
14
treatment”)). Fatal to this potential claim, however, is Plaintiff’s failure to allege that her male
counterparts did not suffer similar adverse employment actions, i.e., termination combined with
inadequate compensation. (See generally Am. Compl.). In addition, Plaintiff does not clearly
allege that Defendants terminated her because of her gender. (See generally id.). Accordingly,

to the extent Plaintiff intended to raise a gender discrimination claim under the NJLAD, she has
not sufficiently alleged a claim for relief. Thus, Count One, specifically Plaintiff’s purported
NJLAD claim for gender discrimination, is DISMISSED without prejudice.
C. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Fraud and Conspiracy Claims (Count III)
Next, Defendants argue that “the allegation that the Company changed its commission plan
and offered a new plan—which Plaintiff signed—fails to plead a single element of either fraud or
conspiracy to commit fraud.” (Mov. Br. at 11). They further contend that “the vague and
conclusory allegations entirely lack the level of detail necessary to meet the heightened pleading
standard for a fraud claim” and fail to put them on notice of the “‘precise misconduct’ charged
against them.” (Id. (quoting Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201 (3d Cir. 2007))).

Plaintiff opposes, noting that the statute of limitations for fraud and conspiracy to commit
fraud claims is six years; however, Defendants do not move to dismiss these claims on statute of
limitations grounds. (Opp. Br. at 7).10 She also argues that her “performance was so impressive
that a 20% annual increase and automotive allowance was effective May 1, 2024.” (Id.). She
continues to note that Defendants received notice of her claims on May 17, 2024. (Id.). Plaintiff
then quotes Paragraphs 33 and 34 of her Amended Complaint and asserts that the explanation in

10 Plaintiff makes similar statute of limitations assertions that are not at issue with respect to her remaining
claims. (See Opp. Br. at 8).
15
Paragraphs 32 to 36 of the same “significantly meets the requirements of” Rule 8 such that “the
12(b)(6) motion should be denied.” (Id. at 8).
When a motion to dismiss involves an action for fraud, a plaintiff may not rely merely on
conclusory statements, but must instead indicate at the very least who made the material

misrepresentation giving rise to the claim and what specific representations were made to comply
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. MedQuist Inc., 516 F.
Supp. 2d 370, 380 (D.N.J. 2007); see also Grant v. Turner, No. 09-2381, 2010 WL 4004719, at
*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (applying heightened pleading standard to state-law fraud claims). To
satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff “must plead with particularity the circumstances of the alleged fraud
in order to place the defendants on notice of the precise misconduct with which they are charged,
and to safeguard defendants against spurious charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior.” Lum
v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). “To place the
defendant on notice of the precise misconduct with which it is charged, a plaintiff must plead or
allege the date, time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure

of substantiation into a fraud allegation, and must allege who made a misrepresentation to whom
and the general content of the misrepresentation.” Hlista v. Safeguard Props., LLC, 649 F. App’x
217, 221 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
“The standard for establishing a claim of common law fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and fraudulent inducement under New Jersey law is the same”—a plaintiff must allege “(1) a
material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the
defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance
thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.” Kare Distrib., Inc. v. Jam Labels & Cards
LLC, No. 09-0969, 2009 WL 3297555, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2009) (quoting Banco Popular N. Am.
16
v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253, 260 (N.J. 2005)). “Misrepresentation and reliance are the hallmarks of
any fraud claim, and a fraud cause of action fails without them.” Banco Popular N. Am., 876 A.2d
at 261. “An alleged misrepresentation must be premised upon an assertion that is not in accord
with the facts.” Read v. Profeta, 397 F. Supp. 3d 597, 635 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 159 cmt. a, c (1981)). “However, the assertion ‘must relate to something
that is a fact at the time the assertion is made in order to be a misrepresentation. Such facts include
past events as well as present circumstances but do not include future events.’” Id. “Indeed, in
order to constitute a fact, a statement’s content must be susceptible of ‘exact knowledge’ at the
time it is made.” Id. (quoting Alexander v. CIGNA Corp., 991 F. Supp. 427, 435 (D.N.J.) aff’d,
172 F.3d 859 (3d Cir. 1998)).
To state a valid claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must allege “(1) a combination of two or
more persons; (2) a real agreement or confederation with a common design; (3) the existence of
an unlawful purpose, or of a lawful purpose to be achieved by unlawful means; and (4) proof of
special damages.” Morganroth & Morganroth v. Morris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d

406, 414 (3d Cir. 2003). In addition, “to succeed on a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must
assert an underlying tort claim.” Trico Equip., Inc. v. Manor, No. 08-5561, 2011 WL 705703, at
*8 (D.N.J. Feb.22, 2011) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F.Supp.2d 460, 496 (D.N.J.
1998)). In other words, civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action, and conspiracy
liability depends on liability for the underlying tort. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s common law fraud claim fails to meet the basic tenants of
Rules 8(a) and 9(b). First, the alleged misrepresentations Defendants purportedly made remain
unclear. While Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendants materially misrepresented commissions
owed to her at the time of her termination, she does not allege the content of those
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misrepresentations with specificity, who made them, or exactly when they occurred—whether on
the day of Plaintiff’s termination (i.e., August 9, 2024), or sometime thereafter. (See Am. Compl.
¶ 36). Furthermore, Plaintiff seems to allege that Defendants’ purported misrepresentations
contradicted her Commissions Agreement; however, the Amended Complaint lacks specific

allegations regarding the agreement’s exact terms, particularly those terms that govern a
termination. (See id.). Second, Plaintiff does not plead whether Defendants knew or believed that
their alleged misstatements were false. (See generally id. ¶¶ 32–26). Finally, while Plaintiff
maintains that Defendants intended to defraud her and that she reasonably relied on her
Commissions Agreement to her detriment (see id. ¶ 36), these barebone recitations of legal
elements are insufficient to survive Defendants’ Motion.
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for common law fraud under Rule 8(a) and
Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. In addition, because Plaintiff has not pled a predicate
claim for common law fraud, she cannot maintain a separate claim for conspiracy to commit fraud.
Thus, Count III is DISMISSED without prejudice.

D. The Court Must Dismiss Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claims (Counts II,
V, & VI)

i. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Breach of Contract Claim (Count II)
With respect to Count II, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead a single contractual
provision or amount allegedly owed to her in support of her breach of contract claim. (Mov. Br.
at 12). Plaintiff opposes, claiming that she “has clearly pled” that Defendants “violated the
Contract, i.e., Sales Compensation Plan signed on February 8, 2024.” (Opp. Br. at 8). She argues
that she “did not receive the monies, compensation, and commissions owed to her” upon her
termination on August 9, 2024. (Id. at 9). She further asserts that she “was not renumerated the
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monies owed and contracts earned.” (Id. (citing “Contract ¶ 9”)).
“To establish a breach of contract claim under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the parties entered into a valid contract, (2) the defendant failed to perform her obligations
under the contract, and (3) she sustained damages as a result.” Ensey v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 663

F. App’x 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation modified). When assessing a breach of contract claim,
“[t]he court determines what obligations the parties owed each other, often by interpreting the
express contract, and decides if one party failed to do what it promised.” Dougherty v. Drew Univ.,
534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 373 (D.N.J. 2021) (citing Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 206 A.3d
386, 392 (N.J. 2019)).
The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to plead a breach of contract claim. As a
preliminary matter, the exact contract(s) at issue remains unclear. Indeed, the allegations specific
to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fail to identify the name of the contract allegedly breached.
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 28 (alleging that “[t]he Contract set forth contractual obligations on [the
parties]” and that Plaintiff “performed all of the obligations under the terms of the contract”)). In

other paragraphs, the Amended Complaint refers to both a “Sales Compensation Plan” and a
“Commissions Agreement.” (Id. ¶¶ 19 & 36). Notwithstanding these ambiguities, Plaintiff failed
to plead any specific contractual obligation Defendants allegedly breached. (See generally id.).
Plaintiff’s citation to “Contract ¶ 9” is of no moment because she did not append the contract(s) at
issue to her pleading or her opposition brief. (See generally id.; see also Opp. Br.). Similarly,
Plaintiff has not identified the amount of compensation she received in connection with her
termination, if any. (See generally Am. Compl.). Nor did Plaintiff allege the specific amount of
compensation she is allegedly owed. (See generally id.). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim is woefully deficient. Accordingly, Count II is DISMISSED without prejudice.
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ii. Plaintiff Fails to Plead an Unjust Enrichment Claim (Count V)
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, also premised on alleged
unpaid commissions, fails because she did not plead “any amount(s) that she is actually owed.”
(Mov. Br. at 12–13). Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment (Count

V) is “entirely duplicative” of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim (Count II) because both appear
to rest on the same allegedly unpaid commissions that Plaintiff claims are governed by the parties’
express (albeit unidentified) contract. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff opposes, offering the same arguments
noted above in connection with her breach of contract claim. (See Opp. Br. at 8–9). She also
argues that “Defendants retained the promised Commissions and the Benefits of [her] hard work”
and that “this is the unjust enrichment.” (Id. at 9).
Under New Jersey law, to state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege “both
that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be
unjust.” Hughes v. Panasonic Consumer Elecs. Co., No. 10-0846, 2011 WL 2976839, at *26
(D.N.J. July 21, 2011) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 922 A.2d 710, 723 (N.J. 2007)).

Unjust enrichment also “requires that [a] plaintiff show that it expected remuneration from the
defendant at the time it performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure of
remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights.” VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Co.,
641 A.2d 519, 526 (N.J. 1994) (emphasis added).
“Unjust enrichment is not an independent theory of liability”; rather, it “is the basis for a
claim of quasi-contractual liability.” Hatteras Press, Inc. v. Avanti Comput. Sys. Ltd., No. 16-
5420, 2017 WL 2838349, at *5 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (quoting Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. N.J.
Turnpike Auth., A.2d 262, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992), aff’d, 645 A.2d 1194 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994)). Thus, “under New Jersey law, liability based on quasi-contractual principles
20
cannot be imposed ‘if an express contract exists concerning the identical matter.’” Freightmaster
USA, LLC v. Fedex, Inc., No. 14-3229, 2015 WL 1472665, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015) (quoting
Suburban Transfer Serv., Inc. v. Beech Holdings, Inc., 716 F.2d 220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Accordingly, “[r]ecovery for unjust enrichment cannot exist when there is an enforceable

agreement among parties.” Gujja v. Inpatient Servs. of N.J., P.C., No. 21-19416, 2022 WL
2834998, at *2 (D.N.J. July 20, 2022) (citing Hatteras Press, Inc., 2017 WL 2838349, at *5).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not pled an independent basis for an unjust enrichment
claim. The Amended Complaint, even when read in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff as the
non-movant, alleges that Defendants failed to renumerate commissions owed to Plaintiff pursuant
to one or more contractual obligations between the parties. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 42 (claiming
that “Defendants received the benefit of services provided by Plaintiff . . . without paying Plaintiff
Robertson in full for these services, i.e. commissions owed”)). Based on a complete reading of
the allegations, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is duplicative of her breach of contract claim.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim fails. Thus, Count V is DISMISSED

without prejudice.
iii. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Claim for Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count VI)

Similarly, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing “must allege something more than a breach of contract.” (Mov. Br. at
14). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s termination, allegedly done without “good cause” (see Am.
Compl. ¶ 48), cannot form the basis of a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. (Mov. Br. at 14). Specifically, they claim that “nothing in the commission
agreement entitled Plaintiff to ongoing guaranteed employment, employment for any specified
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period of time, or employment absent ‘good cause’—nor has Plaintiff alleged any reasonable
expectation to the contrary.” (Id.). In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff “fails to plead
any conduct that violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to her
rights under any contract.” (Id.). Nor does Plaintiff’s PIP support such a claim. (Id. at 14–15).

Plaintiff opposes for the same reasons noted above in connection with Counts II and V. (See Opp.
Br. at 8–9). In addition, she states that the “covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in
every contract in New Jersey.” (Id. at 8).
“Every party to a contract . . . is bound by a duty of good faith and fair dealing in both the
performance and enforcement of the contract.” Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18
Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 395 (N.J. 2005). “The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing calls for parties to a contract to refrain from doing ‘anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive’ the benefits of the contract.” Id. at
396 (quoting Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 207 A.2d 522, 531 (N.J. 1965)). Proof of “bad
motive or intention” is essential to an action for breach of the covenant. Wilson v. Amerada Hess

Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 (N.J. 2001). Importantly, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
involves an implied duty, and a breach of such implied covenants must differ from a literal
violation of the contract. Wade v. Kessler Inst., 798 A.2d 1251, 1259 (N.J. 2002); see Brunswick
Hills Racquet Club, Inc., 864 A.2d at 396 (“A plaintiff may be entitled to relief under the covenant
[of good faith and fair dealing] if its reasonable expectations are destroyed when a defendant acts
with ill motives and without any legitimate purpose.”). In addition, “a plaintiff may get relief if it
relies to its detriment on a defendant’s intentional misleading assertions.” Brunswick Hills
Racquet Club, Inc., 864 A.2d at 396 (citing Bak–A–Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc., 351
A.2d 349, 352 (N.J. 1976)).
22
Courts generally apply claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in three ways, including: (i) to “permit[ ] the inclusion of terms and conditions not
expressly set forth in the written contract”; (ii) “to allow redress for bad faith performance of an
agreement even where the defendant has not breached any express term”; and (iii) to “permit[ ]

inquiry into a party’s exercise of discretion expressly granted by the contract’s terms.” Adler
Eng’rs, Inc. v. Dranoff Props., Inc., No. 14-0921, 2014 WL 5475189, at *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2014)
(citing Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1076 (N.J. App. Div. 2002)). Notably,
however, a claimant “may not maintain a separate action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing [where] it would be duplicative of [its] breach of contract claim.” Id.
(quoting Hahn v. OnBoard LLC, No. 09-3639, 2009 WL 4508580, at * 6 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2009)).
Here, the Court cannot readily distinguish any separate basis for Plaintiff’s claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (See generally Am. Compl.). Indeed,
Plaintiff has not provided any terms that govern the parties’ purported agreement(s), let alone terms
that were not expressly set forth therein. For the same reasons, it is impossible to assess whether

Count VI is premised on an improper exercise of contractual discretion afforded to Defendants.
Significant here, the Amended Complaint does not allege any bad faith conduct carried out by the
Defendants. (See generally id.). Although Plaintiff alleges that she received a PIP in mid-2024,
the Amended Complaint is bereft of allegations that suggest the PIP resulted from an ill motive or
bad faith held by the Defendants. (See id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff’s assertion that her new manager
implemented the PIP because she “was positioned to terminate Plaintiff,” without more, is
conclusory and thus insufficient to sustain a claim for breach of the implied covenant. (See id.).
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to allege a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Accordingly, Count VI is DISMISSED without prejudice.
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E. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Claim for Violation of the NJWPL (Count VII)
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s failure to plead any specific amounts owed to her
is detrimental to her claim for alleged violation of the NJWPL. (Mov. Br. at 15). In addition, they
argue that “[t]o the extent this claim is based upon a theory that she would have earned additional

amounts if she had continued working, such speculative damages are not wages and are not
recoverable under the NJ[WPL].” (Id.). Plaintiff opposes for the same reasons noted above in
connection with Counts II, V, and VI. (Opp. Br. at 8–9). She does not oppose the Motion with
any specific arguments regarding her claim under the NJWPL. (See id.).
The New Jersey Wage Payment Law is considered a “remedial statute” that “governs the
time and mode of payment of wages due to employees.” Musker v. Suuchi, Inc., 331 A.3d 900,
905 (N.J. 2025) (quoting Maia v. IEW Constr. Grp., 313 A.3d 887, 895 (N.J. 2024)). It “is
designed to protect an employee’s wages and to assure timely and predictable payment.” Hargrove
v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 463 (N.J. 2015). Under the statute, an employer generally “must
pay an employee at least twice during a calendar month.” Id. at 457 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11–

4.2). The NJWPL establishes “a minimum wage” in addition to “an overtime rate for each hour
of work in excess of forty hours in any week for certain employees.” Id. at 458 (citing N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 34:11-56a4). Pursuant to the NJWPL “every employee . . . shall have a right of civil action
against any . . . employer for the full amount of his wages in any court of competent jurisdiction
in this State.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.7.
For the same reasons noted above with respect to Counts II, V, and VI, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim under the NJWPL because she does not allege any specific dollar amount owed to
her pursuant to the parties’ agreement(s). (See generally Am. Compl.). Nor does she claim that
Defendants failed to pay her a minimum wage, overtime, or on a bi-monthly basis. (See generally
24
id.). To the extent Plaintiff’s NJWPL claim is premised on another alleged failure by Defendants,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and opposition brief fail to adequately set forth a clear alternative
basis for relief under the statute. (See generally Am. Compl.; see also Opp. Br.). Moreover, as
this Court has previously noted in connection with post-termination pay, a plaintiff “may not bring

a claim under the [NJWPL] for future salary.” Pickholz v. Transparentbusiness, Inc., No. 22-2504,
2025 WL 1779165, at *8 (D.N.J. June 26, 2025) (citing Sud v. Ness USA, No. 21-12330, 2022 WL
1963711, at *4 (D.N.J. June 6, 2022)). Accordingly, Count VII is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Opinion.

s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355690. Public record. Not legal advice.