# DZIADOSZ

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355612

## Case

- **Full name:** Julia Magdalena Dziadosz v. Merrick Garland, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355612

## Opinion text

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JULIA MAGDALENA DZIADOSZ,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 24-10829 (ES)

v. OPINION

MERRICK GARLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants’ Merrick Garland, Alejandro Mayorkas, Ur Mendoza
Jaddou, Christopher A. Wray, and Connie Nolan’s, (collectively “Defendants”) motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Julia Magdalena Dziadosz’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (D.E. No. 1 (“Complaint” or
“Compl.”)). (D.E. No. 15 (“Motion”)). The Court has carefully considered the parties’
submissions, (D.E. No. 15-1 (“Mov. Br.”), D.E. No. 16 (“Opp. Br.”) & D.E. No. 23 (“Reply Br.”)),
as well as the balance of the record, and decides the matter without oral argument. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion and dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a citizen of Poland who, at approximately three years of age, entered the United
States on April 26, 2006, through Newark Liberty International Airport. (Compl. ¶¶ 4(a)–(b) &
12). On March 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
using Form I-821D with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). (Id. ¶¶
2 & 29). On the same day, Plaintiff filed a corresponding application for employment
authorization using Form I-765. (Id. ¶¶ 2 & 29).1 On May 25, 2021, following the submission of
her Applications, Plaintiff attended a biometrics appointment in Hackensack, New Jersey. (Id. ¶¶
7 & 33). At the time of filing her Complaint, Plaintiff’s case status remained unchanged and

USCIS had not adjudicated her Applications. (Id. ¶¶ 33 & 35).
Plaintiff maintains that she was eligible for DACA and employment authorization at the
time she filed her Applications because (i) as of June 15, 2022, she was under the age of thirty-
one; (ii) she entered the United States on April 26, 2006, “in B1/B2 status”; (iii) she remained in
the United States after her lawful status expired on October 23, 2006; and (iv) she has no lawful
immigration status as of June 15, 2012. (Id. ¶ 31). Plaintiff also alleges that (i) she has resided in
the United States since June 15, 2012; (ii) entered the United States before her sixteenth birthday;
(iii) remained physically present in the United States at the time of filing her Applications; (iv) has
no lawful immigration status; and (v) graduated from high school in the United States. (Id. ¶ 32).
Plaintiff further alleges that the USCIS’s delay in resolving her Applications has caused

her significant harm, including deprivation of the benefits associated with DACA, such as
protection from deportation and the ability to work lawfully in the United States. (Id. ¶ 45). In
addition, she suffers from emotional distress, including fear, despair, and uncertainty. (Id.).
Plaintiff maintains that she exhausted all administrative remedies before bringing this action. (Id.
¶¶ 46–47).

1 For ease of reference, the Court sometimes refers to Plaintiff’s DACA and employment authorization
applications together as “Applications.” Indeed, as Plaintiff correctly maintains, “[u]nder 8 CFR [§] 274a.12(c)(33),
an individual who has been granted deferred action under 8 CFR [§§] 236.21 through 236.23, [DACA], may receive
employment authorization for the period of deferred action, provided they can demonstrate ‘an economic necessity
for employment.’” (Compl. ¶ 28 (quoting 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(33))). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s employment authorization
application is “related” to and dependent on her receipt of DACA status. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 34). For this reason, the
Court’s analysis below focuses solely on Plaintiff’s DACA application.
Based on the foregoing allegations, on November 29, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this
matter by filing a three-count Complaint. (See generally id.). First, Plaintiff seeks relief under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., claiming that Defendants have
unreasonably delayed the adjudication of her Applications. (Id. ¶¶ 48–55). Second, Plaintiff asks

the Court to invoke the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, to compel Defendants to process her
Applications. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57). Third, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions deprive her of a
protected interest in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 58–59).
Plaintiff requests, among other things, that this Court (i) declare as unlawful Defendants’ failure
to adjudicate her Applications; (ii) order Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiff’s Applications within
30 days; and (iii) award Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees. (Id. ¶ 60).
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12 (b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See generally Mov. Br.). Defendants’ motion
is fully briefed. (See generally Opp. Br. & Reply Br.).
B. Relevant DACA Litigation
Plaintiff’s Complaint acknowledges litigation involving DACA in the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that directly implicates this matter. As originally implemented,
DACA allowed the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to grant deferred action from
removal to those who entered the United States unlawfully as children, provided that they met
certain criteria. See Memorandum, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Security, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-
came-to-us-as-children.pdf (“June 2012 Memorandum” or “June 2012 Mem.”).
Relevant here, on July 16, 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas resolved competing motions for summary judgment and held that “DHS violated the APA
with the creation of DACA and its continued operation.” Texas v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 3d
572, 624 (S.D. Tex. 2021). The district court therefore vacated the “DACA Memorandum and the
DACA program” that DHS created, and “remanded to DHS for further consideration.” Id. In
addition, the court temporarily stayed “the order of immediate vacatur” as it applied “to current

DACA recipients” until further order from either the Southern District of Texas, the Fifth Circuit,
or the United States Supreme Court. Id. Further, while the decision provided that “DHS may
continue to accept new DACA applications and renewal DACA applications,” it also explicitly
enjoined DHS “from approving any new DACA applications and granting the attendant status.”
Id.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the district court’s decision, including its ruling that
while “DHS may continue to accept new and renewal DACA applications” it was enjoined “from
approving any new DACA applications.” Texas v. United States, 50 F.4th 498, 508 (5th Cir. 2022)
(emphasis added). It further noted that the “district court’s judgment does prohibit the grant of
DACA status to those who were not presently DACA recipients at the time of the district court’s

judgment.” Id. at 529 (emphasis added). Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision in-
part insofar as the lower court (i) held that DACA violated procedural and substantive
requirements of the APA and (ii) implemented a nationwide injunction without abusing its
discretion. Id. at 524, 528 & 531. With respect to the nationwide injunction, the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the district court based on its “reading of circuit precedent,” specifically, that “‘broad
relief is appropriate to ensure uniformity and consistency in enforcement’” of immigration law.
Id. at 531 (quoting Texas v. United States, 40 F.4th 205, 229 n.18 (5th Cir. 2022)).2

2 The Fifth Circuit remanded in-part “to the district court rather than DHS in light of a final rule promulgated
by DHS in August 2022.” Id. at 508; see also Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS Issues
Regulation to Preserve and Fortify DACA (Aug. 24, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/archive/news/2022/08/24/dhs-
issues-regulation-preserve-and-fortify-daca.
On September 13, 2023, the district court issued a decision on remand. Texas v. United
States, 691 F. Supp. 3d 763 (S.D. Tex. 2023). The court found that “the Final Rule, like the 2012
DACA Memorandum before it, is subject to th[e] [c]ourt’s (and the Fifth Circuit’s) prior rulings”
such that “[t]here are no material differences between the two programs.” Id. at 796. It further

held that the “existing injunction and vacatur order” were “supplemented to include the Final Rule”
and noted that the “remaining provisions of that injunction order remain[ed] intact.” Id.
On January 17, 2025, in a second round before the Fifth Circuit, the Court of Appeals
limited the nationwide injunction to the state of Texas only, finding that “the balance of the equities
outweigh[ed]” the “interest of uniformity in immigration laws.” Texas v. United States, 126 F.4th
392, 421 (5th Cir. 2025). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit similarly “limit[ed] . . . the effectiveness
of the vacatur of the Final Rule” to Texas and “require[d] such relief to heed DACA’s severability
provision.” Id. at 422.3 Defendants contend that “[i]t was not until March 11, 2025, that the Fifth
Circuit’s mandate issued, modifying the injunction and limiting it to Texas.” (Reply Br. at 7 (ECF
Pagination)). Thus, March 11, 2025, “was the earliest date at which the agency could restart initial

DACA adjudications.” (Id.).
Here, Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 29, 2024—nearly two months before the
Fifth Circuit’s January 17, 2025 decision limiting the nationwide injunction. (See generally
Compl.). In her pleading, Plaintiff acknowledged the September 13, 2023 decision from the
Southern District of Texas that supplemented its July 16, 2021 decision and continued the
nationwide injunction prohibiting the processing, and consequently, the approval of DACA
applications. (See Compl. ¶ 6 (“However, USCIS will continue to accept and process DACA
renewal requests and accompanying applications for employment authorization under the DACA

3 The Court broadly refers to this case history as the “Texas Litigation.”
regulations at 8 CFR 236.22 and 236.23, as it has since October 31, 2022, in accordance with this
decision. USCIS will continue to accept initial requests, but per the order, not process initial
DACA requests.” (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 25)). Notwithstanding this acknowledgment,
Plaintiff “contend[s] that from USCIS’ receipt of Plaintiff’s timely filed Form I-821D,

Consideration of [DACA] and Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization on March
5, 2021, and her subsequent biometrics appointment on May 25, 2021, the Service had, and
remains to have, authority to timely adjudicate Plaintiff’s pending applications.” (Id. ¶ 7).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
The Court can adjudicate a dispute only if it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
asserted claims. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). “Rule 12(b)(1)
governs jurisdictional challenges to a complaint.” Otto v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-8240,
2016 WL 8677313, at *2 (D.N.J. July 15, 2016). “Two types of challenges can be made under
Rule 12(b)(1)—‘either a facial or a factual attack.’” In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data

Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346
(3d Cir. 2016)). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court
must first determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attack, because the “distinction
determines how the pleading [is] reviewed.” Elbeco Inc. v. Nat’l Ret. Fund, 128 F. Supp. 3d 849,
854 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quotation and citation marks omitted). When assessing a facial attack like
the one presented here, a court must only consider “the allegations of the complaint and documents
referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs.
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). In assessing a facial challenge, the Court
accepts the factual allegations as true. See In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer
Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).4
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts “all well-pleaded allegations as true
and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v.
Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878 (3d Cir. 2018). However, “threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements” are all
disregarded. Id. at 878–79 (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir.
2012)). The burden is on the moving party to show that the plaintiff has not stated a facially

plausible cause of action. See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s APA and
Mandamus Act Claims
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the APA and Mandamus Act for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because (i) there is no “congressionally imposed timeline for
processing initial DACA requests and a corresponding Form I-765,” and (ii) Plaintiff “cannot

4 When presented with a factual attack on jurisdiction, the presumption of truth does not apply “and the
existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional
claims.” Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). As such, when assessing a
factual challenge, courts may weigh and consider evidence “outside the pleadings” to decide whether subject matter
jurisdiction is proper. Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
establish that her claim is clear and certain or that USCIS’s duty to adjudicate her requests at any
specific time is plainly prescribed.” (Mov. Br. at 9–10). In addition, Defendants argue that the
Mandamus Act claim fails because Plaintiff has an alternative form of relief—i.e., an APA claim
for undue agency delay. (Id. at 12–13). Even if the Court has jurisdiction, Defendants maintain

that Plaintiff has failed to assert any viable claims. (Id. at 14). The Court first considers
Defendants’ argument regarding jurisdiction as a threshold issue.
Under the Mandamus Act, courts may issue a writ of mandamus “to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28
U.S.C. § 1361. A writ of “‘mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary
situations.’” Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 934 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v.
Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367,
380 (2004) (characterizing a writ of mandamus as “one of the most potent weapons in the judicial
arsenal” (quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, a writ of mandamus “‘is intended to provide a
remedy for a plaintiff only if [s]he has exhausted all other avenues of relief.’” Temple Univ. Hosp.,

Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 2 F.4th 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Heckler
v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)).
Similarly, under Section 706(1) of the APA, federal courts shall “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); see also id. § 555(b) (“[W]ithin
a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.”). However,
“[a]n agency’s failure to act[] . . . is not always remediable.” Azam v. Bitter, No. 23-4137, 2024
WL 912516, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2024) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55,
64 (2004)). The Supreme Court has noted that “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a
plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”
Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (2004) (emphasis in original). Thus, “[Section] 706(1) grants judicial
review only if a federal agency has a ‘ministerial or non-discretionary’ duty amounting to a
‘specific, unequivocal command.’” Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F.3d 664, 670
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Norton, 542 U.S. at 63–64). Moreover, a court may compel a

nondiscretionary action “when the agency is compelled by law to act within a certain time period.”
Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *7 (emphasis added) (quoting Kale v. Mayorkas, No. 21-8095, 2021
WL 2652124, at *4 (D.N.J. June 28, 2021)); see also Qiu v. Chertoff, 486 F. Supp. 2d 412, 421
(D.N.J. 2007) (dismissing APA claim because there was “no statutory or regulatory provision
compelling adjudication within a certain time period”).
Thus, to establish this Court’s jurisdiction under the APA or Mandamus Act5 to compel an
agency to review a DACA application that is alleged to have been unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed, Plaintiff must satisfy two prongs. First, the plaintiff must identify a
mandatory, nondiscretionary duty. See Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *7 (citing Norton, 542 U.S. at
64). Second, Plaintiff must point to “provisions establishing a specific time frame” for

adjudication of her DACA application. See id. (citing Kale, 2021 WL 2652124, at *4) (quotation
marks omitted). If an agency is not required to act by a statutorily required deadline, the court
nevertheless has jurisdiction if a plaintiff alleges improper behavior, “deliberate inaction[,] or bad
faith on the part of the State Department in processing [an] individual [ ] petition.” Id. at *8 (citing
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 781 (2019)). As set forth below, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has not satisfied either prong.

5 The Court considers Plaintiff’s Mandamus Act claim as subsumed under the APA, consistent with other
courts in this district. See Oladoja v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 24-1143, 2025 WL 880010, at *4 n.4 (D.N.J. Mar. 21,
2025) (first citing Bokhari v. Bitter, No. 23-1947, 2024 WL 244211, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2024) (interpreting the
Mandamus Act claim as subsumed by plaintiff’s APA claim and thus “duplicative”); and then citing Azam, 2024 WL
912516, at *4 (“Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed, courts treat claims under the APA and Mandamus Act co-extensively.”)).
i. DACA’s Discretionary Determination
With respect to the first prong, courts in this District have held that USCIS and related
defendants have “a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate visa applications pursuant to
Sections 1202(b) and (d) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act].” Oladoja, 2025 WL 880010,
at *5 (emphasis added); see Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *7 (“Here, [p]laintiff satisfied the first

step by pointing to Section 1202(b)’s final sentence requiring that the State Department review
and adjudicate visa applications.”). However, unlike those matters, Plaintiff’s Complaint is not
based on the submission of a visa application. Instead, Plaintiff’s APA and Mandamus Act claims
rest on her application for DACA status and corresponding employment authorization. Tellingly,
Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ contention that DACA is a “‘regular practice’ in which the
Secretary of Homeland Security exercises her discretion ‘for humanitarian reasons or simply for
[her] own convenience’ to notify an alien of a non-binding decision to forbear from seeking [her]
removal for a designated period.” (Compare Mov. Br. at 3 (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. (“AADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1999)), with Opp. Br. at 5 (conceding
that “[d]eferred action may be discretionary, as argued by the Defendants”); see also Mov. Br. at

12). Rather, Plaintiff maintains—without citation to authority—that “once USCIS has established
a process of accepting [DACA] applications, taking fees, and granting decisions to some
applications, it cannot refuse to act on others with no justification.” (Opp. Br. at 5; see also id. at
6 (“While agencies still have discretion in how they act, they do not have the discretion to plainly
and pointedly not act at all.”)).
Relevant here, the title alone of the June 2012 Memorandum regarding DACA clearly
denotes the discretionary authority afforded under the program: “Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children.” See June
2012 Mem. at 1 (emphasis added). The June 2012 Memorandum concludes by noting that it “[t]his
memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only the
Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer these rights. It remains for the
executive branch, however, to set forth policy for the exercise of discretion within the framework
of the existing law.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). At the outset, the June 2012 Memorandum outlined

that discretionary policy. See id.
In addition, following publication of the Final Rule codifying DACA in August 2022, the
associated regulations make clear that USCIS retains unfettered discretionary authority to evaluate
requests for DACA status. While the regulations set forth a list of “threshold criteria” to consider
before granting DACA status, such determinations may only be made “if USCIS determines in its
sole discretion that the requestor meets” each criterion “and merits a favorable exercise of
discretion.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.22(b) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the regulations provide that
“[d]eferred action requests . . . are determined on a case-by-case basis” such that “[e]ven if the
threshold criteria . . . have been met, USCIS retains the discretion to assess the individual’s
circumstances and to determine that any factor specific to that individual makes deferred action

inappropriate.” Id. § 236.22(c) (emphasis added).
Thus, based on the clear import of the June 2012 Memorandum and DACA’s regulations,
along with Plaintiff’s effective concession, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not identified a
mandatory, nondiscretionary duty that requires USCIS to act on her pending DACA application.6
ii. Timeframe for Adjudication of DACA Applications
With respect to the second prong, the Court considers whether USCIS must adjudicate
DACA applications within a prescribed period. See Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *7. In the

6 Furthermore, as set forth below, even if Plaintiff had identified a non-discretionary duty, the Texas Litigation
effectively halted the processing of new DACA applications for over three years.
Complaint, Plaintiff cites to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) stating that this provision “direct[s] the Attorney
General to conclude adjudication of immigration applications and petitions within a specifically
delineated time” and that “there is no private right of action under subsection (a) of the same U.S.
Code, which confers Plaintiff[] with an enumerated right to a decision on her Application(s).”

(Compl. ¶ 42 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a))). In addition, Plaintiff alleges that “sister courts have
held that the statutory timeframes delineated in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) are instructive for purposes of
determining whether or not a delay is unreasonable.” (Id. ¶ 43 (citing Pesantez v. Johnson, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124508, at 15 (E.D.N.Y. 2015))).
Defendants argue that there has never been a “congressionally imposed timeline for
processing initial DACA requests and a corresponding Form I-765.” (Mov. Br. at 10). They also
maintain that Plaintiff’s citation to the asylum statute in her Complaint is inapposite because it
does not apply to her DACA application. (Id.). Furthermore, Defendants note that Plaintiff failed
to show how USCIS violated their alleged duty to adjudicate Plaintiff’s DACA application “within
a reasonable time” when the nationwide injunction prohibited Defendants from granting such

requests. (Id. at 11).
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that her APA claim “is not based on the absence of a
statutory deadline, but on the fact that there was an unreasonable delay in processing her case.”
(Opp. Br. at 1; see id. at 2–3 (arguing that “courts have the authority to review agency actions
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, even in the absence of a statutory deadline” because
they are “still required to act within a reasonable amount of time”)). She further maintains that
under Defendants’ theory, USCIS “can indefinitely accept benefit-derived applications for status
and collect fees for those applications but take no action.” (Id. at 3–4). Next, she argues that
Defendants declined to address that the nationwide injunction lifted in January 2025, suggesting
that even a few months of delay is unreasonable under the circumstances. (Id.).7
As reflected above, Plaintiff has not identified—nor is this Court aware of—any authority
that compels Defendants to adjudicate DACA applications within a prescribed period of time. As
argued by Defendants, Plaintiff’s citation to the asylum statute is inapplicable to her DACA

application. Indeed, the bulk of Plaintiff’s briefing on the jurisdictional argument effectively
concedes that no deadline for adjudication of DACA applications exists. (See, e.g., Opp. Br. at 2
(noting that the APA “can be applied even in the absence of a specific statutory deadline”)).
Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the alleged unreasonable delay in the adjudication of her
Applications are better suited for issues concerning the merits of her claim.
In the context of visa applications, courts in this District have found that absent “a
statutorily prescribed time by which the Government must adjudicate visa applications,”
jurisdiction may be found “if a plaintiff alleges some form of bad faith, deliberate inaction, or
improper behavior.” Oladoja 2025 WL 880010, at *5 (citing Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *8).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that Defendants have deliberately declined to

adjudicate her DACA application or acted in bad faith. (See generally Compl.). Rather, when
viewed through the lens of the Texas Litigation, the facts as alleged reflect that Defendants have
been prohibited from potentially granting Plaintiff’s DACA application during most of its
pendency—i.e., over three years.
Accordingly, this Court finds that absent allegations of “bad faith, deliberate inaction, or

7 Plaintiff also argues that because we live in a post-Chevron world, this Court may “consider the
reasonableness of a delay without the same bindings to agency deference.” (Opp. Br. at 4 (citing Loper Bright Enters.
v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024))). Although Plaintiff cites to Loper, she does not articulate why or how it
applies to the framework described herein, nor does this Court independently decipher its applicability to this case. In
Loper, the Supreme Court held that “courts need not[,] and under the APA[,] may not defer to an agency interpretation
of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” 603 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added). Relevant here, although Plaintiff
acknowledges Loper’s holding, she has not argued statutory ambiguity. (See generally Opp. Br.). In fact, DACA—
unlike most immigration petitions—is not governed by statute. Similarly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s policy arguments
unavailing.
improper behavior,” it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s APA and Mandamus Act claims. See
Oladoja 2025 WL 880010, at *5; see also Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *8. For these reasons,
Plaintiff’s claims under the APA and Mandamus Act (Counts I–II) are dismissed without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. In the Alternative, Plaintiff’s Claims Fail Under Rule 12(b)(6)
i. Plaintiff’s Claim for Violation of the APA (Count I)
Even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s APA and Mandamus Act
claims, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants’ delay in processing her DACA application and
corresponding employment authorization application was unreasonable.
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to adjudicate her DACA
application and application for employment authorization within a reasonable time as required by
the APA. (Compl. ¶¶ 48–55). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ delay in processing
her Applications—originally filed on March 5, 2021—is unreasonable. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 35–44).
The APA provides a cause of action where agency action is unreasonably delayed. See 5

U.S.C. § 555(b) (“[W]ithin a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter
presented to it.”). The APA further provides that courts shall “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Id. § 706(1). When determining whether Defendants’ delay
has been sufficiently “unreasonable” to support a claim under the APA, the Court must apply the
four-factor balancing test that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated
in Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 145 F.3d 120,
123 (3d Cir. 1998). (Compare Mov. Br. at 14–15, with Opp. Br. at 10).
In Oil, the Third Circuit directed courts to examine the following four factors when
considering whether an agency’s action is “unreasonably delayed” for APA purposes:
First, the court should ascertain the length of time that has elapsed
since the agency came under a duty to act. Second, the
reasonableness of the delay should be judged in the context of the
statute authorizing the agency’s action. Third, the court should
assess the consequences of the agency’s delay. Fourth, the court
should consider any plea of administrative error, administrative
inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying out a legislative
mandate, or need to prioritize in the face of limited resources.

Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123 (citations omitted); see also Telecomms.
Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. Fed. Commc’ns. Comm., 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (setting forth
similar factors for reasonableness under the APA).8 Both sides argue that the Oil factors fall in
their favor. (See Mov. Br. at 15–18; see also Opp. Br. at 10–12). As explained below, however,
the Court finds that each factor supports Defendants.9
1. The Length of Time Elapsed
First, the Court looks to the length of time that has elapsed since the agency came under a
duty to act. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. Defendants first argue that
they “have never been under a duty to act on Plaintiff’s request” and, even if they did “‘the length
of time that has elapsed’ favors Defendants.” (Mov. Br. at 15). Specifically, Defendants note that
USCIS had the authority to adjudicate Plaintiff’s Applications for approximately four months from
the date of Plaintiff’s Applications—March 5, 2021—before the Southern District of Texas
implemented the nationwide injunction which prohibited the agency from potentially granting
DACA applications on July 16, 2021. (Id.).

8 While courts outside of the Third Circuit use other tests to evaluate APA claims (e.g., the “TRAC factors”),
the relevant considerations are sufficiently similar that such decisions “may be considered persuasive authority.”
Aydin v. Zeleke, No. 24-6253, 2025 WL 3499246, at *6 n.12 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2025). (See Opp. Br. at 8–10).
9 Here, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the Complaint are more than sufficient to decide the
unreasonable delay claim at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Jamoussian v. Blinken, No. 21-10980, 2022 WL
538424, at *2–4 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2022) (applying Third Circuit’s Oil factors and granting motion to dismiss).
Plaintiff contends that a four-year delay (now a five-year delay) in the adjudication of her
Applications since she filed them on March 5, 2021, is excessive and unreasonable. (Opp. Br. at
9–10). Thus, Plaintiff asks the Court to find an unreasonable delay notwithstanding the Texas
Litigation, including the period during which a nationwide injunction prohibited the approval of

DACA applications. (See id.). This remains true despite Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the Fifth
Circuit first lifted the nationwide injunction in January 2025. (Id. at 3–4). She further argues that
since that ruling “no action has been taken.” (Id. at 3–4). For the reasons discussed herein, the
Court agrees with Defendants.
As the Third Circuit made clear in Oil, unreasonable delay claims under the APA are
backward-looking, such that they require the Court to consider the length of the actual delay at
issue when balancing the relevant factors. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123
(“First, the court should ascertain the length of time that has elapsed since the agency came under
a duty to act.”). Here, Plaintiff filed her DACA application and corresponding employment
authorization application on March 5, 2021, and the Court assumes that they remain pending to

date. (Compl. ¶ 2). Based on the Texas Litigation, Defendants could have adjudicated Plaintiff’s
Applications for approximately four months from March 5, 2021, through July 16, 2021.
Defendants’ hands remained tied, however, from July 16, 2021, until January 17, 2025, at the
earliest—the day the Fifth Circuit issued its decision lifting the nationwide injunction in all states
except Texas. As noted by Defendants, the Fifth Circuit issued its mandate nearly three months
later, on March 11, 2025. (Reply Br. at 7 (ECF Pagination)).
Approximately one year and three months have passed since the Fifth Circuit issued its
decision on January 17, 2025. Moreover, approximately one year has passed since the Fifth
Circuit’s mandate issued. Thus, over the past five years, Defendants could have acted on Plaintiff’s
Applications for—at most—a total of one year and seven months.10 See Martinez Rodriguez v.
Warden, Bluebonnet Det. Facility, No. 26-0044, 2026 WL 278020, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2026)
(“[N]o DACA application can be fully reviewed and addressed because the grant of any such
application would be in violation of the Fifth Circuit’s stay of DACA applications in Texas.”).

Most importantly, as Defendants note, when “Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court on
November 29, 2024, Defendants were still enjoined from approving it and only had a total of four
months and eleven days to process her case before they were so enjoined.” (Reply Br. at 7 (ECF
Pagination)).
The Supreme Court has held that evidence of the passage of time cannot, standing alone,
support a claim for unreasonably delayed administrative action. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs.
v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1982). Moreover, as other courts (both in this District and
beyond) have recognized, “[t]he case law, without drawing any bright lines, has found that delays
of three to five years are not unreasonable.” Jamoussian, 2022 WL 538424, at *2 (citing cases);
Elezaj v. Mayorkas, No. 2:24-00935, 2025 WL 368877, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2025) (“The Court

is persuaded by case law from this District and across the country in finding a four-year delay
reasonable, although understandably frustrating.”); Azam, 2024 WL 912516, at *10 (finding that
delay of 18 months fell within the bounds of delay that other courts have found reasonable of
between three and five years); Saleh v. Ridge, 367 F. Supp. 2d 508, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding
a delay of almost five years not unreasonable); De Oliveira v. Barr, No. 19-1508, 2020 WL
1941231, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020) (noting that delay under four years was not
unreasonable). Because the delay in this case—excluding the period during which the nationwide

10 This assumes that Defendants could have adjudicated DACA applications before the Fifth Circuit’s mandate
issued on March 11, 2025. The Court takes no position on when Defendants could have begun to approve DACA
applications.
injunction remained in place—falls well within the bounds of delays that other courts have found
reasonable, the Court finds that the first Oil factor weighs in Defendants’ favor.
2. The Delay Judged Against the Context of DACA’s Regulations
Second, the Court looks to the reasonableness of the delay in the context of the statute

authorizing the agency’s action. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. As
Plaintiff acknowledges, there is no mandated, statutory timeframe during which Defendants must
adjudicate DACA applications. (See Opp. Br. at 1–3 & 8 (arguing that “the absence of a statuary
deadline does entitle the agency from indefinite inaction”)); see also Rodriguez, 2026 WL 278020,
at *5 (“[E]ven if the Texas litigation did not stay grants of DACA relief, the terms of the DACA
memorandum and regulations are purely ‘aspirational,’ setting no expectation of what constitutes
a reasonable amount of time for review.”). Indeed, the regulations governing DACA do not impose
a specific deadline for agency review, as the policy remains a discretionary exercise of
prosecutorial authority. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.21–236.25. The DACA rule “is a form of enforcement
discretion . . . in the interest of ordering enforcement priorities in light of limitations on available

resources, taking into account humanitarian considerations and administrative convenience.” Id.
§ 236.21(c)(1). As such, the Court finds that the second Oil factor also favors Defendants. See
Shams v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 24-4828, 2025 WL 984561, at *8 (“[W]ithout timing restrictions,
this second factor also favors Defendants.”).
3. The Consequences of Defendants’ Delay
Third, the Court looks to the consequences of Defendants’ delay in adjudicating Plaintiff’s
DACA application. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. Here, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants’ delay has caused her several forms of harm, including deprivation of the benefits
associated with DACA status such as protections from removal, the ability to work lawfully in the
United States, and emotional distress stemming from prolonged uncertainty. (Compl. ¶ 45). In
short, Plaintiff alleges harm from the delayed receipt of DACA benefits as well as the associated
uncertainty, fear, and despair she has endured as a result. (See id.; see also Opp. Br. at 8). While
the Court is certainly empathetic to Plaintiff’s position and can readily understand how several

years of waiting might take a toll on a DACA applicant, it agrees with the other courts that have
recognized how “the painful consequences of [ ] delay are inherent in our [ ] system.” See Azam,
2024 WL 912516, at *10; see also Liuqing Zhu v. Cissna, No. 18-9698, 2019 WL 3064458, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019) (stating that an applicant’s inability to plan her future or travel outside
of the United States constituted risk that was “inherent in the process”). Accordingly, the Court
finds that this factor also weighs against a determination of unreasonable delay.
4. Administrative Difficulties
Fourth, the Court considers “any plea of administrative error, administrative
inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying out a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the
face of limited resources.” Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. Here, Plaintiff

submitted her Applications in March 2021, and Defendants collected her biometrics approximately
two months later. (Compl. ¶¶ 2 & 5). Shortly thereafter, the Texas Litigation effectively prohibited
Defendants from potentially granting Plaintiff’s pending DACA application. Nothing in the
Complaint plausibly establishes that Defendants’ delay resulted from anything other than the
unique circumstances tied to the nationwide injunction and the backlog of outstanding DACA
applications that inevitably exist because of that injunction. (See generally Compl.; see also Reply
Br. at 8–9). For example, and as noted above, the Complaint does not allege any intentional neglect
or impropriety on the part of the Defendants to suggest that they have acted in bad faith by not
adjudicating Plaintiff’s Applications.
As judges in this District have recognized in the context of immigration applications, “to
grant relief would accomplish little beyond pushing one applicant ahead of others equally
deserving, scrambling agency priorities[,] and incentivizing litigation.” Jamoussian, 2022 WL
538424, at *3. Further still, “[a] court’s perception of the equities in one case is no substitute for

the agency’s expertise in allocating its resources overall.” Jamoussian, 2022 WL 538424, at *3.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the fourth Oil factor also weighs against a finding of
unreasonable delay.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the APA on the grounds that Defendants
unreasonably delayed the processing of her Applications. See Rodriguez, 2026 WL 278020, at
*4–5. The Court thus grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s APA claim.
ii. Plaintiff’s Mandamus Act Claim (Count II)
The Mandamus Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. As noted above, to

qualify for mandamus relief, a plaintiff must show three elements: “(1) a clear and indisputable
right to relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a clear duty to act, and (3)
that no adequate alternative remedy exists.” Id. (citing 33 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure Judicial Review § 8312 (2d ed. Apr. 2021 update)). The Third
Circuit has explained that these elements are jurisdictional. Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to mandamus relief because Defendants failed to
adjudicate her DACA application in a reasonably timely manner. (Compl. ¶¶ 56–57; Opp. Br. at
5). Plaintiff cannot pursue a Mandamus Act claim, however, where an “adequate alternative
remedy exists.” Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 2 F.4th at 132 (finding that mandamus jurisdiction
statute did not provide a potential basis for subject-matter jurisdiction because “[plaintiff] ha[d] an
adequate alternative remedy through administrative appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review
Board”). Thus, as other courts have recognized, because an alternative remedy is available to
Plaintiff under the APA (i.e., a claim that Defendants failed to adjudicate her DACA application

in a reasonably timely manner) this Court must dismiss her Mandamus Act claim. See Sharkey v.
Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a mandamus claim should be dismissed
where it duplicated claims brought under the APA); Fangfang Xu, 434 F. Supp. 3d at 56; Konde,
2024 WL 2221227, at *5; Arabzada v. Donis, No. 23-0655, 2024 WL 1175802, at *5 n.1 (D.D.C.
Mar. 19, 2024); Cohen v. Jaddou, No. 21-5025, 2023 WL 2526105, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15,
2023) (dismissing mandamus claim in an action where the plaintiff sought to compel adjudication
of his green card application because an adequate remedy was available under the APA and thus
“mandamus relief [was] not available”). This is true even though, in this circumstance, Plaintiff
has “failed to adequately plead that alternative remedy.” Cohen, 2023 WL 2526105 at *7; see also
Zengin v. Mayorkas, No. 24-2196, 2025 WL 337594, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2025) (“As other courts

have consistently held, this alternative remedy under the APA precludes a finding of subject matter
jurisdiction over the mandamus claim, even if the APA claims themselves are not adequately
pled.”).11
As Plaintiff has not established a plausible entitlement to relief under the Mandamus Act,
the Court must dismiss that claim for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, Count II is dismissed without
prejudice.

11 Because Plaintiff’s Mandamus Act claim fails on the “alternative remedy” ground, the Court need not address
whether her claim meets the other jurisdictional requirements. Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 2 F.4th at 132 (limiting
discussion of potential subject matter jurisdiction under the APA to the determination that an alternative remedy
existed).
iii. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim (Count III)
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to process her Applications deprives
her of “a protected interest, in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.” (Compl. ¶ 59). In opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff maintains

that despite her lack of citizenship, she “seek[s] an adjudication on a right that exists under an
existing program for individuals already residing in the United States [i.e., DACA].” (Opp. Br. at
13; see also id. at 14 (arguing that “Plaintiff has a constitutional interest in the adjudication of her
initial [DACA] request and the corresponding Form I-765”)). Defendants assert that Plaintiff
“lacks a constitutional interest in the adjudication of her initial DACA request and corresponding
Form I-765.” (Mov. Br. at 18; see also Reply Br. at 11 (arguing that “the Due Process Clause
recognizes no such right and mandates no such thing” (ECF Pagination))). In addition, Defendants
note that Plaintiff has not “plausibly alleged that she has been deprived of any procedural rights in
her application, or that she is due any additional process.” (Reply Br. at 11 (ECF Pagination)).
The Court agrees with Defendants.

To assert a procedural or substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must establish a
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property.” Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 910 (2024); see
also Riley v. Carroll, 200 F. App’x 157, 158 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To succeed on a due process claim,
Riley must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty interest.”) (citing Fraise v. Terhune,
283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff has not cited any case for the proposition that failure
to adjudicate her pending DACA application and corresponding employment authorization
application violate her procedural or substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
(See Opp. Br. at 12–13).12 Most notably, the Third Circuit has broadly held that “the various

12 Moreover, Plaintiff’s citation to Vidal v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 536 F. Supp. 3d
604 (C.D. Cal. 2021), is inapposite. There, plaintiff’s DACA application had been adjudicated and denied, which
discretionary privileges and benefits conferred on aliens by our federal immigration laws do not
vest in aliens a constitutional right to have their immigration matters adjudicated in the most
expeditious manner possible.” Mudric v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding
no constitutional injury from the delay in adjudicating plaintiff’s asylum application and his

mother’s permanent resident alien application because they “simply had no due process
entitlement to the wholly discretionary benefits of which he and his mother were allegedly
deprived, much less a constitutional right to have them doled out as quickly as he desired”).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutionally protected interest in the
adjudication of her DACA application and corresponding employment authorization application,
Count III is dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion, (D.E. No. 15), and
dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Opinion.

Date: March 31, 2026
s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

prompted her to argue that “her DACA denial interfered with her fundamental rights to familial association under the
Fifth and First Amendment.” Id. at 623. The court ultimately concluded, under the specific facts of the right
implicated in the case that are not present here, that “the Constitution protects the right of a child to associate with a
parent without being tainted by the parent’s crime absent her own participation in it.” Id. at 625.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11355612. Public record. Not legal advice.