# KING

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · May 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11348843

## Case

- **Full name:** Shawn King v. Superintendent Tina Walker, SCI Fayette Superintendent; Keith Matiyasic, Unit Manager; Rhonda House, Facility Grievance Coordinator; Kristina Haluska, Librarian; Doctor Laurel Harry, Secretary PA DOC; Joseph Rusnak, Security Captain; Officer Burkholder, Sergeant Depasquale, Officer Holloway or Hollywood
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11348843

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error
- describing deliberate indifference as occurring when an official knows or should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION
SHAWN KING, )
)
) Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00484
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Christy Criswell Wiegand
SUPERINTENDENT TINA WALKER, ) United States District Judge
)
SCI FAYETTE SUPERINTENDENT;
)
KEITH MATIYASIC, UNIT )
MANAGER; RHONDA HOUSE, )
FACILITY GRIEVANCE ) Christopher B. Brown
COORDINATOR; KRISTINA ) ) United States Magistrate Judge
HALUSKA, LIBRARIAN; DOCTOR )
LAUREL HARRY, SECRETARY PA )
DOC; JOSEPH RUSNAK, SECURITY )
)
CAPTAIN; OFFICER BURKHOLDER, )
SERGEANT DEPASQUALE, )
)
OFFICER HOLLOWAY OR
)
HOLLYWOOD, OFFICER DIX, )
BRITTANY KIMMEL, EDUCATION )
PRINCIPAL; SANDRA CALLOWAY, )
)
ACCOUNTING SUPERVISOR; )
ASHLEY TRAFFICANTE, )
MAILROOM SUPERVISOR; )
)
SERGEANT PEARCE, LISA
)
DUNCAN, PSYCHOLOGY )
MANAGER; JAMES BRIGHT, )
MEDICAL SUPERVISOR; OFFICER )
)
REGINA; “DOE”, CEO PSYCHOLOGY )
CORPORATE ENTITY COMPANY; )
AND JANE OR JOHN DOE, CEO )
)
WELLPATH, INC. MEDICAL
)
PROVIDER, )
)
Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, ECF NO.
104, AND MOTION FOR SPOLIATION SANCTIONS, ECF NO. 118
Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff, Shawn King (“King”), proceeding pro se, is a state prisoner in the
custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). He brings this
case against DOC officials, corrections officers, and other DOC employees
concerning his incarceration at SCI-Fayette. ECF No. 87.
On February 20, 2025, King filed a sprawling 52-page handwritten Third
Amended Complaint (“TAC”), comprised of over 300 paragraphs. Id. He raises a
myriad of claims spanning a three-year time frame from 2022 through 2025.

Pending is the Corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC, with brief
in support, ECF Nos. 104 and 105, to which King has filed a response and attached
45 pages of exhibits, ECF Nos. 113 and 113-1. In addition, King has filed a motion
for spoliation sanctions, ECF No. 118, to which the Corrections Defendants have
responded. ECF No. 124. Both motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.1

After reviewing the motion to dismiss and the opposition to it, as well as
relevant case law, it is respectfully recommended the motion be granted in part and
denied in part as follows:

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a
Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Claims Sought To Be Against Recommendation
Dismissed

Official Capacity All Corrections Defendants Motion to dismiss be
Claims granted and § 1983 official
capacity claims for money
damages be dismissed
with prejudice as such
claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. It
is further recommended
that leave to amend be
denied.

Personal Involvement Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Motion to dismiss be
of Several Corrections and Pearce granted as to Defendants
Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak,
and Pearce as the TAC is
void of specific factual
allegations. It is
recommended TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
_________________________ _________________________

Holloway, Regina, Motion to dismiss be
Burkholder, and Dix granted as to Defendants
Holloway, Regina,
Burkholder, and Dix as
the TAC is void of specific
factual allegations. It is
recommended TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
_________________________ _________________________

Walker Motion to dismiss be
granted to the extent King
is attempting to hold
Superintendent Walker
liable as a supervisor. It
is recommended the TAC
be dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
_________________________ _______________________

Motion to dismiss be
Kimmel and House denied.

First Amendment Haluska, Depasquale, Motion to dismiss be
Claims – Right of Calloway, and Holloway granted as King has failed
Access to Courts to plead Defendants’
conduct prevented him
from pursuing a non-
frivolous or arguable
claim. It is recommended
the TAC be dismissed
without prejudice and
King be granted leave to
amend.

First Amendment Kimmel and House Motion to dismiss be
Claims - Retaliation denied as King has
implicated Kimmel and
House denied his
grievances in retaliation
for his protected activity.
_________________________ ________________________

Bright, Harry, Rusnak, The motion to dismiss be
and Pearce granted as the TAC fails
to include any allegations
identifying the specific
adverse actions taken by
these Defendants against
King. It is recommended
the TAC be dismissed
without prejudice and
King be granted leave to
amend.
_________________________ ________________________
Holloway, Regina, The motion to dismiss be
Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, granted as the TAC fails
and Trafficante to include any allegations
showing a causal link
between King’s protected
activity and these
Defendants’ knowledge of
his protected activity. It is
recommended the TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.

Fourth Amendment Sgt. DePasquale The motion to dismiss be
Claims granted and King’s Fourth
Amendment claims be
dismissed with prejudice
and leave to amend be
denied as futile.

Eighth Amendment – All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be
Conditions of granted as the TAC lacks
Confinement Claims the requisite specificity to
meet minimum pleading
requirements to allege
Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement
claims. It is recommended
the TAC be dismissed
without prejudice and
King be granted leave to
amend.

Eighth Amendment – Dix, Burkholder, Regina, The motion to dismiss be
Failure to Protect and unnamed Corrections granted as the TAC does
Claims Defendants not allege facts to support
a finding that Dix,
Burkholder, or Regina, or
any other Corrections
Defendant, were aware of
any threats to King or
disregarded a substantial
risk to his safety. It is
recommended the TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
______________________ _________________________ _________________________

Fourteenth All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be
Amendment Due granted and King’s
Process Claims Fourteenth Amendment
due process claims be
with prejudice under the
single source rule. It is
further recommended
leave to amend be denied
as futile.

In sum, it is recommended King be granted leave to file a Fourth Amended
Complaint that meets the standards of Federal Rule of Procedure 8 and cures the
pleading deficiencies as noted in this Report and Recommendation. King should be
instructed he cannot include any claim in his Fourth Amended Complaint that has
been dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, it is recommended the motion for spoliation sanctions be denied
as King has not met his burden with respect to his request for spoliation sanctions.
II. Report
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
On March 31, 2022, King was transferred from SCI-Houtzdale to SCI-
Fayette. ECF No. 87, ¶ 26. He contends the Corrections Defendants violated a
number of his constitutional rights, including engaging in a “pattern of retaliation”
in response to his constitutionally protected activity.

King initiated this prisoner civil rights case on March 29, 2024, by submitting
to the Clerk’s Office a 26-page complaint, naming approximately 25 DOC officials
and various employees as defendants. ECF Nos. 1, 9. At the time King commenced
this lawsuit, he was incarcerated at SCI-Fayette.2

The Complaint was “lodged” as it did not come with the filing fee or a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP motion”). About a month later, on April
29, 2024, King filed an IFP motion, ECF 2, which was granted on May 7, 2024, ECF
No. 7, and the Complaint filed. ECF No. 8. Before the Court received service
documents from King, he filed two supplements to the Complaint. ECF Nos. 9 and
18. In August 2024, he then sought leave to file another supplement to his

complaint, ECF No. 38. That request was denied and King was directed to file one
stand-alone Amended Complaint. ECF No. 39.
On September 11, 2024, King filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 44, and
simultaneously filed a motion for leave to file a “final supplement.” ECF No. 45.

The motion for leave to file a “final supplement” was denied, but King was granted
leave to file one stand-alone Second Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 48 and 56. On
February 28, 2025, King filed his Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 59.

2 In February 2026, King notified the Court he had been transferred from SCI-Fayette to SCI-
Phoenix. ECF No. 141.
About two months later, on May 6, 2024, before service was effectuated, King
filed a Motion to Amend Parties. ECF No. 71. The motion was denied without
prejudice as it was unclear whether King was seeking to add new defendants or

terminate existing defendants. ECF No. 72. King was advised to the extent he was
seeking to terminate a previously named defendant, he should file a motion
requesting that party be dismissed from the lawsuit and to the extent he wished to
add new defendants or substitute previously named defendants, he was granted
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 72 and 82.

On July 1, 2025, King filed a TAC, which is far from a model of clarity. It
spans 52 single-spaced handwritten pages and contains over 300 paragraphs. ECF
No. 87. The TAC remains King’s operative complaint.3 In it, seventeen individuals
are named as defendants: FCI Fayette Superintendent Tina Walker, DOC
Secretary Doctor Laurel Henry, Security Captain Joseph Rusnak, Unit Manager
Keith Matiyasic, Facility Grievance Coordinator Rhonda House, Education

Principal Brittany Kimmel, Accounting Supervisor Sandra Calloway, Mailroom
Supervisor Ashley Trafficante, Sergeant DePasquale, Sergeant Pearce, Psychology
Manager Lisa Duncan, Medical Supervisor James Bright, Officer Holloway, Officer
Regina, Librarian Kristina Haluska, Officer Burkholder, and Officer Dix
(collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”), and two Doe Defendants: CEO
Psychology Corporate Entity Company (“Doe”) and CEO Wellpath Inc. Medical

3 “In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original
pleading a nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most
recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” Id.
Provider: Jane or John Doe. ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 9-27. Each defendant is sued in their
individual and official capacities. Id. at 3.

As noted above, the TAC is long and in parts confusing, if not
incomprehensible. For example, factual allegations are dispersed throughout the
document, often the claims are against “the Defendants” and discrete defendants or
the actions taken by an individual defendant are not identified, and the causes of
action are not set forth in separate paragraphs or sections. As far as the

undersigned can discern, the allegations in the TAC are intended to make out
causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As self-described by King, the TAC,
details and alleges Defendants pattern of retaliation for
his participation in protected conduct, numerous
instances of spoliation, censorship, illegal seizures,
withholding of PA DOC authorized outside purchases,
interference with privileged communications,
substandard medical and psychiatric care. The conditions
of confinement component of constant high intensity, cold
air, even during winter months, and the customary
disregard for PA DOC policies and the abdication of
responsibilities and dereliction of duties by SCI-Fayette
prison officials, including refusal to protect inmate and
denial of separations from inmates who pose a substantial
imminent threat to plaintiffs safety and life.

ECF No. 113 at 4. According to King, he raises six claims in his TAC:
|. Failuve - to □□□ rota +
2, FIRST AMENDMENT Violections
a, Gensor ship /Nax\ laterfuvence

c. Aadess- ts -Goawts
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4. Fourtu AMEMDMEMT Seizure /Destuction
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. ub standond Mediaal/ Vs yah lotr G Gare.

ECF No. 113 at 19. As relief, King seeks declaratory judgment, preliminary, and
permanent injunction ordering the SCI Fayette prison officials to cease their threats
toward him, compensatory and punitive damages, recovery of costs of suit, and any
other appropriate relief. ECF No. 87 at 45; ECF No. 113 at 21.

The Corrections Defendants filed the instant motion arguing there is no
substance to the TAC and move to dismiss under Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 104. King filed a response in opposition, ECF
No. 113, and the matter is now ripe for disposition.

The Court has federal question jurisdiction as King’s claims are brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Standard of Review — Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well
settled. A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
10

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and can be
dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint

must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
The Court conducts a three-step inquiry in evaluating a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), as
amended (June 6, 2011). First, the Court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, the Court accepts all the
plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and “construe[s] the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008)). But the Court disregards “legal conclusions and recitals of the elements

of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.” Davis v. Wells
Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016). Third, the Court considers “whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

When a plaintiff, like King here, is proceeding pro se, the complaint is “to be
liberally construed,” and “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93-94 (2007). That said, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in
their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.
1996)). And, “[w]hile a litigant's pro se status requires a court to construe the
allegations in the complaint liberally, . . . a litigant is not absolved from complying
with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds
pro se.” Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App'x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Judging
the sufficiency of a pleading “is a context-dependent exercise.” Garrett v. Wexford
Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc.
v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)). At a minimum, however, the pleading
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, a complaint must identify “discrete defendants and the actions taken
by these defendants[.]” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). Dismissal under
Rule 8(a) is appropriate when the “complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or
otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”
Muhammad v. U.S. States Bd. of Governors Postal Sys., 574 F. App'x 74, 74 (3d Cir.

2014) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).
C. Analysis
1. The TAC Violates Rule 8(a)(2)
The Corrections Defendants initially move to dismiss the TAC on the grounds

it fails to meet the pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. As
noted above, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Put lightly, the TAC is nowhere near a
“short and plain statement.”
The TAC is unwieldy with over 300 paragraphs spread out over 52 pages and

has only grown more so in its third iteration since King’s original pleading. But
striking the TAC will only delay resolution as the undersigned recognizes striking
the TAC for a Rule 8 violation and then directing King, a pro se plaintiff, to file
again would only serve to “unnecessarily proliferate the pleading stage and
postpone a trial on the merits[.]” 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure Civ. § 1281 (4th ed.). While King’s TAC is unnecessarily complicated and

verbose, dismissal is not recommended on this basis. Rather, the undersigned will
wade through the TAC to evaluate the sufficiency of the allegations.
2. The Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), ECF No. 104
Corrections Defendants next argue the TAC should be dismissed on various
grounds: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims against a Corrections

Defendant in their official capacity; (2) the TAC fails to adequately allege personal
involvement of several Corrections Defendants; (3) the TAC fails to state a First
Amendment claim for a violation of the right to access the courts; (4) the TAC fails
to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against several Corrections
Defendants; (5) the TAC fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim; (6) the TAC fails
to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim; (7) the TAC fails to

state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim; and (8) the TAC fails to state a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. ECF No. 105.4 Each of these
arguments is addressed in order.
a. Eleventh Amendment: Official Capacity Claims

The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss claims against them in so far as
they are made against them in their official capacities. ECF No. 105, at 8. The
undersigned agrees with the Corrections Defendants and recommends all claims
against defendants in their official capacities be dismissed.
Official-capacity suits are “only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent[.]” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978). In an official-capacity suit, the entity of which
the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985). As such, claims against state officials in their official capacities for
damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.

Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013).

4 King’s claims for substandard medical /psychiatric care are raised against the Doe
defendants, which remain unidentified and unserved.
King acknowledges the Eleventh Amendment “disallows monetary damages
against Defendants in their official capacity,” but he argues the Eleventh
Amendment does not preclude his claims because is seeking “injunctive relief to

force the State or State Agency for whom they officials work to obey the
Constitution.” ECF No. 113 at 21. The claims in the TAC arise from King’s
incarceration at SCI-Fayette. A prisoner’s transfer or release from the facility
complained of, as is the case here with King transferred to SCI-Phoenix, generally
moots equitable and declaratory claims. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d
Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003). Such claims are not mooted when a

challenged action is (1) too short in duration to be fully litigated before its cessation
or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that the same complaining
party would be subject to the same action again. Id.
The record reflects King was transferred to SCI-Phoenix in February 2026,
after briefing on this motion concluded. ECF No. 141. There is no indication in the

record King is reasonably likely to be transferred back to SCI-Fayette. Therefore, it
is recommended the motion to dismiss be granted with prejudice and all claims
against the Corrections Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed and
leave to amend be denied. See Sutton, 323 F.3d at 249 (holding equitable and
declaratory claims were moot where prisoners who challenged a policy on access to
religious materials were no longer confined at the facility).
b. The TAC Fails to Adequately Allege Personal
Involvement of Several Corrections Defendants5

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove a defendant, acting
under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988). Liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's “personal involvement” in the
deprivation of a constitutional right. Gould v. Wetzel, 547 F. App'x 129 (3d Cir.
2013). “Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction
or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d
Cir. 2020) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Absent specific allegations that a
defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal

is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa.
2013) (dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiffs failed to set forth
sufficient facts to establish certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the
alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Defendants

Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Pearce, Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Walker,
Kimmel, and House for lack of personal involvement. ECF No. 105 at 12-13. The
arguments are addressed in turn.

5 The Corrections Defendants are not at this time asserting a lack of personal involvement
argument for Corrections Defendants Trafficante, Calloway, Matiyasic, Depasquale, and Haluska.
See ECF No. 105, n. 2.
i. Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce

While Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce are named in the
caption of the TAC, the TAC is void of any specific factual allegations against these
four defendants. Thus, it is recommended King’s claims against Defendants Bright,
Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce be dismissed without prejudice and King be granted
leave to amend.

ii. Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, and
Dix
The TAC alleges Defendant Holloway violated King’s “First Amendment
rights by removing and discarding [King’s] initial 1983 complaint and exhibits,”
ECF No. 87 at 35, and King suffered “[i]ncalculable mental loss . . . by exposing him
to and being subjected to fear, uncertainty, threats from prison officials Officers
Dix, Burkholder, and Regina[.]” Id. at 43. Such conclusory statements without any
specificity is not sufficient to establish personal liability. Thus, it is recommended
King’s claims against Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, and Dix be
dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

iii. Defendant Walker
King describes Walker as the “Superintendent and serves as the ‘Facility
Manager” of SCI-Fayette. ECF No. 87 at 2. According to King, Superintendent

Walker was dismissive of his numerous grievances and questioned whether he was
working with his unit staff. Id., ¶¶ 135-143. According to King,
Defendant Walker is largely disinterested and
unconcerned with the behavior and actions of underlings;
believing they (staff) can do no wrong and do not do so.
Ms. Walker defends subordinate prison officials
regardless of allegations without investigation and does
not discipline them.
ECF No. 87, at 15, ¶¶ 142-43.
To the extent King is attempting to hold Superintendent Walker liable as a
supervisor, his allegations fail. Liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a
respondeat superior theory. See Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d
210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL 17248100, at
*2 (3d Cir. 2022) (per curiam). Additionally, the mere fact that a defendant is a
“supervisor” or has supervisory authority, standing alone, cannot support liability
under § 1983. See Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 106 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified two general
instances in which the conduct of a supervisor or the policies/procedures of a
supervisor may constitute personal involvement, thus warranting a finding of
individual supervisory liability for a constitutional tort. First, “a supervisor may be
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's

rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of
and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.
v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v.
Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). Second, supervisors may be
liable if they, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional
harm.” Coulston v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 651 F. App'x 139, 143 (3d Cir.
2016) (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 373 F.3d at 586).

Here, the TAC has no allegations indicating Defendant Walker participated
in violating King’s rights, directed others to violate his rights, or, as the person in
charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional
conduct. Nor are there any allegations Superintendent Walker established or
maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused King constitutional

harm.
Thus, it is recommended King’s claims against Defendant Walker be
dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

iv. Defendants Kimmel and House
The TAC describes Defendant Kimmel as the Education Principal and
Defendant House as the Facility Grievance Coordinator. ECF No. 87 at 3, ¶¶ 13, 14.
It appears the allegations against Defendants Kimmel and House are based on their

involvement and denial of King’s many grievances. Id., ¶¶ 95, 173, 285.
The Corrections Defendants argue Defendants Kimmel and House should be
dismissed because “the fact that an official receives and reviews a letter or request
slip is insufficient to establish personal involvement.” ECF No. 105 at 13. See
Mearin, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (“the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show

the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in
the alleged unlawful conduct.”); see also Longo v. Trostle, No. 24-1981, 2024 WL
4579250, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 25, 2024). However, King repeatedly alleges retaliation
by the Corrections Defendants, including the allegation his grievances were denied
in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. Since King has implicated

Defendants Kimmel and House in his retaliation claims, it is recommended the
motion to dismiss Defendants Kimmel and House for lack of personal involvement
be denied.
c. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State A Plausible
First Amendment Access to Courts Claim

The right of access to the courts derives from the First Amendment's right to
petition and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.6
“It is well-established that prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts.” Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), superseded by statute as stated in Brown v.
Sage, 941 F.3d 655 (3d Cir. 2019)).

To establish a denial of access to courts claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) “they
suffered an ‘actual injury’ in that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or
‘arguable’ underlying claim”; and (2) they have “no other ‘remedy that may be
awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access
suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Christopher v.

6 The right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition. See
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). Also, “[t]he constitutional guarantee of due process of
law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to
challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.”
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
(1989)).
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). The complaint must “describe the underlying
arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must
describe the ‘lost remedy.’” Id. (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17).

According to the TAC, Defendant Haluska violated King’s First Amendment
access-to-courts rights by (1) denying him use of the library and (2) terminating his
use of the library copying machine. ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 66-69, 90. He asserts
Defendants Depasquale and Adams7 violated his First Amendment access-to-courts

rights by seizing, discarding, and removing discovery documents. Id., p. 35. And
that Defendant Calloway violated his First Amendment access-to-courts rights by
not timely submitting documents to the Court and delaying civil action, and
Defendants Calloway and Holloway removed and discarded his initial Section 1983
complaint exhibits. Id.

King does not allege he lost a chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable
underlying claim as a result of Defendants’ actions. As a result, he has failed to
plausibly plead the conduct of Defendants Haluska, Depasquale, Calloway, or
Holloway prevented him from pursuing a non-frivolous or arguable underlying

7 The Court notes the caption of the TAC does not include any individual named “Adams” and
“Adams” is not identified as a party in the TAC. See ECF No. 87 at 2-3. Similarly, the TAC also
states Security Department Officials John Does #1, #2, #3, and #4, Ms. Schaup, and Captain
DiSilva violated King’s First Amendment rights. Id. Yet the caption of the TAC does not include
any individuals identified as Security Department Officials John Does #1, #2, #3, and #4, Ms.
Schaup, or Captain Silva, and none of these individuals are identified as parties in the TAC. Id.
Under Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the
parties[.]”
claim. Accordingly, it is recommended King’s denial of access to the courts claim be
dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

d. The First Amendment Retaliation Claims
Although not explicitly stated, it appears King is attempting to bring a First
Amendment retaliation claim against certain Corrections Defendants, including

Kimmel, House, Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Pearce, Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix,
Halusak, and Trafficante. See ECF No. 87. To the extent King may also be
asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim against Corrections Defendants
Matiyasic and Depasquale, the Corrections Defendants are not challenging such
claims at this juncture. ECF No. 105, n. 3.

To state a § 1983 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) the conduct
which led to the retaliation was constitutionally protected, (2) plaintiff was subject
to adverse actions by a state actor, and (3) the protected activity was a substantial
motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take the adverse action. See Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also Alexander
v. Fritch, 396 F. App’x 867, 871 (3d Cir. 2010).

King asserts the TAC “details and alleges Defendants pattern of retaliation
for his participation in protected conduct, numerous instances of spoilation,
censorship, illegal seizures, withholding Pa DOC authorized outside purchases,
interference with privileged communications, substandard medical and psychiatric
care.” ECF No. 113 at 4. The Correction Defendants do not contest the TAC
adequately pleads King engaged in protected conduct. What the Corrections
Defendants do contest though, is that the TAC fails to state plausible retaliation
claims because there often are no allegations identifying the adverse actions taken

by a discrete defendant or that King’s protected activity was a substantial
motivating factor in a Corrections Defendant’s alleged decision to take adverse
action. ECF No. 105 at 17-20. In particular, the Corrections Defendants argue King
has failed to state a plausible claim for retaliation against Corrections Defendants
Kimmel, House, Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Pearce, Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix,
Halusak, and Trafficante. Id. These arguments are addressed in turn.

i. Defendants Kimmel and House
The Corrections Defendants argue King has failed to sufficiently plead a
claim of retaliation against Defendants Kimmel and House because “a retaliation

claim generally cannot be based off a grievance or lawsuit filed against another
person.” ECF No. 105 at 19. But as noted above, King alleges Defendants Kimmel
and House denied his grievances in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity.
It is well settled “[g]overnment actions, which standing alone do not violate the
Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial
part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.”

Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). Since King has implicated
Defendants Kimmel and House in his retaliation claims, it is recommended the
motion to dismiss the retaliation claims against Defendants Kimmel and House be
denied.
ii. Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce

As to Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce, the undersigned agrees
with the Corrections Defendants that the TAC fails to include any allegations
identifying the specific adverse actions these Defendants took against King. As
such, King has failed to plead a plausible claim for retaliation against Defendants
Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce. Accordingly, it is recommended King’s
retaliation claims against Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak, and Pearce claim be

dismissed without prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.
iii. Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix,
Haluska, and Trafficante
As to Corrections Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Haluska,
and Trafficante, the TAC contains allegations these Defendants retaliated against
King in a number of ways;8 however, as the Corrections Defendants correctly note
the TAC is void of any allegation showing a causal link between King’s protected

activity and each of these Defendant’s knowledge of his protected activity. ECF No.
105 at 19-20. As such, King has failed to plead a plausible claim for retaliation
against Defendants Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, and Trafficante.
Accordingly, it is recommended King’s retaliation claims against Defendants

8 For example, King asserts Defendant Holloway removed and discarded his initial federal
complaint; Defendants Regina, Burkholder, and Dix refused to protect him from known threats by
fellow prisoners; Defendant Haluska denied him access to the library and terminated his copier
usage, and Defendant Trafficante confiscated a book King had ordered. See ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 67-69,
90-94; 184-185.
Holloway, Regina, Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, and Trafficante be dismissed without
prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

e. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State a Claim for A
Fourth Amendment Violation
The TAC states Defendants Depasquale and Adams9 “violated multiple
Constitutional Rights of plaintiff by seizing, discarding and removing ‘Discovery’
documents numbering several hundred without Due Process, also violating his
FIRST and FOURTH AMENDMENT protections.” ECF No. 87 at 35.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants, shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The undersigned understands King to be raising a Fourth Amendment claim
based on the seizure of his documents. Still, he has not stated a plausible claim
under the Fourth Amendment because “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of
privacy and [ ] the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches [and
seizures] does not apply in prisoner cells.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);
see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The defendants correctly

9 Again, the Court notes the caption of the TAC does not include any individual named
“Adams” and “Adams” is not identified as a party in the TAC. See ECF No. 87 at 2-3.
assert that prisoners do not have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in their
cells.” (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529).

As King’s claim fails to state a constitutional claim, it is recommended King’s
Fourth Amendment claim be dismissed with prejudice and leave to amend be
denied as futile.

f. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State Plausible
Eighth Amendment Claims for Conditions of Confinement

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation for conditions of confinement,
“an inmate must allege both an objective element – that the deprivation was
sufficiently serious – and a subjective element – that a prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Nami v. Fauver, 82
F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir.
1992) (describing deliberate indifference as occurring when an official knows or
should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate) (superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir.
2000).

Throughout the TAC, King alleges he was routinely subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Page 42 of the TAC summarizes his
conditions of confinement claims as follows:

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fro ound. sschrenmely cole call fencpercduves ) lack. on
clean —urenlotks y 4 oy 3 the. erclhaust verbs o& the. cells
□□□ net Ce akgely 2 lemvedk -8 ater, Hake Lionel S@iratngs
aun, Rood syroeep retpresentoli ors are vet nach, Stk ounces
yrtce5 Xs reby FRAT PU Ts serveds orca. adler} sefeneees
Soto heals are. Ser ved. mash oat, usdely three oy
Can nek, andim heasy Yas) otions and wdben Q □ Dust
is pre Bicded “4 1S on rippenediand takes olsout Murda. te

Arack of sonitelion: the T3SUe wred boy
ait Mau “gar / DeWrdhauat Yet Makiy erste v1 retol odien
Plank a Spray bottle | ushieh oll Ww robes wALeife_ permitted
Vie per coll +o Seantes ond regularly rrccinkor A iri va She
Panderic - fs eovs, SCL- Foxy ett. & heusi va anit collected
then. wn ~S late 75 ZoZt."p lari St repechedly coq te thed cud
Wles each th ne dovied, eVe2_/) subecthe b oa Grievance in
wth iel, Uni trlouayer /Dehendaat Feclacr Secperot Sort
ples “kK ODS TFinsr Ameadme et aad Spiel probed ov ci ats
cuembin ied, the Dieledkion ‘tn har Lelvemee. ni Lied Re Rew Repetic
by oppranincsbely comoth er Gorky Cire dors, at ushiel Hnce!
Plaanii dhs Acgpest\ of Gricueuce. to Fexcalaty teneqev wes GRANTED
iw pack conch. nod, Mat your lc ORBERZD *o provide. “plan ot a
Spray battle. tt TePASans the sole mstavce , to the best 0
peantitts MERMOES 5 thet □□□ of ‘he S taky + ove Wileds arictade
at SCT- Fayette. Cal demed) hes 2Jev ceversed GH only en part)
ak the Feuck Why Manager level ov Appeal conc viever won Fine □□□

ECF No. 87 at 42. While each of the concerns expressed by King in the TAC are
included in the Eighth Amendment’s protections, his conditions of confinement
claims suffer from the same infirmities as his retaliation claims. As the Corrections
27

Defendants correctly point out, King’s allegations lack the requisite specificity to
meet minimum pleading requirements. ECF No. 105 at 21. There are no factual
allegations “setting forth particularized descriptions of actions” taken by discrete

defendants responsible for the conditions of which he complains or which
defendants were aware of the conditions and chose to ignore them. See Garrett, 938
F.3d at 94. For example, King contends he
repeatedly informed RHU officers that the toilet in his cell
L-C 1009 had low water pressure insufficient to flush the
waste and toilet tissue[,] he continued advising RHU
staff for the next four days that the commode was backing
up; waste and excrement flowing into the toilet and . . .
was at risk of overflowing . . . on April 4, 2022, Plaintiff
was relocated to Cell L-C 2012.
ECF No. 87, ¶¶ 45-51. Such broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient as
they are made against unnamed RHU officers and RHU staff and not against any
one defendant. As a result, King’s allegations lack specificity and he has thus failed
to state a plausible claim for relief.
As to the allegation Defendant Matiyasic denied him a spray bottle to
sanitize his cell, King has not alleged how this condition created a substantial risk
or serious harm or that any such alleged deliberate indifference by Defendant
Matiyasic caused him any harm.
For all these reasons, it is recommended King’s Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claims be dismissed without prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
g. The Facts of the TAC Are Insufficient to State a Plausible
Eighth Amendment Claim for Failure to Protect

A prisoner has a “right to be protected from constant threats of violence and
sexual assault from other inmates[.]” Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir.
1985). To state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a prison
official, the prisoner must allege facts that plausibly support “(1) he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the
official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety,
and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696
F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Fisher v.
Hollingsworth, 115 F.3d 352, 371 (3d. Cir. 2012).
King contends upon his arrival at SCI-Fayette, he immediately informed
prison officials that prior to his transfer he had signed a “Protective Custody Unit
Acknowledgement.” ECF No. 87, ¶ 27. And despite signing such an

acknowledgement, he was informed upon his arrival at SCI-Fayette there was no
such unit at that institution and King was instead placed in the RHU for
approximately seven weeks while the Security Department determined whether it
was safe for him to be released into general population. Id., ¶¶ 27-29. He also
contends he “repeatedly, for nearly four years, periodically requested ‘separations’
from inmates which were each time denied or went unanswered.” ECF No. 113 at
7. King alleges “Defendants” acted with deliberate indifference in “deciding not to

issue ‘separations.’” ECF No. 113 at 5.
The TAC does not explicitly state King is asserting a failure-to-protect claim.
But construing the allegations of the TAC liberally, in light of Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.. 519 (1972), it can be construed he is asserting a failure-to-protect claim against

Corrections Defendants Dix, Burkholder, and Regina, for failing to protect him from
known threats posed by fellow prisoners. ECF No. 87 at 43, ¶ 4.10 However, the
TAC does not allege facts to support a finding that Defendants Dix, Burkholder,
Regina, or any other Corrections Defendant were aware of any threats made to
King or that they disregarded a substantial risk to his safety. His conclusory
allegations of risk and knowledge are insufficient to state a plausible failure to

protect claim against Corrections Defendants Dix, Burkholder, and Regina.
Similarly, King’s assertions the Corrections Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his safety by failing to impose a separation order similarly fails to
support a plausible failure-to-protect claim. See ECF No. 113 at 5 (“prison officials
conduct; their acts and omissions in deciding not to issue ‘separations’ with

deliberate indifference.”). Once again, King fails to identify discrete defendants
responsible for issuing separation orders or which defendants failed to exercise
necessary care to protect his safety.

10 King contends he was “concerned and afraid” inmates [names omitted by Court] and/or
others may at some point, transfer to SCI-Fayette, inmates whom had repeatedly made threats to
harm or kill him because they were family members of the ‘victim’ in the case responsible for his
incarceration currently.” ECF No. 87 at 50, ¶ 28. He contends he saw a family member of the victim
working in SCI-Fayette Barber Shop. Id., ¶ 31. King reported his concerns to Lt. Burgess, the
Security Captain, who is not a defendant here. Id., ¶¶ 29–37.
Thus, it is recommended the failure to protect claims be dismissed without
prejudice and King be granted leave to amend.

h. King’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim is Barred
by the Single Source Rule
It is unclear what claims King is attempting to bring under the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause. There is a reference to “deprivation of property,”
but it is unclear if this relates to the “seizing, discarding, and removing of discovery
documents” by Corrections Defendant Depasquale, ECF No. 87 at 35, or the denial
of commissary paid-for items and outside publications, id., ¶¶ 183-198.
To the extent any due process claim “is covered by a specific constitutional
provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed

under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of
substantive due process.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Thus, to
the extent King’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims arise from the same
factual allegations underlying his First Amendment retaliation claims, he does not
have standalone claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is thus recommended

King’s Fourteenth Amendment claims be dismissed without prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.11

11 King may also be attempting to bring a First Amendment censorship claim based on the
denial of his mail and certain publications. See ECF No. 113 at 8-9. It is recommended King be
granted leave to develop this claim in a Fourth Amended Complaint.
3. The Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, ECF No. 108

Lastly, King also filed a motion for spoliation sanctions alleging Defendants
failed to preserve evidence relevant to this case during a cell search outside his
presence. He asserts,
Prisoner officials, fully aware of their legal affirmative
Duty-to-Preserve and of active litigation in two separate
matters, proceeded in conducting cell searches and
leaving every document plaintiff has been permitted to
process in a heap on the concrete floor. Agents of the Pa
DOC CERT team and SCI-Fayette personnel dumped out
the contends of thirty-two manila envelopes, fifteen
folders, work product previously on the cell’s desk and the
steel top bunk without a mattress. All book marks inside
the legal reference books were removed. The
approximately fifty plastic Sheet Protectors also were
emptied. Absent is the two sided, Court provided THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT and several pages of
Defendants’ Brief in Support and Motion to Dismiss.

ECF No. 118 at 4.12 Notably, King also states while he had legal property
exemption authorizations in two separate pending cases, for a total of three boxes,
“[a]n exemption for this case was denied by [Unit Manager] Ms. Luster.” Id. at 2
(emphasis added). As sanctions he seeks (1) the dismissal of Defendants’ motion to
dismiss in its entirety; (2) appointment of counsel; (3) leave to amend complaint, (4)
bar any motion for summary judgment from Defendants, and (5) additional relief
the Court deems appropriate. Id. at 7. While the Corrections Defendants deny all

12 King does not indicate when this event occurred other than stating it occurred “when his cell
was searched outside his presence, while detained in the R&D strip cage, five hours after filing a
PREA notification on Defendant Officer Regina[.]” ECF No. 118 at 3.
King’s allegations, ECF No. 124, n.1, they argue the motion should be dismissed as
premature as “a complete factual record does not exist[.]” Id. at 3.

“Spoliation occurs where: the evidence was in the party's control; the evidence
is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression
or withholding of evidence; and, the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably
foreseeable to the party.” Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir.
2012). Whether to impose sanctions is within the Court’s sound discretion. Bozic v.

City of Washington, Pa., 912 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266 (W.D. Pa. 2012). If it is
determined that spoliation of evidence has occurred, the Court must determine an
appropriate sanction. GN Netcom, Inc. v Plantronics, Inc., 930 F.3d 76, 82 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994);
see also Bull, 665 F.3d at 74 n. 5 (quoting Schmid).

The undersigned concludes a finding of spoliation is not warranted and
recommends the motion for spoliation sanctions be denied. First, it is not clear
King’s documents in this case were actually destroyed. According to King, his
documents were taken out of envelopes and folders and dumped onto his cell floor
and bookmarks were removed from legal reference books, but he does not contend
his documents were actually destroyed.13 ECF No. 118 at 3. Further, while King

13 King does contend initial discovery documents produced in a separate lawsuit by the Office of
the Attorney General were thrown in the toilet by the Security Department prison officials and then
“the entire contends of one Legal Property Exemption box was discarded by a Supervisor level SCI-
Fayette prison official, defendant Sgt. Pasquale and a subordinate.” ECF No. 118 at 3. King does
not state when this event occurred.
contends his TAC and several pages of the Corrections Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and brief were “absent,” id. at 4, he does not dispute the Corrections
Defendants remailed him those documents. ECF No. 124 at 4.14 King cannot show

the conduct of any Defendant in this action resulted in an actual injury to him in
this case.
Nor is there evidence the Corrections Defendants acted in bad faith. In
determining bad faith, courts look to circumstantial evidence to determine intent,

including “the timing of the destruction, whether there was selective preservation,
and what preservation policies the party had in place.” Donofrio v. Ikea US Retail,
LLC, Civil Action Nos. 18-599, 2024 WL 1998094, at *28 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2024).
The documents were discovered during a cell search and, by King’s own admission,
he did not have an exemption for this material to be maintained in his cell.

Because there is no evidence of bad faith or prejudice, it is recommended
King’s motion for spoliation sanctions be denied.

14 King responded to the motion to dismiss on 12/22/2025, seven days before he filed the instant
motion for spoliation sanctions. ECF No. 118.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended the motion to dismiss
be granted in part and denied in part as most of King’s constitutional claims fail to

state a claim:
Claims Sought To Be Against Recommendation
Dismissed

Official Capacity All Corrections Defendants Motion to dismiss be
Claims granted and § 1983 official
capacity claims for money
damages be dismissed
with prejudice as such
claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. It
is further recommended
that leave to amend be
denied.

Personal Involvement Bright, Harry, Rusnak, Motion to dismiss be
of Several Corrections and Pearce granted as to Defendants
Defendants Bright, Harry, Rusnak,
and Pearce as the TAC is
void of specific factual
allegations. It is
recommended TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
_________________________
_________________________
Motion to dismiss be
Holloway, Regina, granted as to Defendants
Burkholder, and Dix Holloway, Regina,
Burkholder, and Dix as
the TAC is void of specific
factual allegations. It is
recommended TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
_________________________
_________________________
Motion to dismiss be
Walker granted to the extent King
is attempting to hold
Superintendent Walker
liable as a supervisor. It
is recommended the TAC
be dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
_______________________
_________________________
Motion to dismiss be
Kimmel and House denied.

First Amendment Haluska, Depasquale, Motion to dismiss be
Claims – Right of Calloway, and Holloway granted as King has failed
Access to Courts to plead Defendants’
conduct prevented him
from pursuing a non-
frivolous or arguable
claim. It is recommended
the TAC be dismissed
without prejudice and
King be granted leave to
amend.

First Amendment Kimmel and House Motion to dismiss be
Claims - Retaliation denied as King has
implicated Kimmel and
House denied his
grievances in retaliation
for his protected activity.
_________________________ ________________________

Bright, Harry, Rusnak, The motion to dismiss be
and Pearce granted as the TAC fails
to include any allegations
identifying the specific
adverse actions taken by
these Defendants against
King. It is recommended
the TAC be dismissed
without prejudice and
King be granted leave to
amend.
_________________________ ________________________

Holloway, Regina, The motion to dismiss be
Burkholder, Dix, Haluska, granted as the TAC fails
and Trafficante to include any allegations
showing a causal link
between King’s protected
activity and these
Defendants’ knowledge of
his protected activity. It is
recommended the TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.

Fourth Amendment Sgt. DePasquale The motion to dismiss be
Claims granted and King’s Fourth
Amendment claims be
dismissed with prejudice
and leave to amend be
denied as futile.

Eighth Amendment – All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be
Conditions of granted as the TAC lacks
Confinement Claims the requisite specificity to
meet minimum pleading
requirements to allege
Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement
claims. It is recommended
the TAC be dismissed
without prejudice and
King be granted leave to
amend.

Eighth Amendment – Dix, Burkholder, Regina, The motion to dismiss be
Failure to Protect and unnamed Corrections granted as the TAC does
Claims Defendants not allege facts to support
a finding that Dix,
Burkholder, or Regina, or
any other Corrections
Defendant, were aware of
any threats to King or
disregarded a substantial
risk to his safety. It is
recommended the TAC be
dismissed without
prejudice and King be
granted leave to amend.
______________________ _________________________ _________________________

Fourteenth All Corrections Defendants The motion to dismiss be
Amendment Due granted and King’s
Process Claims Fourteenth Amendment
due process claims be
with prejudice under the
single source rule. It is
further recommended
leave to amend be denied
as futile.

Giving deference to the allegations in King’s pro se Third Amended
Complaint, it is recommended King be granted leave to file a Fourth Amended
Complaint that meets the standards of Federal Rule of Procedure 8 and cures the
pleading deficiencies as noted in this Report and Recommendation. King should be
instructed he cannot include any claim in his Fourth Amended Complaint that has
been dismissed with prejudice.
It is also recommended King’s motion for spoliation sanctions be denied as
King has not met his burden with respect to the requested spoliation sanctions.

Any party is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and
Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, King, because he is
a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections, if any, to this
Report and Recommendation by June 1, 2026. The Correction Defendants, because

they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by May 27,
2026. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this
timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187,
193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983).
See also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100
(3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific
objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).

DATED this 12th day of May, 2026.
BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown
Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: SHAWN KING
MM2246
SCI PHOENIX
1200 Mokychic Drive
Collegeville, PA 19426
(via U.S. First Class Mail)

Margaret Potter
PA Office of Attorney General
(via ECF electronic notification)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11348843. Public record. Not legal advice.