# GREEN

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · June 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11347544

## Case

- **Full name:** Isaiah Green, Jr. v. Leah Garland
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** June 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ISAIAH GREEN, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:26CV450
)
LEAH GARLAND, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court for review of subject matter
jurisdiction. (See Text Order dated May 15, 2026 (directing “Clerk
to refrain from issuance of summons pending review of [Plaintiff’s]
Complaint to determine if the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action”).) Because Plaintiff has not
established a basis for this Court’s exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court should dismiss this action.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff instituted this action by paying the filing fee (see
Receipt of Funds dated May 14, 2026) and filing the Complaint
(Docket Entry 1). The Complaint names one Defendant, Leah Garland,
a “Deputy Clerk” of this Court. (Id. at 2.)1 Despite the
admonition in the form portion of the Complaint that “[f]ederal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” (id. at 3; see also id.
1 Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings apply standard
capitalization conventions.
(explaining that, “[g]enerally, only two types of cases can be
heard in federal court: cases involving a federal question and
cases involving diversity of citizenship of the parties”)),
Plaintiff did not identify “the basis for federal court
jurisdiction” (id.). (See id.; see also id. at 1-2 (listing
addresses for both Plaintiff and Deputy Clerk Garland in North
Carolina); Docket Entry 2 at 1 (marking box denominating “U.S.
Government” as “Defendant” in section of Civil Cover Sheet
soliciting “Basis of Jurisdiction” and checking boxes denominating
Plaintiff and Deputy Clerk Garland as “Citizen of This State” in
section of Civil Cover Sheet soliciting “Citizenship of Principal
Parties” (all-caps, bold, and enlarged font omitted)).)
In the space designated within the Complaint for Plaintiff to
“[w]rite a short and plain statement of [his] claim” (Docket Entry
1 at 4), he wrote:
This Plaintiff was denied the U.S. constitutional right
to sign an appeal motion to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals for a plaintiff pro se litigant, who this
Plaintiff pro se litigant was given the authority to sign
on her behalf the legal court motion as her legal-lawful
aid under the Sixth Article of the United States
Constitution – being denied this legal lawful right by
the white female court clerk at the United States Fed.
Courthouse (at Greensboro, N.C. 5/12/2026).
(Id.; see also id. (“requesting a 7.5 million dollar settlement by
this court actor, who wilful [sic] and intentional [sic]
overstepped her limited powers of authority, acting on the behalf
of a court which have [sic] on record the continous [sic] denial of
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circumventing the United States constitutional laws that deny black
and brown skin color taxpaying citizens to exercise the
constitutional law rights as provided by the United States ratified
laws by the United States Congress that are given by law to be
exercised by taxpaying citizens of all ethnic group members”);
Docket Entry 2 at 1 (checking box designating “Nature of Suit” as
“Other Civil Rights,” citing (as basis for “Cause of Action”)
“Article VI – United States Constitution” (all-caps, bold, and
enlarged font omitted)).)
The Complaint thus seeks to hold Deputy Clerk Garland liable
for damages under the Constitution for her enforcement of the
requirement that, in this Court (like all other United States
District Courts), “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other
paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney’s name – or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (emphasis added); see also
M.D.N.C. LR 11.1(a) (“Any individual who is representing himself or
herself without an attorney (pro se) must appear personally when
required and may not delegate that duty to any other individual,

including husband or wife, or any other pro se party. Any
individual representing himself or herself without an attorney is
bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, this
Court’s Local Rules, and all other applicable law.” (italics
omitted)).
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DISCUSSION
“The [C]lourt must determine whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction over [this] action before proceeding any further.”
Coley _v. United States Postal Serv., No. 1:11CV986, 2013 WL
2474357, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 10, 2013) (unpublished) (Schroeder,
J.). In that regard, “[a] federal court has an independent
obligation to assess its subject-matter jurisdiction, and it will
raise a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion.”
Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d
474, 480 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).° Furthermore,
“[t]he burden is on the party asserting the jurisdiction of the
[C]ourt to show that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist.” Bowman v.
White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968).
Here (as the Introduction documents), the Complaint ignores
the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Regardless, due to
the common state citizenship of Plaintiff and Deputy Clerk Garland

* Similarly, the Court retains inherent authority to review
the Complaint for frivolousness. See, e.g., Traywick v. Medical
Univ. of S.C., 671 F. App’x 85, 86 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Because [the
plaintiff] is neither a prisoner nor proceeding in forma pauperis
in district court, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2), 1915A
(2012), permitting sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim, do not apply. A court has, however, inherent
authority to dismiss frivolous complaints.” (internal citations
omitted)); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the
inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been
paid.”).

(again, as documented in the Introduction), Plaintiff could not
satisfy the requirements for diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between[:] (1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state, except . . . [lawful permanent residents] domiciled in the
same State; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens
or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a
foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of
different States.”). And any attempt by Plaintiff to invoke
federal-question jurisdiction based on “[t]he claim[] raised . . .
under the United States Constitution [would] fare no better,”
Housecalls Home Health Care, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs., 515 F. Supp. 2d 616, 628 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (Eliason,
M.J.), recommendation adopted, id. at 618 (Osteen, J.), given that
claim’s patent frivolity.
Indeed, “[o]ver the years th[e United States Supreme] Court

has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to
entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if the[
claims] are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely
devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, plainly
unsubstantial, or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine,
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415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Put another way, “where a claim is obviously without
merit, Hagans precludes a federal district court from exercising
its jurisdiction.” Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.
1999); see also Marshall v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., No.
1:16CV550, 2017 WL 2774265, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 26, 2017)
(unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“As to federal question
jurisdiction, the court does not lack authority to act simply
because a claim lacks merit or is doubtful. But a claim is too
insubstantial and frivolous to support federal question
jurisdiction when it is obviously without merit.” (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted)). “In addition, because [the
C]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously
frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is
permitted.” Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012);
accord, e.g., Ferguson v. Wooton, 741 F. App’x 955, 955 (4th Cir.
2018); Smith v. Kagan, 616 F. App’x 90, 90 (4th Cir. 2015); Yi v.
Social Sec. Admin., 554 F. App’x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014).

The Supreme Court further has explained that “a complaint
. . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Plaintiff’s claim against Deputy Clerk Garland for “deni[al of] the
U.S. constitutional right to sign an appeal motion . . . for
a[nother] plaintiff pro se litigant” (Docket Entry 1 at 4)
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qualifies as frivolous because that claim “lacks an arguable basis
[] in law,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. For starters, “direct causes
of action do not ordinarily exist under the United States
Constitution.” Housecalls, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 628. “Exceptions
have been made in situations such as existed in Bivens[ v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)],” Housecalls, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 628, but the Bivens
implied-cause-of-action-exception does not extend to the federal
constitutional claim asserted by Plaintiff.
“In Bivens, the [Supreme C]ourt permitted an implied cause of
action for plaintiffs whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated
by federal officers.” Williams v. United States, Civ. Action No.
21-537, 2021 WL 1720230, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2021)
(unpublished). Subsequently, “[t]he [Supreme] Court held that the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause gave [a congressional
administrative assistant] a damages remedy [against a Congressman]

for gender discrimination,” Ziglar v. Abassi, 582 U.S. 120, 131
(2017), and “held that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause gave [a federal prisoner’s estate] a damages
remedy [against federal prison officials] for failure to provide
adequate medical treatment,” id. “Th[o]se three cases . . .
represent the only instances in which the [Supreme] Court has
approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution
itself.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he Supreme Court has refused to extend
7
Bivens a number of times and expansion of the Bivens remedy is now
disfavored.” Williams, 2021 WL 1720230, at *3.
Accordingly, even if – contrary to the express terms of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) – the Constitution entitled
Plaintiff to sign a court filing on behalf of a fellow pro se
litigant, any Bivens claim against Deputy Clerk Garland for denying
Plaintiff that entitlement “would nevertheless be subject to
dismissal,” id., as that “claim[] . . . do[es] not fit into any of
the recognized causes of actions to which Bivens has been
extended,” id. See, e.g., Harris v. Hunt, No. 22-4028, 2023 WL
8432699, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (unpublished) (affirming
dismissal of federal constitutional claims against court employees
for “failure or refusal to file various motions and pleadings” and
explaining that “Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens cause
of action for prisoners who claim that officers and employees of
the federal judiciary have violated the[ prisoners’] constitutional

rights,” as well as that “subjecting the government to the costs
and burdens of defending lawsuits arising out of the day-to-day
operations of the clerk of court’s office is a special factor that
counsels against implying a new Bivens cause of action in this
context” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Foltyniewicz v.
United States Supreme Court, No. 5:25CT3251, 2026 WL 382391, at *3-
4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2026) (unpublished) (“declin[ing] to recognize
a Bivens cause of action” against court clerks for rejecting court
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filings, because (A) such “claims present a new context that is
meaningfully different from the causes of action the Supreme Court
previously recognized, [(B) the claims] name[] a new type of
defendant,” and (C) “there indeed is a rational reason for the
court to defer to Congress for creation of a damages remedy in
[such] case[s]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In sum, the Complaint does not involve diverse parties and
does not present a non-frivolous, federal claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established a basis for this Court to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss this action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
June 24, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11347544. Public record. Not legal advice.