# McGrone

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · June 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346768

## Case

- **Full name:** Ivan Mcgrone v. Matt Birge, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** June 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346768

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that a court may allow the case to proceed to discovery against a high-level official with the expectation that he will aid in identifying any Doe Defendants

## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION

IVAN MCGRONE,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-02162-JEH

MATT BIRGE, et al.,
Defendants.

Merit Review Order
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Danville
Correctional Center (“Danville”), filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). This case is before the Court for a
merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true,
liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-
51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.
Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x 588,
589 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
II
Plaintiff files suit against Wardens Matt Birge and McKenna Wenzel,
Sergeants Hubbard, Davis, and Lynch, Correctional Officers Sapp, Walls, Moore,
Nelson, Smith, and Seely, and Cadets Brown, Hopskin, Smith, Garcia, Connor,
Davis, Williams, Johnson, Williamson, Knockles, Lukus, Rivers, Ellison, and John
Does.
At approximately 7:45 a.m. on August 26, 2025, Plaintiff alleges he was
abruptly awakened by Defendant Sergeant Hubbard and approximately thirty
cadets, including Defendants Brown, Hopskin, Smith, Garcia, Connor, Davis,
Williams, Johnson, Williamson, Knockles, Lukus, Rivers, Ellison, and John Does.
Plaintiff was informed that the cadets were going to conduct a strip search and a
shakedown of his cell (3-A-13) for training purposes under Defendant Hubbard’s
supervision and instruction.
Defendant Hubbard allegedly directed the cadets to place Plaintiff in
handcuffs in a manner that was excessively painful. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
his wrists were twisted outward with his thumbs facing upward and his hands
were restrained behind his back in an unnatural, painful position. Plaintiff
remained restrained in this position for approximately two hours. Plaintiff alleges
he experienced pain in his wrists, shoulders, right elbow, lower back, and arms.
Plaintiff was escorted to the North Chow Hall during the shakedown
exercise between 8:00 a.m. and 10:50 a.m. Plaintiff alleges he repeatedly requested
to have his handcuffs loosened and for access to drinking water and the restroom,
but Defendants Sergeants Davis and Lynch and Correctional Officers Sapp, Walls,
Moore, Nelson, Smith, and Seely denied his requests. Plaintiff alleges he advised
correctional staff that he had been awakened from sleep and had not been allowed
to use the restroom prior to being restrained and escorted to the chow hall. Plaintiff
alleges he involuntarily urinated on himself and was forced to sit in urine-soaked
clothing, which caused humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional distress.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Wardens Birge and Wenzel authorized,
condoned, approved, facilitated, or failed to properly supervise and train the
Cadets who participated in the shakedown exercise.
Due to the incident on August 26, 2025, Plaintiff alleges he suffered physical
injuries, including pain in his lower back, shoulders, wrists, arms, and right elbow.
Plaintiff claims he also experienced migraines, dizziness, blurred vision, elevated
blood pressure, anxiety, and emotional distress. Plaintiff received medical
treatment and medication, including Tylenol and Zoloft.
III
A
To proceed on an excessive force claim, Plaintiff must show that the force
was applied maliciously and sadistically, not in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). “[W]hile a plaintiff
need not demonstrate a significant injury to state a claim for excessive force under
the Eighth Amendment, a claim ordinarily cannot be predicated on a de minimis
use of physical force.” Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2001)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). However, if no force is necessary, even
de minimis force may not be used. Reid v. Melvin, 695 F. App’x 982, 983-84 (7th Cir.
2017).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sergeant Hubbard directed the Cadets to place
him in handcuffs in a manner that was excessively painful during a strip search
and shakedown training exercise on August 26, 2025. Plaintiff alleges he remained
handcuffed for approximately two hours and experienced pain in his wrists,
shoulders, right elbow, lower back, and arms. The Court finds that Plaintiff has
stated a colorable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants
Sergeant Hubbard and Cadets Brown, Hopskin, Smith, Garcia, Connor, Davis,
Williams, Johnson, Williamson, Knockles, Lukus, Rivers, Ellison, and John Does.
Plaintiff is advised that the John Doe Cadets cannot be served. The Court
will add Trent Allen, the current Warden of Danville, as a Defendant in his official
capacity to facilitate the identification of the John Doe Cadets. See Donald v. Cook
Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a court may
allow the case to proceed to discovery against a high-level official with the
expectation that he will aid in identifying any Doe Defendants). Plaintiff may
propound written discovery requests upon Warden Allen aimed solely
at identifying the John Doe Cadets. After the John Doe Cadets have been
identified, Warden Allen may move to be dismissed. Ultimately, it is Plaintiff’s
responsibility to identify the John Doe Cadets and file a motion to substitute the
real names of John Doe Cadets. The failure to do so will result in the dismissal of
the John Doe Cadets without prejudice.
B
To allege an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, Plaintiff
must plead that “the conditions at issue were ‘sufficiently serious’ so that ‘a prison
official’s act or omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities’” and that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to
the conditions in question. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). A plaintiff must allege “that
an official actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Petties v.
Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016).
While in the chow hall between 8:00 a.m. and 10:50 a.m., Plaintiff alleges he
was denied access to the restroom, deprived of water, and remained handcuffed
in a painful position during the shakedown. Plaintiff alleges he repeatedly asked
Defendants Sergeants Davis and Lynch and Correctional Officers Sapp, Walls,
Moore, Nelson, Smith, and Seely to loosen his handcuffs and for access to water
and the restroom, but Defendants denied his requests. Plaintiff alleges he
involuntarily urinated on himself and was forced to sit in his urine-soaked clothes.
Based on the alleged conditions during the shakedown on August 26, 2025, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a colorable Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim against Defendants Davis, Lynch, Sapp, Walls, Moore, Nelson,
Smith, and Seely.
C
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Wardens Birge and Wenzel “authorized,
condoned, approved, facilitated, or failed to properly supervise and train cadets
participating in the trainee shakedown operation.” (Doc. 1 at p. 14, ¶ 49). There is
no respondeat superior under § 1983. In other words, Defendants Birge and Wenzel
cannot be liable based only on their supervisory position. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928
F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Officials are accountable for their own acts; they are
not vicariously liable for the conduct of subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 667 (2009); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Defendants Birge and Wenzel are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.
IV
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Request Counsel asking the Court to appoint an
attorney to represent him. (Doc. 5). “There is no right to court-appointed counsel
in federal civil litigation.” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007)). When evaluating a Motion to
Request Counsel, the Court must consider: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a
reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so;
and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to
litigate it himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655.
Plaintiff does not state what attempts he made to obtain counsel.
Demonstrating a reasonable effort to obtain representation typically requires
submitting letters from several attorneys declining assistance and copies of any
documents which show Plaintiff tried to find an attorney. See Olson, 750 F.3d at
711. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable attempt to secure his own lawyer.
Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong of Pruitt, the Court does not
address the second. Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff’s
Motion is DENIED, with leave to renew. If Plaintiff renews his Motion, he is
directed to attach copies of letters he sent to or received from prospective counsel,
list the attorneys or law firms he contacted, and indicate whether he received a
response.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to proceed on (1) an Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendants Hubbard, Brown, Hopskin, Smith1, Garcia,
Connor, Davis, Williams, Johnson, Williamson, Knockles, Lukus, Rivers, Ellison,
and John Does (unknown cadets) based on the alleged use of excessive force on
August 26, 2025, and (2) an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim
against Defendants Davis, Lynch, Sapp, Walls, Moore, Nelson, Smith2, and Seely
for allegedly denying Plaintiff access to the restroom, depriving him of water,
refusing to loosen his painful handcuffs, and forcing him to sit in urine-soaked
clothes in the chow hall during a shakedown on August 26, 2025. Additional
claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on
motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) The Clerk is directed to ADD Trent Allen, the current Warden of
Danville Correctional Center, as a Defendant (in his official capacity only) to assist
Plaintiff in identifying the John Doe Cadets. Plaintiff may propound written

1 Defendant Smith is a Cadet. Plaintiff also files suit against Correctional Officer Smith.
2 Defendant Smith is a Correctional Officer. Plaintiff also files suit against Cadet Smith.
discovery requests upon Warden Allen aimed solely at identifying the John Doe
Cadets. After the John Doe Cadets have been identified, Warden Allen may move
to be dismissed. Ultimately, it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to identify the John Doe
Cadets and file a motion to substitute the real names of the John Doe Cadets. The
failure to do so will result in the dismissal of the John Doe Cadets without
prejudice.
3) Defendants Matt Birge and McKenna Wenzel are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and. § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants
Matt Birge and McKenna Wenzel.
4) Plaintiff's Motion to Request Counsel [5] is DENIED.
5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff
to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give
Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed
before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as
premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless
otherwise directed by the Court.
6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of
service. If Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendants and will require
Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
7) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk
sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer
should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and
subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In
general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ position. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no
response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not
filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this
Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
8) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the
entity for whom Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk
Defendants’ current work address, or, if not known, Defendants’ forwarding
address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained only by the
Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendants’ counsel copies of motions and other
documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to
discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed
with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly
to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be
returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.
Discovery does not begin until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and
the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process
in more detail.
10) Defendants’ counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at
Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
11) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change
in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court
of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this
lawsuit, with prejudice.
12) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records
upon request.
13) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants’ counsel an
authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the
authorization to Defendants’ counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard
qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
14) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from
the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter
scheduling deadlines.
It is so ordered.

Entered: June 23, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346768. Public record. Not legal advice.