# Hardwick

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · March 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346367

## Case

- **Full name:** Kevin D. Hardwick v. 3M Company, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346367

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a plaintiff’s requested relief, even if not a complete remedy for the plaintiff’s injury, establishes redressability where the relief would “remove one barrier” to the plaintiff obtaining that remedy

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN D. HARDWICK,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:24-cv-3121
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall
3M COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Joint Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF Nos. 31, 32) by Defendants 3M Company, EIDP,
Inc., f/k/a E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (“DuPont”), and Chemours Company. Plaintiff Kevin
D. Hardwick responded (ECF No. 36), and Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 43, 44). Also before
the Court is Defendants’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Instanter Notice of Supplemental
Authority. (ECF No. 53.)
Defendants’ Unopposed Motion for Leave (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED. Defendants’
Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss is DENIED (ECF No. 31) and Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss is HELD IN ABEYANCE (ECF No. 31). In addition, the Court certifies this
matter for interlocutory review and stays this matter pending disposition of this certification and
appeal.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Hardwick brings this putative nationwide or Ohio class action for injunctive,
equitable, and declaratory relief, including medical monitoring. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.) He
alleges his injuries, and the injuries of the putative class members, arise from:
the intentional, knowing, reckless and negligent acts and omissions of Defendants
in connection with contamination of the blood and bodies of Plaintiff and other
Class members with two members of the family of synthetic, toxic per- and
polyfluoroalkyl substances (collectively “PFAS”) known as perfluorooctanoic acid
(“PFOA”) and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (“PFOS”) (PFOA and PFOS are
collectively referred to herein as “C8”), which resulted and continues to result from
Defendants using Plaintiff and the other Class members as part of a massive,
undisclosed human health experiment without the knowledge or consent of Plaintiff
or the other Class members.
(Id.)1
Mr. Hardwick’s case, as he explains, is a re-filed case. (Compl., ¶ 2); see Kevin D.
Hardwick v. 3M Co., et al., S.D. Ohio Case No. 2:18-cv-1185 (“Hardwick I”). This case has a
storied past, which the Court describes below.
I. Alleged Facts
Mr. Hardwick is a citizen of Ohio and a resident of the Southern District of Ohio.
(Compl., ¶ 8.) He has worked as a firefighter for more than 40 years. (Id.) Mr. Hardwick alleges
that he “was exposed at home and at work to C8 through ingestion, inhalation, and absorption of
C8 in air, water, food, dust, clothing, uniforms, equipment, gear, and consumer and industrial
products contaminated with or otherwise containing C8.” (Id.) Mr. Hardwick states that testing
has confirmed he has more than 2 parts per billion (“ppb”) C8 in his blood serum. (Id.) He
alleges Defendants manufactured the C8 in his blood. (Id.)
Mr. Hardwick includes allegations specific to each Defendant. The Court summarizes
those allegations in the subsections below.

1 Defendants assert that the Complaint improperly lumps together PFOA and PFOS under the
term “C8.” (Mot., ECF No. 32, PageID 604 n.1.) But Defendants, “[f]or purposes of this Motion
only, . . . use the term C8 consistent with the Complaint’s definition of the term” without
conceding “PFOA and PFOS are properly characterized as the same chemical.” (Id.) The Court
therefore uses the term “C8” too.
A. 3M
Mr. Hardwick asserts that Defendant 3M Company was the inventor of many PFAS,
including C8. (Compl., ¶ 10.) 3M “made, used, disposed, and directly discharged and released
C8 into the environment, including in Ohio and this District.” (Id.) 3M did so, the Complaint
alleges, through putting C8 directly into the air, water, and soil and through selling products
containing C8, “including, but not limited to, FC-143, FC-195, Scotchgard ™, and
Scotchban.™”(Id.) The Complaint provides a history of 3M’s manufacturing, use, sale, and
marketing of C8-based products. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12.) Mr. Hardwick alleges that “3M was the original
and exclusive manufacturer of C8, including both PFOS and PFOA, within the United States
until it claims to have phased out production of C8 around 2002.” (Id. ¶ 13.)
Mr. Hardwick alleges that “3M is the source of all PFOS found in human blood within
the United States,” including in the blood of Mr. Hardwick and the putative class members. (Id.

¶ 15.) “[A]nalytical testing can confirm that 3M is the sole source of all PFOA found in human
blood, including in Plaintiff and all [putative] Class members, generated from the ECF method
used and patented by 3M (the ‘3M ECF-Made PFOA’).” (Id.) Mr. Harwick alleges the PFOS and
3M ECF-Made PFOA in his blood is directly traceable to 3M and came from 3M. (Id. ¶ 17.)
B. DuPont
As for DuPont, Mr. Hardwick describes how DuPont trademarked fluoropolymer
polytetrafluoroethylene (“PTFE”) as Teflon™ and introduced it to the market. (Compl., ¶¶ 19–
20.) From 1951 until 2000 DuPont manufactured Teflon™ at its manufacturing facility in
Washington, West Virginia (the “Washington Works Plant”), and used PFOA that it had

purchased from 3M to do so. (Id. ¶ 21.) This manufacturing process resulted in residual PFOA in
and on consumer products and the release of PFOA into the air, water, and soil. (Id.) PFOA
traveled through the air and water to other states—including Ohio and this District—where it
was “either ingested, inhaled, adsorbed or otherwise entered the bodies and blood of humans,”
including Mr. Hardwick and the putative class members. (Id.)
There are many other products that DuPont made with PTFE and that “PFOA also has
been found in or degrading from.” (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) Mr. Hardwick explains that DuPont also
“manufactured and marketed PTFE micropowders under the Zonyl™ brand name, beginning in
the 1960s,” and that product “was used in grease-resistant, non-stick paper and cardboard
consumer products like fast food packaging and microwave popcorn bags.” (Id. ¶¶ 24–25.)
C. Chemours
As for Defendant Chemours, the Complaint explains that it is a corporation that “has by
contract and other written instruments, or by operation of law, assumed or otherwise is
responsible for DuPont’s PFOA-related liabilities.” (Compl., ¶ 34.) Mr. Hardwick’s Complaint

alleges that Chemours has continued manufacturing, marketing, selling, and disposing of
products and materials like Teflon™, Zonyl™, Nomex™, and Stainmaster™, which historically
were made with or contained PFOA. (Id. ¶ 35.) “[T]o this day,” Chemours “manufactures PFAS
and other materials that result in continuing release of PFOA into the environment” and end up
contaminating the blood of Mr. Hardwick and other putative class members. (Id.)
Mr. Hardwick explains that the PFOA from DuPont and Chemours products can be
distinguished from PFOA made by 3M based on a “distinct chemical signature or ‘fingerprint’
identifiable by scientists using complex and analytical techniques where branched versus linear
chained C8 materials can be identified.” (Id. ¶ 36.) This fingerprint allows Mr. Hardwick to trace

the PFOA from DuPont and Chemours to his blood and the blood of putative class members. (Id.
¶ 37.)
D. The History of C8
Mr. Hardwick’s Complaint contains a thorough history of C8, beginning in the late 1930s
through present day. (Compl., ¶¶ 42–128.) While the historical allegations provide helpful
context to Mr. Hardwick’s Complaint, it is unnecessary for this Court’s purposes to summarize
the complete history.
It suffices to say that the Complaint alleges that PFAS are “a class of non-naturally-
occurring, man-made chemicals” (id. ¶ 42), and by at least the end of the 1960s, 3M and DuPont
were aware that C8 is “mobile and persists” which meant that once it is introduced into the
environment—through emissions, releases, or disposal into the air, water, or soils—it spreads
quicky and is resistant to metabolic and environmental degradation processes (id. ¶ 51). And by
the 1970s, Mr. Hardwick alleges, 3M and DuPont were aware that once C8 was in the world and
moving through environmental media, C8 would be “ingested, inhaled, or otherwise absorbed

into living creatures,” bind to materials within blood, and bioaccumulate. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 55.) By the
late 1990s, 3M’s and DuPont’s research and testing indicated that PFOA has caused a “a triad of
tumors (Leydig cell (testicular), liver, and pancreatic) in a second chronic cancer study in rats.”
(Id. ¶ 70.) They also knew that C8 had been associated with increased prostate cancer among 3M
workers exposed to PFAS, as well as elevated kidney and other cancer rates. (Id.)
The Complaint describes the additional potential adverse health impacts for those
exposed to C8. (Id. ¶¶ 71–75.) It describes the various classification determinations of and
regulations on C8 that the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) made in the
2020s. (Id. ¶¶ 76–81.) Mr. Hardwick explains that the National Academy of Sciences “release[d]

a report in June 2022 indicating that medical monitoring would be appropriate for any person in
the United States with more than 2 ppb total PFAS in their blood.” (Id. ¶ 82.) He notes too that as
of present day, “blood serum testing and analysis by Defendants, independent scientific
researchers, and government entities has confirmed that C8 (both PFOA and PFOS) is clinically
demonstrably present in approximately 99% of the current population of the United States” and
“has been present in such blood since at least the 1970s.” (Id. ¶ 98.)
E. Class Allegations, Claims, and Prayer for Relief
The Complaint contains class action allegations. Mr. Hardwick seeks to bring his lawsuit
on behalf of the following class: “Individuals subject to the laws of Ohio, or subject to the laws
of any other state that recognizes the claims for relief filed by Plaintiff, who have 2 parts per
billion (2 ppb) or more of PFOA and PFOS (combined) manufactured by Defendants in their
blood serum.” (Compl., ¶¶ 129–46.)
Mr. Hardwick brings the following causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) battery,
(3) declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and (4) conspiracy. (Id. ¶¶ 147–

79.) As for relief requested, Mr. Hardwick and the putative class seek “equitable and/or
injunctive relief, including but not limited to medical monitoring and associated research and
studies, for each of the causes of action alleged herein.” (Id. ¶ 182.) He clarifies that neither he
nor the class seeks any compensatory damages. (Id.) The medical monitoring they seek would
include “diagnostic testing and studies overseen by a court-appointed panel of independent
scientists,” who would be tasked with the following:
[I]ndependently studying, evaluating, reviewing, identifying, publishing, and
notifying/informing the Class of Sufficient Results, which work, including but not
limited to any testing, sampling, studies, or monitoring deemed appropriate by the
Science Panel for Class member blood contamination with C8 or C8 mixed with
other PFAS (hereinafter “Science Panel Work”) [to be] funded by Defendants.

(Id. ¶ 183.) Mr. Hardwick’s defines “Sufficient Results” in paragraph 115:
Yet, to this day, 3M, DuPont, and Chemours knowingly, willfully, purposefully,
intentionally, recklessly, and/or negligently refuse to fund or conduct any scientific
study research, testing, or other work of any kind that is extensive or comprehensive
enough, according to Defendants, to generate results that Defendants will accept
(outside the context of an existing written settlement agreement such as DuPont
entered with respect to certain PFOA exposures, which created the C8 Science Panel)
as sufficient to confirm a causal connection between C8 in human blood and any
injury, human disease, adverse human health impact, and/or a risk sufficient to
warrant any personal injury compensation or future diagnostic medical testing,
including medical monitoring (hereinafter “Sufficient Results”).
(Id. ¶ 115.) Next, the Court turns to the procedural history of this litigation.
II. Procedural History
Mr. Hardwick’s original case, Hardwick I, was filed in October 2018 against the same
Defendants (and others). (Hardwick I, ECF No. 1.) Among other motion practice and court
orders, that case went through briefing and oral argument on motions to dismiss, which were
denied, and the close of class certification discovery. (See, e.g., Hardwick I, ECF Nos. 127, 128.)
The Court certified Mr. Hardwick and the same plaintiff’s counsel in this case to represent a
class comprised of “[i]ndividuals subject to the laws of Ohio, who have 0.05 parts per trillion
(ppt) of PFOA (C-8) and at least 0.05 ppt of any other PFAS in their blood serum.” (Hardwick I,
ECF No. 233.) This Court reasoned that certification only as to Ohio was an appropriate first step
because it was “not inclined to consider a nationwide class with individuals injured in states that
do not recognize the type injury afflicting Mr. Hardwick.” Hardwick v. 3M Co., 589 F. Supp. 3d
832, 851 (S.D. Ohio 2022), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 87 F.4th 315 (6th Cir. 2023).
Shortly thereafter, the defendants in Hardwick I filed a request for an interlocutory appeal
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (ECF No. 237.) About six months
later, the Sixth Circuit granted that request. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj.
Litig., No. 22-0305, 2022 WL 4149090 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2022) (“23(f) Order”).
A. The 23(f) Order
The Circuit Court explained that it granted the Hardwick I defendants’ petition for
interlocutory review because it found that this Court’s certification decision “involve[d]
important and unsettled questions of law and that it could prove the death knell of the litigation.”
Id. at *1. The Sixth Circuit characterized Mr. Harwick’s case in Hardwick I as follows:
Hardwick alleges he has PFAS in his blood. But he admits “he has ‘no idea’ which
Defendant (if any) exposed him to PFAS.” And he claims no health condition as a
result of his exposure. He instead asserts that he faces an “associated risk of
developing various diseases” later on. But how much of a risk he doesn’t know.
Indeed, that is the point of this lawsuit. Hardwick (and class counsel) want an
injunction from the district court requiring defendants to fund a “science panel” to
study whether exposure to PFAS is harmful and, if so, the degree of exposure
required to cause health complications. Class counsel also seek medical monitoring
for Hardwick and every other member of the proposed class—any resident of the
United States “with 0.05 parts per trillion (ppt) or more of PFOA and at least 0.05
ppt or more of any other PFAS chemical in their blood serum.” As defendants point
out (and plaintiffs do not contest) this class would include over 330 million
Americans.

Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted). After noting its broad discretion to determine whether to permit an
interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f), the Circuit Court discussed whether Mr. Hardwick had
standing. Id. at *3–4.
i. Standing
The Sixth Circuit considered “whether Hardwick illustrated (1) an injury in fact that
[was] concrete and particularized and actual or imminent (rather than conjectural or
hypothetical), (2) whether the injury [could] be fairly traced to defendants, and (3) whether the
injury would likely be redressed by a decision in Hardwick’s favor.” 23(f) Order at *4 (citing
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
As for injury in fact, the Sixth Circuit noted that Mr. Hardwick considered his injury in
fact to be both (1) the presence of PFAS in his blood, and (2) the allegedly increased risk of
disease PFAS inflicts. Id. The Circuit Court then explained that the “presence of PFAS in Mr.
Hardwick’s blood may potentially qualify as an Article III injury in fact—but not for the reasons
the district court suggested.” Id. The Sixth Circuit explained that this Court’s conclusions that
(1) Ohio law permits medical monitoring claims without proof of physical injury, and (2) that the
Circuit’s decision in Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 2011) was on point and
binding as to whether Mr. Hardwick alleged an injury in fact, were both “open to doubt.” Id.
Starting with Hirsch, the Circuit Court characterized its decision as never resolving or
discussing “whether the plaintiffs’ exposure to toxic fumes constituted an Article III injury in
fact.” Id. (citing Hirsch, 656 F.3d 359). Rather, it characterized Hirsch as affirming “the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that the exposure so
minutely increased the plaintiffs’ risk of disease that no reasonable physician would order
medical monitoring under the circumstances.” Id. (citing Hirsch, 656 F.3d at 364). The Sixth

Circuit found it was “unclear” why Hirsch would be binding or on point. Id.
As for (1), the Sixth Circuit confined the probative value of “Ohio’s recognition of a
cause of action for medical-monitoring claims after exposure to toxic substance” as to the
existence of an injury in fact. Id. at *5. The Circuit Court explained that the legislature’s
recognition of a cause of action is not itself dispositive that the asserted injury is cognizable
under Article III. Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341–42 (2016).) An
“independent inquiry” must be taken, and Mr. Hardwick may have satisfied that showing by
analogizing his claim to battery, providing a common-law analogue for his asserted injury. Id.
(“After all, the common law arguably regarded even minor intrusions as cognizable.”) (citing

Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, L.L.C., 998 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 2021)).
Even so, the Sixth Circuit said that Mr. Hardwick would next run into redressability
problems because medical monitoring cannot do anything about the presence of PFAS in his
blood. Id. Such monitoring would not eliminate PFAS from his blood or prevent PFAS from
entering his blood again. Id. “So if Hardwick’s injury is understood as being the mere presence
of PFAS, it is questionable whether either aspect of his requested relief would likely redress his
asserted injury.” Id.
As for Mr. Hardwick’s claim that PFAS in his blood increases the likelihood he will
develop certain disease, the Sixth Circuit identified a tension between the standing doctrine’s
“concrete-harm requirement” (mandating that the risk of harm bet both imminent and
substantial) and his requested remedy to determine whether he has an elevated risk of disease. Id.
at *6. Put differently, the Circuit Court noted the “circular nature” of Mr. Hardwick argument—
“he claims to be sufficiently likely to develop a disease to have Article III standing, but because
he actually has no idea about his risk of future disease, he wants an injunction creating a science

panel to tell him if he’s at risk of developing a disease.” Id.
Based on its preliminary review, the Sixth Circuit also found Mr. Hardwick “[came] up
short” when it came to traceability, too, because he did not know which defendant exposed him
to PFAS. Id.
ii. Other Findings
The Sixth Circuit observed challenges with respect to class cohesion and specificity of
relief—it was suspect whether plaintiffs had “common answers,” and plaintiffs were challenged
to show that the class was cohesive and specificity of the requested relief. 23(f) Order at *7–9.
The Circuit Court also found that this case presented a “reverse death knell” scenario in that the

certification decision threatened “such massive liability that it induces defendants to settle rather
than defend the action on the merits.” Id. at *9. Finally, considering the posture of the case, the
Sixth Circuit found that this Court’s statement that it might revisit its class certification decision
and expand the class underscored the need for a second look. Id. at *10. The Circuit Court found
further review was warranted.
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Panel Order
A little over a year after the petition for interlocutory review was granted, the Sixth
Circuit issued its opinion holding that Mr. Hardwick lacked standing to bring his case. In re E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 87 F.4th 315 (6th Cir. 2023) (“Panel Order”).
After reciting the familiar elements of standing, the Circuit Court explained that Hardwick “must
show the existence of his own ‘case or controversy’ as to every defendant he has chosen to sue
here.” Id. (citing Fox v. Saginaw Cnty., Michigan, 67 F.4th 284, 294 (6th Cir. 2023)). The Sixth
Circuit “choose to begin and end [its analysis], however, with the element of traceability,” that is
the required “a showing that the plaintiff’s ‘injury was likely caused by the defendant’—or in

this case, by each of the ten defendants.” Id. at 320.
In framing the issue, the Sixth Circuit stated:
Hardwick’s alleged injury, by his own account, is the presence of five particular
PFAS compounds in his blood. He must therefore show that he has alleged facts
plausibly supporting an inference that each defendant “likely caused” at least one
of those PFAS compounds to end up in his blood.

Id. Mr. Hardwick had failed to carry his burden for two reasons, said the Court of Appeals. First,
he and this Court had treated the defendants as a collective, rather than tying Mr. Hardwick’s
injury to each defendant. Id. Second, the Circuit Court found the traceability allegations in Mr.
Hardwick’s complaint to be conclusory. Id. at 321. Mr. Hardwick had failed to allege facts
supporting a plausible inference that any of the defendants caused these five particular PFAS to
end up in his blood:
To allege simply that these defendants manufactured or otherwise distributed
“PFAS,” therefore, is patently insufficient to support a plausible inference that any
of them bear responsibility for the particular PFAS in Hardwick’s blood. Yet
nowhere in his complaint, for example, did Hardwick allege that any of these
defendants, much less every one of them, manufactured any of those five
compounds. Nor did he allege any plausible pathway by which any of these
defendants could have delivered any of these five PFAS to his bloodstream. Instead,
he simply alleged that “Defendants” manufactured and distributed “one or more
PFAS materials, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to cause the
contamination of Plaintiff’s and the class members’ blood[.]” That is a textbook
example of the type of “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” that the
Supreme Court has found inadequate. [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)].

Id. The Circuit Court vacated this Court’s class certification order and remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss the case for lack of standing. Id. Upon return of the mandate, this Court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Hardwick I, ECF No. 249.
* * *
With that abridged version of the history of Hardwick I, the Court turns to the instant
Motions and, guided by precedent, endeavors to determine whether Mr. Hardwick’s new
Complaint withstands Defendants’ new Motion to Dismiss.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, Defendants have filed an Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Instanter Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF No. 53.) Defendants ask the Court to consider
Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), which was issued by the United States Supreme
Court last summer and limits the scope of a district court’s equitable authority. (Id. PageID
1021.) Defendants cite Local Civil Rule 7.2(a)(2), which permits additional memoranda “upon
leave of court for good cause shown.” (Id. PageID 1020.) They assert their Unopposed Motion is
supported by good cause and granting the Motion will not cause Mr. Hardwick prejudice. (Id.)
They reinforce their asserted good cause by explaining CASA was decided after the parties had
fully briefed the Motion to Dismiss and urging that it is “directly relevant to the Court’s
resolution of” the Motion to Dismiss. (Id. PageID 1021.)
The Unopposed Motion (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED for good cause shown. The Court’s
grant of the Motion, however, is in no way an indication of the Court’s view on the applicability
of Trump v. CASA. The Court turns next to the briefing on the Motion to Dismiss.
I. What the Court Can Consider
The parties argue about which materials the Court can consider when deciding this
Motion to Dismiss. (See Resp., ECF No. 36, PageID 782–87; Reply, ECF No. 43, PageID 849–
50; see also ECF No. 44.) The objects of this disagreement are the transcript from Mr.
Hardwick’s deposition taken more than four years ago, a June 2022 National Academy of
Sciences report (“NAS Report”), and a 2024 United States Center for Disease Control/Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry report (“CDC Report”). (Resp., PageID 782; ECF
No. 31-1.)

Mr. Hardwick argues these materials were improperly attached to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss and should be stricken, or the Court should decline to consider them when deciding the
Motion. (Resp., PageID 782–83.) Mr. Hardwick asserts that matters outside the pleadings are
only properly considered where they are referred to in a complaint or central to the claims in the
complaint. (Id. PageID 783 (citing Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680–81
(6th Cir. 2011)).)
A. Mr. Hardwick’s Deposition Transcript from Hardwick I
Beginning with his previous deposition transcript, Mr. Hardwick states that he does not
refer to his previous deposition transcript or any statements from the transcript in his Complaint.

(Resp., PageID 783.) It is not central to his claims, he says. (Id.) Mr. Hardwick urges that if the
Court does choose to consider any of the deposition testimony, Defendants have “grossly
mischaracterized and falsely represented that testimony.” (Id. PageID 783–84.) Mr. Hardwick
corrects what he says are incorrect mischaracterizations and representations. (Id. PageID 784.)
Defendants reply that Mr. Hardwick’s deposition transcript was referenced in his
Complaint. (Reply, PageID 849 (citing Compl., ¶ 2).) Defendants also argue that Mr. Hardwick’s
deposition transcript was filed on the public docket in Hardwick I, and so is a matter of public
record that can be considered at the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) stage. (Id. (citing two
cases).)
The Court will not consider Mr. Hardwick’s deposition transcript now. First, Mr.
Hardwick’s reference to the transcript in paragraph two of his Complaint is cursory. When
discussing Hardwick I, he explains:
Following full, complete briefing and oral argument on dispositive motions by the
same Defendants herein, all of which were denied, and the close of class
certification discovery, including the extensive, complete deposition of Plaintiff by
the same Defendants herein, this Court issued an Opinion & Order on March 7,
2022, certifying Plaintiff and undersigned counsel to represent a class in the
Original Case.
(Compl., ¶ 2.) That is the extent of the reference. The prior deposition transcript is not central to
Mr. Hardwick’s claims.
Next, the cases Defendants cite to support the proposition that the Court can consider
matters of public record at the Rule 12(b) stage are inapposite. One case cited is from the Eastern
District of Tennessee (and so not binding on this Court) and involved a pro se plaintiff and an
estate dispute. See Green v. Green, No. 1:14-CV-43, 2015 WL 1206690, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
16, 2015). That Court considered the plaintiff’s prior litigation when deciding motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment. Id. The other case is from the Southern District of Ohio and
simply restates the Rondigo test, which is unpersuasive because Mr. Hardwick’s deposition
transcript is referenced in his Complaint only in a perfunctory manner and is not central to his
claims. See Father Flanagan’s Boys Home v. Donlon, 449 F. Supp. 3d 739, 746 (S.D. Ohio
2020) (Black, J.) (“These materials include exhibits attached to the complaint, public records,
items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to the defendant’s motion to
dismiss so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.”) (citation modified).
Thus, the Court does not consider Mr. Hardwick’s prior deposition transcript when
deciding the Motion to Dismiss.
B. NAS and CDC Reports
As for the NAS and CDC Reports, Mr. Hardwick argues the reports are not central to his
Complaint because he references them each only one time in the 42-page, 183-paragraph
document. (Resp., PageID 783.) Like his deposition testimony, Mr. Hardwick urges that if the
Court does consider the Reports, it should also consider the additional context and

characterization of the Reports provided by Mr. Hardwick in his response. (Id. PageID 785–87.)
Defendants reply that the Reports are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the
claims contained therein—specifically, “that exposure to C8 supposedly warrants medical
monitoring in certain circumstances”—so should be considered. (Reply, PageID 849.)
The Reports are a closer call than the deposition transcript, given the following
allegations in Mr. Hardwick’s Complaint:
82. The expanding awareness of the body of adverse health impact data for C8 also
prompted the National Academy of Sciences to release a report in June 2022
indicating that medical monitoring would be appropriate for any person in the
United States with more than 2 ppb total PFAS in their blood, with even more
monitoring potentially being recommended for even more severe health impacts if
total PFAS blood levels exceeded 20 ppb.
. . . .
84. In 2024, the United States Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) also released
guidance recommending that testing and monitoring be considered by doctors for
individuals anywhere in the United States with C8 in their blood.
(Compl., ¶¶ 82, 84.) Medical monitoring is the central relief sought by Mr. Hardwick. Both
reports discuss medical monitoring and when it is recommended and appropriate. As such, the
Court considers the Reports to the extent necessary when deciding the Motions to Dismiss.
II. Oral Argument Request
Defendants and Mr. Hardwick request oral argument in the captions of their respective
briefs. (Mot., ECF No. 32, PageID 598; see also ECF No. 31; Resp., PageID 757.) Local Civil
Rule 7.1(b)(2) provides for oral argument where it “is deemed to be essential to the fair
resolution of the case because of its public importance or the complexity of the factual or legal
issues presented.” S.D. Ohio Civ. Rule 7.1(b)(2). This case deals with issues of public
importance—particularly given the putative class would be comprised of many citizens—as well
as complex legal issues. Nevertheless, the Court has analyzed the parties’ briefs and is quite
familiar with this dispute after presiding over it for more than seven years. The Court held oral
argument in Hardwick I and deems it unnecessary here. See Whitescarver v. Sabin Robbins
Paper Co., No. C-1-03-911, 2006 WL 2128929, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2006) (Dlott, C.J.)
(“Local Rule 7.1(b)(2) leaves the Court with discretion whether to grant a request for oral
argument.”).

III. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
Standing is a threshold question because it is a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Panel Order at
319; Henry v. Blank, 167 F.4th 375, 380 (6th Cir. 2026). The Court begins with the threshold
question.
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts are limited to hearing
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The doctrine of standing is one such
limitation on that authority. Dep’t of Educ. v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551, 561 (2023) (citing Carney v.
Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58 (2020)). To sufficiently plead standing, Mr. Hardwick must illustrate
(1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent (rather than
conjectural or hypothetical) (2) fairly traced to Defendants and (3) likely be redressed by a
decision in his favor. 23(f) Order at *4; Panel Order at 319 (restating the same elements and
citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A plaintiff’s injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant if there is a causal connection between the injury and the complained-of conduct.
Dep’t of Educ., 600 U.S. at 561.
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing these elements, “with the manner and degree
of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Ward v. J.M. Smucker Co., No.
24-3387, 2025 WL 2613489, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
“A plaintiff’s burden at the pleading stage is to plausibly claim standing.” Id. (citing Ass’n of

Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. FDA, 13 F.4th 531, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2021)). “Where there is a
facial attack on the pleadings for lack of standing,” courts must accept all factual allegations in
the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at *2
(Mosley v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 942 F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 2019)).
Defendants assert that Mr. Hardwick lacks standing because he does not “plausibly allege
a cognizable injury in fact” and his requested relief “would not redress his purported injuries.”
(Mot., PageID 610.) Although Defendants do not challenge traceability (see id. PageID 602), the
Court addresses the traceability element first because, as stated above, whether this Court has the
power to adjudicate this suit is a threshold question and so the Court must be satisfied this

element is met. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d
1390, 1394 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
A. Traceability
Mr. Hardwick says he has resolved the issues identified by the Sixth Circuit’s Panel
Decision and that his blood “contains the C8 manufactured by Defendants.” (Compl., ¶ 3.) In
Hardwick I, he sued 3M, DuPont, Chemours, Archroma Management L.L.C., Arkema, Inc.,
Arkema France, S.A., Daikin Industries Ltd., Daikin America, Inc., Solvay Specialty Polymers,
USA, L.L.C., and Asahi Glass Company, Ltd. Hardwick I, ECF No. 1. In this litigation, he has
dropped the last seven defendants named in Hardwick I.
As for 3M, Mr. Hardwick alleges it made its C8 “using its own patented electrochemical
fluorination process, which generated C8 with a distinct chemical signature or ‘fingerprint’
identifiable by scientists using complex analytical techniques.” (Compl., ¶ 14.) The Complaint
continues:
15. 3M is the source of all PFOS found in human blood within the United States,
including in Plaintiff and all Class members, and analytical testing can confirm that
3M is the sole source of all PFOA found in human blood, including in Plaintiff and
all Class members, generated from the ECF method used and patented by 3M (the
“3M ECF-Made PFOA”), based on branched versus linear chain results.

16. 3M designed, manufactured, marketed, used, sold, and released C8, including
in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the manufacture, use, disposal,
and release of various products and materials containing or contaminated with C8
across the United States, including in Ohio, resulting in the release of C8 into the
air, water, and soil where such C8 then traveled through the air, water, and
otherwise across the country, including into Ohio, where such C8 then inevitably
was either ingested, inhaled, adsorbed or otherwise entered the bodies and blood of
humans exposed to such C8, proximately resulting in the contamination of
Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ blood and bodies with C8, and the
biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such C8 in such blood and bodies.

17. All of the PFOS and all of the 3M ECF-Made PFOA in the blood of Plaintiff
and all Class members came from 3M and is directly traceable to 3M. The blood of
Plaintiff and all Class members contain PFOS and 3M ECF-Made PFOA that came
from 3M.

(Compl., ¶¶ 15–17.) At this stage, Mr. Hardwick’s burden is to plead facts that allow the Court to
draw the reasonable inference that 3M is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at
677–78; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Complaint includes
sufficient allegations that Mr. Hardwick’s alleged injury—ongoing intrusion into his blood and
increased risk of disease as a result, as discussed further below—can be fairly traced to
Defendant 3M.
Mr. Hardwick’s traceability allegations with respect to DuPont and Chemours are
similarly adequate. He alleges DuPont purchased PFOA from 3M for use in manufacturing
Teflon™ at its Washington Works Plant and that residual PFOA was in and on consumer
products like Teflon™ cookware. (Compl., ¶ 21.) He alleges PFOA was also released in the air,
water, and soil from the Washington Works Plant and its associated landfills and disposal sites.
(Id.) PFOA eventually made its way to his and the putative class members bodies and blood, says
Mr. Hardwick. (Id.)

Mr. Hardwick describes DuPont’s other consumer products in detail. (Id. ¶¶ 22–26.) He
recounts how DuPont began making its own PFOA at plants when 3M stopped, and how the
PFOA released and discharged from those plants made its way to his blood and the blood of the
putative class members. (Id. ¶¶ 28–30.) Like 3M, “DuPont developed its own telomerization
method for manufacturing PFOA and other materials that break down into, degrade to, or
otherwise result in the release of PFOA” and the method generates “PFOA with a distinct
chemical signature or ‘fingerprint’ identifiable by scientists.” (Id. ¶ 31.)
As for Chemours, among other allegations, Mr. Hardwick alleges Chemours assumed or
is otherwise responsible for DuPont’s PFOA-liabilities, “including DuPont’s liability for

contaminating Mr. Hardwick’s and the other Class members’ blood and bodies with PFOA.” (Id.
¶ 34.) He alleges that Chemours “continues to this day to manufacture PFAS and other materials
that result in the continuing release of PFOA into the environment.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Because it finds
the traceability allegations against DuPont sufficient, the Court also finds them sufficient against
Chemours.
B. Injury in Fact
Defendants argue that Mr. Hardwick has no certainly impending future injury as required
by Article III due to PFAS in his blood. (Mot., PageID 602.) They urge that “[o]ver five-and-a-
half years after filing Hardwick I based on PFAS exposures during decades of work as a
firefighter and otherwise, Hardwick still does not allege that he is suffering from any concrete,
present illness or condition attributable to PFOA or PFOS”—a point they say Mr. Hardwick
concedes. (Id. PageID 611.) They argue Mr. Hardwick’s allegations that C8 is in his blood are
insufficient because, in the toxic-tort context, where an unwanted substance is in one’s body,
there is no injury in fact where the plaintiff does not allege to have suffered any adverse health

consequences. (Id. PageID 611–12.)
Mr. Hardwick responds that “Defendants inflicted [him] with an injury by intruding on
perhaps the oldest legally protected interest: his right to bodily integrity.” (Resp., PageID 787.)
He contends, “Defendants’ intrusion into [his] blood is ongoing, and he faces a significantly
increased risk of disease as a result.” (Id.) Mr. Hardwick asks this Court not to deviate from its
prior reasoning—the Court got it right the first time in its opinion and order on the motions to
dismiss in Hardwick I. (Id. PageID 788–90); Hardwick v. 3M Co., No. 2:18-CV-1185, 2019 WL
4757134, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2019) (“Hardwick I MTD Opinion”). Mr. Hardwick also
asserts that in its 23(f) Order, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that he may have satisfied the

injury-in-fact showing. (Id. PageID 790; 23(f) Order, at *5.)
Article III requires an injury to be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). While the “most obvious [injuries] are
traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms,” intangible harms can
also be concrete, such as “intrusion upon seclusion.” Id. at 423–25.
In the Hardwick I MTD Opinion, this Court relied on Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., No.
1:07-cv-3512, slip op. (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2008) and Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359
(6th Cir. 2011) to support its reasoning. Hardwick I MTD Opinion, at *6–9 (characterizing
Hirsch as “on point and binding”). Specifically, this Court concluded that “Mr. Hardwick ha[d]
alleged injury sufficient to state a claim of negligence and/or battery,” and
comparable to the ‘no injury’ Hirsch plaintiffs, Mr. Hardwick allege that PFAS are
toxic substances . . . that the PFAS were released into Ohio because of Defendants’
acts and/or omissions, that he was exposed to PFAS because of Defendants’
conduct, that PFAS is associated with increased risk of disease in humans, that each
Defendant’s conduct caused him to be exposed to these toxic substances in Ohio,
and that he now faces an increased risk of disease requiring medical monitoring and
scientific research.

Id. at *9.
But in granting the petition to appeal under Rule 23(f), the Sixth Circuit found that this
Court’s conclusion that Hirsch was on point and binding was “open to doubt”:
As to Hirsch, which involved a chemical leak from a train derailment, our decision
never resolved (or even discussed) whether the plaintiffs’ exposure to toxic fumes
constituted an Article III injury in fact. See generally Hirsch, 656 F.3d at 359.
Moreover, we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendants on the ground that the exposure so minutely increased the plaintiffs’ risk
of disease that no reasonable physician would order medical monitoring under the
circumstances. Id. at 364. True, our decision to reach the merits may implicitly
suggest that we believed the exposure an injury in fact. But as the Supreme Court
has made clear, glossing over jurisdiction is not a holding on jurisdiction. Arizona
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011); see also Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (1974). And it may be telling as well that we
considered the plaintiffs’ exposure to the fumes such a minimis injury that summary
judgment was warranted for the defendants. Hirsch, 656 F.3d at 364. Thus, as to
Article III standing, it is unclear why Hirsch is “binding” or even “on point.”

23(f) Order, at *4.
This language casts doubt on this Court’s finding in Hardwick I that Mr. Hardwick had
sufficiently alleged an injury in fact, but the 23(f) panel did not decide the question. Mr.
Hardwick reminds the Court of the other cases cited in its Hardwick I MTD Opinion other than
Hirsch. (Resp., PageID 789.) This Court explained that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has since then relied
upon Hirsch and Brush Wellman for the proposition that medical monitoring is an available
remedy in a tort action under Ohio law.” Hardwick I MTD Opinion, at *9 (citing Baker v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 533 Fed. Appx. 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2013)). See also Wilson v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 2004). Neither Brush Wellman nor Baker v. Chevron was
discussed in the 23(f) Order.
In Brush Wellman, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered “whether class certification
under [Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 23(B)(2)] [was] proper in an action seeking to establish a
medical-monitoring fund” and found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the cohesiveness

requirement of the Rule. 817 N.E.2d at 61. In that case, the plaintiffs were all employed at
various times in the 1950s through the 1990s by contractors at the Brush Wellman Elmore plant,
where beryllium alloy was produced for use in industrial applications. Id. As the plaintiffs
alleged, they were exposed to beryllium dust and fumes that were generated by manufacture of
the alloy, and beryllium exposure could cause a lung ailment called chronic beryllium disease
and other ailments. Id. “Some individuals may never show symptoms or develop any disease,
while others can have serious impairments or even die as a result of their exposure.” Id.
Among other findings in Brush Wellman, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted a “bright-
line test” to determine whether requested medical-monitoring relief was injunctive in nature:

“Court supervision and participation in medical-monitoring cases is a logical and sound basis on
which to determine whether the action is injunctive.” Id. at 65. Brush Wellman supports the
conclusion that Ohio law recognizes that exposure to a toxic substance that increases one’s risk
of disease constitutes an injury because the Supreme Court of Ohio could not have adopted a
bright line test or concluded that medical monitoring could be a form of injunctive relief
otherwise.
Baker v. Chevron dealt with benzene contamination from seeping fuel. 533 Fed. Appx. at
511–12. Over 55 years, roughly 8 million gallons of fuel had leaked from a crude oil refinery
near Hoover, Ohio. Id. at 512. Chevron began remediation and by 2006, the Environmental
Protection Agency and Ohio Department of Health had found no ongoing health risks. Id. at
512–13. Two hundred residents filed a mass tort suit alleging Chevron’s emissions and
contamination caused personal injury, property damage, and heightened health risks requiring
medical monitoring. Id. at 511, 513. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for
Chevron on all claims. Id. at 511–16; see Baker v. Blackhawk Mining, LLC, 141 F.4th 760, 768

(6th Cir. 2025) (summarizing Baker v. Chevron).
In Hardwick I, this Court relied on this paragraph in Baker v. Chevron acknowledging a
medical monitoring claim:
As this court explained in Hirsch, in accordance with Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp.
869 (S.D. Ohio 1994) [(Spiegel, J.)] and Wilson v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 103 Ohio
St.3d 538, 817 N.E.2d 59 (2004), “medical monitoring” is a remedy for being
presently injured with an “increased risk of—and corresponding cost of screening
for—certain diseases that . . . are more likely to occur as a result of [a defendant’s
tortious conduct].” Hirsch, 656 F.3d at 363.

Baker v. Chevron, 533 F. App’x at 525; see Hardwick I MTD Opinion, at *9.
Brush Wellman, Baker v. Chevron, and Day and other cases indicate that an increased
risk of disease from toxic chemical exposure can constitute a present injury under Ohio law.2 See

2 Despite Mr. Hardwick’s class action allegations in the Complaint, which state that he is
bringing the “lawsuit as a class action on behalf of the following nationwide Class, . . .
also Ward, 2025 WL 2613489, at *2 (“We have held that an increased risk of illness can
constitute injury-in-fact.” (citing Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 571–75 (6th
Cir. 2005)); In re E. Palestine Train Derailment, No. 4:23CV0242, 2024 WL 1096062, at *21–
22 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2024) (on motions to dismiss, finding plaintiffs had pleaded sufficiently
exposure to hazardous materials which caused such an increased risk of disease such that a
reasonable physician would order medical monitoring); Allen v. Wenco Mgmt., LLC, 696 F.
Supp. 3d 432, 438 (N.D. Ohio 2023) (explaining that the Ohio Supreme Court has “blessed” a
medical monitoring claim “under the proper circumstance”). Ward, In re E. Palestine Train
Derailment, and Allen were all issued after the 23(f) Order.
Mr. Hardwick asserts that the Sixth Circuit “agreed” in the 23(f) Order that “Ohio’s
recognition of a cause of action for medical monitoring claims after exposure to toxic substances
may be probative that such injury constitutes an injury in fact’ for Article III standing

purposes, . . . especially when the asserted injury ‘has a close historical analogue.” (Resp.,
PageID 789.) The Sixth Circuit finished that thought, however, with: “But as the Supreme Court
has explained, a legislature’s recognition of a cause of action is not itself dispositive that the
asserted injury is cognizable under Article III.” 23(f) Order, at *5. To be sure, the Sixth Circuit
doubted Mr. Hardwick’s case in Hardwick I in the 23(f) Order. Yet, the panel that decided the
23(f) Order did not decide the merits of the standing challenge to Mr. Hardwick’s case. The
panel found further review was warranted and granted defendants’ petition to appeal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Put differently, the 23(f) Order panel doubted Mr.

Individuals subject to the laws of Ohio, or subject to the laws of any other state that recognizes
the claims for relief filed by Plaintiff” (Compl., ¶ 131), the parties cite and discuss Ohio law
only. The Court follows suit, with the caveat that this Opinion does not examine or opine on if
Mr. Hardwick has sufficient standing to bring similar claims under the law of any state other
than Ohio because the parties did not advance such arguments.
Hardwick had adequately shown the elements of standing but did not decide the issue.
Defendants urging that Mr. Hardwick’s future injury is not “certainly impending” does
not convince the Court that it should reach a different outcome. (Mot., PageID 611 (citing
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).) Case law supports the conclusion that
Mr. Hardwick is presently injured—he has C8 in his blood, and that C8 exposes him to an
increased risk of disease. In other words, his alleged injury is not a future injury, it is that he is
already injured. Mr. Hardwick fervently argues this point, reminding that “[t]he right to bodily
integrity is so fundamental that the unlawfulness of intruding upon it has always been obvious
and well understood.” (Resp., PageID 791 (citing Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 919 (6th Cir.
2019).) See Day, 851 F. Supp. at 878 (“[O]nce a plaintiff ingests a harmful contaminant, they
have suffered a ‘technical’ physical injury, even though the Plaintiffs have not yet suffered from
actual disease.”). “C8 is already present and persisting in Mr. Hardwick’s blood and already

causing concrete, current subcellar changes and other injury,” says Mr. Hardwick. (Resp.,
PageID 793 (emphasis in original) (citing Compl., ¶¶ 8, 57–61, 72, 99–100, 138, 143, 181).) The
Court finds these allegations to be sufficient.
Mr. Hardwick also alleges that the C8 present in his blood and body already exceed
levels scientist determined to be safe and certain scientists have publicly recommended medical
monitoring given those levels. (Id. (citing Compl., ¶¶ 8, 72–85, 138, 143, 181).) At the pleading
stage, Mr. Hardwick need not prove or introduce evidence of increased risk of harm to confer
standing; he need only plead increased risk of disease. Sutton, 419 F.3d at 573 n.5 (“[W]e again
note that specific evidence of the alleged increased risk of harm is not a requirement to confer

standing.”); In re E. Palestine Train Derailment, 2024 WL 1096062, at *21 n.16 (explaining that
while expert medical testimony is required to demonstrate increased risk of disease, “[e]xpert
proof, however, is better reserved for summary judgment and trial and not the pleading stage of
litigation” and the plaintiffs did not need to prove anything or present sufficient evidence at the
motion to dismiss stage). At this stage, this Court cannot attempt to evaluate the merits of Mr.
Hardwick’s “contention that he is entitled to medical monitoring”; during “the threshold standing
inquiry,” this Court must accept Mr. Hardwick’s allegations as true and construe the Complaint
in Mr. Hardwick’s favor. Sutton, 419 F.3d at 571. Doing so, the Court finds Mr. Hardwick has
sufficiently pled an injury in fact.
C. Redressability
Defendants next argue that “Mr. Hardwick lacks standing because he alleges nothing
showing that his required remedy—a Science Panel and medical monitoring—would redress his
alleged injuries.” (Mot., PageID 602–03, 616.) Relying on the 23(f) Order, Defendants urge that
even assuming the PFAS-in-the-blood theory supports an injury in fact, “studies and monitoring

would not eliminate the PFAS from his blood.” (Id. PageID 616 (citing 26(f) Order, at *5).) Nor
would the medical monitoring and studies prevent more PFAS from entering Mr. Hardwick’s
blood again, Defendants say. (Id. (citing 26(f) Order, at *5).)
Defendants also argue that the Complaint does not contain necessary allegations about
how Mr. Hardwick’s requested relief would ameliorate any C8-related health risks faced by Mr.
Hardwick. (Id. PageID 617.) Defendants state that Mr. Hardwick’s “only allegations about
recommended PFAS-related monitoring for which Hardwick could potentially qualify concern
‘usual standard of care’ monitoring of cholesterol levels.” (Id.) But he is already monitoring his
cholesterol—Defendants urge, relying on Mr. Hardwick’s previous deposition testimony—and

so medical monitoring would have “no ameliorative effects on” any risk of future injuries. (Id.
(quoting Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, 13 F.4th at 540).) “Nor can Hardwick satisfy the
redressability requirement by pointing to the supposed possibility that the requested Science
Panel might someday find that his alleged exposures place him at risk of some other illness or
condition for which the Science Panel deems monitoring appropriate.” (Id. PageID 617.) That is
too speculative, Defendants say. (Id. PageID 618.)
Mr. Hardwick responds that Defendants’ redressability arguments depend on the
assumption that his injury is the “mere presence” of C8 in his blood. (Resp., PageID 797.) But
Mr. Hardwick frames his injury as “the presence of C8 in the blood, coupled with its unique
persistence bioaccumulation, and toxicity that also creates a continuing, significantly increased
risk of serious disease, including cancer” (and the Court agreed with that framing in the Injury in
Fact Section above). (Id. (emphasis in original).) So the redressability issue is not simply
whether monitoring can remove the C8, or eliminate or prevent it, but if medical monitoring can
“redress the harm associated with the ongoing, continuing threat of a significantly increased risk

of serious disease associated with the C8 in the blood.” (Id.) Mr. Hardwick asserts that medical
monitoring and studies would redress his injury by “providing information and data” that he
“could use in discussions with his doctor . . . to further investigate, prepare for, and minimize the
risks of disease arising from his C8 exposures.” (Id.)
“An injury is redressable if a court order can provide ‘substantial and meaningful relief.’”
Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 801 F.3d 701, 715 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 243 (1982)). Redressability is satisfied if a plaintiffs can show that “a favorable
decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself.” Id. (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 244 n.15).
“He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury.” Id. (emphasis in

original). Likelihood is the standard—whether it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t
Services (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
The parties agree that scientific testing will not remove C8 from Mr. Hardwick’s blood.
Nor will it prevent C8 from entering Mr. Hardwick’s blood again. The Sixth Circuit explicitly
noted this in the 23(f) Order. 23(f) Order, at *5.
Mr. Hardwick’s position, though, is that he has adequately alleged that medical
monitoring and studies are likely to redress part of his injuries, and that is enough. He says such
a remedy “would . . . undoubtably help to remedy [his] ongoing injury because providing such
relief would not only provide [him] (and his doctors/medical professionals) with crucial
information and data necessary to combat and minimize his future risk of disease but would also
help redress the past battery he suffered.” (Resp., PageID 798 (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517
F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008)).)
The Court agrees. Here at the pleading stage, it is enough that Mr. Hardwick’s requested

equitable and injunctive relief would make sure he receives a medical response to Defendants’
“invasion of [his] bodily integrity.” (See Resp., PageID 799). See Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842,
850–51 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff’s requested relief, even if not a complete remedy
for the plaintiff’s injury, establishes redressability where the relief would “remove one barrier” to
the plaintiff obtaining that remedy).
Defendants’ argument about Mr. Hardwick already monitoring his cholesterol is not
persuasive. As the Court explained above, it does not consider Mr. Hardwick’s deposition
testimony from Hardwick I. The Court is not persuaded that Mr. Hardwick’s requested relief is
too speculative because the medical monitoring could identify “someday” “some other illness or

condition,” particularly at the pleading stage. (Mot., PageID 617–18.) As Mr. Hardwick pleads
and explains, early detection and treatment for a toxic substance injury can ameliorate increased
risk of developing multiple diseases, including cancer. (Compl., ¶¶ 65, 70, 73, 76, 82–84, 94,
100; Resp., PageID 799.) The Day Court succinctly explained how medical monitoring claim
precipitated in toxic substance injury cases:
In recent years medical science has come to understanding that certain exposures
can cause a disease with a protracted latency period, which may not manifest itself
for many years. Under these circumstances a prudent physician could order
preventative measures and periodic future testing, in order to have the best
opportunity for early detection and treatment of the full blown disease, if and when
it might manifest itself. It is the combination of the traditional tort policy of
compensation for reasonable diagnostic procedures and the medical understanding
of diseases with protracted latency periods that have led courts to order prospective
medical monitoring . . . .

Day, 851 F. Supp. at 880.
Mr. Hardwick has sufficiently pled his alleged injury in fact is redressable by a favorable
decision of this Court. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion is DENIED.
IV. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
Many of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) arguments are the same as or similar to their Rule
12(b)(1) arguments. For example, Defendants correctly argue that an injury is a requirement for
all three of Mr. Hardwick’s claims under Ohio law—negligence, battery, and conspiracy. (Mot.,
PageID 618–19.) They cite Ohio case law favorable to their position that has rejected claims
premised on allegedly toxic exposures that could alter a plaintiff’s body or blood without causing
identifiable illness or adverse effects. (Id. PageID 619–20.) They also re-argue the applicability
of the reasoning in the 23(f) Order and the inapplicability of Hirsch. (Id. PageID 620–21.) The
Court has addressed many of Defendants’ injury-related arguments above when analyzing Mr.
Hardwick’s standing.
Defendants’ other arguments for dismissal on the pleadings include:
• To survive, Mr. Hardwick’s conspiracy claim must allege the existence of an
unlawful act independent from the actual conspiracy and to the extent Mr.
Hardwick pleads a fraud claim, he has not met the particularity requirement of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (Mot., PageID 622–23);
• The conspiracy claim cannot be based on the tort of negligence because it is
impossible to conspire to commit negligence (id. PageID 623);
• Mr. Hardwick’s conspiracy allegations do not offer any facts to plausibly
plead Defendants agreed to commit a battery against Mr. Hardwick (id.);
• Declaratory judgment is a form of relief, not a standalone claim, so that claim
should be dismissed (id. PageID 623–24);
• The requested medical monitoring and Science Panel order “is not properly
characterized as injunctive or other equitable relief,” but a request for
damages that is barred by the Ohio Product Liability Act (id. PageID 624–27);
and
• This Court lacks authority to award equitable relief in the form of medical
monitoring and a Science Panel because such relief “bears no resemblance to
anything that court of equity could have awarded in 1789” (id. PageID 627–
631).
Mr. Hardwick, not surprisingly, zealously opposes each of the above arguments and highlights
that this Court decided many of the issues in Hardwick I. (Resp., PageID 801–18.) Defendants
thoughtfully and thoroughly reply. (Reply, PageID 865–80.)
Yet, as discussed in the next Section, the Court is of the view that an immediate appeal of
this Opinion and Order on standing is appropriate. If the Sixth Circuit agrees immediate appeal is
warranted, but disagrees with this Court’s standing analysis, then the Court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to hear Mr. Hardwick’s case. An opinion with that holding from the Sixth Circuit
would moot Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. If the Sixth Circuit agrees that an immediate
appeal is warranted and agrees with this Court’s standing analysis, then many of Defendants’
Rule 12(b)(6) arguments would be unpersuasive. Finally, if the Sixth Circuit finds no immediate
appeal is warranted, the Court will decide the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion thereafter, with much
familiarity to the arguments therein.
Being mindful of obtaining an efficient and legally-sound disposition of this dispute, as
well as conserving judicial resources and party expenses in this litigation, the Court HOLDS IN
ABEYANCE the Joint Motion Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No.
31.)
IMMEDIATE APPEAL
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the statute that governs interlocutory decisions, states as follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon,
in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made
to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

This provision allows a district court to certify for immediate appeal an interlocutory order that
(1) involves a controlling question of law, (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and (3) when an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation. In re Salas, 160 F.4th 810, 814 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
“If a party cannot petition for appeal unless the district court first enters an order granting
permission to do so or stating that the necessary conditions are met,” Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 5(a)(3) state that the district court “may amend its order, either on its own or in
response to a party’s motion, to include the required permission or statement.” If that happens,
“the time to petition runs from entry of the amended order.” Fed. R. App. P. 5(a)(3) (emphasis
added); see T.P. by & through S.P. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d
665, 668 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“A district court may certify an order sua sponte or in response to a
request from a party.”); Hampel v. Mecosta Cnty. Med. Ctr., No. 1:09-CV-219, 2011 WL
13354078, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2011) (explaining that “[t]he Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that this statute requires three elements be present before a court may, in its
discretion, certify an order for interlocutory appeal” and that “Federal Rule of Appellate
procedure 5(a)(3) permits a district court to amend an order to include this language either sua
sponte or upon motion by a party”).
This matter involves a controlling question of law because subject matter jurisdiction
“goes to the very power of a court to hear a controversy.” See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs.
& Prod. Liab. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 723, 732 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
Second, this case involves substantial ground for difference of opinion. The procedural
posture is unique—this is a re-filed case involving a putative nationwide or Ohio class action.
Presumably such a putative class would be large. In Hardwick I, this Court certified an Ohio
class, described as follows: “Individuals subject to the laws of Ohio, who have 0.05 parts per

trillion (ppt) of PFOA (C-8) and at least 0.05 ppt of any other PFAS in their blood serum.” 23(f)
Order, at *2. The parties agreed that class comprised of “at least about 11.8 million Americans
who reside in Ohio.” Id. In this re-filed action, Mr. Hardwick seeks to certify a class of
individuals “subject to the laws of Ohio, or subject to the laws of any other state that recognizes
the claims for relief filed by Mr. Hardwick, who have 2 parts per billion (2 ppb) or more of
PFOA and PFOS (combined) manufactured by Defendants in their blood serum.” (Compl.,
¶ 131.) That is a smaller putative class—with a lower limit that is now 20,000 times greater in
combined PFOA and PFOS blood serum amount—but still the Court presumes the class would
be large if certified. Not surprisingly, then, this case has been zealously advocated on both sides.

The parties have filed lengthy briefs in Hardwick I and here, requiring careful opinions and
orders. The case law on standing and medical monitoring in Ohio and the Sixth Circuit is
complicated and subject to varying interpretations and outcomes, as shown by the opinions and
orders here and in Hardwick I (in the District Court and Circuit Court).
While the Sixth Circuit’s 23(f) Order casts doubt on Mr. Hardwick’s standing, the Sixth
Circuit only definitively decided the issue of traceability in the Panel Order, and the Court finds
Mr. Hardwick has remedied the traceability issue in his re-filed Complaint. Yet this Court
engaged in its standing analysis cautiously, navigating the law available and mindful of 23(f)
Order. There is little doubt, however, that the case law indicates there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion on the availability and boundaries associated with medical monitoring
relief.
Third, if the Court’s analysis above is incorrect and it does lack jurisdiction over this
case, “continued litigation would waste time and resources by requiring the Court to render
decisions that would ultimately be deemed void.” See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod.

Liab. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d at 732. The Court is mindful of the substantial time and resources
the parties, the Court, and the Sixth Circuit have expended on this litigation. In Hardwick I, the
parties briefed and argued motions to dismiss (which this Court denied by opinion), and then the
parties engaged in class certification discovery, as well as briefing of a class certification motion.
See supra Section II. This Court granted class certification by an approximately 50-page opinion.
See id. Then, the Sixth Circuit issued two separate opinions on the interlocutory appeal of that
opinion. See 23(f) Order, Panel Decision. All these opinions and orders discussed standing.
This recount of the history of this litigation is not meant to minimize the importance and
seriousness of the allegations in Mr. Hardwick’s operative Complaint. Rather, it is to show how

important ensuring that this Court’s standing analysis is proper before the litigation proceeds
further, avoiding having the parties engage in unnecessary costly litigation and the Court expend
its limited judicial resources.
The Court acknowledges that “[r]eview under § 1292(b) is granted sparingly and only in
exceptional cases,” In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2002), yet respectfully
suggests that this is an exceptional case as the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged previously. See
23(f) Order (explaining further review was warranted where the theory of standing was
questionable and massive liability was threatened).
The Court certifies this matter for interlocutory review and stays this matter pending
disposition of this recommendation.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Instanter Notice of Supplemental
Authority (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED (ECF No. 31) and Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is HELD IN

ABEYANCE (ECF No. 31). The Court certifies this matter for interlocutory review. This case
remains open but is stayed for now.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
3/20/2026 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346367. Public record. Not legal advice.