# Dudkewic

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346331

## Case

- **Full name:** John Dudkewic v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP and Carlos Miguel Ayala
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346331

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that there was no evidence of the amount in controversy where there were “no specific factual details, no discovery, no affidavits or declarations, no testimony, no interrogatories, and no exhibits other than the complaints”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DUDKEWIC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:25-cv-1091-WWB-SJH

WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP and
CARLOS MIGUEL AYALA,

Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Corrected Motion to Remand (Doc.
26) and Defendants’ Joint Response (Doc. 28). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s
Motion will be granted in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, John Dudkewic, worked as an online grocery shopper for Defendant Wal-
Mart Stores East, LP (“Walmart”) from December 2021 to January 2023. (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 17,
34). Defendant, Carlos Miguel Ayala, was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff
alleges that Ayala repeatedly flirted with him and made sexual advances, at one point
touching Plaintiff without his consent, despite Plaintiff stating he was not interested and
already had a partner. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20, 25). The conduct was also directed at other
employees, including minors at the age of sixteen and seventeen years. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24).
Plaintiff requested a change to the night shift to escape Ayala’s conduct but
received no response. (Id. ¶ 26). Plaintiff then reported Ayala’s conduct to a member of
Walmart’s management, who told Plaintiff that he “ha[d] no power” and directed him to
report the incidents to the company’s ethics department. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff did so, and
the ethics department told him there would be an investigation. (Id. ¶ 28). Following
Plaintiff’s complaint, Ayala began directing employees not to speak to Plaintiff and

increased Plaintiff’s workload. (Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff asked Walmart to remove him from
Ayala’s supervision, which Walmart denied. (Id. ¶ 30). Plaintiff was then informed by the
ethics department that his complaint was closed, but no further detail was provided
despite several requests. (Id. ¶ 31). Plaintiff reported Ayala’s worsened behavior to the
store manager, who told him that she “could not look after 500 employees” and that he
would be let go if he did not accept the investigation results. (Id. ¶ 32). Plaintiff alleges
that he was therefore “constructively discharged.” (Id. ¶ 33).
As a result, Dudkewic brought this action against Ayala and Walmart in state court
under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), section 760.01, Florida Statutes, for
gender discrimination, harassment, retaliation, negligent supervision and retention,

assault, battery, and vicarious liability. (See generally id.). Ayala removed the case to
this Court on September 16, 2025. (See Doc. 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a district court may have original
jurisdiction where both “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000”
and the parties are “citizens of different States.” In determining the amount in controversy,
the relevant question is whether the plaintiff seeks damages in excess of the jurisdictional
limit, not whether the plaintiff will actually recover sufficient damages. Pretka v. Kolter
City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 751 (11th Cir. 2010). In that vein, “[a] court’s analysis of
the amount-in-controversy requirement focuses on how much is in controversy at the time
of removal, not later.” Id. (citing cases).

A defendant seeking to remove a case bears the burden of proving that the federal
district court has original jurisdiction. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001). Where, as here, the plaintiff fails to plead “a specific amount of damages, the
removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” Id. Nonetheless, “a removing
defendant is not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond all doubt or to banish
all uncertainty about it.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754. “Eleventh Circuit precedent permits
district courts to make ‘reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other
reasonable extrapolations’ from the pleadings to determine whether it is facially apparent
that a case is removable.” Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061–62 (11th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754).
“Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal
courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999). Any doubt as to “jurisdiction should be resolved
in favor of remand to state court.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves to remand this action, first, on the basis that Walmart did not
consent to removal and, second, because the amount-in-controversy is not satisfied.
Plaintiff also seeks attorney’s fees and costs for the removal.
The “unanimity rule” requires that all defendants consent to and join in a notice of
removal pursuant to § 1446(2)(a). Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202,
1207 (11th Cir. 2008). In this case, the removal documents contained a Walmart

manager’s declaration consenting to removal on behalf of the company. (Doc. 1-8 at 1;
see also Doc. 27 at 1). Even if this was insufficient to establish consent, “[a] technical
defect related to the unanimity requirement may be cured by opposing a motion to remand
prior to the entry of summary judgment.” Stone v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, N.A., 609 F. App’x
979, 981 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Walmart joins Ayala in opposing the instant
motion to remand and thus has properly consented to removal. Cf. Est. of Everett v.
Under Armour, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1171 (M.D. Fla. 2023) (remanding where co-
defendant did not file a notice of consent or join in the opposition to remand).
Turning to diversity jurisdiction, the parties agree that complete diversity of
citizenship exists. However, Plaintiff argues that Ayala has not established the requisite

amount in controversy. Defendants rely on five categories of damages to establish the
amount in controversy: back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages,
and attorney’s fees.
First, the courts within this District are split on whether back pay accrues after
removal. Compare Gonzalez v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-3359-T, 2017 WL
164358, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2017) (“Courts in this Circuit have previously held that
back pay may be calculated through the estimated date of trial.”), with Bragg v. Suntrust
Bank, No. 8:16-cv-139-T, 2016 WL 836692, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2016) (“[B]ack pay
should be calculated only to the date of removal.”). Upon review, and without binding
authority to the contrary, this Court declines to consider back pay that accrues post-
removal. Thus, Plaintiff’s pay at $15.00 per hour would be calculated from his separation
of employment on January 13, 2023, to removal on September 16, 2025.
But Plaintiff argues that he mitigated his damages by working various jobs,
reducing his back pay damages to $24,893.90. (Doc. 26-1 at 3). “[M]ost courts consider

mitigation when calculating back pay if the plaintiff submits affidavits or other evidence
specifying the amount of mitigation.” Ambridge v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:14-cv-
1212, 2014 WL 4471545, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2014) (quoting Fusco v. Victoria’s
Secret Stores, LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2011)). While the declaration
does not specify the companies, dates, and income from Plaintiff’s employments, the
statement is made under the penalty of perjury and is itself evidence based upon Plaintiff’s
personal knowledge. Cf. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 753 (explaining that there was no evidence
of the amount in controversy where there were “no specific factual details, no discovery,
no affidavits or declarations, no testimony, no interrogatories, and no exhibits other than
the complaints”). Therefore, Plaintiff has established, for purposes of the amount in

controversy, that his back pay damages were $24,893.90 at the time of removal.
With respect to front pay, the Notice of Removal states that Plaintiff, if successful,
would be entitled to $31,200.00. Entitlement to front pay is only speculative where there
is no presumption of entitlement to such damages in an action. Cf. Brown v. Wendy’s
Int’l, LLC, No. 6:21-cv-449, 2021 WL 2886078, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 2021) (“[B]ecause
some amount of front pay will presumptively be awarded in this dispute, and Defendant’s
valuation is supported by the record, this Court finds that it is more likely than not that,
even with an allowance for mitigation, at least $40,000.00 of front pay is at issue in this
litigation.” (footnote omitted)). “Under the FCRA, a prevailing plaintiff is presumptively
entitled to reinstatement or front pay. Courts in this Circuit have previously held that it is
reasonable to add one year of front pay to the amount in controversy in an FCRA
employment discrimination case.” Gonzalez, 2017 WL 164358, at *2 (citation omitted).
That being so, the Court considers $22,063.00 of front pay in calculating the amount in
controversy. (See Doc. 26-2 at 3).1

Next, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Under the FCRA, “[t]he
court may also award compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, damages for
mental anguish, loss of dignity, and any other intangible injuries.” Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).
The statute also permits recovery of punitive damages up to $100,000. Id.
As to compensatory damages, this Court agrees with Defendants that comparable
facts and claims in past cases can provide a basis for an estimate, but the Notice of
Removal provides no such basis. Ayala cites to two cases where jury awards for
emotional damages—one for $150,000.00 and the other for $457,000.00—in
employment cases were upheld. (Doc. 1 at 7). While these cases establish that

emotional damages have been awarded in employment cases, Ayala fails to explain the
factual basis for these awards and how they were similar to the facts in the instant action.
See Metts v. Circle K Stores Inc., No. 6:24-cv-1712, 2024 WL 4866965, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 22, 2024) (“Defendant fails to explain how [the cases] are similar to the present case
and why Plaintiff here could potentially receive a comparable award.”); Destel v.
McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., No. 03-62067-Civ., 2004 WL 746293, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 17, 2004) (“Defendant cites to cases where other plaintiffs were awarded large

1 Because Plaintiff produced his W-2 indicating his income for the year preceding
his departure from the company, the Court relies on the W-2 as opposed to the
approximation offered by Defendants. (See Doc. 1-8 at 1).
amounts in compensatory and/or punitive damages without comparing the factual or legal
claims made in those cases to Plaintiff’s claims or explaining the relevance of those
awards to the instant inquiry.”). Therefore, the Court does not find that Defendants have
met their burden in showing that compensatory damages of $25,000 are at issue.

Turning to punitive damages, the Court will not rely on boiler plate allegations
within the Complaint to guess a number within the statutory cap that is in controversy.
Defendants provide no other argument on the matter, and without more, the Court is left
to speculate as to Plaintiff’s potential damages, which it will not do. See Metts, 2024 WL
4866965, at *5 (“[T]he court finds that the defendant has not established any jurisdictional
facts beyond the fact that Plaintiff requested punitive damages and alleged Defendant’s
conduct was ‘intentional, willful, and malicious.’”); Scott v. Walmart, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 3d
1267, 1277–78 (M.D. Fla. 2021); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1214–
15 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[N]either the defendants nor the court may speculate in an attempt
to make up for the notice’s failings.”).

Finally, “[a]lthough generally excluded from the calculation, ‘[w]hen a statute
authorizes the recovery of attorney’s fees, a reasonable amount of those fees is included
in the amount in controversy.’” Scott, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 1278 (quoting Morrison v. Allstate
Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000)). A prevailing plaintiff may be awarded
attorney’s fees under the FCRA. See Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). Like with back pay and
consistent with “the general rule that the amount in controversy is determined as of the
time of removal,” this Court considers only attorney’s fees accrued at the time of removal.
Johnston v. Progressive Select Ins. Co., No. 3:23-cv-1374, 2024 WL 3402458, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 29, 2024). Plaintiff filed this action in state court on May 20, 2025, and the state
court docket reflects that relatively little had been litigated prior to removal on September
16, 2025. (See Doc. 1-4 at 1). Because Defendants have only established a total of
$46,956.90 in controversy before attorney’s fees are considered, there is no reasonable
estimation that attorney’s fees greater than $28,043.10 were incurred prior to removal in

this case. Accordingly, this case will be remanded.
Plaintiff also seeks attorney’s fees and costs for Defendants’ removal. “An order
remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including
attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “[C]ourts may
award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546
U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Because the district courts in this Circuit are split on how several
issues presented in this action should be calculated into the amount in controversy,
Defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 25) is DENIED as moot.
2. Plaintiff’s Corrected Motion to Remand (Doc. 26) is GRANTED in part as
set forth in this Order and DENIED in all other respects.
3. This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit,
in and for Flagler County, Florida, Case Number 2025 CA 000297.
4. The Clerk is directed to terminate all other pending motions and close this
case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on February 24, 2026.

WENDY W.B
UNITED STATES T JUDG

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346331. Public record. Not legal advice.