# TINSMAN

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346305

## Case

- **Full name:** Bridgette T. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346305

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding ALJ’s error was harmless
- concluding it was legal error for the ALJ to rely “principally on [normal examination] results—i.e., a full range of motion and the lack of joint inflammation—in discounting [the SSA claimant’s] complaints as inconsistent with the objective evidence”
- finding it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider objective evidence where the plaintiff not only suffered from fibromyalgia, 296 F. App’x 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008
- finding it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider objective evidence where the plaintiff not only suffered from fibromyalgia, but also cervical spine disc herniation, lumbar spine degenerative joint disease, and carpal tunnel syndrome

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRIDGETTE T.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-13547 (BRM)

v. OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Bridgette T.’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the final decision of the
Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 1.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Having reviewed and considered the submissions filed in connection with the appeal and
having declined to hold oral argument in accordance with Local Civil Rule 78.1(b), for the reasons
set forth below and for good cause shown, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History

This matter arises out of the Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application
for DIB, dated June 18, 2025. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.) On March 23, 2023, Plaintiff applied for DIB
alleging disability beginning on June 30, 2021, based on the following allegations of impairments:
scoliosis, stenosis, degenerative disc disease, lordosis, bone loss, nerve pain, collapsed spine,
misalignment of the head with the pelvis, and fibromyalgia. (Transcript of Proceedings (“Tr.”)
(ECF No. 4) at 18, 232.)
At Plaintiff’s request, Administrative Law Judge David Suna (“ALJ” or “ALJ Suna”) held
a hearing on August 8, 2024. (Id. at 57.) In a decision dated September 26, 2024, the ALJ found

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Id. at 36.) The ALJ’s decision became
final when the Appeals Council declined review on June 18. 205. (Id. at 1–7.) Having exhausted
her administrative remedies, on July 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed her appeal with this Court pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of ALJ Suna’s decision. (ECF No. 1).
B. Administrative History

The ALJ determined Plaintiff last met the Act’s insured status requirements on June 30,
2021. (Tr. at 21.) To evaluate whether Plaintiff was eligible for social security and disability
benefits, the ALJ employed the five-step process established by the SSA. (Id. at 21–36.) At the
time of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff was forty-three years old and had at least a high school
education.1 (Id. at 34, 233.)
At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity on June
30, 2021.2 (Id. at 21.) While Plaintiff “worked after the alleged disability onset date,” the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s earnings and found her work activity did not rise to the level of substantial
gainful activity. (Id.)
At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe medically determinable
impairments: lumbar spine impairment, scoliosis, leg length discrepancy, rheumatoid arthritis, and

1 Plaintiff has a “GED,” otherwise known as a general educational development
diploma/certificate. (Tr. at 233.)

2 The relevant period for this SSA appeal is indeed a period of just one day.
fibromyalgia. (Id. at 21 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).) The ALJ determined the following
impairments were non-severe: ventral and umbilical hernia, Vitamin D deficiency, and right
epicondylitis. (Id. at 21–23.) Additionally, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged COVID-19 infection,
cervical spine impairment, migraine headaches, and impairments involving her thumbs and index

fingers were “not a medically determinable impairment through the date last insured.” (Id. at 23–
24 (emphasis added); but see ECF No. 6 at 14 (misstating the ALJ’s determination as to Plaintiff’s
“history of COVID-19, cervical spine impairment, migraine headaches, and thumb and index
finger impairments [as] non-severe impairments”).)
At step three, ALJ Suna concluded Plaintiff did not have an “impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).” (Id. at 24.)
First, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of listing 1.15 for the scoliosis
and lumbar spine impairments because there was “no documentation of the use of any handheld
assistive devices, and the clinical examinations do not show any significant neurologic deficits in

the upper extremities such as motor strength deficits, loss of sensory functioning, or abnormalities
in reflexes.” (Id.) Second, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of listing
14.09 for the rheumatoid arthritis because there were no “remarkable” findings from either Dr.
Janet B. Bartov or Dr. Denis L. Autotte, except “findings of thoracic and lumbar scoliosis without
any apparent notations of gait abnormalities or neurologic deficits.” (Id. at 25.)
Additionally, before turning to step four, the ALJ considered “the entire record” and found
Plaintiff “had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b)” but with certain functional limitations.3 (Id. at 25–33.) In considering a claimant’s
symptoms, ALJs “follow a two-step process.” (Id. at 25.) First, the ALJ evaluated “whether there
is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” (Id.) Then, “once an
underlying physical or mental impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce the

claimant’s pain or other symptoms has been shown,” the ALJ “evaluate[d] the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they
limit the claimant’s work-related activities.” (Id.)
After considering the evidence and conducting the aforementioned two-step process,4 the
ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects
of [her] symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in
the record.” (Id. at 28.) With respect to her scoliosis, lumbar spine impairment, the ALJ noted there
was “minimal treatment, relatively unremarkable clinical examination findings, and no significant
treatment for the scoliosis or lumbar [impairment].” (Id.) The ALJ observed that Plaintiff “worked
at the substantial gainful activity level in 2019 and 2020 performing light to medium exertion, with

evidence of worsening of her condition clearly documented after the date last insured,” despite a
“May 2011 X-ray showing that her right leg was shorter than her left leg.” (Id. at 28, 30.) The ALJ
also considered Plaintiff’s diagnostic testing and treatment history. (Id. at 28–30.) Additionally,
the ALJ reviewed documentation from a time shortly after the date Plaintiff was last insured, which

3 The limitations are as follows: Plaintiff can “stand or walk no more than 4 hours in an eight-hour
workday[,] . . . occasional[ly] push/pull[,] . . . climb[] . . . ramps and stairs[,]” balanc[e], stoop[],
kneel[], and crouch[,] . . . and tolerate moderate noise as defined by the Selected Characteristics
of Occupations.” (Tr. at 25.) However, the ALJ also found Plaintiff could not “climb[] ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds[,] never crawl[,] [and could have] no exposure to hazards such as unprotected
heights, dangerous machinery, or operating a motor vehicle.” (Id.)

4 The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected
to cause the symptoms she had alleged. (Tr. at 28.)
revealed “normal gait, no muscle atrophy, no swelling of any joints, and full [range of motion] of
all joints.” (Id. at 30.)
As to Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis, the ALJ observed “the only
treatment for these conditions [occurred] during the period at issue is the May 19, 2021 visit with

rheumatologist Dr. Bartov, who documented no acute distress, intact orientation, normal gait, no
muscle atrophy, normal affect, no swelling, and full [range of motion] in all joints.” (Id. at 31.)
Critically, “the record [revealed] only one treatment with [Plaintiff’s] rheumatologist just prior to
the alleged onset date and date last insured with an unremarkable clinical examination and
continuation of the Tramadol, which she has taken since at least 2012.” (Id.)
Additionally, mindful he “cannot defer or give any specific evidentiary weight . . . to any
prior administrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s),” the ALJ “considered the medical
opinions and prior administrative” contained in the record. (Id. at 31–33.) The ALJ reviewed Dr.
Autotte’s various opinions and found each unpersuasive.5 (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ considered

5 On November 7, 2013, Dr. Autotte completed a form, where “she reported that she first treated
[Plaintiff] on July 19, 2010, with diagnoses of spinal stenosis and recurrent umbilical hernia.” (Tr.
at 31.) “She opined that [Plaintiff] could lift and/or carry 5 to 10 pounds, sit less than 6 hours per
day, stand and/or walk up to 2 hours per day, and [could not] bend[].” (Id.) The ALJ found this
opinion unpersuasive not only because it was provided “years prior to the alleged onset date and
date last insured,” but also because he found it inconsistent “with the objective evidence during
the period at issue.” (Id.) Dr. Autotte also completed a form on October 25, 2023, indicating
Plaintiff’s “most recent clinical examination was on July 21, 2023” with “abnormal”
musculoskeletal findings and “anxious” mood. (Id. at 32.) In that form, Dr. Autotte opined Plaintiff
had “severe” limitations in “the duration that she [could not] stand, sit, walk, lift, or carry.” (Id.)
The ALJ found that opinion unpersuasive because Dr. Autotte “did not quantify the degree of
limitations in these work related domains” and because the opinion was unsupported by her own
“contemporaneous treatment notes.” (Id.) On June 4, 2024, Dr. Autotte reported in a medical
source statement form that Plaintiff’s diagnoses were severe scoliosis, rheumatoid arthritis,
umbilical hernia, and a herniated nucleus pulposus. (Id.) She also reported Plaintiff’s symptoms
were “pain and fatigue, with pain described as severe sharp pain in [the] back, worse with more
than 10 minutes of standing or . . . more than 5 minutes” of sitting. (Id.) Dr. Autotte opined Plaintiff
“could walk less than one block without severe pain, sit for 10 minutes at one time, stand for
[twenty] minutes at one time, stand/walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, must be allowed
Dr. William E. Zaccheo’s opinion that Plaintiff “could return to work but should not do any heavy
lifting” but found it unpersuasive because the opinion “was provided years prior to the alleged
onset date and date last insured.” (Id. at 33.) However, the ALJ found the opinions of the state
agency medical consultants, Dr. Seung Park and Dr. Mohammad Rizwan, persuasive.6 (Id.)

Mindful that the letters submitted by Plaintiff’s husband, sister, and mother “are not medical
opinions under the . . . rules for the evaluation of opinion evidence,” the ALJ nevertheless
considered them as part of the overall record evidence. (Id.) Ultimately though, the ALJ concluded
the objective evidence did not support additional or more restrictive functional limitations in
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for the period at issue. (Id.)

to shift position from sit[ting], stand[ing], or walk[ing] at will, and could lift/carry no weight.”
(Id.) She further opined,

Plaintiff must get up every [ten] minutes [for a period of five]
minutes, would require unscheduled breaks two to three times per
hour lasting [five] minutes each, could never twist, crouch, squat, or
climb ladders, rarely stoop, bend, or climb stairs, and could use her
upper extremities for gross manipulation 10% of a workday, fine
manipulation 50% of the time, reach overhead less than 5% of a
workday, and reach in front of her body less than 10% of a workday.

(Id.) Dr. Autotte also opined Plaintiff “would be off-task 25% or more of the time, was incapable
of even ‘low stress’ work, and would be absent more than four days per month.” (Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “She reported these limitations applied . . . since 2019.” (Id.) The ALJ
found these opinions unpersuasive for two reasons. First, while Dr. Autotte noted these limitations
started in 2019, the record shows Plaintiff “performed work at the substantial gainful activity level
requiring light to medium exertion in 2019 and 2020.” (Id.) Moreover, the ALJ concluded these
opinions were unsupported by Dr. Autotte’s contemporaneous treatment notes. (Id.)

6 On July 10, 2023, and November 13, 2023, Dr. Park and Dr. Rizwan opined Plaintiff “could
perform light exertion except standing or walking for four hours, with occasional postural activities
[but] never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.” (Id. at 33.) Dr. Park and Dr. Rizwan also
determined Plaintiff would “need to avoid all exposure to hazards.” (Id.) The ALJ found these
opinions persuasive because the state agency medical consultants “supported their opinions by
reviewing the evidence of record and providing a detailed rationale for them” and were “generally
consistent with the overall [record evidence] for the period at issue.” (Id.)
At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was “unable to perform any past relevant work”
through the date last insured. (Id.) The ALJ considered her work as a sales associate for a national
retail store from October 2018 and December 2020 and found this work “qualifie[d] as past
relevant work because [Plaintiff] performed it at the substantial gainful activity level[] within five

years of the date last insured[] and long enough to achieve average performance as required by
SSR 24-2p.” (Id. at 34.) However, given the vocational expert’s testimony at the hearing, the
limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC “would preclude her from meeting all exertional and nonextertional
and requirements of her past relevant work.” (Id.)
At step five, the ALJ took into account Plaintiff’s “age, education, work experience, and
[RFC],” and concluded “there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy” Plaintiff “could have performed.” (Id. at 34, 36.) The ALJ determined that “[t]hrough
the date last insured,” Plaintiff “had the [RFC] to perform the full range of light work” but with
“additional limitations.” (Id. at 35.) At the hearing, the vocational expert, Melissa Fass-Karlin,
testified Plaintiff would have been able to perform the requirements of representative occupations

such as:
• Routing Clerk (DOT#222.687-022), which is light exertion that
is unskilled with a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) of
two, with 117,393 jobs nationally;
• Marker (DOT#209.587-034), which is light exertion that is
unskilled with an SVP of two, with 136,791 jobs nationally;
• Apparel Stock Checker (DOT#299.667-014), which is light
exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with 11,293 jobs
nationally;
• Telephone Quotation Clerk (DOT#237.367-046), which is
sedentary exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with
2,730 jobs nationally;
• Call-Out Operator (DOT#237.367-014), which is sedentary
exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with 1,977 jobs
nationally;
• Document Preparer (DOT#249.587-018), which is sedentary
exertion that is unskilled with an SVP of two, with 15,670 jobs
nationally.

(Id.) The ALJ determined “the vocational expert’s testimony [was] consistent with the information
contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” (Id.) The ALJ also assessed the fact that the
vocational expert’s basis for her opinion “that an individual with the same [RFC] could perform
[the aforementioned] jobs at light exertion” was her “professional knowledge, education, and
training in the field of vocational rehabilitation counseling” and found the opinion “based on her
expertise rather than the” Dictionary of Occupational Titles and/or the Selected Characteristics of
Occupations were “reasonable” and “accepted” the testimony “as a whole.” (Id.)
Moreover, “in response to a hypothetical question involving a person limited to sedentary
exertion with the same nonexertional limitations as the [ALJ’s] [RFC] findings,” the vocational
expert opined, “[i]f someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary
work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or [an] inability to
sit for long periods of time.” (Id. at 36.) Accordingly, ALJ Suna ultimately concluded Plaintiff
“was not under a disability, as defined in the [SSA], at any time from June 30, 2021, the alleged
onset date, through June 30, 2021, the date [Plaintiff] [was] last insured.” (Id.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power
to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.
2001). The Commissioner’s decisions regarding questions of fact are deemed conclusive by a
reviewing court if supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp
v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). A district court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753

F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence “is more than a mere scintilla
of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541,
545 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this understanding of the substantial evidence
standard in Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019). To determine whether an ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence, a court must review the evidence in its totality.
Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). “Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the
evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d
356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a court may not set an ALJ’s “decision aside if it is supported
by substantial evidence, even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranft
v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

Under the Act, the SSA is authorized to pay SSI and DIB to “disabled” persons. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(a). A person is “disabled” if “he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A person is unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations promulgated under the Act establish a five-step process for determining
whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of SSI and DIB. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant has shown he or she is not currently engaged in “substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140
(1987). If a claimant is presently engaged in any form of substantial gainful activity, he or she is
automatically denied disability benefits. Id. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has
demonstrated a “severe impairment” or “combination of impairments” that significantly limits his
or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c);
see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140–41. Basic work activities are defined as “the abilities and aptitudes
necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). These activities include:
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple
instructions;
(4) Use of judgment;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual
work situations; and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.

Id. A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is not considered disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(c); see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
Third, if a claimant’s impairment(s) is found to be severe, the ALJ then determines whether
the impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (the “Impairment List”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates
his or her impairment(s) is equal in severity to, or meets, one of the impairments on the Impairment
List, the claimant has satisfied his or her burden of proof and is automatically entitled to benefits.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the claimant’s specific
impairment is not listed, the ALJ will consider the most similar listed impairment to decide whether

the claimant’s impairment is medically equivalent. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526. If there is more than
one impairment, then the ALJ must consider whether the combination of impairments equals any
listed impairment. Id. An impairment or combination of impairments is basically equivalent to a
listed impairment if there are medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most
similar. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992).
If the claimant is not conclusively disabled under the criteria set forth in the Impairment
List, step three is not satisfied, and the claimant must prove at step four whether he or she retains
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), (f); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. Step four involves three sub-steps:
(1) the ALJ must make specific findings of fact as to the claimant’s
[RFC]; (2) the ALJ must make findings of the physical and mental
demands of the claimant’s past relevant work; and (3) the ALJ must
compare the [RFC] to the past relevant work to determine whether
claimant has the level of capability needed to perform the past
relevant work.

Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). When
determining RFC, an ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence is subject to the framework
articulated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (for claims filed before March 27, 2017) or 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(c) (for claims filed after March 27, 2017).
Claimants are not disabled if their RFC allows them to perform their past relevant work.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). However, if the claimant’s RFC prevents him or her from
doing so, or if the claimant has no past relevant work, an ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step
of the process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(g). The final step requires the ALJ to “show there are
other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform,
consistent with [his or] her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and
[RFC].” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In doing so, “[t]he ALJ must

analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining whether she is
capable of performing work and is not disabled.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.
An ALJ typically seeks the assistance of a vocational expert at this final step. Plummer, 186 F.3d
at 428.
The claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four. Sykes v. Apfel, 228
F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither side bears the burden of proof for step three “[b]ecause step
three involves a conclusive presumption based on the listings.” Id. at 263 n.2; see Bowen, 482 U.S.
at 146 n.5. An ALJ bears the burden of proof for step five. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263.
On appeal, the harmless error doctrine requires a plaintiff to show, as to the first four steps:
(1) an error occurred; and (2) but for that error, they might have proven their disability. Holloman

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016). In other words, when reviewing an
appeal based on the first four steps, a court considers whether the plaintiff articulated a basis for a
decision in their favor, based on the existing record. If the plaintiff cannot, it is unlikely they will
meet their burden of showing an error was harmful. See, e.g., Lippincott v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
982 F. Supp. 2d 358, 380–81 (D.N.J. 2013) (finding ALJ’s error was harmless); Powers v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 19–21970, 2021 WL 1207793, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2021) (finding the
plaintiff had not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s decision and had not shown an
error occurred amounting to harm).
The court’s review of legal issues within this appeal is plenary. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). However, factual findings are reviewed “only to
determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the
findings.” Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262. Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of the

evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted). Substantial evidence also “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). When substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s factual findings, this
Court must abide by those determinations. See id. (citing Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
IV. DECISION

Plaintiff appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asks the Court to reverse ALJ Suna’s
decision and remand the action for further proceedings. (ECF No. 6.) However, the Commissioner
requests the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision because it claims the ALJ relied on
substantial evidence to find Plaintiff not disabled during the relevant period. (ECF No. 8.)
A. Based on existing Third Circuit precedent, it was not error for the ALJ to discredit
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding fibromyalgia symptoms.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to properly assess her subjective complaints of
pain and fatigue from her fibromyalgia. (ECF No. 6 at 16–18.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges
the ALJ failed to adequately consider the waxing and waning of her fibromyalgia symptoms and
erroneously “rejected [her] reported symptoms based on a lack of objective evidence.” (ECF No.
6 at 16–17.)
The Commissioner disagrees. First, the Commissioner contests the supposed inadequacy
of the ALJ’s consideration of the waxing and waning nature of Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia symptoms,
noting the ALJ “acknowledged Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that she experienced ‘more flare ups
of her fibromyalgia . . . in 2021’” and considered “the longitudinal record, despite a relevant period
of only one day, and found that Plaintiff’s rheumatology treatment notes showed relative stability
of her fibromyalgia, particularly as her only treatment, tramadol, was required ‘very sparingly.’”

(ECF No. 8 at 8–9 (quoting Tr. at 27, 1221).) Additionally, the Commissioner points out that
“Plaintiff’s 2021 treatment records with rheumatologist Dr. Bartov” does not include a “complaint
regarding flare ups or waxing and waning symptoms, let alone a reported increase in the same.”
(Id. (citing Tr. at 1216).) Second, the Commissioner suggests Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ
incorrectly discounted her fibromyalgia complaints based on a lack of objective evidence is
unpersuasive because the ALJ “considered the objective evidence as one consideration, among
many, in his analysis.” (Id. at 9 (citing Tr. at 28–31).)
In reply, Plaintiff argues “the ALJ’s acknowledgment of [Plaintiff’s] hearing testimony of
having more flare ups in 2021,” his “consider[ation] [of] the longitudinal record,” and “f[inding]
that Plaintiff’s rheumatology treatment notes showed relative stability of her fibromyalgia” do not

constitute “a discussion of why symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or
cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence.” (ECF No. 9 at
2–3 (first quoting ECF No. 8 at 7; then quoting SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)).)
Instead, Plaintiff contends the Commissioner has merely provided a post hoc rationale. (Id. (citing
Keiderling v. Astrue, Civ. A. No. 07-2237, 2008 WL 2120154, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2008)).)
Plaintiff goes on to argue that courts in the Third Circuit have recognized that fibromyalgia is a
disease which is notable for its lack of objective diagnostic techniques and consequently held it is
legal error for an ALJ to reject a plaintiff’s fibromyalgia symptoms for lack of objective findings.
(Id. at 3–4 (citing Claudine J.N. v. Bisignano, Civ. A. No. 24-5925, 2025 WL 2555371, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 2025); Emily K. v. Dudek, Civ. A. No. 22-3279, 2025 WL 762688, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar.
11, 2025)).)
When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, ALJs must use the two-step framework set forth
in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must

determine whether objective medical evidence presents a “medically determinable impairment”
that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3.
Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must assess the
intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they affect the claimant’s
ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p,
2016 WL 1119029, at *4. At this step, objective evidence is not required to find the claimant
disabled. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4–5. SSR 16-3p recognizes “[s]ymptoms cannot
always be measured objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. at *4.
As such, the ALJ must consider the entire case record and may “not disregard an individual’s

statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the
objective medical evidence does not substantiate” them. Id. at *5. This is especially important
when assessing the intensity and persistence of alleged fibromyalgia symptoms because “[t]he
problem with looking for independent findings and observations is that fibromyalgia is a disease
which is notable for its lack of objective diagnostic techniques.” Emily K., 2025 WL 762688, at
*10 (quoting Foley v. Barnhart, 432 F. Supp.2d 465, 475 (M.D. Pa. 2005)); see also Wilson v.
Apfel, Civ. A. No. 98-6511, 1999 WL 993723, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999) (symptoms of
fibromyalgia are subjective), aff’d, 225 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2000).
Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments [including her
fibromyalgia] could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” satisfying the first
step of the symptom-evaluation framework. (Tr. at 28.) At the second step, the ALJ discredited
Plaintiff’s statements about the severity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms because
he did not find them to be “entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the

record.” (Id.) As the ALJ recounted, Plaintiff reported “flare ups of her fibromyalgia and
rheumatoid in 2021,” and shared that these conditions caused, inter alia, “more pain in her knees,
ankles, wrists, thumbs, and index fingers.” (Id. at 27.) “Due to these issues, [Plaintiff] reported that
she couldn’t really function that well anymore.” (Id. (internal quotation marks removed).)
However, the ALJ discounted these statements and emphasized: (1) Dr. Bartov’s documentation
[of] no acute distress, intact orientation, normal gait, no muscle atrophy, normal affect, no
swelling, and full range of motion in all joints,” (2) Plaintiff’s “continued [use] [of] . . . Tramadol
for her fibromyalgia” during the period at issue, (3) Plaintiff’s use of Tramadol “since at least
October 1, 2012,” and her request for more on November 6, 2017, “with good results,” and (4) Dr.
Autotte’s notation “Plaintiff ‘did well with [the] Tramadol that she only takes’ at night.” (Tr. at 31

(quoting Tr. at 586, 597, 1337, 1348).)
This was not error—at least not in the Third Circuit.7 Trauterman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

7 In Arakas v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the Fourth Circuit joined the First,
Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, holding “ALJs may not rely on objective
medical evidence (or the lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a
claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia.” 983 F.3d 83, 95–98 (4th
Cir. 2020) (concluding it was legal error for the ALJ to rely “principally on [normal examination]
results—i.e., a full range of motion and the lack of joint inflammation—in discounting [the SSA
claimant’s] complaints as inconsistent with the objective evidence”). The Fourth Circuit held it
was “doubly erroneous” for the ALJ to “‘effectively require[] ‘objective’ evidence for a disease
that eludes such measurement.’” Id. (quoting Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108 (2d
Cir. 2003)). Perhaps, in time—“based on the current medical understanding of [fibromyalgia],” id.
at 97—the Third Circuit will revisit Trauterman v. Commissioner of Social Security and join the
majority of its sister circuits. 296 F. App’x 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding it was appropriate for
the ALJ to consider objective evidence where the plaintiff not only suffered from fibromyalgia,
296 F. App’x 218, 220 (3d Cir. 2008). In Trauterman, the Third Circuit found “it was quite
appropriate for the ALJ to consider the objective medical evidence of record” where the SSA
claimant’s claim of disability was “not attributed exclusively to fibromyalgia.” 296 F. App’x at
220. But see Johnson v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 2010); Green-Younger v. Barnhart,

335 F.3d 99,108 (2d Cir. 2003); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007);
Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996); Brosnahan v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 671, 677–
78 (8th Cir. 2003); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 666 (9th Cir. 2017).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim for DIB is not based solely on fibromyalgia; the ALJ also found that
Plaintiff suffered from lumbar spine impairment, scoliosis, leg length discrepancy, rheumatoid
arthritis, among others. (Tr. at 21.) “In light of these diagnoses, it was . . . appropriate for the ALJ
to consider the objective medical evidence of record.” Trauterman, 296 F. App’x at 220 (finding
it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider objective evidence where the plaintiff not only suffered
from fibromyalgia, but also cervical spine disc herniation, lumbar spine degenerative joint disease,
and carpal tunnel syndrome); see also Ilaria G. v. Colvin, Civ. A. No. 22-1366, 2024 WL 5244864,

at *20 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2024) (noting “the ALJ properly considered the objective evidence relating
to Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines as well as fibromyalgia”).
Additionally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that she was experiencing
“more flare ups of her fibromyalgia” and “more pain in her knees, ankles, wrists, thumbs, and
index fingers.” (Tr. at 27.) “Even in fibromyalgia cases, the ALJ must compare the objective

but also cervical spine disc herniation, lumbar spine degenerative joint disease, and carpal tunnel
syndrome). However, unless and until Trauterman is clearly overruled by the Third Circuit or the
Supreme Court of the United States, this Court is dutybound to follow Trauterman. See Gov’t
Emps. Ins. Co. v. Caring Pain Mgmt. PC, Civ. A. No. 22-5017, 2025 WL 2017255, at *6 (D.N.J.
July 18, 2025) (observing that district courts must follow Third Circuit precedent “until a proper
intervening change in the law has occurred”).
evidence and the subjective complaints and is permitted to reject plaintiff's subjective testimony
so long as [the ALJ] provides a sufficient explanation for doing so.” Ivelise S. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., Civ. A. No. 24-9381, 2025 WL 2734160, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2025). ALJ Suna concluded
Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 28.)
Specifically, as detailed above, the ALJ found “the only treatment for [Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia]
during the period at issue [wa]s the May 19, 2021 visit with . . . Dr. Bartov, who documented no
acute distress, intact orientation, normal gait, no muscle atrophy, normal affect, no swelling, and
full ROM in all joints.” (Id. at 31.) The ALJ also considered that Plaintiff “continued [using]
Tramadol for the fibromyalgia at that time . . . . [and] [had] been taking Tramadol since at least
October 1, 2012, as noted by primary care physician Dr. Autotte.” (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ
observed that Plaintiff “informed Dr. Autotte that Tramadol works for R.A. pain . . . [and] . . .
asked for more Tramadol, which she took at night, with good results.” (Id. (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).) Moreover, the ALJ also credited Dr. Autotte’s assessment that Plaintiff

“did well with [the] Tramadol that she only takes at night.” (Id.) Therefore, the Court finds the
ALJ sufficiently supported his reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony and subjective
complaints of pain. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129-130 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision where the ALJ considered parts of the plaintiff’s
testimony but found them inconsistent with other parts of the medical record); see also
Trauterman, 296 F. App’x at 221 (“The ALJ also concluded that Trauterman’s activities of daily
living and subjective complaints of pain were, in some respects, contrary to the medical evidence.
These findings are supported by substantial evidence . . . .”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. An
appropriate Order follows.

Date: March 19, 2026 /s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346305. Public record. Not legal advice.