# WILDERNESS

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · June 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346198

## Case

- **Full name:** Lavonte Wilderness v. Lt. Timothy Leffler, Investigator Randy VanVleet
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** June 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346198

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

LAVONTE WILDERNESS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00624-JRS-MG
)
LEFTLER, )
RANDELL VANVLEET, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The Plaintiff, Lavonte Wilderness, is currently incarcerated at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility ("Wabash Valley"). On March 16, 2026, this Court's screening order allowed Eighth
Amendment claims to proceed against the Defendants, Lt. Timothy Leffler and Investigator Randy
VanVleet, based on allegations that Lt. Leffler used excessive force against Mr. Wilderness and
both Defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Dkt. 10.1 The Court
also directed the Defendants to respond to Mr. Wilderness's emergency motion for temporary
restraining order,2 which requested immediate transfer to another prison based on the allegations
that the Defendants tampered with Mr. Wilderness's food and that he was being threatened in
segregated housing and experiencing mental distress. See dkt. 3.
For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES Mr. Wilderness's motion, dkt. [3].

1 The clerk is directed to update the spelling of the Defendants' names on the docket.

2 As will be explained below, the Court construes Mr. Wilderness's motion as a motion for preliminary
injunction since the relief requested would necessarily exceed 14 days.
I. Legal Standard
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts to issue two forms
of temporary injunctive relief: preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining
orders. Courts generally apply the same equitable standards to a motion for a temporary

restraining order as they do to a motion for a preliminary injunction. See International Profit
Associates, Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (collecting cases). Mr.
Wilderness has filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking transfer to another facility.
Given the substance of the relief sought, the motion for a temporary restraining order is better
understood as a motion for preliminary injunction. This is because "[a] temporary restraining order
may not exceed 14 days without good cause." Decker v. Lammer, 2022 WL 135429, *2 (7th Cir.
Jan. 14, 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2)).
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is available only when
the movant shows clear need." Turnell v. Centimark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). To
obtain a preliminary injunction Mr. Wilderness first must show that: "(1) without this relief, [he]

will suffer irreparable harm; (2) traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3) [he] has
some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of [his] claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968 F.3d
628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020). If Mr. Wilderness meets these threshold requirements, "the court then
must weigh the harm the denial of the preliminary injunction would cause the plaintiff against the
harm to the defendant if the court were to grant it." Id. "[A] preliminary injunction is an exercise
of a very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it." Orr
v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2020).
In addition to these requirements, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that
"[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to
correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). "This section of the PLRA enforces a
point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: '[P]rison
officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.'"

Westerfer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467
(1983)); see also Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2020)). Therefore, courts have been
hesitant to order a prisoner's transfer to a different institution. See Shaw v. Rozmarynoski, 2025
WL 1869659, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2025) ("Prison officials are uniquely qualified to decide
where a particular prisoner should be housed, how to manage the staffing at each institution, and
how to preserve safety and security at the institution. It is not this Court's job to second-guess those
decisions."); Felton v. Matushak, 2025 WL 1454971, at *9 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2025) (The court
has no authority to order the plaintiff's transfer to another institution.). In general, "[m]andatory
preliminary injunctions" requiring affirmative acts, such as transferring a plaintiff to a different
facility, are viewed with particular caution and have been "sparingly issued[.]" Mays v. Dart, 974

F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
II. Discussion
A. Irreparable Harm
"[H]arm is considered irreparable if it "cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final
judgment after trial." Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of
Education, 858 F.3d 1034, 1045 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). "'The mere possibility
of irreparable injury is not enough' to prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction." Boykins v.
Simmerman, 2023 WL 6461002, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 3, 2023) (quoting Orr, 953 F.3d at 501).
"'[T]he moving party must demonstrate he will likely suffer irreparable harm absent obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief.'" Id. (quoting Orr, 953 F.3d at 503). Here, the Defendants are correct
to argue that Mr. Wilderness has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive
relief. Instead, he speculates that he faces "immediat[e] and irreparable harm" because he is already
in imminent danger due to the food contamination and to the medical department not responding

to his requests. Dkt. 3 at 2. He also claims that he is contemplating self-harm due to the conditions
in segregation. Id. Although these allegations are serious, Mr. Wilderness has not provided any
evidence showing that future injuries are likely to occur and are not just hypothetical. See East St.
Louis Laborers' Local 100 v. Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co., 414 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2005)
("[A] plaintiff cannot obtain a preliminary injunction by speculating about hypothetical future
injuries.").
Furthermore, the Defendants cite Mr. Wilderness's recent medical records, which do not
provide evidence that his food is contaminated or that he is currently experiencing a mental health
crisis due to his placement in segregated housing. Mr. Wilderness has been seen by medical
providers several times since filing his complaint, but he has not complained about issues with his

food or symptoms of being poisoned. See dkt. 17-1 at 209–11; 260–63; 307–14. Even though Mr.
Wilderness was placed on suicide watch in October 2025, the medical records do not show that
Mr. Wilderness has recently reported suicidal ideation, as expressed in his complaint and his
motion. See id. at 87–88; 94–95; 161–64; 264–306. Moreover, the records show that Mr.
Wilderness is receiving ongoing treatment for his mental health. In sum, based on the evidence in
the current record, Mr. Wilderness has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not
transferred.3

3 See Minocqua Brewing Co. LLC v. Hess, 160 F.4th 849, 852 (7th Cir. 2025) ("[T]he district court's fact
finding for purposes of the denial of the preliminary injunction is not controlling at a later hearing on the
merits.").
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Even if Mr. Wilderness could establish irreparable harm, he has not established that he is
likely to succeed on the merits. "A movant's showing of likelihood of success on the merits must
be strong." Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). A "better

than negligible" likelihood of success is not enough. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d
760, 762−63 (7th Cir. 2020). "A 'strong' showing . . . does not mean proof by a preponderance . . .
[b]ut it normally includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements
of its case." Id.
In this case, Mr. Wilderness proceeds on Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claims against the Defendants based on allegations that they have contaminated his food and kept
him in segregated housing where he is being threatened and suffering from mental distress.4 Under
the Eighth Amendment, "prisoners cannot be confined in inhumane conditions." Thomas v.
Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).
A conditions-of-confinement claim includes both an objective and subjective component. Giles v.

Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). Under the objective component, a prisoner must
show that the conditions were objectively serious and created "an excessive risk to his health and
safety." Id. (cleaned up). Under the subjective component, a prisoner must establish that the
defendants had a culpable state of mind — that they "were subjectively aware of these conditions
and refused to take steps to correct them, showing deliberate indifference." Thomas, 2 F.4th at 720.
Proving the subjective component is a "high hurdle" that "requires something approaching a total
unconcern for the prisoner's welfare in the face of serious risks." Donald v. Wexford Health

4 Mr. Wilderness also proceeds on Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Lt. Leffler. However,
based on the substance of Mr. Wilderness's motion, which requests transfer because Defendants are
tampering with his food, these claims do not appear to be relevant to his request for injunctive relief.
Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Neither "negligence
[n]or even gross negligence is enough[.]" Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008).
The current record does not show that Mr. Wilderness is suffering from objectively serious
conditions that create an excessive risk of danger to his health and safety. As seen above, Mr.

Wilderness's medical records do not mention any issues with his food or Mr. Wilderness's
complained-about symptoms even though he has seen medical providers several times since filing
his complaint. See id.; dkt. 17-1 at 209–11; 260–63; 307–14. They also do not show any reported
mental health issues since Mr. Wilderness initiated this lawsuit even though Mr. Wilderness has
been receiving ongoing mental healthcare. See id. at 87–88; 94–95; 161–64; 264–306. Mr.
Wilderness did not file a reply disputing the Defendants' representation of the facts supporting his
claims. Accordingly, because the record does not support the objective component of Mr.
Wilderness's Eighth Amendment claims, he has not established a likelihood of success on the
merits.
Importantly, the Court's decision today is limited to the question of injunctive relief and

does not reflect any judgment on the merits of Mr. Wilderness's claims for damages. As the
Supreme Court explained in Farmer, when reviewing a plaintiff's request for "injunctive relief to
prevent a substantial risk of serious injury from ripening into actual harm, the subjective factor,
deliberate indifference, should be determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and
conduct, . . . their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter." 511
U.S. at 845–46 (internal citations and quotations omitted). "[T]o establish eligibility for an
injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance of that disregard during the remainder of
the litigation and into the future." Id. Here, the record does not reveal a likelihood of showing that
the Defendants are continuously subjecting Mr. Wilderness to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement.
Because Mr. Wilderness has not shown that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm or that
he will likely succeed on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim against the Defendants, the
Court does not discuss the inadequacy of legal remedies.
HI. Conclusion
For the above reasons, the court DENIES Mr. Wilderness's motion for preliminary
injunction, dkt. [3].
IT IS SO ORDERED. +"

JAMES R. SWEENEY II, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
LAVONTE WILDERNESS
257088
WABASH VALLEY - CF
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
Electronic Service Participant — Court Only
All ECF-registered attorneys of record via email

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11346198. Public record. Not legal advice.