# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · May 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345956

## Case

- **Full name:** Ricardo E. Pu Lux v. Kevin Raycraft, Field Office Director, Cleveland Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345956

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the benefits of limiting judicial interference in agency affairs in the immigration context
- finding no statutory right to periodic bond hearings for aliens detained during the pendency of removal proceedings
- holding, in an immigration case, that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause does not require that bail be available, only that, when it is, bail is not excessive
- recognizing the serious constitutional concerns of indefinite detention following a final order of removal

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RICARDO E. PU LUX, ) Case No. 1:26-cv-1007
)
Petitioner, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge
) James E. Grimes, Jr.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Field Office )
Director, Cleveland Field Office of )
U.S. Immigration and Customs )
Enforcement, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
)

OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Ricardo E. Pu Lux, a citizen and national of Guatemala unlawfully
present in the United States since 2014, was apprehended at a traffic stop on April 4,
2026. Since then, he has been in the custody of the immigration authorities. Mr. Pu
Lux filed an application for cancellation of removal and is currently in removal
proceedings. He has a hearing scheduled on May 29, 2026. He petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, the Court
DISMISSES the petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to Petitioner, Mr. Pu Lux entered the United States in 2014 when
he was approximately 17 years old. (ECF No. 1, PageID #7.) Since then, he has
resided in the United States and developed deep ties to the community. (Id.) He
resides in Willard, Ohio, a small community in Huron County. (Id.) He has a child
who is a United States citizen and has no criminal record. (Id.)
Mr. Pu Lux applied for cancelation of removal for non-permanent residents

under federal law. (Id., PageID #8.) He is currently in immigration proceedings
pending in immigration court in Cleveland, Ohio and has a hearing scheduled on May
29, 2026. (Id.)
On April 4, 2026, Mr. Pu Lux was taken into custody during a traffic stop. (Id.)
The immigration authorities designated him for mandatory detention, and he has not
had an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. (Id.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 29, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) Although he does not assert specific
causes of action, Petitioner generally alleges that his detention without an
individualized bond hearing violates: (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment; and (2) the Immigration and Nationality Act;.
HABEAS STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a court shall forthwith issue a writ or order the
respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue, “unless it appears from the
application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled” to a writ of habeas
corpus. This statute requires an initial screening of a petition. See Alexander v.
Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). At this stage of
the proceedings, a court accepts as true the allegations in the petition and construes
them in favor of the petitioner. Id. “If it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the
judge must dismiss the petition.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

(applicable to petitions under Section 2241 through Rule 1(b)).
JURISDICTION
Section 2241(c)(3) extends the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to
persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) provides that no court has jurisdiction to review any
immigration matter except as provided by statute: “Notwithstanding any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any
other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall
have jurisdiction to review” immigration cases.
As relevant here, judicial review is available in two circumstances. First, a
final order of removal is subject to judicial review by “the court of appeals for the
judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” not the
district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2); see also id. § 1252(b)(9). This provision does not

apply here.
Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves the ability to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to raise a constitutional issue. In such a case, however, Congress
significantly limited judicial review and the ability of courts to engage in fact-finding:
no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of
title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order [a
final order of removal] or such questions of law or fact [those involving
interpretation and application of statutory provisions, arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States].
Id. § 1252(b)(9). This statute encompasses challenges to the decision to seek removal
and the decision to detain an alien in the first place. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 294 (2018); see also Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). Significantly,
Congress specifically divested courts of jurisdiction to review bond determinations
and other discretionary determinations pending removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Determinations of bond or detention are discretionary, even under
administrative policy in effect until the middle of 2025. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For

this reason, the Court finds that Congress has not conferred jurisdiction on federal
district courts to interpret or apply Section 1225 or Section 1226 of the INA.
Divesting federal district courts of jurisdiction over such determinations makes
sense. After all, Congress created an administrative process intended to act quickly
(though in practice its actions have been anything but) in a field requiring specialized
knowledge generally outside the experience of most district courts.

I. Split of Authority in the Inferior Courts
Notwithstanding the sharp jurisdictional limits in Section 1252, federal
district courts have scarcely noticed that the statute exists. But federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only the jurisdiction that Congress gives
them pursuant to the Constitution.
Whatever the reason judges in the inferior courts have skirted analysis of the
jurisdictional limits of Section 1252, they have taken competing approaches to
whether petitioners are entitled to a bond hearing pending removal. The majority of
courts agree with Petitioner that such a hearing is warranted. See, e.g., Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-

11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *9 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); Paredes Padillia v. Galovich,
et al., No. 25-cv-863, 2025 WL 3251446, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2025); Diaz-
Villatoro v. Larose, et al., No. 25-cv-3087, 2025 WL 3251377, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21,
2025); see also Cunha v. Freden, ___ F.4th ___, No. 25-3141-PR, 2026 WL 1146044, at
*23 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026).
However, other courts have taken a contrary position, agreeing with the

Administration’s reading of the statute. See, e.g., Coronado v. Secretary, Dep't of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-831, 2025 WL 3628229, at *6–12 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15,
2025); Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-00168, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 10, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump, No. 8:25CV526, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (D.
Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Chavez v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025); see also Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026);
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026)

In the Court’s view, both approaches are mistaken. The statutory framework
provides a limited role for district courts to review a habeas petition in the
immigration context not concerning a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
That is, Section 1252 preserves the ability of district courts to review a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus regarding a constitutional issue. Id. For example, such claims
might challenge what amounts to indefinite detention. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (recognizing the serious constitutional concerns of indefinite
detention following a final order of removal); but see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
(finding no statutory right to periodic bond hearings for aliens detained during the

pendency of removal proceedings).
Outside of such limited and narrow constitutional claims, which Petitioner
does not raise, other constitutional challenges quickly implicate and often become
entwined with interpretation and implementation of the statutory framework and its
associated procedures. Such is the case with Petitioner’s claims here. Indeed, he
asserts various violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Taken as a whole,

his petition pursues that issue to a far greater degree than it outlines a claimed due-
process violation. There might well be good reason for that. In the immigration
context, Congress has broad discretion to determine what process is due. See, e.g.
Department of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309 (1993). And it may enact laws that “constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,”
even if the Constitution does not tolerate similar treatment of citizens. Demore v.

Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 526 (2003); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (holding,
in an immigration case, that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause does not
require that bail be available, only that, when it is, bail is not excessive).
Put another way, a constitutional challenge to detention pending removal and
entitlement to a bond hearing collapse into analysis of the statutory and regulatory
regime—whether, for example, Section 1226(a) entitles an alien to bond pending
removal or whether Section 1225(b) authorizes the government to detain an alien.
Congress has made clear that district courts lack the jurisdiction to make such
determinations, even on a habeas petition under Section 2241. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(9). As the Supreme Court has long recognized, these statutory provisions
aim “at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that can fairly
be said to be the[ir] theme.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 486 (1999).
Nonetheless, the federal district courts that have considered the issues raised
in the petition have not hesitated to wade into interpretation of a statutory scheme

where Congress has made clear they have little, if any, place. The Court fails to see
how it has jurisdiction to consider the petition.
II. Exhaustion
Out of an abundance of caution, if the Court is mistaken in its read of the
interplay between Section 1252 and Section 2241, the Court proceeds. If vested with
jurisdiction, the familiar principles of habeas practice and procedure apply. In light
of the congressional limitations on jurisdiction, prudential principles of exhaustion

counsel that a petitioner pursue his administrative remedies to a final judgment from
the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Because
of the expertise that the Board of Immigration Appeals and the immigration courts
more generally have in the statutory and administrative regime governing the
admission and removal of foreigners, “‘many of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’
may be served by permitting agency review in the first instance.” Ba v. Director of
Detroit Field Off., No. 4:25-cv-02208, 2025 WL 2977712, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,
2025) (quoting Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
01621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)); see also Beharry v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the benefits of limiting judicial

interference in agency affairs in the immigration context).
II.A. Prudential Exhaustion
“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court
ordinarily should either dismiss the [habeas] petition without prejudice or stay the
proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is
excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). In Leonardo, the petitioner pursued habeas review of the Immigration

Court’s adverse bond determination before he appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that filing a habeas petition in federal
district court was improper because the petitioner “should have exhausted
administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district
court to review the IJ’s decision.” Id. (citing Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814,
819 (9th Cir. 2003)).

The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this procedure for challenging bond
determinations, albeit in a short, unpublished order. See Rabi v. Sessions, No. 19-
3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1–2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018) (citing Leonardo,
646 F.3d at 1160); see also Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (applying
the Ninth Circuit’s test for prudential exhaustion). Previously, the Court has done
so as well. See Tecum Pastor v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, 814 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Monroy Villalta v. Greene, 794 F.
Supp. 3d 528, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Laguna Espinoza v. Director of Detroit Field Off.,
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 4:25-cv-02107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 9, 2025); Ba, 2025 WL 2977712, at *2.

In this case, Mr. Pu Lux has available to him an appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. As in Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160, prudential principles of
exhaustion counsel that Petitioner pursue his administrative remedies to a final
judgment from the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas
corpus. In his petition, Mr. Pu Lux alleges violation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Though couched in the language of due process under the Fifth

Amendment, it also invites review of the process due under the statute and its
associated procedures. Further, Petitioner seeks review of the application and
interpretation of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In other
words, any determination regarding detention here turns on interpretation and
application of the governing removal regime.
In the first instance, such review should proceed before the Board of
Immigration Appeals to “apply its experience and expertise without judicial

interference.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other
grounds); see also Rojas-Garcia , 39 F.3d at 819 (acknowledging that a “petitioner
must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims in a
habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”); Monroy
Villalta, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 531; Laguna Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2; Ba, 2025
WL 2977712, at *2.
II.B. Futility
Petitioner implies that an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals would
be futile. But courts in this Circuit have determined that even where there is a “high

probability of denial” of a petitioner’s appeal of an Immigration Judge’s bond decision,
such a probability “does not weigh in favor of waiving exhaustion.” Hernandez
Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11. Indeed, the acting Attorney General remains
free to exercise his discretion to use an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
to change or modify the policy about which Petitioner complains.
In Hernandez Torrealba, the petitioner sought relief from the exhaustion
requirement based on a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the

denial of bond. But the court was “not certain how the BIA will rule on Petitioner’s
appeal given the particular circumstances of her case, and it would be presumptuous
of this Court to simply assume that the BIA will rule against Petitioner.” Id. So too
here. Petitioner presents relevant background of Mr. Pu Lux that appears
particularly sympathetic. For this reason, his case might well prove to be one in
which the agency changes or refines its policy announced in Matter of Yajure Hurtado

through agency adjudication. That prerogative belongs in the first instance to the
agency, which also has the knowledge and ability and to adopt policies that are more
tailored to the statutory scheme it is tasked with implementing in a way that courts
are not.
“[M]any of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’ may be served by permitting
agency review in the first instance.’” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11
(quoting Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62). Indeed, courts outside this Circuit acknowledge
that the purposes of requiring exhaustion in the immigration context “include
protecting the authority of administrative agencies, limiting interference in agency
affairs, developing the factual record to make judicial review more efficient, and

resolving issues to render judicial review unnecessary.” Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62
(citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)). In any event, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, including in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). That authority rests, if anywhere, with the Sixth
Circuit. For these reasons, the Court cannot say that exhaustion is futile or a waste

of time or that prudential reasons apply for excusing it. To the contrary, it promotes
judicial restraint, separates the powers and proper roles of the agency and the courts
in the administrative regime Congress created, and reserves judicial review from
decisions of the agency for the Sixth Circuit (something that no petitioner, to the
Court’s knowledge, has yet availed himself of).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition but if it had

jurisdiction would require exhaustion as a prudential matter. Accordingly, the Court
DISMISSES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 5, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345956. Public record. Not legal advice.