# Sahil Sahil v. Markwayne Mullin, et al.

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · May 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345223

## Case

- **Full name:** Sahil Sahil v. Markwayne Mullin, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** May 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345223

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from immigration detention”
- stating that an individual’s interest in being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

SAHIL SAHIL, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-761-SLP
)
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., )
)
Respondents1. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Sahil Sahil, a noncitizen,2 seeks a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.3 Chief United States District Judge Scott L. Palk
referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. The Government responded, Doc. 8,
and Petitioner replied, Doc. 9. So the matter is at issue.

1 Respondent Warden Scarlet Grant is not a federal official, and the
response is not filed on her behalf. See Doc. 8, at 1 n.1.

2 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

3 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant
Petitioner’s habeas petition and order Respondents to immediately release

Petitioner.
I. Factual background and procedural history.

Petitioner is a citizen of India who entered the country on August 26,
2023, without inspection or parole. Doc. 1, at 5-6. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) placed him into removal proceedings by charging him as
removable under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).4 Id. at 2. On October 3, 2023, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) released him on his recognizance. Id. at 6. Petitioner “timely filed for

asylum based on political persecution” and his “asylum application is currently
pending.” Id.5 On March 25, 2026, he was transferred to ICE custody after
being detained by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. Id. at 5. Aware that
Immigration Courts feel bound by Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N Dec.

4 This section is codified in the United States Code as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) provides that an alien who is present
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General is ineligible to be admitted to the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

5 The parties have not provided the Court with a copy of Petitioner’s
asylum application.
2
216 (BIA 2025),6 Petitioner correctly believed it futile to seek a bond hearing.
Doc. 1, at 5.

II. Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner raises two grounds for relief:
Ground One: Violation of the INA; and

Ground Two: Violation of Due Process.

Id. at 7-8. In sum, he argues he is not subject to mandatory detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and his continued detention without the opportunity for a
bond hearing violates the INA and his due process rights. Id.
Petitioner asks this Court to order Respondents to show cause as to why
the petition should not be granted within three days; not to remove him from
this District;7 release him under his previous terms or, in the alternative, order
Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing within five days; enter

6 In Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) held that those who entered the country without admission or
parole are ineligible for a bond hearing and are detained under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). Hurtado is not binding on this Court. See Loper Bright Enters.
v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (“[C]ourts need not and under the APA
may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute
is ambiguous.”).

7 The Court addressed Petitioner’s requests when it ordered a response to
the petition, see Doc. 6, and determines a hearing is not necessary.

3
injunctive and declaratory relief; and award him reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Id. at 9.

III. Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88
(2001)).8
IV. Discussion.

8 “When called on to resolve a dispute over a statute’s meaning,” the Court
should “seek[] to afford the [statute’s] terms their ordinary meaning at the time
Congress adopted them” and to “exhaust all the textual and structural clues
bearing on the meaning.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 160 (2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This Court’s “‘sole function’ is to apply the
law as the Court finds it, . . . not defer to some conflicting reading the
government might advance.” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Oklahoma
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 107 F.4th 1209, 1222 n.11 (10th Cir.
2024) (stating that the court “must independently interpret the statutory
phrase irrespective of the parties’ positions”), judgment vacated on other
grounds, 145 S. Ct. 2837 (2025).

4
A. Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.
This Court should reject, as it has before, Respondents’ statutory

interpretation of §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court further adopts the
reasoning set forth in Lopez v. CoreCivic Cimarron Corr. Facility, No. CIV-25-
1175-SLP, 2026 WL 165490 at *3-7 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026),9 where this
Court has previously addressed, in a more detailed Order, these same issues.

In doing so, the Court joins the decision reached by the vast majority of district
judges in this judicial district, in district courts within the Tenth Circuit10 and
across the country11 to have addressed the same issues as those raised by
Petitioner.12 The Court’s decision is also in accord with the Second Circuit,

which has rejected the statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) urged by
Respondents. See generally Cunha v. Freden, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1146044

9 Lopez, 2026 WL 165490, at *5 (collecting cases in this judicial district
concluding that § 1225(b)(2) does not govern the petitioner's detention).

10 See, e.g., Aguilar Tanchez v. Noem, 2026 WL 125184, at *11-12 (D. Utah
Jan. 16, 2026); Hernandez v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 2996643, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct.
24, 2025).

11 See, e.g., Lopez, 2026 WL 165490, at *7 (collecting cases concluding that
§ 1226(a) is the governing statutory framework).

12 But see Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344
at *3-5 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026); Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-235-1231-JD, 2025
WL 3733302, at *5-12 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025).

5
(2d Cir. April 28, 2026); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, --- F.4th ---, 2026
WL 1283891, at *11 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden,

Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 2026 WL 1243395, at *22 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026);
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2026 WL 1223250, at *21 (7th
Cir. May 5, 2026); but see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th
Cir. Feb. 6, 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 2026). The

Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.13
B. Petitioner is entitled to relief under § 1226(a).
When Petitioner was detained after residing in the country for over two
years, he was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Instead, Petitioner is subject to § 1226, and “is entitled to a prompt bond
hearing before an immigration judge [(IJ)] pursuant to § 1226(a).” Cortes v.
Holt, No. CIV-25-1176-SLP, 2026 WL 147435, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026);

13 Petitioner’s asylum request does not change this outcome. This Court
has “declined to find” that either refusing to voluntarily depart or seeking
asylum “‘constitutes ‘seeking admission’ for purposes of this subsection.’”
Malacidze v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1527-D, 2026 WL 227155, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 28, 2026) (quoting Cruz-Hernandez v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1378-D, 2026 WL
18932, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 2026)); see also Hernandez Alvarez, 2026 WL
1243395, at *21 (“This argument fails at the gate. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) makes
it clear that an applicant for admission’s status as one ‘seeking admission’
becomes relevant upon examination by an immigration officer, which occurs
before a § 1229a proceeding even commences.” (quoting 8 U.SC § 1225(b)(2)(A)).

6
see also Cunha, 2026 WL 1146044, at *2 (concluding the petitioner’s detention
was “governed by Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A),” and explaining

that its holding “allows noncitizens . . . who are already present in the United
States and are determined not to be a flight risk or danger to the community
to be released on bond under Section 1226(a) while their removal proceedings
are pending”).

C. Petitioner is entitled to due process.

“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to
deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. Trump v.
J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“‘It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal

proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“The [INA] establishes procedures for removing [and detaining
noncitizens] living unlawfully in the United States.” Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 527 (2021); see Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S.

573, 578 (2022) (“The INA establishes procedures for the Government to use
when removing certain noncitizens from the United States and, in some cases,
7
detaining them.”). The Government does not develop a fulsome argument in
response to Petitioner’s procedural due process Fifth Amendment claim and

instead encourages the Court to rest its decision on the statutory
interpretation question. See Doc. 8, at 2.
This Court analyzes Petitioner’s due process claim to determine whether
he has a protected liberty interest, and what process is necessary to ensure any

deprivation of that liberty interest aligns with the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
In examining the necessary process, the Court turns to the three factors set
forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by

the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that

the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976).
“When the government grants [a noncitizen] parole into the country, it
creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment.”

Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); see also
Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“Individuals
8
released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest
in their ‘continued liberty.’” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482

(1972))); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 27,
2026) (finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from
immigration detention”). Petitioner’s interest in physical freedom “is the most
elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004);

see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an individual’s interest in
being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]
Clause protects”). Respondents deprived Petitioner of his protected status
when they arrested him and placed him in custody.

Turning to the Mathews factors, the Court finds that Petitioner has a
significant private interest in remaining free from detention after spending
two years here. To be sure, “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).

But that power remains “subject to important constitutional limitations.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. And it does not erase Petitioner’s significant
interest in remaining free from detention.
Respondents do not suggest Petitioner violated any laws while in the

United States. During his release, Petitioner’s interest in release grew even
stronger as he worked and presumably “form[ed] the other enduring
9
attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The first Mathews
factor favors Petitioner.

Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The
risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is considerable

where he was arrested without any notice of the reason, no explanation of any
changed circumstances, and no hearing.
“Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally
inadequate opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be

meaningful to be constitutionally sufficient.” Saqib v. Andrews, 2026 WL
350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026). This factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025)
(“That the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner

does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that
comports with due process.”).
Finally, the Court considers the Government’s interest, including any
fiscal or administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While this Court

recognizes that the government has an interest in enforcing immigration
laws,” the government’s interest in arresting Petitioner without a
10
determination whether he posed a risk of flight or danger is low. Saqib, 2026
WL 350830, at *6; see, e.g., Diaz v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal.

June 14, 2025) (“[T[he Court concludes that the government’s interest in re-
detaining Petitioner . . . is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that Petitioner[]
has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). And the Court can
discern no significant administrative or fiscal burden associated with placing

the burden on the government to follow its own laws and regulations. See, e.g.,
Iza, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (“An alien’s opportunity to be heard regarding the
revocation of his parole is only meaningful if the government comports with its
own internal standards regarding parole revocation.”). Especially given that

Petitioner’s detention was not deemed necessary for more than two years.
D. Remedy.

Habeas is “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) “The typical remedy for such detention is, of course,
release.” Id.; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
107 (2020) (“Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from
unlawful detention.”). Federal district courts have broad equitable powers to
craft habeas relief. Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1992).

District courts have the power and authority to dispose of habeas corpus
matters “as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
11
The undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s continuing due process
violation requires his immediate release subject to the same conditions of his

earlier release. This view is shared by numerous courts across the country,
including courts in this Circuit.14
Further, there is “mounting evidence” that bond hearings in
Immigration Court have preordained outcomes. Singh v. Valdez, 2026 WL

890240, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr. 1, 2026) (“As a result, courts across the country
have, with increasing frequency, ceased ‘order[ing] even initial bond hearings
. . . involving unlawful detention under § 1225(b) because Respondents’ conduct
can no longer be attributed to mere negligence or ineptitude, . . . and doing so

would effectively allow the Government to transform an unlawful detention

14 See Ewere v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-320-SLP, 2026 WL 1207088, at *1-2
(W.D. Okla. May 4, 2026) (ordering Petitioner’s “immediate release” for due
process violation and denial of a bond hearing); Singh v. Noem, 2026 WL
766228, at *10 (D.N.M. Mar. 18, 2026) ( “Petitioner’s . . . release is required to
remedy the ongoing due process violation caused by Petitioner being detained
while his conditional parole has not yet been terminated.”); Velasquez Montillo
v. Brooksby, 2026 WL 592355, at *10 (D. Utah Mar. 3, 2026) (concluding
immediate release was the appropriate remedy where “there has been no notice
of a change in circumstances requiring modification of the November 2021
[order of release on recognizance]”); Vielma Uzcategui v. Brooksby, 2026 WL
622751, at *13 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2026) (same as to petitioner ordered released
on her own recognizance in September 2023); Murzi v. Noem, 2026 WL 395111,
at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2026) (ordering petitioner’s immediate release where
petitioner had previously been released on parole).

12
into a lawful one through post-hoc justifications.’” (quoting Zheng v. Rokosky,
2026 WL 800203, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2026) (collecting cases)).15 Given this

reality, the Court recommends Petitioner’s immediate release.16

15 See, e.g., Zheng, 2026 WL 800203, at *6 (ordering immediate release
after “IJ erroneously stated that she lacked jurisdiction in direct defiance of
[the] Court’s Order, failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for her
supposed alternative holding that Petitioner is a flight risk, and by all
appearances acted as a ‘mere rubber-stamp’. . . for Respondents’ predetermined
decision to deny bond”); Montero-Martinez v. Mattos, 2026 WL 674497, at *1–
2 (D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2026) (ordering release after petitioner’s due process rights
were violated when his bond was “revoked based on materially false
information” regarding his criminal record); Miri v. Bondi, 2026 WL 622302,
at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) (ordering release after finding IJ abused its
discretion in denying bond where they “did not explain the reasons for denying
Miri’s bond and the record does not establish that the [IJ] relied on the
appropriate factors”); Rodriguez v. Greene, 2026 WL 574961, at *12 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 2, 2026) (finding due process violation where “the IJ’s decision . . .
contain[ed] zero reference to any record or arguments put forth by either
party,” denied bond “exclusively on jurisdictional grounds,” and held in the
“alternative” that the petitioner was a danger to the community and a flight
risk “without supplying any reasoning [as to] how the IJ came to such a
conclusion”).

16 Should the Court determine a bond hearing is the appropriate remedy,
the undersigned recommends that, given Petitioner’s prolonged detention
under the incorrect statute, the Court should find that it is more appropriate
for the government to bear the burden of proof in this context. See, e.g., Garcia
Cortes v. Noem, 2025 WL 2652880, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025) (citing L.G.
v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1185 (D. Colo. 2024)). “Freedom from
imprisonment . . . lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Under these circumstances, the
government ought to bear the burden of proving that Petitioner poses a danger
to the community or a risk of flight such that he should remain in detention.
The clear and convincing standard that generally “applies to civil detention
where liberty is at stake” is appropriate here as well. See L.G., 744 F. Supp. 3d
13
V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

• grant Petitioner’s habeas petition and order his immediate release
or, in the alternative, order a bond hearing to be held within five
days at which the Government bears the burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk and

a danger to the community17; and
• Order the Government to certify compliance by filing a
status report within ten business days of the Court’s order,
and to promptly provide a copy of this order to Counsel for the

Warden of the Cimarron Correctional Facility; and
• Order that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without notice
and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decision-maker
where the government bears the burden of proving, by clear and

at 1186 (first citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987), and
then citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)).

17 Adoption of this Report and Recommendation will moot Petitioner’s
request for “injunctive relief necessary to preserve jurisdiction and prevent
irreparable harm . . . upon the Court’s finding that the Winter factors are
satisfied.” Doc. 1, at 9 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7
(2008)).
14
convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk and a danger to
the community.18

The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by May 21, 2026,
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72.19
The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely

objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation

18 To the extent that Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as
a prevailing party, Petitioner must seek those separately after a final
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152,
1166 (10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad language to unambiguously
authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention”).

19 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation to three
days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition
(noting that rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas
corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings
under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484
F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
may be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that
“while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas
proceedings, they need not be in every instance – particularly where strict
application would undermine the habeas review process.”).
15
disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the
captioned matter.
ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2026.

hea tere _
SUZANNE MITCHELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345223. Public record. Not legal advice.