# Hanchey

> District Court, S.D. Florida · April 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345213

## Case

- **Full name:** Dawson Hanchey v. Blew Bayou Services, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345213

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that courts evaluate FCRA claims under the same framework as ADA claims
- explaining that damages may be awarded on default judgment only if the record adequately reflects a basis for an award of 5 of 14 damages

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT PIERCE DIVISION

CASE NO. 25-14334-CIV-MARTINEZ/MAYNARD

DAWSON HANCHEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

BLEW BAYOU SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before me upon Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Entry of Final Default
Judgment (“Motion”). DE 15. No response in opposition has been filed. U.S. District Judge Jose
E. Martinez has referred this Motion to me for appropriate disposition. DE 17. Having reviewed
the Motion, the record, and the governing law, I respectfully RECOMMEND that (1) the Motion
be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, (2) the Clerk’s default be VACATED, (3) Plaintiff’s
Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and (4) Plaintiff be required to file and
serve an amended complaint before seeking default judgment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on September 11, 2025, asserting four claims against Defendant:
disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
(Counts I and II), and parallel claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) (Counts III and
IV). DE 1.
The Complaint alleges that venue is proper in this District because the events giving rise
to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Martin County, Florida. Id. ¶ 3. In the section identifying the
parties, Plaintiff states that he “is a resident of Wauchula County, Florida, and he worked in Hardee
County.” Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “operates a store in Stuart, in Martin

County, Florida.” Id. ¶¶ 4-5. No further details about the parties are provided in this section.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff began working for Defendant as an apprentice
lineman on September 5, 2023. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges he is a qualified individual with a
disability based on multiple medical conditions, including rhinovirus, pneumonia, RSV,1 Still’s
disease, and myocarditis. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
Plaintiff alleges that on November 1, 2023, which was approximately two months into his
employment, he was working “for Defendant in Georgia” when he informed his supervisor that he
was feeling ill. Id. ¶ 15. He sought medical care at a hospital on November 3, 2023, and was
diagnosed on November 8, 2023, with rhinovirus, pneumonia, and RSV. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. He later
received additional diagnoses of Still’s disease and myocarditis. Id. ¶ 18.

On November 9, 2023, Plaintiff allegedly informed Defendant’s owner that he was
hospitalized due to a heart condition. Id. ¶ 19. On November 11, 2023, the owner texted Plaintiff
requesting a status update; Plaintiff reported that he remained hospitalized, and the owner
encouraged Plaintiff to feel better. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. The Complaint then summarily alleges that
“Plaintiff required and requested a reasonable accommodation of a medical leave of absence.” Id.

1 The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffers from “RSV” but does not define the acronym or otherwise clarify the
condition. Based on the context provided, I assume Plaintiff is referring to respiratory syncytial virus.

2 of 14
¶ 22. The pleading does not specify when this request was made, to whom it was directed, or its
scope or duration.
Plaintiff alleges he remained on medical leave until March 13, 2024, when he received
medical clearance. Id. ¶ 23. During his leave, Plaintiff’s brother-in-law, who was also employed

by Defendant, allegedly provided periodic updates to Plaintiff’s foreman. Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 13, 2024, he texted his foreman a photograph of his medical
clearance and advised that he could return to work the following Monday. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. According
to Plaintiff, later that same day, the foreman called and terminated his employment, stating that
Plaintiff was “too much of a ‘liability’ for Defendant.” Id. ¶ 29.
On November 12, 2025, the Clerk entered default against Defendant for failure to appear
or otherwise respond. DE 6. On November 14, 2025, the case was administratively closed with
instructions for Defendant to respond or, failing that, for Plaintiff to “file a motion for final default
judgment that includes affidavits of the amounts due by Defendant, if necessary, and any other
supporting documentation necessary to determine the measure of damages and/or conclude this

action.” DE 7, reiterated in DE 10.
Plaintiff has since filed three motions for default judgment. DE 11, DE 13, DE 15. Judge
Martinez denied the first two motions without prejudice based upon procedural deficiencies,
including the absence of a legally sufficient proposed order and supporting legal analysis. DE 12,
DE 14. In his most recent order, Judge Martinez emphasized that that Plaintiff’s proposed order
failed to articulate the governing legal standards or provide meaningful analysis, noting that it
improperly “rubber stamps the requested relief with no analysis.” DE 14 at 2.

3 of 14
The present Motion is Plaintiff’s third attempt. The Motion references two attached
exhibits, DE 15 at 10, 12, 14, yet none are included. I assume for present purposes that Plaintiff
intends to rely on two affidavits attached to his initial motion for default judgment.2 The first is
Plaintiff’s own affidavit, which largely restates the Complaint’s allegations. DE 11-1. Plaintiff

also submits his counsel’s affidavit regarding attorney’s fees, although the fee figures vary across
submissions: $10,085 in counsel’s affidavit, DE 11-2 at 3; $10,709 in Plaintiff’s affidavit, DE 11-
1 at 5; and $10,000 requested in the Motion, DE 15 at 12, 14. Apart from these affidavits, Plaintiff
submits no corroborating documentation, such as medical records, medical clearance
documentation, or evidence of any request for accommodation. To date, Defendant has not
appeared or responded.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 55 establishes a two-step process for entry of default judgment. First, when a
defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend, the clerk of court may enter a clerk’s default. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after entry of default, the Court may enter default judgment against the

defendant under Rule 55(b), provided the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(b).
A default, however, does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of right. Because
cases should ordinarily be resolved on their merits, “default judgments are generally disfavored.”
Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing In re Worldwide
Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003)). A default judgment may be entered only

2 Although I have considered these affidavits for present purposes, I note that it is not the Court’s role to sift through
the record in search of evidentiary support for a party’s motion. Plaintiff is cautioned that future filings must include
all referenced exhibits or properly incorporate them by reference with pinpoint accuracy.

4 of 14
where the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint establish a sufficient legal basis for liability.
Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200,
1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). A defaulting defendant is deemed to admit well-pleaded factual allegations,
but not legal conclusions or allegations that are not well-pleaded. Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins.

Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206). “[A] default
judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor
Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997). “Conceptually, then, a motion for default
judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245.
Accordingly, courts must assess the sufficiency of the complaint before entering a default
judgment. See U.S. v. Kahn, 164 F. App’x 855, 858 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d
at 1206). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must allege more
than labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of elements. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Finally, if liability is established, the Court must then evaluate damages. “A default

judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.”
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to recover
the amount of damages sought in the motion for default judgment. Wallace v. The Kiwi Grp., Inc.,
247 F.R.D. 679, 681 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Damages must be supported by competent evidence, and
the Court must independently determine the appropriate amount. Id. (citation omitted); Anheuser
Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003); see Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement
Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that damages may
be awarded on default judgment only if the record adequately reflects a basis for an award of

5 of 14
damages). Ordinarily, unless a plaintiff’s claim against a defaulting defendant is for a liquidated
sum or one capable of mathematical calculation, the law requires the district court to hold an
evidentiary hearing to fix the amount of damages. See Adolph Coors, 777 F.2d at 1543-44.
However, no hearing is needed “when the district court already has a wealth of evidence from the

party requesting the hearing, such that any additional evidence would be truly unnecessary to a
fully informed determination of damages.” See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th
Cir. 2005).
DISCUSSION
Before addressing damages, I must first determine if the Complaint’s allegations establish
liability. They do not. The Motion is undermined at the outset by substantive and procedural
deficiencies that go to the sufficiency of the Complaint itself, not merely the evidence. Against
that backdrop, below I will address (1) material inconsistencies in the Complaint, (2) liability, (3)
damages, and (4) the appropriate path forward.
1. Material Inconsistencies in the Complaint

As a threshold matter, the Complaint contains glaring inconsistencies regarding location
and key facts. Plaintiff alleges he resides in “Wauchula County, Florida,” and worked in Hardee
County, DE 1 ¶ 4, even though Wauchula is not a county, but is a city located within Hardee
County. See Wauchula Main Website, available at https://www.cityofwauchula.gov/ (last accessed
Apr. 15, 2026). He further alleges that Defendant “operates a store” in Stuart, Martin County,
Florida, and that venue is proper based on events occurring there. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. But he later alleges
that he was working in Georgia for Defendant as an “apprentice lineman” when he first became
ill. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. Beyond these bare assertions, the Complaint provides no allegations regarding

6 of 14
the nature of Defendant’s business, Plaintiff’s duties as an employee, or what happened in Stuart,
Florida that would cause venue to be appropriately located in this court. This lack of clarity
obscures key information about where the operative events occurred and the employment
relationship at issue. It also undermines the basis for venue and the asserted Florida statutory

claims.
2. Liability
a. Disability Discrimination Under the ADA/FCRA (Counts I and III)
As currently pled, Plaintiff’s disability-discrimination claims fail as a matter of law. The
ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified individual employee because of
disability. Surtain, 879 F.3d at 1246 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). To state a disability
discrimination claim under the ADA and FCRA, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that he (1) has
a disability; (2) was a qualified individual for the position in question; and (3) his employer
discriminated against him because of his disability. Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos., 93 F.4th 1181, 1191
(11th Cir. 2024) (citing Beasley v. O’Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023)); Holly

v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that courts evaluate FCRA
claims under the same framework as ADA claims). The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as
“an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
The ADA regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the
employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Whether a plaintiff can perform the essential
functions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation requires a “fact-intensive
inquiry.” Hardin v. Oakley Transp., Inc., 2025 WL 948313, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2025).

7 of 14
Plaintiff’s disability-discrimination allegations are largely conclusory and merely trace the
statutory definitions of disability. For instance, he asserts he is a “qualified individual,” but fails
to provide factual support regarding job duties or functional limitations. DE 1 ¶ 13. He alleges
multiple medical conditions but provides no facts to link those conditions to an inability or ability

to perform essential job functions with or without accommodation.
The Complaint also fails to plausibly allege that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff
“because of” his disability. The allegation that Plaintiff “required and requested” a reasonable
accommodation—a medical leave of absence—is unsupported by factual detail. The Complaint
does not identify when the request was made, to whom it was directed, the scope or duration of
the requested accommodation, or whether any denial occurred. Nor do the allegations plausibly
support a causal connection between disability and termination beyond the conclusory assertion
that Plaintiff was deemed a “liability.” This is insufficient.
b. Retaliation Under the ADA/FCRA (Counts II and IV)
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, as currently pled, likewise fail as a matter of law. The ADA

prohibits employers from taking adverse action against individuals because they challenge conduct
prohibited by the ADA or because they file a complaint under it. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d
1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)). To state a retaliation claim, Plaintiff
must allege that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse action. Id. ADA and FCRA retaliation claims are analyzed under the same framework.
See Monroe v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 793 F. App’x 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Frazier-White,
818 F.3d at 1258).

8 of 14
While a request for accommodation may constitute protected activity, it must be grounded
in a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief of entitlement. Meyer v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs., 592 F. App’x 786, 792 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc.,
161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998)). A request for leave “might be a reasonable accommodation

in some cases,” so long as the leave request is not for an indefinite leave. See Wood v. Green, 323
F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003); Santandreu v. Miami Dade County, 513 Fed. App’x 902, 905
(11th Cir. 2013). Additionally, a plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker was aware of the
protected activity, because “[a] decision maker cannot have been motivated to retaliate by
something unknown to him.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th
Cir. 2000).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to plausibly establish protected activity or causation. First,
Plaintiff summarily asserts that he “required and requested” a medical leave of absence at some
unspecified time as an accommodation. DE 1 ¶ 22. However, he does not identify the timing,
content, or recipient of the alleged accommodation request. No documents are attached to the

Complaint or Plaintiff’s affidavit to support the existence or content of any such request. Second,
Plaintiff fails to clearly connect any decisionmaker to knowledge of the request. Plaintiff describes
a shifting series of communications involving multiple individuals: first to a supervisor, then to
the owner, and later to a foreman, with some of these latter communications relayed through his
third party brother-in-law. DE 1 ¶¶ 15, 19-20, 24, 26-29. These allegations do not support a
plausible inference that any decisionmaker acted with retaliatory intent.

9 of 14
The allegations overall are insufficient to establish liability for disability discrimination or
retaliation under the ADA or FCRA. The deficiencies go to the core elements of each claim and
preclude a finding of liability as to all counts asserted in the Complaint.
3. Damages

Even assuming liability, Plaintiff has not established a competent evidentiary basis for
damages.
Plaintiff’s back pay calculations are internally inconsistent and unsupported, including
discrepancies in the relevant time period and math errors. In his Motion, Plaintiff asserts that he
earned $24 per hour for approximately 45 hours per week ($24 x 45 = $1,080), plus $12 per hour
for five overtime hours per week ($12 x 5 = $60), and $150 in daily per diem for five days ($150
x 5 = $750), for a claimed weekly total of $1,890 ($1,080 + $60 + $750 = $1,890). DE 15 at 9.
The Motion estimates 16 weeks of total backpay damages “amounting to the following: $1,890.00
x 16 weeks = $20,240.00.” Id. Plaintiff’s affidavit attached to a prior motion includes these same
calculations. DE 11-1 at 4.3

On closer review, Plaintiff’s calculations are largely unsupported and flawed. As an initial
matter, other than his affidavit, Plaintiff provides no documentation supporting his claimed wages,
overtime, or per diem. More importantly, his submissions contain inconsistent calculations. In
his affidavit and Motion, Plaintiff asserts a back pay period of “roughly 16 weeks” from “around
March 13, 2024 until September 2024.” Id.; see also DE 15 at 9. However, the alleged time span
from March 13, 2024 through September 1, 2024, is approximately 24 weeks. Additionally,

3 As I previously noted, the Motion refers to exhibits that are not attached and appears to rely on prior filings. The
Court should not have to assemble a record from prior motions. Plaintiff’s counsel shall ensure that any future
submissions are complete and self-contained.

10 of 14
$1,890 multiplied by 16 weeks equals $30,240—not $20,240 as stated. These discrepancies
prevent any determination of back pay with reasonable certainty.
Plaintiff’s claim for $50,000 in emotional distress is similarly deficient. This claim rests
on four brief, conclusory statements in his affidavit. DE 11-1 at 4-5. Although a plaintiff’s own

testimony may, in some circumstances, support an award of compensatory damages for emotional
distress, such damages must nonetheless “be proven by competent, sufficient evidence” that
demonstrates articulable harm. Garcia v. Unit Dose Servs., LLC, 2023 WL 6962827, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 2, 2023) report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6958658 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20,
2023) (citing Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Notably, Plaintiff’s cited case of Garcia ultimately underscores the requirement he fails to
satisfy here. Unlike the Title VII plaintiff in Garcia who described her experiences at work based
on a supervisor’s sexual advances and harassment, Plaintiff offers only brief, generalized
statements in his affidavit, with no corroboration or factual detail to tie the alleged disability-based
discrimination to his alleged emotional distress. This stands in contrast to cases where courts have

awarded such damages based on more developed evidence describing the plaintiff’s experiences
and their tangible effects. See, e.g., Fountain v. Chime Sols., Inc., 2023 WL 12166515, at *10
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 12166500 (N.D. Ga.
Nov. 21, 2023) (awarding $50,000 in compensatory damages to a plaintiff based on her testimony
at an evidentiary hearing that her employer’s conduct in not reasonably accommodating her
disability by allowing her to work remotely, and terminating her based on her disabilities and her
protected activity, caused her significant stress and mental distress). Accordingly, on the present
record, Plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated entitlement to emotional distress damages.

11 of 14
Should Plaintiff continue to pursue such relief, he must provide more detailed evidentiary support
or be prepared to substantiate his claims at an evidentiary hearing.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is inconsistent across filings. The Motion
seeks $10,000 in attorney’s fees and $624 in costs. DE 15 at 13-14. In support, counsel provides

an affidavit with a differing lodestar calculation of $10,085. DE 11-2 at 3. Although the Motion
acknowledges the $10,085 and indicates that this amount was reduced to $10,000, DE 15 at 14,
Plaintiff’s affidavit reflects a differing combined request of $10,709 for fees and costs, DE 11-1 at
5. These variations, even if relatively minor, create internal inconsistencies that render the request
unclear and unsupported. On this record, there is no reliable basis to award attorneys’ fees and
costs as requested.
4. Appropriate Outcome
Given the above defects, I conclude that the Motion should be denied. The deficiencies
are fundamentally pleading-based and cannot be cured through a fourth motion for default
judgment or additional evidence. See Nelson v. Atlas Apartment Homes, LLC, 2020 WL

10456792, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2020) (in the default judgment context, a party “may not rely
on (nor may the Court consider) other evidence or argument outside the complaint and attachments
thereto in determining whether the plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for which relief may be
granted”); CHCC Co. LLC v. Pilgrim Pipeline Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 4216464, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 22, 2017) (“Plaintiff cannot cure a deficiency in its Complaint through its Motion for
Default Judgment.”). The existing Clerk’s default and the present default judgment proceedings
rest on a Complaint that does not state a plausible claim. Under these circumstances, maintaining
the default does not serve the interests of orderly procedure. At the same time, a sua sponte

12 of 14
dismissal for failure to state a claim without notice and an opportunity to amend would be improper
where amendment may not be futile. See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1248 (11th Cir. 2015) (a district
court abuses its discretion when it dismisses an action sua sponte without providing the plaintiff
with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond unless amendment would be futile

or the complaint is patently frivolous).
Accordingly, the appropriate course is to deny the Motion without prejudice, vacate the
Clerk’s default, dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice, and permit Plaintiff the
opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies before any renewed request for
default judgment.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully RECOMMEND that:
1. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Final Default Judgment, DE 15, be DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
2. The Clerk’s Default entered on November 12, 2025, DE 6, be VACATED;
3. Plaintiff’s Complaint, DE 1, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
4. Plaintiff be directed to file and properly serve an amended complaint within a
specified time that cures the deficiencies identified in this Report; and
5. Plaintiff be permitted to renew any motion for default judgment only after curing
pleading deficiencies and satisfying procedural requirements.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with presiding U.S.

13 of 14
District Judge Jose E. Martinez. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de
novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation
and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
contained in this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1
(2016). Conversely, if a party does not intend to object to this Report and Recommendation,
then that party shall file a Notice of such within five (5) days of the date of this Report and
Recommendation.
DONE AND RECOMMENDED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this 17th day of
April, 2026.
Seow Nanpold
SHANIEK MILLS MAYNA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14 of 14

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345213. Public record. Not legal advice.