# IDOC

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · June 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345203

## Case

- **Full name:** Cordero Williams v. IDOC, C/O Hungate, SGT. Agnew, John M Barwick, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and John Doe 1
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** June 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345203

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding plaintiff must plausibly allege supervisor had requisite state of mind to state a claim for facilitating, approving, or condoning unlawful act

## Opinion text

FOINR T THHEE U SNOIUTTEHD ESRTNA TDEISST DRIISCTTR IOCFT I CLOLIUNROTI S

CORDERO WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 26-cv-00035-SPM
v.

IDOC,
C/O HUNGATE,
SGT. AGNEW,
JOHN M BARWICK,
JANE DOE 1,
JANE DOE 2, and
JOHN DOE 1,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Cordero Williams commenced this lawsuit while an inmate of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC). He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of his constitutional rights that occurred at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. The
Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that on November 15, 2024, while he was incarcerated at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center, Correctional Officer Hungate approached him saying that he had heard from
friends at Centralia Correctional Center, where Plaintiff was previously housed, that Plaintiff
thought of himself as tough but writes grievances. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Hungate also told Plaintiff that
he “would introduce Plaintiff to someone though.” (Id.). Plaintiff took this comment as a threat,
and so, later that night, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Chief Administrative Officer John Doe 1 and
“intel” describing his conversation with Hungate. (Id.). In the letter, Plaintiff asked for an
investigation to be conducted and to be protected because he feared for his life. (Id.).
The next day, on November 16, 2024, Hungate came to Plaintiff’s cell and placed him in
handcuffs. (Doc. 1, p. 4). While Plaintiff was sitting in his cell handcuffed, he heard an inmate
outside of his cell named Lamar Berger tell Hungate that he was not going to be housed with
anyone and that he would assault whoever was inside the cell. (Id. at p. 4, 19). Hungate responded,
“I know how you get down. Now this guy is going to find out.” (Id. at p. 4). Plaintiff asked Hungate

to “please get off that BS and to get [Plaintiff] a crisis team.” (Id.). Hungate told Plaintiff, “You’re
getting beat up and raped and I might spray you.” (Id.). Hungate then placed Berger in the cell
with Plaintiff and closed the door. (Id.). Once inside the cell, Berger spat on Plaintiff, threatened
him, and attempted to attack him. (Id.). Hungate instructed Berger to wait to assault Plaintiff until
he had uncuffed Berger so that Berger could “get [Plaintiff] good.” (Id. at p. 5). Plaintiff “pushed
up against” Berger to defend himself and so that Berger did not have room to attack him. (Id.).
Sergeant Agnew arrived at the cell. (Doc. 1, p. 5). At the time, Plaintiff and the inmate
were still both restrained with their hands cuffed, and they were not fighting. (Id.). Hungate told
Agnew, “Light them up for me.” (Id.). Agnew then sprayed a chemical agent onto Plaintiff. (Id.).

Plaintiff started to choke and was in excruciating pain. (Id.). Plaintiff asked Hungate and Agnew
for a chance to “properly decontaminate.” Hungate told Agnew, “That one doesn’t get a shower,
he tried snitching on me.” (Id.). Agnew responded, “I heard.” (Id.).
Plaintiff was treated by a nurse, Jane Doe 1.1 (Doc. 1, p. 5). He asked Jane Doe 1 for a

1 In the Complaint, Plaintiff describes interacting with two unknown nurses. He lists two Jane Does as defendants,
shower. (Id.). The Jane Doe 1 told Plaintiff, “That’s on them, you know how it goes.” (Id.). When
Plaintiff was escorted back to his cell, he again asked to be allowed to shower. (Id.). His request
was denied. (Id.).
Plaintiff sent a letter to Chief Administrative Officer John Doe 1 stating that he was in
severe pain from not being allowed to decontaminate and that he was suffering from burning skin,
irritation to his eyes, and a headache. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff did not receive a response to his letter,
and he was not allowed to shower for “a few days.” Plaintiff submitted a sick call slip but did not
receive a medical appointment. (Id.).
Plaintiff spoke to a nurse, Jane Doe 2, when she “did med line.” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff
informed her that he needed proper decontamination procedure and his eyes needed to be

examined. (Id.). Jane Doe 2 responded, “One of Hungate’s people must of made [the] sick call
[slip] disappear. You know we’re all friends here.” (Id. at p. 5, 9). Jane Doe 2 failed to intervene
or do anything to assist Plaintiff in receiving medical care. (Id. at p. 6).
PRELIMINARY DISMISSAL
Plaintiff states that he is suing John Doe Intel Lieutenant under the Eighth Amendment for
“being alerted that [he] was in imminent danger then failed to investigate, intervene, or to take
responsible measures to protect Plaintiff causing an Eighth Amendment violation.” (Doc. 1, p. 9).
John Doe Intel Lieutenant, however, is not listed as a defendant. The Court will not treat parties
not listed in the case caption or un the “Defendants” section of the complaint form as defendants.

See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (to be properly considered a
party a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). Accordingly, any claims brought against
John Doe Intel Lieutenant are dismissed.

and they are both described as nurses. (Doc. 1, p. 3). For clarity, the Court will refer to these individuals as Jane Doe
1 and Jane Doe 2.
The Court also dismisses any intended claims against John M. Barwick, described as the
Warden at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Barwick is listed as a defendant, but
Plaintiff does not identify him anywhere else in the Complaint. Thus, the Court is unable to
ascertain what claims, if any, Plaintiff has against Barwick. Where a plaintiff has not included a
defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice
of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. Furthermore, merely invoking
the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See
Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a
defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). All claims against John Barwick
are therefore dismissed.

And finally, the Court also dismisses IDOC as a defendant. IDOC is not a “person” subject
to suit for money damages under Section 1983. Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir.
2012). Neither can IDOC be sued for prospective injunctive relief in federal court. See Quick v.
Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 468 F. Supp.3d 1001, 1009 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2020)
(collecting cases).
DISCUSSION
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations and his articulation of his claims, the Court designates the
following counts:
Count 1: First Amendment claim against Hungate and Agnew for retaliating
against Plaintiff because he filed grievances and reported threats.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against
Hungate for intentionally placing Plaintiff in a cell with a violent
inmate on November 16, 2024.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Hungate and Agnew for the use
of excessive force against Plaintiff on November 16, 2024.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against
Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and John Doe 1 for
rNeofuvseimngb etro 1 6a,l l2o0w2 4P, lwaiinthti faf chtoe msihcoawl aegr enaftt. er he was sprayed on

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Jane Doe
2 for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs –
irritated/injured eyes caused by the chemical agent sprayed on him
on November 16, 2024.

Count 6: Eighth Amendment claim against John Doe 1 for failing to intervene
and protect Plaintiff from the misconduct of Hungate and Agnew
that occurred on November 16, 2024.

Count 7: Illinois state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and John Doe 1.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the
Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice
as inadequately pled under the Twombly2 pleading standard.
Count 1
“To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim,” a plaintiff must establish “that (1) he
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered an adverse action that would
likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at
least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v.
Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th
Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff asserts that because he has a history of filing grievances and he wrote a complaint
against Hungate, Hungate threatened him and attempted to house him with an inmate known to be
violent. Agnew then sprayed Plaintiff with a chemical agent, and both Hungate and Agnew refused
to allow Plaintiff to shower. These allegations are sufficient for Count 1 to proceed against Hungate

2 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
and Agnew.
Count 2
Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Hungate, who knew Plaintiff’s
cellmate, Berger, posed a substantial risk of serious injury to him yet intentionally placed Berger
in the cell. Hungate not only failed to take appropriate steps to protect Plaintiff from danger but
encouraged Berger to physically assault Plaintiff. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847
(1994).
Count 3
Plaintiff’s assertions that Agnew, at the direction of Hungate, sprayed him and his cellmate
with a chemical agent while they were both restrained and not fighting states an Eighth

Amendment claim for excessive force. See Gaines v. Prentice, No. 21-1588, 2022 WL 2304227,
at *3 (7th Cir. June 27, 2022) (allegations that officer personally ordered the unnecessary and
excessive use of mace without justification stated Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983) (citing
Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding plaintiff must plausibly allege
supervisor had requisite state of mind to state a claim for facilitating, approving, or condoning
unlawful act); Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 2012) (the use of force maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm states claim under Eighth Amendment)). Count 3 will proceed
against Hungate and Agnew.
Count 4

Plaintiff states that Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2 denied his requests for a
shower so that he could wash off the chemical agent that coated his face and body. He states that
he had to wait “a few days” to shower, suffering ongoing pain and discomfort in the meantime.
(Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment claim. See Kervin v. Barnes,
144 F. App’x 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005)( “detaining an inmate for eight hours after using chemical
agents without allowing him to wash his face amounts to the wanton infliction of pain and
suffering”). See also Keller v. Sanchez, No. 25-cv-712-MAB, 2025 WL 1734884, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
June 23, 2025) (observing that the plaintiff’s claim that he was refused a shower to wash off pepper
spray was “better viewed as a generic cruel and unusual punishment claim” than deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs). Count 4 will proceed against Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe
1, and Jane Doe 2.
Count 4 will be dismissed against John Doe 1, the chief administrative officer. Supervisory
liability does not constitute an independent legal theory under Section 1983. To state a claim
against a defendant who is an upper-level official a plaintiff must allege that the supervisor knew
of an underlying wrong and affirmatively assisted in furtherance of that wrong or deliberately

turned a blind eye. Plaintiff’s allegations, however, are too vague to state a claim against John Doe
1. A single letter sent to John Doe 1 informing him that Plaintiff needed a shower is insufficient
for the Court to plausibly infer that John Doe knew about and disregarded a serious risk of harm
to Plaintiff. See Wilson v. Warren County, Ill., 830 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2016); Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009).
Count 5
Plaintiff asserts that Jane Doe 2 “turned a blind eye to his medical needs” when she refused
to help him after he told her that he had submitted a sick call request and that his eyes needed to
be examined due to the chemical agent that had been sprayed. (Doc. 1, p. 5, 6). According to

Plaintiff, Jane Doe 2 acknowledged that Plaintiff’s sick call request probably “disappeared” at
Hungate’s request and stated, “We’re all friends here.” (Id. at p. 5, 9).
The Court notes that numerous courts in this Circuit and others “have specifically held that
exposure to pepper spray or similar chemical agents does not create lingering effects that are
objectively serious medical conditions for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment.” See e.g.,
Hughes v. Durrent, No. 15 C 6432, 2017 WL 3978702, at * (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2017) (collecting
cases). However, exposure to a chemical agent, such as OC spray, can “result in a serious medical
condition that implicates the Eighth Amendment,” and is “a fact-intensive inquiry.” McCloud v.
Vanschoyck, No. 21-cv-00429-JPH-MKK, 2024 WL 229740, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 19, 2024).
Therefore, given that Plaintiff pleads that (1) he was continuing to suffer from ongoing issues
caused by the chemical agent; (2) Jane Doe 2 was aware that he was in need of additional treatment;
(3) Jane Doe 2 knew that his sick call request had been mishandled or destroyed; and (4) Jane Doe
2 failed to ensure he received needed medical treatment, the Court finds that at this stage, Plaintiff
has adequately stated a deliberate indifference claim against Jane Doe 2. Count 5 will proceed.
Count 6

Plaintiff asserts that John Doe 1, the chief administrative officer, was alerted that Plaintiff
was in imminent danger from Hungate but “failed to investigate, intervene, or to take reasonable
measures to protect [him].” (Doc. 1, p. 9).
A failure to intervene claim requires the plaintiff to plead that “(i) the defendant knew of
the unconstitutional conduct; (ii) the defendant had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm; (iii)
the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm; and (iv) the plaintiff suffered
harm as a result.” Watkins v. Ghosh, No. 11 C 1880, 2014 WL 840949, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4,
2014) (citing Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1994)).
Plaintiff states that John Doe 1 was alerted to imminent harm by a letter he sent November

15, the day before Hungate and Agnew’s misconduct. As stated above, one letter without any
suggestion that it might have been received is typically not enough to sustain a Section 1983 claim
premised on that individual’s personal responsibility for some issue mentioned in the
correspondence. See e.g., Burks, 555 F.3d at 595-96 (a letter-writing campaign to high-level
officials such as local government officials or the prison warden is not sufficient to sustain a claim
premised on personal involvement under Section 1983). There are no facts to suggest that John
Doe 1 knew of Hungate and Agnew’s unconstitutional conduct and had a realistic opportunity to
prevent the harm based on Plaintiff’s letter. Accordingly, Count 6 is dismissed.
Count 7
Plaintiff asserts that Hungate, Agnew, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2 “engaged
in extreme and outrageous conduct that exceeded all bounds of decency tolerated in a civilized
society.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). Because of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff claims that he suffered severe
emotional distress, including fear, anxiety, humiliation, psychological trauma, and mental anguish.
(Id.).
Under Illinois law, to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff

must allege (1) the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the defendants
either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew there was a high probability that their
conduct would cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendants’ conduct in fact caused
severe emotional distress. McGreal v. Vill. Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 2017). See
also Bailey v. City of Chic., 779 F.3d 689, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2015); Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d
323, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (citing Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 761 N.E.2d 175 (Ill. 2001)).
The Court considers it “extreme and outrageous” conduct that Hungate would orchestrate
an attack on Plaintiff by another inmate, direct Agnew to spray Plaintiff with a chemical agent,
and then refuse Plaintiff a shower. Furthermore, based on Hungate’s threat to Plaintiff and

Agnew’s affirmation that he had heard that Plaintiff filed a complaint against Hungate, the Court
can plausibly infer that Hungate and Agnew either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or
knew there was a high probability that severe emotion distress would result from their actions.
Count 7 will proceed against Hungate and Agnew.
Count 7 will also proceed against Jane Doe 2. According to Plaintiff, Jane Doe 2 knew that
Plaintiff was in need of a shower and medical care and that his sick call slips were purposefully
not being processed, and Jane Doe 2 still refused to help him because she was friends with the staff
members who had targeted Plaintiff. As pled, Jane Doe 2’s behavior could be considered extreme
and outrageous.
Count 7 is dismissed, however, against Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 1. Plaintiff states that
after he was sprayed with the chemical agent, he was treated by Jane Doe 1. He asked Jane Doe 1
if he could shower, and she responded, “[T]hat’s on them, you know how it goes.” (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Denying Plaintiff’s request and relying on correctional staff to ensure Plaintiff received a shower
is not outrageous behavior and does not allow the inference that Jane Doe 1 intended to cause or
knew her actions would cause severe emotional distress. Count 7 is therefore dismissed against

Jane Doe 1.
Because the Court has found that Plaintiff’s letters to John Doe 1, the chief administrative
officer, did not establish that John Doe 1 was personally involved or aware of any of the alleged
constitutional violations, the Court finds that a lack of response by John Doe 1 was not extreme or
outrageous. Count 7 is dismissed against John Doe 1.
MOTIONS FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is DENIED.3 In
an attempt to find an attorney on his own, Plaintiff states that he has written to lawyers, and they
declined to take his case. He has attached declination letters from three law firms to his Motion.

Based on this information, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to retain
counsel on his own.
With respect to his ability to pursue this action pro se, Plaintiff indicates that he only has a

3 In evaluating the Motion for Recruitment of Counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote, 503
F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) and related authority.
grade school education. He states that he is unable to represent himself because he cannot read and
write, and he had assistance in drafting the Complaint. Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff
is capable of proceeding pro se, at least for now. Given that this litigation is in the very early stages
and Defendants have not been served, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the need for assistance
of counsel. See Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants
respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel…cannot be gauged.”).
Plaintiff has recently been released from custody, which means the people and resources available
to assist him are now presumably more readily accessible. Thus, recruiting counsel would be
premature. Should Plaintiff’s situation change as the case proceeds, he may file another motion
setting forth all facts that support his request for court recruited counsel.

IDENTIFICATION OF UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff will have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to ascertain the identity
of the unknown defendants. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th
Cir. 2009). Although all claims are dismissed against Warden Barwick, Barwick will remain a
defendant in his official capacity only for the purpose of responding to discovery aimed at
identifying Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Guidelines and information for discovery will be set by a
separate order once all Defendants are served.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to

Section 1915A. COUNT 1 will proceed against Hungate and Agnew. COUNT 2 will proceed
against Hungate. COUNT 3 will proceed against Hungate and Agnew. COUNT 4 will proceed
against Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2 but is DISMISSED without prejudice as
to John Doe 1, the chief administrative officer. COUNT 5 will proceed against Jane Doe 2.
COUNT 6 is DISMISSED without prejudice. COUNT 7 will proceed against Hungate, Agnew
and Jane Doe 2 and is DIMISSED without prejudice as to Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 1, the chief
administrative officer. All intended claims against Warden Barwick are DISMISSED without
prejudice. Because there are no surviving claims against IDOC and John Doe 1, the Clerk of Court
is DIRECTED to terminate IDOC and John Doe 1 as parties on the docket.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Hungate, Agnew, John Barwick (official capacity
only), and Jane Does 1 and 2 (once identified) the following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and
Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to
sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the

date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the
Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the
extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer
shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his last known
address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally
effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Because this suit includes claims of physical injury, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
Defendants, with the exception of Warden Barwick, are ORDERED to timely file an
appropriate responsive pleading to the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2(b), Defendants should respond to the issues
stated in this Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give security
for the same, the applicant and (if applicable) his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into
a stipulation that any unpaid costs taxed against the applicant shall be paid from any recovery
secured in the action.
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 1, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and
serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will
enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from
the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take
90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling
Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit
any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11345203. Public record. Not legal advice.