# GODFREY

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · June 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11344287

## Case

- **Full name:** Tracey Dale Godfrey v. Sheriff Department Knox County Vin. Ind., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** June 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

TRACEY DALE GODFREY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00371-JRO-MJD
)
SHERIFF DEPARTMENT KNOX COUNTY )
VIN. IND., et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND
DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, AND GRANTING MOTION FOR
CASE STATUS

Plaintiff Tracey Godfrey, who is currently incarcerated at the Knox County
Jail, alleges in this case that he was wrongly denied participation in the Life After
Meth (“LAM”) Program at that facility. Because the plaintiff is a “prisoner,” this
Court must screen the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a), (c).
I. SCREENING STANDARD
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The

Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a “less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
II. THE COMPLAINT
Godfrey names the following defendants: Sheriff of Knox County,1 and
LAM Directors2 Aaron and Marsha Bishop. Godfrey’s factual allegations are
accepted as true at the pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470,
472 (7th Cir. 2023).

Godfrey alleges that the LAM Directors denied him entry into the program
because of his “nervous attention deficit” disorder. The Sheriff does not require
the LAM staff not to deprive inmates of equal opportunities. Godfrey further
alleges that the defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances and
lawsuits.
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a), Godfrey has identified the theories he wishes to use—retaliation

1 Although Mr. Godfrey identifies this defendant in the caption as the Sheriff’s
Department, his allegations in the complaint are against the Sheriff individually.

2 The complaint is understood to name LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop as
defendants, rather than LAM Directors of Life After Meth Program as a distinct
defendant.
under the First Amendment and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Where a pro se litigant has expressly stated the legal theory he
wishes to pursue, the district court is not required to analyze whether the

allegations in the complaint might state a claim under a different legal theory.
See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. App’x 413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v.
Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07
(7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the court analyzes Godfrey’s claims only under the
theories he has identified.
Applying the screening standard to the facts alleged in the complaint, the
complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.

First, any allegation against the Sherriff is dismissed. Godfrey’s only
allegation against the Sheriff is that the Sheriff failed to require his staff not to
discriminate against inmates seeking to enter the LAM Program. But “[l]iability
under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their
own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that
subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d
1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). Godfrey does not allege that the Sheriff personally
participated in Godfrey’s allegations. Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649,

657 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).
Next, any retaliation claim is dismissed. To state a First Amendment
retaliation claim, Godfrey must allege that: (1) he engaged in activity protected
by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter
First Amendment activity; and (3) the protected activity he engaged in was at
least a motivating factor for the retaliatory action. Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d

603, 618 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir.
2009) and Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977)). Godfrey’s bald claim that he was denied access to the LAM program
because he filed grievances is not enough to allow an inference that his filing of
grievances motivated the defendants’ actions. Godfrey does not allege that the
defendants knew about his grievances or any facts to support a conclusion that
they acted because of his grievances. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,
403 (7th Cir. 2010) (a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper

that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”).
Godfrey’s claim against LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop shall
proceed as a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. To state an Equal
Protection claim, Godfrey must allege that (1) he was a member of a protected
class, (2) he was treated differently from a similarly situated member of an
unprotected class, and (3) the defendants were motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. Alston v. City of Madison, 853 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2017). Or, “[a]

plaintiff alleging a class-of-one-equal-protection claim must establish that (1) a
state actor has intentionally treated him differently than others similarly
situated, and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Reget
v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010). Godfrey’s allegation that
the defendants denied him entry into the LAM program because of his attention
deficit disorder is understood to be a claim that they treated him differently
because of a disability.

“Disabled individuals, like any class, are protected by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Stevens v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 210 F.3d
732, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, “it is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment for the State to discriminate against disabled persons in an
irrational manner or for an illegitimate reason.” Id. That said, courts subject
such claims only to rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny. “States are
not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for
the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.” Bd.

of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). Plaintiff’s claim may
not survive a dispositive motion filed by Defendants or trial—since only irrational
state action can be a violation. But his complaint, taken as true at this stage,
sufficiently states an Equal Protection Clause claim based on disability without
a rational purpose. See also Ostrowski v. Lake County, 33 F.4th 960, 966 (7th
Cir. 2022) (explaining that a disability-based equal protection challenge to
pension-plan offerings “qualifies . . . for rational basis review”); Mullins v.
Indiana, No. 1:20cv-02900-JPH-TAB, 2023 WL 7513693, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Nov.

13, 2023) (quoting Stevens, 210 F.3d at, 737-38).
This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the
Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that
additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,
he shall have through July 15, 2026, in which to file a motion to reconsider the
screening order.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
The following claims are proceeding in this action: an Equal Protection
Clause claim against LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop. All other claims
have been dismissed.
The clerk is directed to terminate the Sheriffs Department and LAM
Directors of Life After Meth Program as defendants.
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to the defendants in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of
the complaint, dkt. [1], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for
Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this
Order.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Godfrey’s motion for case status, dkt. [23], is GRANTED consistent with
the rulings in this Order.
SO ORDERED.
Date: June 17, 2026
\s R. Olson
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

TRACEY DALE GODFREY
2000050067
KNOX COUNTY JAIL
2375 S. Old Decker Rd.
Vincennes, IN 47591

LAM Director Aaron
KNOX COUNTY JAIL
2375 S. Old Decker Rd.
Vincennes, IN 47591

LAM Director Marsha Bishop
KNOX COUNTY JAIL
2375 S. Old Decker Rd.
Vincennes, IN 47591

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11344287. Public record. Not legal advice.