# Spencer

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · June 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11344285

## Case

- **Full name:** Jacob Spencer v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** June 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JACOB SPENCER,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 5:26-cv-34-HDM
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action is before the court on a Partial Motion to Dismiss by Defendant
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”). (Doc. 2). For the reasons

explained herein, the motion is due to be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The court accepts as true the following well-pleaded factual allegations from
Plaintiff Jacob Spencer’s Complaint. Spencer owns a single-family residence and

three barns, all of which are insured under a policy with State Farm (the “Policy”).
(Doc. 1-1, ¶ 3). The Policy, in part, obligates State Farm to repair or replace
Spencer’s roofs in the event of wind or hail damage and to repair any resulting

interior water damage. Id., ¶ 4. On May 2, 2025, Spencer noticed that the roof of the
residence was leaking, so he filed a claim with State Farm, reporting the leak and
the resulting interior water damage. Id., ¶¶ 6–7. State Farm sent an adjuster to
Spencer’s property, and the adjuster found hail damage to the residence and the three

barns. Id., ¶ 8. On that basis, State Farm agreed to provide roof coverage in the
amount of $22,152.60 for the residence and $21,000.86 for one of the three barns
located on the property. Id., ¶ 9.

State Farm’s estimate, however, used incorrect measurements for the relevant
structures, resulting in a disparity between its offered coverage and the damage
suffered by Spencer. Id. Spencer independently obtained an estimate for the roof
replacements for the residence and barns and for the interior damage in the combined

amount of $106,937.71, which he submitted to State Farm for approval. Id., ¶ 10.
State Farm has failed to pay Spencer that full amount. Id., ¶ 14.
Spencer subsequently filed suit in the Circuit Court of Marshall County, (doc.

1-1), which action State Farm removed to this court, (doc. 1). On January 9, 2026,
State Farm filed the pending Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 2). On January 12,
2026, the Court entered its Initial Order Governing All Further Proceedings. (Doc.
5). Pursuant to the Initial Order, Spencer was required to respond within fourteen

days of the Motion, id. at 8, but he never did.
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785
F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is inadequate. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering the facts, courts view the
allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must merely allege enough facts to “raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the necessary
elements. Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The pleading standard “requires only a

plausible short and plain statement of the plaintiff’s claim, not an exposition of his
legal argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). At this stage, the issue is “not whether [the plaintiff] will ultimately
prevail . . . but whether his complaint was sufficient to cross the federal court’s

threshold.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Furthermore, when a plaintiff alleges a fraud-based claim, his Complaint is
subject to a heightened pleading standard. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

requires that “[i]n alleging fraud . . . , a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The purpose of Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirement is to “alert[] defendants to the precise misconduct with

which they are charged and protect[] defendants against spurious charges of immoral
and fraudulent behavior.” Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to comply with Rule 9(b), a

“plaintiff must plead facts as to time, place, and substance of the defendant’s alleged
fraud, specifically the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when they
occurred, and who engaged in them.” U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab’y Corp. of Am.,
290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION
Spencer brings four counts against State Farm: (I) negligence, (II) breach of
contract, (III) wantonness, and (IV) misrepresentation. (Doc. 1-1). State Farm moves

to dismiss the first, third, and fourth counts. (Doc. 2).
State Farm’s motion must be granted as to each of these three Counts.
Spencer’s negligence and wantonness claims must be dismissed because Alabama
law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent or wanton claim handling.

Spencer’s misrepresentation claim likewise fails and must be dismissed because it is
impermissibly intertwined with his breach of contract claim and is not pleaded with
the particularity required by Rule 9(b).1

I. Negligence and Wantonness
In Counts One and Three, Spencer attempts to assert claims for negligence
and wantonness based on State Farm’s handling of his claim for insurance benefits
under the Policy.2 (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 18–20, 28–31). Spencer alleges in Count One that

State Farm “negligently allow[ed] or cause[d] unreasonable and/or

1 State Farm also argues that the court may grant its Partial Motion to Dismiss because, by not
filing a response, Spencer has abandoned his claims as to Counts I, III, and IV. (See Doc. 10). The
Eleventh Circuit has explicitly addressed the abandonment of claims in response to a motion to
dismiss:
[A]t the motion to dismiss stage, the scope of a court’s review must be limited to
the four corners of the complaint. Accordingly, in considering the defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court erred by going beyond the
face of the complaint. [The plaintiff] did not abandon his due process and malicious
prosecution claims by failing to adequately address them in his response brief.
Boyd v. Peet, 249 Fed. App’x 155, 157 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly—although some district courts have relied on summary-judgment precedent to find
abandonment of claims at the motion to dismiss stage, see, e.g., Prickett v. BAC Home Loans, 946
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (citing Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition
v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000), and McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d
936, 940–41 (11th Cir. 1999))—“[a]t the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff does not abandon his
claims by not responding to the defendants’ arguments.” Logan v. Hughes, No. 2:24-cv-1348, 2025
WL 2432204, at *9 n.9 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 22, 2025) (citing Boyd, 249 Fed. App’x at 157). The
“appropriate inquiry at this stage of the litigation [is] whether the allegations of the complaint
plausibly indicate that [the plaintiff] has a claim for relief,” not whether the plaintiff responded to
the defendant’s arguments for dismissal. Boyd, 249 Fed. App’x at 157. The court, therefore,
addresses Spencer’s claims against State Farm, despite his failure to file a response brief.
2 The court will analyze these claims under Alabama law because “[a] federal court sitting in
diversity jurisdiction applies the substantive law of the forum state, which, in this case, is
Alabama.” J & M Assocs., Inc. v. Romero, 488 F. App’x 373, 376 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
misrepresentative assessments and/or estimates to be conducted on [his] residence.”
Id., ¶ 19. Similarly, in Count Three, he alleges that the “basis for the assertion of

wantonness is that State Farm blatantly ignored clear and convincing evidence of
extensive damage to [his] property, while keeping all insurance premium monies
obtained from [him].” Id., ¶ 29.

The allegations of negligence and wantonness in Counts One and Three, being
based on State Farm’s handling of Spencer’s claim, fail as a matter of law because
the Alabama Supreme Court “has consistently refused to recognize a cause of action
for the negligent . . . [or] wanton handling of insurance claims.” Kervin v. S. Guar.

Ins. Co., 667 So. 2d 704, 706 (Ala. 1995). See also U.S. Liab. Ins. Grp. v. Miller,
No. 5:08-cv-79, 2008 WL 11382029, at *2 (N.D. Ala. May 5, 2008) (holding that,
in Alabama, “no claim for negligent or wanton handling of insurance company may

lie against an insurance company.”); Pate v. Rollison Logging Equip., Inc., 628 So.
2d 337 (Ala. 1993). Accordingly, Spencer’s negligence and wantonness claims are
due to be dismissed.
II. Misrepresentation

In Count IV, Spencer alleges that State Farm “intentionally and/or recklessly”
misrepresented to him that it “would comply with the terms of the parties’ contract,
and act in good faith regarding any insurance claims submitted to State Farm by

[Spencer], including conducting claim investigations in a thorough and reasonable
manner.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 32–39). This claim is due to be dismissed both because it
fails to allege fraud with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and because it is unacceptably intertwined with and
indistinct from his breach of contract claim.
A. Failure to Plead with Particularity

Although Spencer does not use the word “fraud” in his Complaint,
“[m]isrepresentation and suppression are . . . types of fraud which must be pled with
particularity.” Fed. Home Loan Corp. v. Brooks, No. 2:14-cv-262, 2014 WL
5410236, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 23, 2014). See also Ala. Code § 6-5-101

(“Misrepresentations of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly
without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and
innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud.”); Jenkins v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 2:11-cv-350, 2011 WL 3359996, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Aug. 4, 2011) (citing U.S. Diagnostic, Inc. v. Shelby Radiology, P.C., 793 So. 2d
714, 720–21 (Ala. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d
47, 58 (Ala. 2003)) (“A claim of ordinary fraud is in fact a claim of fraudulent

misrepresentation.”).
Rule 9(b) requires that the circumstances of alleged fraud be stated “with
particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted

“particularity” as requiring a plaintiff to “plead facts as to time, place, and substance
of the defendant’s alleged fraud, specifically the details of the defendants’ allegedly
fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who engaged in them.” Clausen, 290 F.3d

at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted). More specifically, a plaintiff making a
fraud claim must allege:
(1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral
representations or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and
place of each such statement and the person responsible for making (or,
in the case of omissions, not making) same, and (3) the content of such
statements and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and (4)
what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.
Ziemba, 256 F.3d at 1202; Berger v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:24-cv-1435,
2026 WL 923619, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2026).
Here, Spencer’s Complaint contains little information regarding State Farm’s
alleged fraudulent activity. His only factual allegation in support of his
misrepresentation claim is that State Farm “represented to [him], at the signing of
the contract, that State Farm would comply with the terms of the parties’ contract,
and act in good faith regarding any insurance claims submitted to State Farm by

[him], including conducting claim investigations in a thorough and reasonable
manner,” and then failed to do so. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 36, 38). There are no allegations
stating with particularity where the representation was made, the identity of the
individual who made the representation, the context in which it was made, or the

manner in which it was made (i.e., in writing or orally). Spencer’s Complaint is
therefore insufficient as it does not contain the required particularity for claims
involving fraud. Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1310.

B. Intertwinement with Breach of Contract
Spencer’s allegations of misrepresentation are also insufficiently distinct from
his underlying breach of contract claim. Under Alabama law, “[a] mere breach of a

contractual provision is not sufficient to support a charge of fraud.” Brown-Marx
Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1370–71 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing
McAdory v. Jones, 71 So. 2d 526, 528 (Ala. 1954)). Indeed, more broadly, the
“failure to perform a contract obligation is not a tort.” C & C Prods., Inc. v. Premier

Indus. Corp., 275 So. 2d 124, 130 (Ala. 1972). Thus, “to assert a fraud claim that
stems from the same general facts as one’s breach-of-contract claim, the fraud claim
must be based on representations independent from the promises in the contract and

must independently satisfy the elements of fraud.” Hunt Petroleum Corp. v. State,
901 So. 2d 1, 10–11 (Ala. 2004) (Houston, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); see
also Muncher v. NCR Corp., No. 2:16-cv-782, 2017 WL 2774805, at *16–17 (N.D.
Ala. June 27, 2017) (noting that although Justice Houston’s concurrence in Hunt is

non-binding, it is “in line with long-settled Alabama law”). In short, although the
breach of contract may be considered, “other circumstances” must support the
allegation of fraud. 21st Mortg. Corp. v. Robinson, 429 So. 3d 381, 389 (Ala. 2024),

reh’g denied (Apr. 11, 2025).
Here, Spencer’s fraud claims, as pleaded, are fully intertwined with and
indistinct from State Farm’s alleged breach of contract. Spencer has not alleged any

conduct “independent from the promises in the contract” to support claims grounded
in both fraud and breach of contract. Hunt Petroleum Corp., 901 So. 2d at 10–11.
Specifically, he has not alleged sufficient conduct, independent from State Farm’s

alleged failure to perform its contractual obligations, to establish that State Farm
intended to deceive him at the time the parties entered into the contract. See P & S
Bus., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 928, 930 (Ala. 1985) (a failure to
perform a promise “is not in itself evidence of intent to deceive at the time the

promise was made.”); see also Killough v. Monkress, No. 5:17-cv-247, 2018 WL
3641859, at *5–6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2018) (dismissing fraud claim when plaintiff
“failed to allege specific conduct, independent from [defendant’s] purported . . .

failure to perform its contractual obligations, to establish that [defendant] intended
to deceive [plaintiff] at the time the agreement was made, or to show the existence
of representations, other than [defendant’s] contractual promises, capable of
supporting an independent fraud claim”). Instead, Spencer’s allegations are simply

that State Farm failed to provide him with the claim damages to which he is entitled.
(See Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 32–39). Accordingly, Spencer’s misrepresentation claim (Count
Four), as pleaded, is due to be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein, State Farm’s Partial Motion to Dismiss,
(doc. 2), is GRANTED. Spencer’s negligence (Count I) and wantonness (Count III)
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Spencer’s misrepresentation claim
(Count IV) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
DONE and ORDERED on June 17, 2026.

HAROLD D. Ze III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11344285. Public record. Not legal advice.