# Walker

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · May 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11343673

## Case

- **Full name:** Anthony L. Walker v. University of Louisiana Monroe, ET AL.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** May 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11343673

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing an African American plaintiff as “a member of a protected class.”
- holding plaintiff cannot show pervasive harassment where “the complained of actions were isolated or infrequent[.]”
- rejecting that the continuing violation theory applied to older adverse actions and holding that a “three-year period is not the very close in time connection we require to establish causation by timing alone.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

ANTHONY L. WALKER CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-1181

VERSUS JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA
MONROE, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Anthony L. Walker (“Walker”) spent an almost twenty-year career working for
the University of Louisiana Monroe’s (“ULM”) College of Pharmacy. Throughout his
career, Walker served as an academic professor, moving through the ranks from
instructor to professor. Walker also held an administrative position as the
pharmaceutical lab manger (“Lab Manager”) and received an annual stipend for his
administrative duties. But Walker, who is African American, has alleged that ULM
paid him a smaller stipend than what the white administrators received. Walker also
claims that ULM retaliated against him for filing a discrimination complaint and
taking statutorily protected leave, and otherwise, created a hostile work
environment. For the following reasons, the Court grants summary judgment and
dismisses Walker’s claims.
Background
In 2005, ULM hired Walker for both an academic and an administrative
position. Walker’s Dep. 20, Record Document 42-2. Academically, Walker originally
held the title of instructor and taught three “lab sequences.” Id. at 20, 58. In his
administrative role, Walker served as the Lab Manager. Id. at 20. Importantly, ULM
structured the Lab Manager position as independent of Walker’s academic one. The
Lab Manager position required an annual contract extension and provided an

administrative stipend of $2,500. Id. at 21.
As Lab Manager, Walker had primary responsibility for overseeing the school’s
“mock pharmacy” where students learned how to counsel patients, interact with
doctors, compound medicines, and dispense medicines. Walker’s Dep. 26-27. Walker
handled purchasing, inventorying, and maintaining equipment used in the mock
pharmacy. Id. at 27. Walker also ensured medications were secured when not being
used or were returned after they had been dispensed. Id. at 24.

Since the beginning, one of Walker’s duties as Lab Manager had been acting
as the Pharmacist-in-Charge for the mock pharmacy. Walker’s Dep. 18 (“All I know
is I’ve done that work from the beginning until the end that I was there.”). According
to Walker, the Pharmacist-in-Charge is a regulatory requirement of the Louisiana
Board of Pharmacy. Id. at 22. To purchase and dispense medication, a pharmacy must
designate a registered pharmacist to act as the Pharmacist-in-Charge. Id. And

because the mock pharmacy, which Walker managed, purchased and dispensed
medication, Walker was designated as the Pharmacist-in-Charge. See id. at 17.
Around two years after he started, Walker pushed to have his job description
changed. Walker’s Dep. 17. Walker said that “nobody” acknowledged that he had been
designated as the Pharmacist-in-Charge, and he advocated to have that duty listed
in the Lab Manager’s job description. Id. at 17, 161 (“I asked that they add pharmacist
in charge to it.”). Sometime later, Walker’s supervisors acquiesced and updated the
job description to specifically identify the Pharmacist-in-Charge role as a duty of the
Lab Manager. See id. at 161. Under the revised job description, the Lab Manager

performed “5%” administrative work, including serving “as Pharmacist-in-Charge of
the mock pharmacy.” Record Document 34-9, at 1. Walker’s administrative stipend
did not change when his job description was updated. Id. at 16, 169.
Over a decade later, on October 1, 2017, Glenn Anderson, the Dean of
Pharmacy, announced a faculty retention plan. Walker’s Dep. 97, 109. Under the
plan, Anderson created five program director positions that received an annual
administrative stipend of $15,000. Id. at 148. The administrative duties of each

position varied, but all included a significant time commitment to administrative
tasks, ranging from 90% to 25% of their workload. See Record Documents 34-10 – 34-
14. Notably, Walker’s direct supervisor, Connie Smith, was selected as the Program
Director of Experiential Education, and her workload consisted of 90% administrative
duties. Record Document 34-11; Walker’s Dep. 79, 162. Although Walker alleged that
Anderson discriminated against him by selecting five white employees for the

program director positions, Walker did not file an EEOC charge of discrimination.
Walker’s Dep. 18, 153.
Less than a year later, a College of Pharmacy committee rejected Walker’s
application for promotion from assistant professor to associate professor. Walker’s
Dep. 43. After the rejection, on September 18, 2018, Walker filed a discrimination
complaint with ULM’s human resources department. Id. at 45. In his complaint,
Walker alleged that he had been better qualified than two white candidates who had
received a promotion. Id. ULM performed an investigation and determined that the
committee had applied the wrong guidelines to Walker’s application. The same

committee then reconsidered Walker’s application and granted his promotion. See id.
at 45-46; Record Document 34-6, at 1.
Several years later, in 2022, Walker filed a pay grievance asserting that ULM
should increase his administrative stipend to match the $15,000 stipend of the
program directors. Id. at 74-75. Following an investigation, ULM found that Walker
was not entitled to a higher stipend because he held a lower rank within the
organizational structure, and in effect, sought the same stipend that his supervisor

had received. See id. at 84-85, 96.
Not long after ULM rejected his demand, Walker requested extended leave
under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). According to Walker, the grievance
process had caused him anxiety, and he needed time to care for his mental health.
Walker’s Dep. 114, 194. ULM approved his FMLA leave request. Id. at 137. Then,
around the same time, Walker informed Anderson that he would no longer serve as

the Pharmacist-in-Charge, and Walker also notified the Board of Pharmacy that he
had withdrawn from the role. Id. at 69; Record Document 34-7 at 1.
When Walker withdrew as the Pharmacist-in-Charge, Anderson did not
reappoint him as the Laboratory Manager. Anderson’s Decl. 2, Record Document 34-
17. In his declaration, Anderson explained the Pharmacist-in-Charge role is a
“required duty of any person seeking to serve as Lab Manager.” Id. at 1. Moreover,
according to Anderson, Walker “no longer met the requirements of the Lab Manager
position” because he “resigned his Pharmacist-in-Charge” role and thereby “refused
to undertake the full responsibilities, duties, and requirements of the Lab Manager

position[.]” Id. at 2. Given the timing of Walker’s withdrawal as the Pharmacist-in-
Charge, Walker had still been on FMLA leave when Anderson decided not to renew
his contract. Walker’s Dep. 137.
Ultimately, about a year after his demotion, Walker retired from ULM and
filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Walker’s Dep. 36, 61-62; Record Document 34-3.
He filed the EEOC charge on May 24, 2024 and alleged that ULM discriminated

against him when it demoted him from Lab Manager. Record Document 34-3. After
the EEOC issued its determination and notice of rights, Walker filed this lawsuit
against ULM, Anderson, and others. Record Document 1. Previously, this Court
dismissed with prejudice Walker’s claims arising under the Americans with
Disability Act. Record Document 48. And now, ULM has filed a motion for summary
judgment on Walker’s remaining claims. Record Document 34.

Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires a court to “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When the burden at
trial will rest on the nonmovant, the movant need not produce evidence to negate the
elements of the nonmovant’s case; rather, it need only point out the absence of
supporting evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the movant
satisfies its initial burden, the nonmovant must demonstrate a genuine dispute exists
by “going beyond the pleadings” and “designating specific facts.” Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). This burden requires more than
metaphysical doubt, conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or a mere scintilla of
evidence. Id.
Analysis
Walker’s remaining causes of action arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (“Title VII”), Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:301 (“LEDL”), and the Family Medical Leave

Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (“FMLA”). Walker has alleged race-based violations of
Title VII through discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. See Record Document
1 at 5. Because LEDL “is substantively similar to Title VII,” the Court considers these
claims together and reaches the same outcome on the LEDL claims as it does the
Title VII claims. Vidrine v. Guillot, No. 21-30203, 2022 WL 3544396, at *2 (5th Cir.
Aug. 18, 2022) (quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 n.4 (5th Cir.

2007)). In addition, Walker has asserted a retaliation claim under the FMLA. See
Record Document 1, at 7; Record Document 42 at 9.
I. Title VII Discrimination
Title VII makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual’s race[.]” Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2023)
(abrogating requirement that an employee show “an ultimate employment
decision[.]”). A burden shifting framework applies to Title VII discrimination claims,
and the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Lee v. Kan.

City R.R. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). If he does, the burden shifts to the
employer “who must offer an alternative non-discriminatory explanation for the
adverse employment action.” Id. Once an employer has offered a non-discriminatory
explanation, “the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the
employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for racial bias.” Id.
Although unclear, Walker seemingly articulated two theories of racial
discrimination. First, Walker stated a “failure to promote” claim, alleging ULM

should have named him a program director alongside the five white employees who
were promoted on October 1, 2017. See Record Document 1 at 5. Second, Walker
pleaded a “wage discrimination” claim, arguing that he should have received a
stipend equal to the allegedly “similarly situated” program directors. See id.
A. Failure to Promote
Before considering the merits of Walker’s failure to promote claim, the Court

must determine whether it is time barred. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit “has long required plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies
before bringing suit under Title VII.” Price v. Choctaw Glove & Safety Co., 459 F.3d
595, 598 (5th Cir. 2006). In Louisiana, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination
within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory act. Hartz v. Adm’r of Tulane Educ.
Fund, 275 F. App’x 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2008). Failing to do so means that “the employee
may not challenge the alleged discrimination in court.” See, e.g., id. at 287 (barring a
college professor’s failure to promote claim because he did not timely file a charge of
discrimination).

In this case, Anderson announced the faculty retention plan that created the
program director positions on October 1, 2017. Walker’s Dep. 109, 147-48. Walker
learned at the time of announcement that he had not been chosen as a program
director. Id. at 150. Had Walker filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
within thirty days of that announcement then his claim would have been timely.
Instead, Walker waited more than six years, filing his EEOC charge on May 24, 2024.
Record Document 34-3, at 1. Therefore, Walker’s failure to promote claim is time

barred under Title VII.
B. Wage Discrimination
Walker also alleged that ULM paid him less of an administrative stipend than
what the allegedly “similarly situated” white program directors received. Record
Document 1 at 5. To survive summary judgment, Walker must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination and prove that (1) he is a member of a protected class,

and (2) he is paid less than a non-member for work requiring substantially the same
responsibility. Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984).
Walker, who is African American, satisfies the first element, so the central issue is
whether ULM paid him less than white employees who had substantially the same
responsibility. See Lyles v. Tex. Alcohol Beverage Com’n, 379 F. App’x 380, 383 (5th
Cir. 2010) (recognizing an African American plaintiff as “a member of a protected
class.”).
In determining whether Walker had substantially the same responsibility as

his comparators, the Court considers whether the employees were similarly situated.
See Shahrashoob v. Tex. A&M Univ., 125 F.4th 641, 651 (5th Cir. 2025). Although
the employees need not have “identical” circumstances, the circumstances must still
be “nearly identical.” Id. Nearly identical circumstances exist where the employees
“held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their
employment status determined by the same person[.]” Id.
Here, the Court finds that Walker has failed to prove that he is similarly

situated to the five white program directors who received a higher administrative
stipend. To start, the Court is not persuaded by Walker’s attempt at manufacturing
“nearly identical” circumstances, because he described his position and those of the
comparators at an exceedingly general level. See, e.g., Record Document 42 at 16-17.
According to Walker, he is nearly identical to the comparators because they were:
registered pharmacists, professors in the same department, worked under the same

decision maker, and performed administrative duties. Id. Walker’s generalized claim
of nearly identical circumstances fails for several reasons.
First, that Walker and his comparators are all pharmacists and professors is
immaterial for the stipend at issue. As Walker explained throughout his deposition,
he received a regular salary as a professor but the complained of stipend resulted
from his administrative role as the Lab Manager. Walker’s Dep. 57, 72. Walker does
not argue that ULM paid him a discriminatory salary as a professor, only that his
administrative stipend was less than his comparators. See Walker’s Dep. 199.
Accordingly, the administrative duties of Walker and the comparators, not their

professorial roles, matter for determining whether they were similarly situated.
Second, Walker’s conclusory statement that the comparators all “performed
administrative duties” does not reflect that his role had significantly less
administrative responsibility than the better paid program directors. Walker received
his stipend because he held the title of “Manager, Pharmaceutical Care Lab,” Record
Document 34-9 at 1; Walker’s Dep. 71-72. Based on his job description, which Walker
helped create, only 5% of his work involved administrative duties. Record Document

34-9, at 2; Walker’s Dep. 18.
Meanwhile, the administrative work of the program directors involved far
more of their time. The workload of the Program Director of Experiential Education
consisted of 90% administrative duties, including overseeing the daily operations of
the office. Record Document 34-11 at 1,3. Similarly, the Program Director of Student
Success devoted 80% of his time to administrative work like supporting the

university’s admissions committee. Record Document 34-12 at 1-2. Even the two
program director positions with the lightest administrative workloads devoted one-
quarter of their time to administrative tasks, far exceeding Walker’s 5% percent.
Record Document 34-10 at 1 (“The Director of Faculty Development will be a 25%
position.”); “Record Document 34-14 at 1 (“The Information Services Director is a 25%
position.”). Moreover, as for the tasks themselves, Walker admitted that each
program director had individualized duties, and he did not know their specific
functions. See Walker’s Dep. 79-80.
Third, Walker mischaracterizes the evidence in claiming that he and the

comparators “worked under the same decision maker.” Record Document 42 at 17. To
the contrary, Walker did not share a direct supervisor with the other program
directors, and he held a lower administrative rank than them. As the Lab Manager,
Walker reported to the Program Director of Experiential Education, Connie Smith.
Record Document 34-9 at 1; Walker’s Dep. 96. Walker even acknowledged in his
deposition that the higher stipend he desired “would equate to that of [his]
supervisor” who was a program director. Walker’s Dep. 96. Near his retirement,

Walker “appealed” to have a different supervisor because Smith did not “advocate”
for him. See Walker’s Dep. 59. Consequently, Walker’s supervisor became Jessica
Brady, an associate clinical director. Walker’s Dep. 133-34.
Even after his supervisor changed to an associate clinical director, Walker still
did not share a supervisor with or the rank of the program directors. Walker himself
explained the leadership structure: dean of pharmacy, associate dean, clinical

director, associate clinical director, and then program director. See Walker’s Dep. 135.
While Walker reported to the associate clinical director, the program directors
reported to someone two tiers higher. Id. Each of the program directors reported to
the associate dean of academic affairs, not the lower ranked associate clinical
director. See, e.g., Record Document 34-11 at 1 (stating that the Program Director of
Experiential Education “reports to Associate Dean, Academic Affairs.”).
In short, Walker has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact that he is
similarly situated to the white program directors. Walker performed less
administrative work than the program directors, held a lower rank within the

organizational structure, did not share a direct supervisor, and otherwise, Walker
offered no evidence that he and the comparators performed the same administrative
tasks. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Shaw Group, Inc., 250 F. App’x 603, 606-07 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding employees were not similarly situated where one worked in a senior
management position whereas the plaintiff worked in a lower ranking managing
position). Therefore, Walker’s claim of wage discrimination fails.
II. Title VII Retaliation

An employer cannot discriminate against an employee for engaging in conduct
protected by Title VII. Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t Crim. Just., 220 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir.
2000). The familiar burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas applies to Title
VII retaliation claims. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). Under
the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee must first establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. Id. If the employee does so, the burden shifts to the employer who

must “articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment
action.” Id. at 305. Then, the ultimate burden shifts back to the employee who “bears
the burden of proving that the employer’s reason is a pretext for the actual retaliatory
reason.” Davis v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 492 (5th Cir. 2011).
A prima facie case of retaliation requires that Walker establish three elements:
(1) he participated in a Title VII protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action by his employer, and (3) there is a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Com’n, 586 F.3d
321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009). If Walker cannot satisfy all three elements, summary

judgment is appropriate. Id.
In this case, Walker has satisfied the first element of his prima facie case. The
Fifth Circuit has held: “[a]n employee that files an internal complaint of
discrimination engages in a protected activity.” Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
540 F. App’x 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013). ULM does not dispute that Walker engaged in
a protected activity when he filed an internal discrimination complaint with the
human resources department on September 20, 2018. Record Document 34-1 at 24;

Record Document 34-5 at 1. Accordingly, Walker has satisfied the first element of a
prima facie discrimination claim.
Second, Walker must show that he suffered an adverse employment action.
Walker claims that he experienced an adverse action when Glenn Anderson, the Dean
of Pharmacy, removed his administrative stipend on three occasions: October 2017,
June 2019, and August 2023. Record Document 1, at 4. ULM argues that two of these

actions are barred, because he did not file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the
act. Record Document 34-1 at 24. Meanwhile, Walker claims that all three actions
“fall under the continuing violation doctrine” and none should be barred. Record
Document 42 at 17.
The continuing violation doctrine holds that “where the last act alleged is part
of an ongoing pattern of discrimination and occurs within the filing period, allegations
concerning earlier acts are not time-barred.” McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of
Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 865 (5th Cir. 1993). However, “discrete actions, even if serial,
are not entitled to the shelter of the continuing violation doctrine.” Doe v. United

States, 853 F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). At least one
other court has recognized that a reduction in pay is a “discrete act” and not a
continuing violation. See, e.g., Webb v. HMSHost, Inc., No. 24-3111, 2026 WL 886626,
at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2026).
Here, the Court finds that Walker has alleged a series of discrete acts, not one
continuing violation. Anderson’s decisions to remove Walker’s stipend on three
different occasions constitute three independent acts, and thus, three separate

adverse employment actions. Although each removal had a continuing effect in
reducing Walker’s compensation with every paycheck, the continuing violation
doctrine applies to ongoing acts not ongoing effects. See Del. State Co. v. Ricks, 449
U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (noting that continuing violation theory did not apply because
denial of tenure was discrete act despite having an ongoing effect); see also McGregor
v. La. State Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 867 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he continuing

violation theory [cannot] resurrect claims about discrimination concluded in the past,
even though its effects persist.”) (internal quotations and alternations omitted); see,
e.g., Baldwin v. Extended Stay Am. Co., No. 16-604, 2016 WL 4386098, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 17, 2016) (“[T]he continuing violations doctrine does not apply to ongoing
effects.”)
Having decided that the continuing violation theory does not apply, the Court
must determine which adverse employment actions Walker can use to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation. As explained already, actions that did not occur within

300 days of the filing of an EEOC charge of discrimination are time barred. Hartz,
275 F. App’x at 287. Walker filed his EEOC charge on May 24, 2024, so the removal
of his stipend on August 29, 2023 is the only adverse employment action that occurred
within 300 days of that date. Record Document 34-2 at 1; see also Record Document
1 at 4. Moreover, ULM has conceded that the removal of Walker’s stipend constitutes
an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. Record Document 34-1 at 24.
Therefore, Walker’s prima facie case of retaliation depends entirely on the removal of

his stipend on August 29, 2023.
Third, Walker must establish a causal connection exists between his internal
discrimination complaint on September 20, 2018 and the removal of his
administrative stipend on August 29, 2023. The Court finds that he has not done so.
Almost five years elapsed between the date of Walker’s internal complaint and the
removal of his stipend, and considering similar gaps in time, the Fifth Circuit has

held them “far too long” to establish a causal connection “without other evidence of
causation.” Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. and Agric. And Mech. Co., 850
F.3d 731, 741-42 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting that the continuing violation theory
applied to older adverse actions and holding that a “three-year period is not the very
close in time connection we require to establish causation by timing alone.”). Because
Walker has offered no other evidence of a causal connection aside from a lengthy time
gap, his prima facie case of retaliation fails.
III. Title VII Harassment

Title VII guarantees employees “the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). As such, an employee “may establish a violation of Title VII
by proving that discrimination based on [race] has created a hostile or abusive work
environment.” Id. To establish a hostile work environment claim, an employee must
prove he:
(1) belongs to a protected group; (2) was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of
was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; (5)
the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial
action.

Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012). In this case,
Walker alleged that he endured harassment through unequal treatment when
Anderson removed his administrative stipend thrice, demoted him from Lab
Manager, and refused to raise his administrative stipend. Record Document 42 at 13.
Even assuming this disparate treatment is a cognizable hostile work environment
claim, which is doubtful, Walker’s claim fails because it did not affect a term,
condition, or privilege of his employment.
Harassment only affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment when
its “either severe or pervasive.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 651. In evaluating severity,
courts “look to the totality of the circumstances” and consider factor like “the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct…whether its physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance[, and] whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee’s work performance.” Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d
321, 330 (5th Cir. 2009).
In this case, the alleged conduct of Anderson “is not sufficiently harassing to
make out a hostile work environment claim.” See, e.g., Smith v. Miss. Dep’t of Child
Protective Serv., No. 18-4418802, 2019 WL 4418802, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 16, 2019)
(rejecting claim about unequal treatment in work assignments). Harassing conduct
requires “discriminatory verbal intimidation, ridicule, and insults[.]” Walker v.

Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000). Walker has offered no evidence of
hostile or abusive behavior from Anderson or others. See, e.g., Akanno v. Med. City
McKinney, No. 23-1054, 2024 WL 4272936, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2024) (rejecting
hostile environment claim where “[p]laintiff does not identify any other instance of
intimidation, ridicule, or insult.”). Moreover, Anderson’s alleged conduct occurred
only a few times across several years, and such isolated incidents are not enough to

sustain a hostile work environment claim. West v. City of Houston, Tex., 960 F.3d 736,
742 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding plaintiff cannot show pervasive harassment where “the
complained of actions were isolated or infrequent[.]”). Accordingly, Walker’s Title VII
harassment claim does not survive summary judgment.
IV. FMLA Retaliation
The FMLA “guarantees eligible employees 12 weeks of leave in a 1-year period
following certain events: a disabling health problem; a family member’s serious

illness; or the arrival of a new son or daughter.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide,
Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002). Furthermore, the FMLA “protects employees from
retaliation or discrimination for exercising their rights under the FMLA.” Mauder v.
Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., Tex., 446 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 2006). In his
complaint, Walker alleged that ULM and Anderson retaliated against him while on
FMLA leave when it decided to not renew his Lab Manager appointment. Record
Document 1 at 4, 7.

A. Sovereign Immunity
As a threshold, the Court finds that ULM1 is entitled to sovereign immunity
for Walker’s FMLA claim. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction for “suits against a
state, a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has
waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.” Bryant v. Tex.
Dep’t of Aging and Disability Serv., 781 F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2015). Here, ULM is

entitled to sovereign immunity, because Louisiana has not waived its sovereign
immunity for FMLA claims and ULM is an “arm of the state” as a member of the
University of Louisiana system. See Allain v. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of La. Sys.,
No. 13-2754, 2015 WL 6554440, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 29, 2015) (“Per Fifth Circuit

1 The Court’s finding of sovereign immunity applies equally to defendants named in their official
capacity.
precedent, ULM is an ‘arm’ of the state and not subject to suit absent waiver or
congressional abrogation.”).
Nevertheless, Walker argues that Congress has abrogated immunity for

“family care” claims under the FMLA. Record Document 42 at 28-29. Walker is
correct that Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity for family care claims, but
it has not done so for self-care claims. Bryant, 781 F.3d at 769 (“Congress has validly
abrogated states’ sovereign immunity with respect the FMLA’s family-care provision.
It has not done so with respect to the statute’s self-care provision; thus, states may
still assert an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense against claims based on that
provision.”). Here, Walker asserted a self-care claim, not a family care claim, under

the FMLA, because he used the FMLA’s extended leave to care for himself and his
mental health. Walker’s Dep. 194 (testifying that “I went on family medical leave in
’23…because my mind wasn’t in the right place.”). Accordingly, ULM is entitled to
sovereign immunity for Walker’s FMLA claim.
B. Qualified Immunity
Walker asserted an FMLA retaliation claim against Anderson in his individual

capacity, and in response, Anderson pleaded qualified immunity. See Record
Document 1 at 4; Record Document 5 at 2. Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine
“shield[ing] federal and state officials from money damages.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011). As a threshold, the defendant must show that “he is a
government official whose position involves the exercise of discretion[.]” See Pierce v.
Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997). Here, Anderson was a dean of ULM
handling employment decisions, and as such, he was an official working for an arm
of the state whose position involved the exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Babinski v.
Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515 (5th Cir. 2023) (allowing university professor to raise

qualified immunity). Therefore, Anderson may invoke the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity is a two-part inquiry. Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 179
(5th Cir. 2006) (applying qualified immunity to an FMLA claim). First, the district
court determines whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish a violation of a clearly
established right. Id. Second, the district court must decide whether the official’s
conduct was objectively reasonable. Id. If an official’s conduct was objectively

reasonable, even if he had violated a clearly established right, he is entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. The plaintiff has the burden “to demonstrate the
inapplicability of the defense.” Babinski, 79 F.4th at 520. In this case, Anderson has
conceded that Walker alleged a violation of a clearly established right because he
argued only that his conduct was objectively reasonable. Record Document 34-1 at
41-42; see Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that

failure to raise an argument forfeits it).
The Court finds that Anderson’s decision to not reappoint Walker as Lab
Manager was objectively reasonable. As Anderson explained in his declaration,
Walker “no longer met the requirements of the lab manager position” because he
refused to fulfill the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge. Anderson’s Decl. 2. Although
Walker claims the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge had been independent of the Lab
Manager position, his own testimony belies that argument. Walker admitted that he
had performed the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge since the “beginning” of his time as
the Lab Manager. Walker’s Dep. 18. Moreover, the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge had

been specifically identified as a responsibility of the Lab Manager in its description.
Record Document 34-9 at 2. Even more telling, Walker himself pushed himself to
have the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge listed as a duty of the Lab Manager. Walker’s
Dep. 161. According, the Court holds that removing Walker from a position when he
refused to complete a duty of that position is objectively reasonable.
Nevertheless, Walker claims that Anderson’s reason for removing him as Lab
Manager was pretext for retaliation. See Record Document 42 at 19-23. According to

Walker, Anderson replaced him as Pharmacist-in-Charge with Jessica Brady
(“Brady”) who did not hold the position of Lab Manager. Id. at 20. Walker argues that
installing someone other than the Lab Manager as the Pharmacist-in-Charge
constitutes an “inconsistent,” pretextual explanation. Id. at 22-23
The Court finds his argument unavailing and insufficient to create a genuine
dispute of material fact. Even if the Court accepted that only the Lab Manager could

serve as the Pharmacist-in-Charge, which is doubtful, Anderson effectively satisfied
that condition when he named Brady as the replacement. Brady held the title of
associate clinical director, and her responsibilities included supervising all registered
pharmacists and the College of Pharmacy’s Monroe facility, including its mock
pharmacy. Walker’s Dep. 133-135. Brady also served as Walker’s direct supervisor at
the time of his demotion from Lab Manager. Walker’s Dep. 133. Until ULM hired
another Lab Manager, Brady functioned as the closest equivalent because she had
supervisory authority over Walker, the mock pharmacy, and all registered
pharmacists. Under these circumstances, Anderson’s decision to replace Walker with
Brady as the Pharmacist-in-Charge was an objectively reasonable, non-pretextual,
action, and therefore, Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment and dismisses
Walker’s remaining claims with prejudice.
DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 6th day of May, 2026.

Uy ©. Ve
ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11343673. Public record. Not legal advice.