# Lowe

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · April 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11342862

## Case

- **Full name:** Angel Adrian Cajilema Hidalgo v. Craig Lowe, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11342862

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying that test to determine whether applicable deportation regulations were capable of protecting an individual’s due process rights
- applying that test to determine whether applicable deportation regulations were capable of protecting an individual’s due process rights

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANGEL ADRIAN CAJILEMA No. 4:26-CV-00686
HIDALGO,
(Chief Judge Brann)
Petitioner,

v.

CRAIG LOWE, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

APRIL 1, 2026
I. BACKGROUND
Angel Adrian Cajilema Hidalgo, currently a detainee of the United States
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),
has filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition seeking his release from ICE custody.1
Hidalgo is currently detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility within the
Middle District of Pennsylvania.2
Hidalgo, a citizen and native of the Republic of Ecuador, entered the United
States of America in 2000 at the age of five.3 After having lived in the United States
without lawful authority for some time, in 2012 Hidalgo obtained Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”); that authorization was revoked in 2025 after

1 Doc. 1.
2 Id. at 1-2.
Hidalgo was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of incident exposure.4 On April
10, 2025, Hidalgo was arrested by ICE and appears to have been detained without a

bond hearing since that date.5
In July of 2025, an immigration judge found that Hidalgo was removable from
the United States, but issued a cancellation of removal and granted Hidalgo’s
application for legal permanent residency.6 That decision was later vacated by the

Board of Immigration Appeals, which found that the immigration judge’s decision
did not allow for meaningful appellate review, and the matter was remanded for
further factfinding.7

In March of 2026, Hidalgo filed this § 2241 petition asserting that he is
entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).8 Specifically, Hidalgo
argues that, because he was detained inside of the United States, his detention is

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and the Government is incorrect that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)—which provides for mandatory detention without a bond hearing—
applies to him.9 The failure to provide him with a bond hearing, Hidalgo argues,
violates his due process rights.10

4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 5-6.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 6.
8 See Doc. 1.
9 Id. at 6-12.
10 Id. at 12-16.
Respondents contend that § 1225(b) applies to all individuals who are not
inspected and lawfully admitted to the country, regardless of whether they manage

to enter the country surreptitiously, and Hidalgo is therefore subject to mandatory
detention without a bond hearing.11 Moreover, Respondents assert that Hidalgo’s
continued detention without a bond hearing does not violate his due process rights.12

The Court has considered the arguments. For the reasons discussed below, the
petition will be granted.
II. DISCUSSION
Hidalgo brings his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which provides, as

relevant here, that it applies to any individual who “in custody for an act done or
omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree
of a court or judge of the United States.”13 As the Supreme Court of the United States

has emphasized, when ICE detainees challenge “their confinement” pending
removal, “their claims fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus and thus
must be brought in” a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition.14
The determination of whether Hidalgo is improperly detained requires an

examination of two separate provisions in immigration law: 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1225(b) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an

11 Doc. 5 at 18-40.
12 Id. at 41-44.
13 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2).
14 Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025).
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,

the alien shall be detained” pending removal hearings.15 In contrast, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) states only that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” In accordance with

that language, “[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a)
receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.”16 These two provisions therefore
provide for opposite outcomes: under § 1225(b) Hidalgo may not receive a bond
hearing, but under § 1226(a) he must receive such a hearing. The Court therefore

examines each statute to determine which applies to Hidalgo.
Turning first to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as the Honorable Karoline Mehalchick
recently observed, “[t]o trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining immigration officer

must determine that an individual is (1) an applicant for admission, (2) seeking
admission, and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”17
“Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is both an ‘applicant for
admission’ and ‘seeking admission.’”18

15 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
16 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018).
17 Ramirez-Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22,
2025).
18 Id.
Section 1225 defines “applicant for admission” since “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether

or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the
United States after having been interdicted in international or United States
waters).”19 While applicable federal law does not define “alien seeking admission,”

courts construe the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe “active and
ongoing conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a
border or port of entry.”20
As courts have observed, such a “reading comports with the Supreme Court’s

finding in Jennings v. Rodriguez,”21 wherein the Supreme Court “noted [that]
§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.”22 That
reading of “seeking admission” further “preserves a distinction between ‘seeking

admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’ ensuring that each phrase
carries independent meaning.”23 In sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates
that it applies to individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those
already within the country.

19 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
20 Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (collecting cases).
21 Id.
22 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297.
23 Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4.
With respect to § 1226, the Supreme Court has been explicit that “§ 1226
applies to aliens already present in the United States.”24 That Section “creates a

default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General
to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings” and
“permit[ting] the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.”25 Therefore,

while § 1225 applies to individuals detained while entering or attempting to enter
the country, § 1226 applies generally to those who are detained within the country.
These definitions create dual tracks: if an individual is detained attempting to
enter the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for inspection

and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225. If they are
arrested after having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under
§ 1226 and are entitled to a bond hearing.

Applying that distinction here, Hidalgo must be detained pursuant to § 1226
and is therefore entitled to a bond hearing. Hidalgo entered the United States in the
year 2000 and, at that time, he could reasonably have been construed as seeking
admission and therefore as an individual governed by § 1225.26 However, he was

not arrested and detained until April of 202527 after having resided “in the United
States for an extended period of time”; accordingly he is no longer an seeking

24 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
25 Id.
26 Doc. 1 at 4.
27 Id. at 5.
admission and “§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to” Hidalgo during his
detention.28 Because § 1226(a) applies, mandatory detention is not warranted, and

he must be provided with a bond hearing.29
Having determined that Hidalgo is being detained under the wrong section of
immigration law and is improperly being denied a bond hearing, the Court must next

determine whether Respondents’ actions violate Hidalgo’s Fifth Amendment Due
Process rights.30
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

That Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent,”31 and
therefore individuals “facing removal are entitled to due process.”32

28 Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5.
29 See, e.g., Patel v. O’Neil, No. 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)
(finding in similar circumstances that § 1226(a) applies).
30 Magatte brings claims under the Fifth Amendment and violations of the applicable statute.
Doc. 1 at 16-20. Because this Court will resolve the issue on the Fifth Amendment question, it
need not address the remaining claim.
31 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
32 Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).
This Court applies the balancing test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge33 to
determine whether the failure to provide Hidalgo with a bond hearing under

§ 1226(a) violates his due process rights.34 Under that test, courts must consider
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.35

The first factor weighs heavily in favor of concluding that Petitioners’ actions
have deprived Hidalgo of his due process rights, as “[f]reedom from imprisonment—
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the
heart of the liberty that Clause protects.”36 The second factor likewise favors
Hidalgo, “as he is presently and erroneously detained under the mandatory detention
provisions of § 1225, without an opportunity for a bond hearing.”37
Finally, as other courts have observed, the Government does have an interest
in detaining noncitizens to ensure “‘the appearance of aliens at future immigration

33 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
34 Cf. Sewak v. I.N.S., 900 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying that test to determine whether
applicable deportation regulations were capable of protecting an individual’s due process
rights).
35 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
36 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6; Ramirez-Montoya, 2025
WL 3709045, at *6.
37 Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (quoting Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025
WL 2976572, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)).
proceedings’ and ‘prevent[] danger to the community.’”38 These interests certainly
justify detaining individuals in appropriate circumstances. But they cannot weigh in

favor of Respondents when they are denying wholesale a bond hearing—the very
purposes of which is to establish whether an individual “poses [a] flight risk [or a]
danger to the community.”39 In balancing these three factors then, it is clear that

Hidalgo’s continued detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights.
Consequently, the Court will grant his § 2241 petition.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Respondents have violated

Hidalgo’s due process rights by detaining him without a bond hearing. Accordingly,
his petition will be granted, and the Government will be required to provide Hidalgo
with a bond hearing or release him from custody.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

38 Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
39 Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11342862. Public record. Not legal advice.