# EDMONDS

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · July 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11342314

## Case

- **Full name:** Scott A. Edmonds v. Rose A. Semple and John F. DiSalle
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11342314

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that States’ immunity has not been abrogated for actions brought under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986
- stating that the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against the defendant judge was subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
- holding that States’ immunity has not been abrogated for actions brought under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SCOTT A. EDMONDS, )
) Civil Action No. 22 – 653
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) District Judge William S. Stickman
) Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan
ROSE A. SEMPLE and JOHN F. )
DISALLE, )
)
Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 15) be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(iii)
with respect to his claims for damages against Defendant John F. DiSalle and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
with respect to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against Defendant DiSalle. It is also
recommended that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) with respect to his claims against Defendant Rose A. Semple. It is
further recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 6) be
denied as moot.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff Scott A. Edmonds (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee currently in custody at the
Washington County Correctional Facility in Washington, Pennsylvania.1 He initiated this action
by the filing of a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), which was

1 Plaintiff is awaiting trial for criminal homicide and tampering with evidence charges in case
CP-63-CR-0000833-2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania.
1
granted on May 4, 2022, (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff has sued John F. DiSalle (“Judge DiSalle”), the
President Judge for the Washington County Court of Common Pleas and the judge presiding
over Plaintiff’s criminal case, and Rose A. Semple (“Attorney Semple”), his current court
appointed attorney from the Office of Conflict Counsel. He alleges that Defendants have denied

him a fair and unbiased trial, including conspiring to deny him his constitutional rights, and he
requests that the Court order Judge DiSalle to reinstate Plaintiff’s right to self-representation and
to stay Plaintiff’s criminal trial until this case has been fully adjudicated. See, generally, ECF
No. 15. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
A. Standard of Review
When a plaintiff has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, district courts must
review his allegations in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Section 1915(e)(2) requires
federal courts to review complaints filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any
action that: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2
When determining whether an action has failed to state a claim for purposes of §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). D’Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 F. App’x 70, 72
(3d Cir. 2011). That means that the Court must dismiss a complaint if it does not allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

2 Dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) is “often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to
spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
2
554, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In reviewing a plaintiff’s complaint, the court must accept all factual allegations in the

complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56; see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level[.]” Id. at
555. The court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the
facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp.,
394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906
(3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Additionally, a
civil rights claim “must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of
constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory

statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.” Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d
883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings
than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and
draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. See Dluhos v.
Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a section 1983 action, the court must “apply the
applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d
3
244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this
is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently
alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”) (citing Holder v. City of
Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants

are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v.
Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
B. Discussion
1. Judge DiSalle
The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against Judge DiSalle to the extent he is being sued in
his official capacity as a judge for the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County,
Pennsylvania. In this regard, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different
from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)

(internal citation omitted). Here, a claim against Judge DiSalle in his official capacity is really a
claim against the court over which he presides; an entity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See PA. CONST. Art. V, §§ 1, 7; 42 Pa. C.S. §
1511. See also Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198
(3d Cir. 2008); Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2005) (Holding that
Pennsylvania’s First Judicial District was “state entity” entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity); Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000) (“All courts and
agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are
state rather than local agencies.”).
4
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be lost only in one of two ways: (1) if the
Commonwealth waives its immunity; or (2) if Congress abrogates the States’ immunity pursuant
to a valid exercise of its power. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240-4

(1985). By statute, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has specifically withheld its consent to
be sued. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521(b); 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310; see also Lavia v. Pennsylvania,
Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25
(3d Cir. 1981). Additionally, Congress has not expressly abrogated Pennsylvania’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity from civil rights suits for damages. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 66
(“Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it
does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged
deprivations of civil liberties.”); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979); Boykin v.
Bloomsburg Univ. of Pa., 893 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that States’ immunity has
not been abrogated for actions brought under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986), aff'd, 91 F.3d 122

(3d Cir. 1996). As such, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars any claim he may have against
Judge DiSalle in his official capacity.
To the extent Plaintiff has sued Judge DiSalle in his individual capacity, it is a well-
established principle of law that judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for conduct
performed in the course of their official duties. The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity
grants judges absolute immunity “from liability for damages for acts committed within their
judicial jurisdiction . . . .” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). “A judge will not be
deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in
excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear
5
absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal citation
and quotation omitted). Judicial immunity will not apply only if the judge acts with “clearly no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter,” id. at 356 n.6 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351-
52 (1871)), or where the challenged conduct is not a judicial act, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991). Whether an act is a judicial one is determined by whether the action is typically one
performed by a judge and whether the parties thought they were dealing with a judge acting in
his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
Plaintiff alleges that Judge DiSalle “acted in an administrative capacity when he . . .
scheduled himself as judge” with an “ulterior agenda or motive in mind” after Plaintiff sent him
“threatening letters” regarding Conflict Counsel Attorney Kimberly Furmanek, which Plaintiff
claims lead to Attorney Furmanek’s termination and a headache for Judge DiSalle who, as “the
immediate supervisor for attorneys in the Office of Conflict Counsel” had to “spend massive
amounts of time and money . . . to procure paid private counsel for Attorney Furmanek’s clients
(inmates) left without counsel.” (ECF No. 15, pp.3-4.) Essentially, Plaintiff infers that Judge

DiSalle is biased against him for what he did, and, as a result, Judge DiSalle appointed himself as
judge to Plaintiff’s criminal case and then wrongfully terminated Plaintiff’s pro se status and
appointed an attorney from the Washington County’s Office of Conflict Counsel, Attorney
Semple, whom Plaintiff states should not have been appointed because of his ongoing conflict
with Washington County and because Judge DiSalle is the immediate supervisor of the attorneys
in said Office. Plaintiff alleges that Judge DiSalle and Attorney Semple have conspired to deny
Plaintiff his right to self-representation and a fair and unbiased trial. Plaintiff also alleges that
Judge DiSalle has improperly ruled on motions alleging “obstruction and malfeasance” in his

6
criminal case by Judge DiSalle’s long-time friend, Washington County District Attorney Gene
Vittone.
Plaintiff argues that his claims against Judge DiSalle are not barred by judicial immunity
because Judge DiSalle’s actions were not judicial in nature, but rather “administrative.” See

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988) (“Administrative decisions, even though they may
be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial
acts[]” to which judicial immunity would apply.) However, no matter how Plaintiff frames
them, the actions by Judge DiSalle of which Plaintiff complains were judicial actions taken by
Judge DiSalle in the course of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. This includes Judge DiSalle’s
reassignment of Plaintiff’s criminal case, which is his primary complaint. See e.g., Gochin v.
Haaz, 16-5359, 2017 WL 4475973, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2017) (plaintiff’s allegation that
defendant president judge improperly reassigned his case to another judge is barred by judicial
immunity because it was an action taken within the president judge’s judicial capacity), aff’d,
724 F. App’x 155 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2018); see also In re Picozzi, 18-CV-2201, et al., 2018 WL

3393279, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2018) (claims against chief judge based on reassignment of
plaintiff’s cases barred by judicial immunity); Chaplin v. Manfredi, 87-6781, 1988 WL 7844, at
*1 (Feb. 2, 1988) (judicial immunity applied to plaintiff’s claim that defendant judge reassigned
plaintiff’s criminal action to another judge and appointed a new attorney to represent him as
stand-by counsel because by doing so defendant judge was acting in his judicial capacity as
Major Felony Calendar Judge); 42 Pa. C.S. § 325(e) (setting out the powers and duties of
president judges in Pennsylvania, including making “all judicial assignments”). This also
includes Plaintiff’s allegations that Judge DiSalle’s actions and rulings were motivated by malice
against Plaintiff for his conduct involving Attorney Furmanek or Judge DiSalle’s long time
7
friendship with District Attorney Vittone. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is
not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be
resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967) (“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and

corruptly[.]”); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985) (“It is a well established
rule that where a judge’s absolute immunity would protect him from liability for the performance
of particular acts, mere allegations that he performed those acts pursuant to a bribe or conspiracy
will not be sufficient to avoid the immunity.”) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for damages
against Judge DiSalle are subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). See,
e.g., Ball v. Butts, 445 F. App’x 457 (3d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011).
Additionally, while Plaintiff is also seeking injunctive relief against Judge DiSalle, such
relief is not available because Congress enacted § 309(c) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act
(“FCIA”) in 1996, which amended § 1983 to provide that, “in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief

shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c); 110 Stat. 3847 (1996); 41 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated, or that declaratory relief was unavailable
to him. Because Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against Judge DiSalle is not available, it
is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See e.g., L.B. v. Town of Chester,
232 F.Supp.2d 227, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F.Supp. 194, 201-202
(N.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Jung v. Pennsylvania, 3:18-CV-01248, 2018 WL 3717213, at *4
(M.D. Pa. June 27, 2018); Steinberg v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 09-86, 2009 WL
1684663, at *22 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2009); see also Ball v. Butts, 445 F. App’x 457 (3d Cir.
8
Sept. 21, 2011) (stating that the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against the defendant
judge was subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
2. Attorney Semple
Plaintiff’s claims against Attorney Semple are subject to dismissal for failure to state a

claim because the Supreme Court has held that a public defender does not act “under color of
state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing a lawyer’s traditional function as
counsel to an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 325 (1981). And, this principle extends to court appoint attorneys, like those through
conflict counsel. See T.R. v. Havens, 612 F. App’x 83, 89 (3d Cir. 2015). While court
appointed attorneys “may” act under color of state law for section 1983 purposes “while
performing certain administrative and possibly investigative functions,” Polk, 454 U.S. at 325,
Plaintiff fails to allege any plausible “administrative action” exception to the general rule. Thus,
to the extent Plaintiff complains about any specific conduct by Attorney Semple, it appears to be
based entirely on her actions as counsel to Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings.3 Accordingly,

Attorney Semple is not a state actor for section 1983 purposes and Plaintiff’s claims against her
are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Tchirkow v. Powanda, 2:19-CV-
00984, 2020 WL 2425795, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege that Attorney Semple conspired
with Judge DiSalle to deny Plaintiff his federally protected rights, including his right to self-

3 Apart from allegations that she conspired with Judge DiSalle to deny Plaintiff his rights, which
will be addressed next, the undersigned cannot actually make out any action by Attorney Semple
about which Plaintiff is complaining, only that she is employed by the Office of Conflict Counsel
and is paid by Washington County. According to Plaintiff, no attorney from the Office of
Conflict Counsel should be appointed to his case because of an apparent conflict that he has with
that office due to the actions of another attorney and because those attorneys are paid by
Washington County against whom Plaintiff alleges wrongdoing.
9
representation. In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a private
person engaged with state officials in prohibited conduct is acting under color of state law for
purposes of § 1983 liability. Id. at 27. Although § 1983 liability will not generally lie against a
private party, liability may attach where the private party “is a willful participant in joint action

with the State or its agents.” Id. Hence, a private action may be converted into state action if a
state actor conspires with a private individual to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights.
Id. at 27-29. The requisite state action may be found even if the state actor with whom the
private individual allegedly conspired is himself immune from suit. Id. (action against private
parties accused of conspiring with judge found to be state action under § 1983). However, the
allegations of a complaint must state a claim for conspiracy.
In order to make out a claim for conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege conspiracy with particularity even though a heightened pleading standard generally does
not apply to civil rights actions against individual defendants. Bieros v. Nicola, 860 F.Supp.
223, 225 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligent &

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). “To plead conspiracy adequately, a plaintiff must
set forth allegations that address the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and
the certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that purpose.” Shearin v. E.F.
Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Beck v.
Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000). Further, in light of Twombly and its progeny, there must be
“‘enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made,’ in other words,
‘plausible grounds to infer an agreement.’” Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

10
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible conspiracy claim pursuant to the
requirements of Twombly and its progeny. There are no facts that plausibly suggest a meeting of
the minds between Attorney Semple and Judge DiSalle to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional
rights, including his right to self-representation. Plaintiff only alleges that Attorney Semple has

“the power to correct Plaintiff’s loss of liberty,” and “under normal circumstances an attorney
would adhere to their client’s wishes, and would certainly object when a federally protected right
is violated,” but she “has never at any time objected to said loss” and so “reasonable minds”
would conclude that she engaged in a conspiracy with Judge DiSalle to deprive Plaintiff of his
constitutional rights, including his right to self-representation. (ECF No. 15, pp.7-8.) However,
Plaintiff’s bald allegations of conspiracy fail to set forth “plausible grounds to infer an
agreement.” Mincy v. Klem, 1:08-CV-0066, 2009 WL 331432, at *5 (M.D. Pa Feb. 9, 2009) (In
alleging conspiracy “[a] plaintiff cannot rely on subjective suspicions and unsupported
speculation.”) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not contain enough facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” See Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556. Accordingly, Plaintiff may not convert Attorney Semple’s purely private action
into state action by including her in an alleged conspiracy with Judge DiSalle. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy, to the extent he brings it pursuant to § 1983, should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
Unlike § 1983, state action is not required to support a claim pursuant to § 1985(3),
which Plaintiff appears to invoke. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In order to
state a claim under § 1985(3), the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in
11
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) injury to a person or property or deprivation of any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local
610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983) (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03). Again, Plaintiff
must set forth specific factual allegations that demonstrate collusion or concerted action among

the alleged conspirators. Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir.
1993) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)), abrogated on other
grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, Pa., 316 F.3d 392, 400
(3d Cir. 2003); Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991), later proceeding,
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321, as discussed in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65
(3d Cir. 2000). Even though the Supreme Court held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993), that the allegations in a § 1983
complaint cannot be held to a standard of heightened specificity, a plaintiff must allege
conspiracy with some particularity. Bieros, 860 F.Supp. 223, 225 (E.D. Pa.1994) (citing

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that indicate Attorney Semple
and Judge DiSalle entered into any agreement or plan to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional
rights, nor has Plaintiff averred any facts to show an act in furtherance of the agreement.
“[M]ere conclusory allegations of deprivations of constitutional rights are insufficient to state a §
1985(3) claim.” D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocations Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1377 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Accordingly, he has failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
3. Younger Abstention
12
Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks any form of injunctive relief for alleged present and
continuing constitutional deprivations regarding his representation or the on-going criminal
proceedings against him, Plaintiff seeks relief that a federal court should not provide. In
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court “established a principle of abstention

when federal adjudication would disrupt an ongoing state criminal proceeding.” Yang v. Tsui,
416 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Younger). Younger abstention “is premised on the
notion of comity, a principle of deference and ‘proper respect’ for state governmental functions
in our federal system.” Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, Pa., 959 F.2d 1227,
1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). Comity concerns are especially
heightened when the ongoing state governmental function is a criminal proceeding. Id.
However, “[a]bstention under Younger is appropriate only if (1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.”
Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).

The Younger requirements are clearly met in this case. First, Plaintiff’s criminal
proceedings are still pending. Second, the state proceedings implicate the important interest of
enforcing the Commonwealth’s criminal laws. Third, the state appeals process affords Plaintiff
an adequate opportunity to argue that the actions of Judge DiSalle and Attorney Semple deprived
him of a fair and impartial trial. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff’s claims were not subject to
dismissal for the reasons previously stated, it would be appropriate to abstain out of deference to
the state judicial process.4

4 Exceptions to the Younger doctrine exist where irreparable injury is “both great and
immediate,” where the state law is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
13
C. Amendment
Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.

2002). Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by settled law and cannot be resurrected via an
amendment. Based on his current allegations, the undersigned can imagine no additional facts
Plaintiff could plead that would overcome the deficiencies in his Amended Complaint. The
undersigned also notes that it issued a similar Report and Recommendation on May 12, 2022
(ECF No. 9) and Plaintiff was granted leave to file this Amended Complaint, which also did not
overcome the deficiencies in his original Complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned does not
recommend granting Plaintiff leave to amend.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 15) be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(iii)

with respect to his claims for damages against Defendant John F. DiSalle and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
with respect to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against Defendant DiSalle. It is also
recommended that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) with respect to his claims against Defendant Rose A. Semple. It is

prohibitions,” or where there is a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual
circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54. The
exceptions are narrowly construed. See, e.g., Hall v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. 12-2373, 2012
WL 5987142, *2 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Loftus v. Twp. of Lawrence Park, 764 F. Supp. 354, 357
(W.D. Pa. 1991). There is nothing in the Amended Complaint to indicate that Plaintiff falls
within any of the narrow exceptions to the Younger doctrine.
14
further recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 6) be
denied as moot.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen
(14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written
objections thereto. Plaintiff’s failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his
appellate rights.
Dated: July 22, 2022.
FOorn
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge

Ce: Scott A. Edmonds
20140007250
Washington County Correctional Facility
100 West Cherry Avenue
Washington, PA 15401

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11342314. Public record. Not legal advice.