# BRYANT

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · June 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341994

## Case

- **Full name:** Raevin B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** June 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341994

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “a whether the claimant is disabled. Id. proper RFC analysis has three at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need 4 not credit them if they conflict with (vi
- holding that “it was not social medial presence and website improper for the ALJ to consider the for her business. (Tr. 21, 24, 26-27, level and type of treatment [the 60-62, 446, 449.
- observing that a remand is proper where a court if “left The remainder of Raevin’s challenge to guess about how the ALJ arrived at to the ALJ’s decision amounts to a his conclusions”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RAEVIN B., )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) 1:25CV831
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, )
Commissioner of Social )
Security, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The plaintiff, Raevin B. (“Raevin”), I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
brought this action to obtain review of
a final decision of the Commissioner Raevin filed an application for
of Social Security denying her claim disability insurance benefits and a
for social security disability insurance period of disability in July of 2022,
benefits and a period of disability.1 alleging a disability onset date of June
The Court has considered the certified 15, 2022, later amended to September
administrative record and dispositive 19, 2022. (Tr. 181-87, 221, 17.) The
briefing from the parties. Because applications were denied initially and
substantial evidence supports the upon reconsideration. (Tr. 106-09,
determination of the Administrative 112-14.) After two hearings,2 the
Law Judge (“ALJ”), the Court will Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
deny Raevin’s request for the award of determined on August 30, 2024 that
benefits or for a remand, as set forth Raevin was not disabled under the
below. Act. (Tr. 17-76.) The Appeals Council
denied a request for review, making
the ALJ’s decision the final decision
for review. (Tr. 1-6.)

1 Transcript citations refer to the in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Administrative Transcript of Record filed 636(c). Docket Entry 11.
manually with the Commissioner’s
Answer. See Docket Entry 4. By Order of 2 A supplemental hearing was held after
Reference, this matter was referred to the technical issues ended the first hearing.
Undersigned to conduct all proceedings (Tr. 17.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The Commissioner uses a five-step
process to evaluate disability claims.”
While Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470,
United States Code “authorizes 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20
judicial review of the Social Security C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4),
Commissioner’s denial of social 404.1520(a)(4)).
security benefits,” see Hines v.
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. Under this process, the
2006), the scope of that review is Commissioner asks, in
specific and narrow, see Smith v. sequence, whether the
Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th claimant: (1) worked during the
Cir. 1986). Specifically, review is alleged period of disability; (2)
limited to determining if there is had a severe impairment; (3)
substantial evidence in the record to had an impairment that met or
support the Commissioner’s decision. equaled the requirements of a
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. listed impairment; (4) could
Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. return to her [or his] past
1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d relevant work; and (5) if not,
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In could perform any other work
reviewing for substantial evidence, in the national economy.
the Court does not re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility Id. at 472. A finding adverse to the
determinations, or substitute its claimant at any of several points in
judgment for that of the this five-step sequence forecloses a
Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 disability designation and ends the
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Put inquiry. Id. at 473. “Through the
simply: the issue before the Court is fourth step, the burden of production
not whether Raevin is disabled but and proof is on the claimant. If the
whether the finding that she is not claimant reaches step five, the burden
disabled is supported by substantial shifts to the Secretary to produce
evidence and based upon a correct evidence that other jobs exist in the
application of the relevant law. Id. national economy that the claimant
can perform considering his age,
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION education, and work experience.” See
Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal
The ALJ followed the correct process, citations omitted).
set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to
determine disability. See Albright v. The ALJ determined at step one that
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d Raevin had not engaged in substantial
473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). gainful activity since the alleged onset
date. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ next found the
following severe impairments at step
2
two: degenerative disc disease; (Tr. 22-23.) At the fourth step, the
depressive, bipolar, and related ALJ determined that Raevin was
disorders; anxiety and obsessive- unable to perform her past relevant
compulsive disorder; and post- work. (Tr. 30.) Last, at step five, the
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). ALJ concluded that there were other
(Tr. 20.) At step three, the ALJ found jobs in the national economy that
that Raevin did not have an Raevin could perform. (Tr. 30.)
impairment or combination of
impairments listed in, or medically IV. DISCUSSION
equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr.
20.) In her appeal, Raevin asserts only that
“[t]he ALJ erred by failing to evaluate
The ALJ next set forth Raevin’s and account for [her] therapy animal
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) usage in the RFC assessment.”
and determined that she could Docket Entry 8 at 4. The record
perform a reduced range of medium demonstrates otherwise, as set forth
work as follows: below.

specifically, the claimant can A. The RFC Determination
lift and/or carry up to 50
pounds occasionally and up The RFC measures the most a
and 25 pounds frequently; she claimant can do in a work setting
is [sic] sit, stand, and walk up to despite the physical and mental
six hours each in an eight-hour limitations of his or her impairments
workday; she can push/pull as and any related symptoms (e.g., pain).
much as she can lift/carry; See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see
further, she is able to also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x
understand, remember and 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015)
carryout instructions by (unpublished) (claimant’s RFC is “[a]
performing simple, routine, medical assessment of what an
and repetitive tasks, but not at individual can do in a work setting in
a production rate pace (e.g., spite of the functional limitations and
assembly line work); she is able environmental restrictions imposed
to perform simple work-related by all of his or her medically
decisions; she can frequently determinable impairment(s)”)
interact with supervisors, and (internal citation omitted); Hines,
occasionally interact with 453 F.3d at 562. The RFC includes
coworkers and the public; and both a “physical exertional or strength
the claimant’s time-off task can limitation” that assesses the
be accommodated by normal claimant’s “ability to do sedentary,
breaks. light, medium, heavy, or very heavy
work,” as well as “nonexertional
3
limitations (mental, sensory, or skin components: (1) evidence, (2) logical
impairments).” Hall v. Harris, 658 explanation, and (3) conclusion”). As
F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981). noted earlier, the ALJ “must both
identify evidence that supports his
“Social Security Ruling 96-8p conclusion and ‘build an accurate and
explains that the RFC assessment logical bridge from [that] evidence to
must include a narrative discussion his conclusion.’” Woods v. Berryhill,
describing how the evidence supports 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018)
each conclusion, citing specific (alteration in original) (quoting
medical facts (e.g., laboratory Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Failure to
findings) and nonmedical evidence do so constitutes reversible error. See
(e.g., daily activities, observations).” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868
Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2017). Where an ALJ’s
(4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations “analysis is incomplete and precludes
omitted). An ALJ need not discuss meaningful review,” remand is
every piece of evidence in making an appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191.
RFC determination. See Reid v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, Moreover, “[a]n ALJ assesses the
865 (4th Cir. 2014). Yet, the ALJ credibility of a claimant’s subjective
“must build an accurate and logical statements about his condition as part
bridge from the evidence to [the] of the RFC assessment,” Ladda v.
conclusion.” Brown v. Commissioner, Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 166, 170 (4th
873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017) Cir. 2018) (unpublished), using a two-
(internal quotations omitted). “The part test: “First, there must be
RFC assessment must first identify objective medical evidence showing
the individual’s functional limitations ‘the existence of a medical
or restrictions and assess his or her impairment(s) which results from
work-related abilities on a function- anatomical, physiological, or
by-function basis . . . . Only [then] psychological abnormalities and
may RFC be expressed in terms of the which could reasonably be expected to
exertional levels of work, sedentary, produce the pain or other symptoms
light, medium, heavy, and very alleged,’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (citing
heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b),
at *1. 404.1529(b)).

The Fourth Circuit has held that If such an impairment exists, the ALJ
“meaningful review is frustrated when must then consider, as the second
an ALJ goes straight from listing prong of the test, all available
evidence to stating a conclusion.” evidence, including the claimant’s
Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, statements about pain, to determine
311 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a whether the claimant is disabled. Id.
proper RFC analysis has three at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need
4
not credit them if they conflict with (vi) Any measures [Plaintiff]
the objective medical evidence or if use[s] or [has] used to
the underlying impairment could not relieve his pain or other
reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms (e.g., lying flat
symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ on [his] back, standing
has considered the relevant factors, for 15 to 20 minutes
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and every hour, sleeping on a
heard the claimant’s testimony and board, etc.); and
observed his or her demeanor, the
Court will defer to the ALJ’s (vii) Other factors concerning
determination regarding those [Plaintiff’s] functional
subjective complaints. Shively v. limitations and
Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. restrictions due to pain
1984). or other symptoms.

Those relevant factors include: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).

(i) [Plaintiff’s] daily Additionally, the longstanding
activities; requirements calling for adjudicators
to weigh medical opinions and give
(ii) The location, duration, special deference to treating source
frequency, and intensity opinions have changed. See 20 C.F.R.
of [Plaintiff’s] pain or § 404.1520c(a) (effective March 27,
other symptoms; 2017). Now, adjudicators “will not
defer or give any specific evidentiary
(iii) Precipitating and weight, including controlling weight,
aggravating factors; to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s),
(iv) The type, dosage, including those from [a claimant’s]
effectiveness, and side medical sources.” Id. Nevertheless, an
effects of any medication ALJ must consider and articulate in
[Plaintiff] take[s] or the administrative decision how
[has] taken to alleviate persuasive he or she finds each
his pain or other medical opinion or prior medical
symptoms; finding in a claimant’s case record.
See id. § 404.1520c(b). When a
(v) Treatment, other than medical source provides more than
medication, [Plaintiff] one opinion or finding, the ALJ will
receive[s] or [has] evaluate the persuasiveness of such
received for relief of his opinions or findings as a class. See id.
pain or other symptoms; § 404.1520c(b)(1). The ALJ is “not
required to articulate how [she]
5
considered each medical opinion or claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §
prior administrative medical finding 404.1520b(c)(1)-(3). The regulations
from one medical source also make clear that, for such claims,
individually.” Id. “we will not provide any analysis
about how we considered such
As to persuasiveness, the ALJ must evidence in our determination or
articulate two factors: supportability decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c).
and consistency. Id. §
404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability is an Last, though there appears to be no
internal check that references binding Fourth Circuit precedent,
objective medical evidence and other courts have found that the use of
supporting explanations that come a therapy/service animal must be
from the source itself. Id. § medically necessary (for example,
404.1520c(c)(1); see also Revisions to medically prescribed or
Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. recommended) to be considered in an
Consistency is an external check that RFC assessment. See Shue v.
references evidence from other O’Malley, No. 23-1795, 2024 WL
medical and nonmedical sources. Id. § 2827936, at *3 (4th Cir. June 4, 2024)
404.1520c(c)(2); see also Revisions to (unpublished) affirming, 2023 WL
Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. The ALJ 3727935, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 30,
must only address the three other 2023) (“A prescription has reasonably
persuasiveness factors—relationship been considered adequate evidence of
with the claimant, specialization, and necessity, which would trigger a duty
the catchall “other factors”—when two for the ALJ to address the service
or more medical opinions, or prior animal’s role and impact on the
administrative medical findings about claimant’s RFC, while a lack of a
the same issue, are equally persuasive prescription or other credible medical
in terms of supportability and documentation may indicate the
consistency. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), animal is not medically necessary.”).
404.1520c(c)(3)-(5). However, the Fourth Circuit has
noted that the medical necessity
Furthermore, “[s]tatements that standard “appears to be in tension
[claimants] are or are not disabled, . . with the requirement that the RFC be
. able to work, or able to perform based on all the relevant medical and
regular or continuing work,” are other evidence found in the record.”
statements on an issue reserved to the Shue, 2024 WL 2827936, at *3
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § (emphasis added).
404.1520b(c)(3). And statements on
issues reserved to the Commissioner B. The RFC Is Legally Correct, Well-
are deemed evidence that “is Supported, and Susceptible to
inherently neither valuable nor Review.
persuasive to the issue of whether [a
6
Here, regardless of whether the concerning the intensity, persistence
“medical necessity” standard or the and limiting effects of these
“all the relevant medical and other symptoms are not entirely consistent
evidence” standard applies, the ALJ in with the medical evidence and other
this case adequately explained in a evidence in the record for the reasons
manner susceptible to judicial review explained in this decision.” (Tr. 24.)
why the RFC did not warrant the As shown below, the ALJ then gave
inclusion of a therapy animal. good reasons for partially discounting
Instead, the ALJ concluded, in a her subjective allegations (which
decision supported by substantial includes any purported need for a
evidence, that Raevin could perform a therapy animal in the workplace),
range of medium work with which are the same reasons that also
numerous mental limitations. (Tr. support the ALJ’s overall RFC
22.) determination.

Specifically, the ALJ began his RFC First, the ALJ accurately pointed to
assessment by summarizing at length Raevin’s sparse mental health
Raevin’s testimony. (Tr. 23-24.) And, treatment, explaining that
in pertinent part, the ALJ noted that
Raevin testified that she “lives by for her mental health
herself in an apartment with a therapy impairments, the claimant has
dog, stating that the therapy dog helps had sparse medical treatment.
. . . with her anxiety, depression, and Although she alleges that she
bipolar disorder. She stated that the became too limited to work as
therapy dog [provides] reminders of of September 2022, she had
[sic] during the day of things such as only been seen on three
when to go to bed, and reminds [her] occasions for mental health
to eat.” (Tr. 23.) treatment in July 2022, and did
not seek any additional mental
Nevertheless, the ALJ decided not to health treatment until
fully credit all of Raevin’s allegations, November 2023. She began
including any allegation that she consistent outpatient therapy
required a therapy animal to function sessions in January 2024, but
in the workplace. Specifically, the ALJ did not begin any medication
explained that Raevin’s “medically until June 2024.
determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause some Tr. 27, 427-30 (7/1/2022), 431-34
of the alleged symptoms . . . .” (Tr. 24.) (7/7/2022), 435-38 (7/21/2022),
The ALJ thus performed the first step 369-78 (11/20/2023), 400-12, 407
of the Craig analysis. Next, the ALJ (11/20/23) (“not open to psychotropic
performed step two of the analysis, medications at this time”), 379-89
concluding that Raevin’s “statements (1/31/24), 390-91 (2/7/2024), 392-
7
94 (2/15/2024), 395-96 (2/21/2024), Second, in supporting his RFC
413-23 (1/30-31/2024), 440-42 determination and subjective
(4/12/2024), 443-45 (4/15/2024), complaints assessment, the ALJ
446-48 (4/25/2024), 449-51 pointed to Raevin’s extensive daily
(5/7/2024), 452-54 (5/14/2024), activities. For example, the ALJ
455-57 (5/21/2024), 458-60 pointed out that at a consultative
(5/28/2024), 461-63 (6/11/2024), physical examination in March 2023,
464-66 (6/18/2024), 467-68 Raevin stated that she lived
(7/7/24), 471-73 (6/21/2024) independently. (Tr. 22, 335.) She also
(“Currently w/o medications for few stated that she was able to do
years and agreed to medication household chores like cooking,
management and OPT . . . . Wants to cleaning, washing dishes, laundry,
try new medication or holistic and that she was able to take care of
remedy.”), 474-76 (7/2/2024), 477-79 her hygiene. (Tr. 21, 335.) She
(7/9/2024), 480-82 (7/16/2024), reported at another March 2023
483-85 (7/30/2024). consultative examination that her
daily routine consisted of caring for
Raevin has not challenged this her dog, completing chores, and
finding, and it supports the ALJ’s grooming. (Tr. 26, 343.) She stated
conclusion that she did not suffer that she was able to drive and could
from disabling mental health grocery shop independently although
impairments. See Lewis v. Colvin, No. she generally used Instacart. (Tr. 26,
3:12-CV-08073, 2013 WL 6145811, at 343.) Also, during therapy, she
*21 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 21, 2013) reported that she was able to live
(“Claimant’s sparse mental health independently, dated, was working
treatment is inconsistent with her towards her degree (receiving an A in
claim of severe impairment due to a class in 2024), and also started her
PTSD. The overall paucity of own business. (Tr. 21, 26-27, 379, 413,
treatment records reflecting any 427, 428, 431-32, 435-36, 455, 449.)
limiting complaints or symptoms of
PTSD undercuts Claimant’s reports of In fact, she was interviewed for this
symptoms to the consultative business, participated in the filming
examiners.”) (citing Mickles v. of a one-hour video regarding the
Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 930 (4th Cir. business, and sustained an active
1994) (holding that “it was not social medial presence and website
improper for the ALJ to consider the for her business. (Tr. 21, 24, 26-27,
level and type of treatment [the 60-62, 446, 449.) The ALJ further
claimant] sought and obtained in pointed out that Raevin also hosted a
determining what weight to accord “yoga event” in 2024. (Tr. 26, 63-64,
her allegations” of symptoms and 330, 390, 438, 452 (“She mentioned
severity). that she hosted a yoga event”), 343
(“She has attempted odd jobs like
8
teaching yoga but proved Jill J. v. Dudek, No. 8:23-CV-5536-
unsuccessful due to issues with WSB, 2025 WL 1009089, at *12
location.”).) Raevin has not (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2025) (“[N]ormal
challenged the ALJ’s assessment of mental status findings, when
her activities of daily living and these considered in combination with
extensive activities further support Plaintiff’s conservative treatment
the ALJ’s RFC determination as well during the period under review and
as his decision to partially discount Plaintiff’s daily activities, provide
her allegations of total disability, substantial evidence to support the
including any allegation that she ALJ’s decision as to Plaintiff’s mental
required a therapy animal in the limitations.”).
workplace. See Monroe, 826 F.3d at
189 (listing daily activities as the type Fourth, the ALJ addressed numerous
of non-medical evidence an ALJ may medical opinions in assessing
consider in assessing the RFC); 20 Raevin’s RFC. Specifically, the ALJ
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (listing considered the March 2023 opinions
activities of daily living as a relevant of non-examining state agency
factor to consider in assessing medical consultant C. Leinweber, DO,
subjective allegations). as well as a December 2023 opinion of
non-examining state agency medical
Third, the ALJ pointed to Raevin’s consultant Dr. Scott Murkin, both of
generally normal mental status whom concluded that Raevin could
examinations. (Tr. 21 (“Mental status perform a full range of medium work.
examinations noted that her thought (Tr. 28, 89, 100.) The ALJ found these
process and thought content were opinions persuasive, because “they
normal, she was oriented on all had an opportunity to review the
planes, and that her immediate and entirety of [Raevin’s] medical records
remote memory seemed to be within regarding her physical impairments,
normal range. Additionally, her including the consultative physical
mental trend and thought content examinations, and their findings are
revealed no hallucinations, delusions, consistent with the relative lack of any
persecutions, obsessions, thought physical findings at these
control, unusual power, suicidal or examinations.” (Tr. 27.)
homicidal ideation.”), 22, 25, 27, 428,
372-75, 403-06, 354-57, 341, 344-47.) The ALJ next considered the medical
Raevin has not challenged the ALJ’s opinions of the non-examining state
assessment of her generally normal agency psychological consultants. (Tr.
mental status reports and this was 28.) In May 2023, Dr. Kristin Wiltrout
additional substantial evidence in concluded that Raevin could
support of both the ALJ’s RFC understand and remember at least
determination as well as the ALJ’s simple instructions, could sustain
subjective complaints analysis. See concentration and persistence for
9
simple work in a low-stress, non- had no medical treatment for any
production environment, could physical impairments and further
maintain appropriate interactions in because they were consistent with the
the workplace, and could adapt to lack of any significant findings at Dr.
occasional, predictable changes in a Flores’ examination. (Tr. 28.) Raevin
stable work environment. (Tr. 28, 89- has not challenged the ALJ’s
91.) Dr. Susan Stanton, another state assessment or Dr. Flores’ opinion.
agency psychological consultant,
came to the same conclusion in The ALJ next found the March and
January 2024. (Tr. 28, 101-03.) The December 2023 medical opinions of
ALJ found these opinions persuasive consultative examiners Warren E.
because the consultants supported Hoskins, LPA HSP, a licensed
their findings with record evidence psychological associate, and Larry
and their findings were consistent Hines, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist
with the medical and other evidence only “somewhat persuasive.” (Tr. 28-
as a whole.3 (Tr. 28.) 29, 341-48, 352-58.) In both opinions
they described Raevin as “emotionally
The ALJ next found Dr. Augustin fragile” with mild to moderate
Flores’ March 2023 opinion difficulties negotiating simple stress
persuasive, which found that Raevin in light of her history; mild difficulties
had no limitations with regards to her understanding, retaining and
ability to stand, walk, or sit and found following instructions to performing
that she would be limited to routine, repetitive tasks given her
lifting/carrying/pushing/pulling up reported short term memory
to 50 pounds occasionally and up to impairment; mild/moderate
25 pounds frequently, and that she limitations in concentration
had no postural, manipulative, or persistence and pace in light of her
environmental limitations. (Tr. 28, current functioning; and moderately
339.) He concluded the same self-sufficient, though her level of self-
following a second consultative sufficiency was likely to parallel
physical examination in December declines in mental functioning in light
2023. (Tr. 28, 365.) The ALJ found of her history of not showing up to
these opinions persuasive, because work because of depression after
they were consistent with the record mania. (Tr. 28, 347, 358.)
as a whole, which showed that Raevin The ALJ explained that these

3 Raevin has not challenged the ALJ’s the ALJ’s assessment or this Order,
assessment of the non-examining state especially in light of the remaining record
agency opinions other than to note that illustrating Raevin’s sparse mental
they are silent on the issue of the need for health treatment, extensive activities of
a therapy animal. Docket Entry 10 at 2-3. daily living, and generally normal mental
However, that does not undermine either status reports.

10
opinions were not entirely supported Phillip’s letter did not contain any
by the medical evidence, which vocationally relevant functional
showed that, at the time of the initial assessment. (Tr. 29.)
consultative examination, Raevin was
not receiving any mental health Likewise, the ALJ noted that Dr.
treatment, that she opted not to take Tasha Holland-Kornegay, with Our
any medication until June of 2024 for Treatment Center, wrote in May 2023
her conditions, and that despite her that, upon evaluation, Raevin was
mental health impairments, she was “limited [in] one or more major life
able to work on college classes, live activities or major bodily functions,
alone, and establish and maintain her including the ability to care for one’s
own business. (Tr. 29.) Raevin has not self and within their work.” (Tr. 29.)
challenged the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Holland-Kornegay thus
these opinions. recommended an emotional support
animal. (Tr. 29, 426.) However, the
The ALJ then noted that Nizae Phillip, ALJ found that this recommendation
MSW, LCSWA, with B&D Integrated was not persuasive either, because
Health Services, wrote that in there was no vocationally relevant
November 2023 Raevin was functional assessment, and there were
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, no treatment notes from Dr. Holland-
generalized anxiety disorder, and Kornegay to verify these statements.
major depressive disorder, and that (Tr. 29.)
outpatient therapy services and
medication management had been In light of all this, the ALJ limited
recommended. (Tr. 29, 425.) The ALJ Raevin to, in pertinent part, a reduced
found that, to the extent this range of medium work performing
statement could be considered a simple, routine, and repetitive tasks,
medical opinion under the but not at a production rate pace;
regulations, it was unpersuasive performing simple work-related
because there was no vocationally decisions; and only frequent
relevant functional assessment. (Tr. interactions with supervisors, and
29.) The ALJ further noted that only occasionally interaction with
Phillip also wrote in a June 2024 coworkers and the public. (Tr. 22-23.)
letter that Raevin was disabled and The ALJ also considered all the
was eligible for an emotional support material evidence related to Raevin’s
animal to help alleviate her mental alleged need for a therapy animal in
health challenges and improve her the workplace (i.e., Raevin’s
ability to live independently. (Tr. 29, testimony and the two letters from
439.) The ALJ found this medical providers, neither of which
unpersuasive, noting that the issue of were persuasive) but concluded that
disability is one reserved for the this alleged need did not warrant
Commissioner and noting further that inclusion in the RFC in light of
11
Raevin’s sparse mental health the letter written by therapist Phillip,
treatment, her extensive activities of both of whom recommended a
daily living, her mental status reports therapy animal (Tr. 426, 439) and she
upon examination, and the persuasive challenges the ALJ’s decision to find
medical opinion evidence. This is them unpersuasive because they
substantial evidence to support the lacked “any vocationally relevant
ALJ’s RFC determination as well as functional assessment” (Tr. 29).
the omission of a therapy animal from However, under both the old and new
the RFC. regulations describing how an ALJ is
to evaluate medical opinions,
C. Raevin’s Objections to the vagueness in assessing vocational
Contrary Are Not Persuasive. limitations constitutes a permissible
ground for an ALJ to discount a
Nevertheless, Raevin contends that medical opinion in whole or in part.4
the ALJ erred by failing to either The Court is unaware of any law that
include the use of a therapy animal in would change this general principle
the RFC or to explain why he omitted when it comes to a therapy animal and
the use of one. Docket Entry 8 at 6. In ample persuasive case law supports
support, she points to the letter this conclusion.5 See also 20 C.F.R. §
written by Dr. Holland-Kornegay and 404.1513(a)(2) (providing that “[a]

4 See, e.g., Wesley v. Kijakazi, No. reversible error where “Dr. Stromberg
1:20CV364, 2021 WL 4129234, at *11 did not opine that Plaintiff required an
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 2021) (“Vagueness emotional support animal in order to
constitutes a permissible grounds for an perform any work-related functions, nor
ALJ to discount a medical opinion.”) did he discuss what Plaintiff could do in
(collecting cases); Betty C. v. Comm’r, a work setting despite her symptoms and
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:23-CV-00246- diagnoses”); Angela H. v. Comm’r, SSA,
JMC, 2023 WL 7386206, at *5 (D. Md. No. 2:22-cv-4461, 2024 WL 1259875, at
Nov. 8, 2023) (collecting cases); Samuel *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2024) (holding
P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-5881, that a letter recommending that the
2021 WL 5769404, at *6 (W.D. Wash. plaintiff obtain an emotional support
Dec. 6, 2021); Langford v. Comm’r of Soc. animal to help alleviate issues with social
Sec. Admin., No. 1:22-CV-00665-CEH, interaction, stress, and anxiety and to
2023 WL 3058160, at *26 (N.D. Ohio Apr. enjoy the use of her dwelling was not a
24, 2023); Chiccola v. Comm’r of Soc. medical opinion because it did not
Sec., No. 1:18 CV 2940, 2020 WL describe the work functions she could
1031488, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2020) perform despite her symptoms); Ashley
(internal citations omitted) (collecting D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 22-
cases). 11344, 2023 WL 5266849, at *10 (E.D.
Mich. July 17, 2023) (finding no error
5 See Leticia B. v. King, No. CV 24-116 where “Dr. Cousineau’s letter [does not]
MV/GJF, 2025 WL 289420, at *10 indicate how the use of an emotional
(D.N.M. Jan. 24, 2025) (finding no support dog would bear on Plaintiff’s
12
medical opinion is a statement from a the dwelling unit you own and/or
medical source about what you can administer.” (Tr. 426.) She states,
still do despite your impairment(s) “My client’s emotional support
and whether you have one or more animal helps them deal with the stress
impairment-related limitations or and pain associated with their
restrictions in [specified] abilities”). disability.” (Tr. 426.)

More specifically, Dr. Holland- The ALJ did not err here. The
Kornegay’s letter references generic question of disability is reserved to
“mental health conditions,” asserts in the Commissioner and the ALJ
a conclusory fashion that Raevin is accurately stated the same. See 20
disabled, and then asserts vaguely C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3). Nor, in light
that she is “substantially limit[ed in] of the ample case law cited above,
one or more major life activities or supra note 5, and the ALJ’s evaluation
major bodily functions, including the of the overall record, did the ALJ err
ability to care for [her] self and within in finding this vague, conclusory, and
[her] work.” (Tr. 426.) Dr. Holland- unsupported letter unpersuasive,
Kornegay then “recommend[s] an especially where there are no
emotional support animal” as treatment notes in the record from Dr.
“necessary to provide therapeutic Holland-Kornegay.
emotional support that alleviates
symptoms of [her] client’s Therapist Nizae Phillip’s letter is
impairment, and to enhance [her] similar to Dr. Holland-Kornegay’s.
client’s ability to function and live Phillip’s letter asserts that “[b]ased on
independently and fully use and enjoy my evaluation of [Raevin’s] mental

ability to work.”) (citations omitted); 3:19-CV-47, 2019 WL 6257994, at *19
Horne v. Saul, No. 2:19-CV-013-DCP, (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 4, 2019) (“[T]he ALJ
2020 WL 1547068, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. does not need to consider the use of a
Mar. 31, 2020) (“[T]he Court finds that service dog in Plaintiff’s RFC as there has
Plaintiff has failed to establish that a been no testimony regarding . . . whether
service animal was medically necessary. Plaintiff requires the service dog to
The referenced letter . . . does not . . . perform work[.]”) (collecting cases);
provide an opinion on the impact of a Payano v. Colvin, No. 2:15-cv-00294-
service animal on Plaintiff’s ability to RFB-GWF, 2017 WL 4778593, at *4 (D.
work.”); Nancy J. M. v. Saul, No. ED CV Nev. Oct. 23, 2017) (finding that a letter
19-01144-RAO, 2020 WL 1975364, at *14 from a VA psychiatrist recommending
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020) (“[T]he ALJ the use of a service dog when out in
gave no weight to Dr. Reid’s opinion that public “alone does not support an
Plaintiff requires an emotional support assessment that the dog is necessary for
animal because the opinion did not Plaintiff to work, nor describe how she
provide specific information regarding would need any dog in a work setting”)
[Plaintiff’s] work-related abilities.”) adopted in pertinent part in, 2017 WL
(citation omitted); Cordell v. Saul, No. 4778593, at *9 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2017).
13
health condition and considering her obligation to determine whether
history and functional limitations Raevin’s alleged therapy dog use
stemming from emotional/mental qualified as medically necessary. See
health barriers, it is evident that [she] supra note 5. Thus, if the medical
qualifies as having a disability[.]” (Tr. necessity standard were to apply here,
439.) Phillip notes that Raevin is Raevin’s objection would fail for this
“eligible to have an emotional support reason alone. See id. But even if the
animal” “[t]o help alleviate [her] medical necessity standard does not
challenges and improve her ability to apply here, Raevin’s objection still
live independently” and fails in light of the ALJ’s discussion of
“recommend[s] an animal [to] assist all of the evidence in the record,
[her] in managing her disability.” (Tr. including Raevin’s sparse mental
439.) health treatment, her extensive
activities of daily living (including
Again, the ALJ did not err here. As going to college and running a
noted, the question of disability is business), her mental status reports
reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 upon examination, and the medical
C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3). Nor, in light opinion evidence. See id.
of the authorities cited above, supra
note 5, and the ALJ’s evaluation of the In support of her challenge to the
overall record, did the ALJ err in ALJ’s decision, Raevin also points to
finding this vague, conclusory, and her testimony at the administrative
unsupported letter (which does not hearing. Docket Entry 8 at 4-5
reference the workplace or assert any referencing Tr. 49 (“[S]he helps with
functional limitation) unpersuasive. my anxiety, depression, the
See also Sandra A. v. O’Malley, No. symptoms of my bipolar disorder. She
3:23-CV-417-SLS, 2024 WL 4351441, does help me kind of keep my daily
at *8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2024) needs. She she’ll let me know if it is
(finding insufficient “evidence of any time to get up or time to go to bed.
need for a service dog in the She’ll let you know that I need to eat
workplace” where “Nurse Practitioner sometimes or sit down if my anxiety is
Moore-Zierow recommended that getting a little out of whack.”).
Plaintiff use an emotional support However, the ALJ specifically
animal in her home and during referenced this testimony as part of
aircraft travel to alleviate her his summation of Raevin’s allegations
emotional difficulties and enhance (Tr. 23) and then went on to provide
her ability to live independently.”). good reasons for not fully crediting all
of her purported limitations. Again,
Because the ALJ gave good reasons these reasons include Raevin’s sparse
for finding the two letters mental health treatment, her
recommending a therapy animal extensive activities of daily living
unpersuasive, he satisfied any (including going to college and
14
running a business), her mental status words, the Court is not left to guess
reports upon examination, and the why the ALJ declined to include a
persuasive medical opinion evidence. therapy animal in the RFC. See
These are good reasons to partially Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 637
discount her allegations. (4th Cir. 2015) (observing that a
remand is proper where a court if “left
The remainder of Raevin’s challenge to guess about how the ALJ arrived at
to the ALJ’s decision amounts to a his conclusions”). The ALJ addressed
recitation of evidence that if fully all the material evidence on the issue
credited in her favor, would render and gave good reasons backed by
her disabled. Docket Entry 8 at 5-11. substantial evidence in support of the
However, the ALJ evaluated the RFC. For all of these reasons, the
relevant and material evidence in this Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
case, reconciled it when necessary,
and reasonably concluded that Racvin V. CONCLUSION
was not disabled under the Act. While After careful consideration of the
Raevin disagrees and points to evidence of record, the Court finds
evidence that the ALJ already that the Commissioner’s decision is
considered to argue for the inclusion legally correct, supported by
of a therapy animal in the RFC, this substantial evidence, and susceptible
does not mean that the ALJ’s decision to judicial review. Accordingly, IT IS
was erroneous or that she can ask this HEREBY ORDERED that the final
Court to reweigh the evidence to decision of the Commissioner is
arrive at a different conclusion. upheld.
In the end, remand is not warranted,
given that the ALJ already provided a JoAnna Gibsdn McFadden
logical bridge connecting substantial United States Magistrate Judge
evidence to an RFC that did not
include a therapy animal.® In other June 12, 2026

6 Citing SSR 11-2p, the Commissioner an accommodation, then an ALJ is not
contends that “the ALJ was also not permitted to consider any limitations
required to consider [Raevin’s] alleged posed by the need for a service animal or
need for a service animal,” Docket Entry ESA.”) (collecting cases). However,
9 at 7 citing SSR, 11-2P, 2011 WL because the Fourth Circuit has not
4055665, and there is some support in definitely resolved this issue, Shue, 2024
the caselaw for this, see W.D. v. Dudek, WL 2827936, at *4, the Court has not
No. 1:24-CV-00444-SBP, 2025 WL disposed of this case on that ground and
947533, at *6 n.8 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, has instead fully entertained the merits
2025) (“Several courts have entertained of Raevin’s challenge and found them to
the notion that if a service animal or be unpersuasive for the reasons
[emotional support animal] is considered described herein.
15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341994. Public record. Not legal advice.