# Richard Jackson v. William Jones

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · June 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341883

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** June 12, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341883

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding state action when “the state, acting through the pri- vate entity, caused the third party’s harm” (emphasis added)
- explaining that “[c]ampaigning for a specific candidate is not official conduct”

## Opinion text

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FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 26-10854
____________________

RICHARD L. JACKSON,
JACKSON FOR GOVERNOR, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
Cross-Appellees,
versus

WILLIAM BURTON JONES,
in his personal capacity, and in his official
capacity as the Lieutenant Governor of Georgia,
WBJ LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE, INC.,
BURT JONES FOR GEORGIA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees
Cross-Appellants,
CHRISTOPHER M. CARR, et al.,
in their official capacities,
Defendants.
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2 Opinion of the Court 26-10854
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:26-cv-00782-TWT
____________________
____________________
No. 26-10886
____________________

RICHARD L. JACKSON,
JACKSON FOR GOVERNOR, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus

WILLIAM BURTON JONES, in his personal
capacity, and in his official capacity as the
Lieutenant Governor of Georgia,
WBJ LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.

____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:26-cv-00782-TWT
____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and GRANT,
Circuit Judges.
GRANT, Circuit Judge:
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 3

Gubernatorial candidate Rick Jackson is the latest in a line of
would-be governors who have objected to the uncapped
fundraising opportunity that Georgia law offers incumbent
Governors and Lieutenant Governors. And he is likely correct.
The First Amendment does not forgive such favoritism.
To receive the preliminary injunctive relief he seeks, Jackson
must also show a likelihood that the conduct of his opponent’s
“leadership committee” qualifies as state action. This question is
admittedly somewhat closer, in part because federal courts have
not confronted a similar statute from any other jurisdiction. But
the actions of this one-of-a-kind “leadership” entity—the existence
of which is attributable to the State and the challenged conduct of
which can occur only with a specific state official at its helm—are
fairly characterized as state action.
Jackson is thus likely to succeed on the merits question, and
the other preliminary injunction factors favor him as well—both
the equities between the parties and the public interest point in
favor of resolving the irreparable First Amendment injury caused
by Georgia’s singular campaign finance innovation. We affirm the
district court’s preliminary injunction.
I.
The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign
Finance Act comprehensively regulates campaign financing and
spending in state elections. OCGA §§ 21-5-1, 21-5-2. The law
imposes limits on the amount of money that candidates for
statewide office can accept from individual contributors. Id. § 21-
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4 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

5-41(a). Currently, those limits are $8,400 for primary and general
elections, and $4,800 for runoff elections. See id. § 21-5-41(a), (k). 1
Georgia has had contribution limits in place, indexed for inflation,
since at least the year 1990. 2
Campaign committees are subject to those same limitations.
See OCGA § 21-5-41(a). Georgia also allows various other political
committees that have different rules, but none of them allow both
contributions of an unlimited amount and direct support of a
candidate. Independent committees, for example, can accept
unlimited amounts from an individual donor, but cannot
coordinate their expenditures with candidates or their campaign
committees. Id. § 21-5-3(15); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 189-6-.04.
Next take political action committees, which also face no
restrictions on the amount of money they can accept from
individual donors, but their own contributions to candidates
cannot exceed the usual limits. Cf. OCGA § 21-5-41(a). Hybrid
PACs fall somewhere in the middle; they can contribute directly to
candidates (like a PAC) and expend uncoordinated funds to support
or oppose a candidate (like an independent committee), but only if
the committee maintains separate accounting for the two pots of

1 The statutory contribution limits are indexed for inflation.
See OCGA § 21-
5-41(k); Contribution Limits, Ga. State Ethics Comm’n, https://ethics.ga.gov
/contribution-limits/ [https://perma.cc/R9Y9-UNHS].
2 See 1997 Op. Att’y Gen. 97-8 (Ga.), https://law.georgia.gov/opinions/97-8

[https://perma.cc/R3SZ-WQHF].
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 5

money and limits any direct candidate contributions to the typical
contribution limits.3
The “leadership committees,” authorized by the Georgia
legislature in 2021, are birds of a different feather. Id. § 21-5-34.2.
They are bound by neither contribution limits nor restrictions on
direct support for candidates—they can both give and receive
unlimited dollars. Id. § 21-5-34.2(e). And they can directly
coordinate with any campaign. See id. § 21-5-34.2(d).
Sounds great, at least from the candidate’s perspective. But
not all candidates can take advantage—only those occupying a few
particular roles can form and chair leadership committees. See id.
§ 21-5-34.2(a). Most relevant here, and in past litigation over this
provision, is that two major players can chair leadership
committees ahead of a primary election for statewide office—the
incumbent Governor and the incumbent Lieutenant Governor.4
Id.
The consequences are significant—a complete release from
generally applicable contribution limitations in a primary election

3 See Ga. State Ethics Comm’n, Adv. Op. 2015-02, at 3, https://ethics.ga.gov

/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/2015.06.25-AO-2015-02-PAC-Registration-
Executed.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNK3-5UDX]; see also OCGA § 21-5-41(a).
4 After a primary election, the nominees of a political party for Governor and

Lieutenant Governor selected during that primary may also form leadership
committees. OCGA § 21-5-34.2(a). Additionally, the leaders of the majority
and minority caucuses of the State House and Senate may create leadership
committees. Id.
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for these two officials. And only these two officials. So ahead of a
primary election, a leadership committee can accept contributions
in any amount and then use those contributions to directly support
the sitting Governor or Lieutenant Governor’s campaign. The
incumbent’s opponents, however, are not so lucky. Other than the
majority and minority caucus leaders of both legislative houses, no
one else can establish a leadership committee. Not a legislator, not
another statewide elected official, and not a private citizen. These
candidates have all the usual contribution limits imposed by
Georgia law.5
These “leadership committees” have raised eyebrows
during the last several election cycles, and this year is no exception.
Georgia’s Lieutenant Governor, Burt Jones, is seeking the
Republican nomination for Governor. In 2022, Jones set up a
leadership committee, the WBJ Leadership Committee, Inc., under
§ 21-5-34.2. Free from contribution limits, his leadership
committee has raised millions of dollars—including multiple
individual contributions of $100,000. And Jones has used those
funds to support his campaign.
The same rules do not apply to Richard Jackson, who
entered the gubernatorial race on February 3, 2026, and also seeks
the Republican nomination. Currently a private citizen, he cannot

5 One other thing: the leadership committee statute relieves the incumbent

Governor and Lieutenant Governor from the restrictions that Georgia law has
long placed on candidates accepting campaign contributions during legislative
sessions. See OCGA § 21-5-35(a).
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establish a leadership committee. See id. § 21-5-34.2(a). So while
his primary opponent has unlimited fundraising and unrestrained
coordination, Jackson does not.
Chafing against these comparative limits, a week after he
entered the race, Jackson (and his campaign committee, Jackson for
Governor) filed a complaint against Jones, the WBJ Leadership
Committee, Burt Jones for Georgia, Georgia’s Attorney General,
and the members of the Georgia State Ethics Commission. Jackson
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
arguing that the leadership committee statute violates his rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The next day, he
filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction seeking,
among other things, to enjoin political fundraising and spending by
Jones’s leadership committee.
Before the district court ruled on that motion, Jackson filed
one more—a motion for a temporary restraining order. In that
motion, Jackson alleged that Jones’s leadership committee sharply
increased its spending after the complaint was filed. The district
court swiftly held a hearing and granted a TRO from the bench.
The court’s written order, filed the next week, barred Jones’s
leadership committee from raising or spending money in support
of Jones’s gubernatorial campaign. Jackson v. Jones, No. 26-cv-
00782, 2026 WL 561148, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2026). The
record is not clear about whether spending stopped.
A few weeks later, the district court held a hearing on
Jackson’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Having concluded
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8 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

that Jackson was substantially likely to succeed on the merits, the
court entered a preliminary injunction against the leadership
committee. The committee orally moved to stay the preliminary
injunction pending an appeal to this Court, and after hearing
arguments from the parties, the court granted that motion.
The district court’s written preliminary injunction order
followed. See Jackson v. Jones, No. 26-cv-00782, 2026 WL 781193
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2026). Building on three earlier orders from the
Northern District of Georgia, all holding that the leadership
committee statute likely violates the First Amendment, the district
court concluded that Jackson was likely to succeed on the merits.
Id. at *7–8 (citing Perdue v. Kemp, 584 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1321–27
(N.D. Ga. 2022); One Ga., Inc. v. Carr, 601 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1304–
07 (N.D. Ga. 2022); Graham v. Carr, 634 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1354–56
(N.D. Ga. 2022), vacated as moot sub nom., Graham v. Att’y Gen., State
of Ga., 110 F.4th 1239 (11th Cir. 2024)). 6 The court also concluded
that Jones’s leadership committee likely qualified as a state actor,
making it subject to suit under § 1983. Id. at *6–7. As a result, and

6 In fact, this case marks the seventh time that the leadership committee

statute has been challenged in federal court since its enactment. Its
constitutionality has been tested in three other cases in the Northern District
of Georgia, in addition to the cases cited above. Those cases did not result in
preliminary injunctions for reasons unrelated to the merits of the First
Amendment question. See Order at 16–20, Carr v. WBJ Leadership Committee,
No. 25-cv-04426 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2025), Dkt. No. 22 (standing); Order at 26–
29, Democratic Party of Ga. v. Kemp, No. 24-cv-03154 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 2024),
Dkt. No. 23 (standing); Safe Affordable Ga. v. Kreyenbuhl, No. 25-cv-06985, 2026
WL 1072927, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2026) (scope of the injunction).
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 9

after weighing the remaining preliminary injunction factors, the
court enjoined the leadership committee from “soliciting
contributions and making any expenditures in support of” Jones’s
campaign for Governor—that is, until he “becomes the nominee
of the Republican Party or further order of this Court, whichever
comes first.” Id. at *13.
The district court stayed that injunction pending appeal,
citing “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at *10. This Court
subsequently denied Jackson’s motion to vacate the stay pending
appeal, but also expedited this appeal.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion, reviewing underlying legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See
Gonzalez v. Governor of Ga., 978 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020); cf.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 428 (2006). Because a preliminary injunction is an
“extraordinary and drastic remedy,” it is appropriate only when the
moving party can show that “(1) it has a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless
the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause
the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest.” Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d
854, 860 (11th Cir. 2020).
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10 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

III.
The defendants first challenge Jackson’s Article III standing
to seek a preliminary injunction against Jones’s leadership
committee. We see little to discuss, despite the defendants’
“spirited efforts to overcomplicate these questions.” Mobile
Baykeeper, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 175 F.4th 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.
2026). “A party has standing when it (1) suffered an injury in fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 100 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).
An injury in fact is one “that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical.”
Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 925 (11th Cir.
2020) (en banc). As this Court and the Supreme Court have already
recognized, a candidate is harmed by the “grant of a competitive
advantage—an increase in the ability of [a candidate’s] opponent to
speak.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008).
Georgia’s leadership committee statute provides Jones with an
opportunity to raise “additional funds” relative to Jackson. Ariz.
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 747
(2011) (quotation omitted); see OCGA § 21-5-34.2(e). Jones’s
leadership committee has taken that opportunity, which makes
Jackson’s “own speech . . . less effective.” Bennett, 564 U.S. at 747
(quotation omitted). We agree with the district court that Jackson
suffers injury when he is “confronted with an uneven electoral
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 11

playing field between incumbents and non-incumbents.” Jackson,
2026 WL 781193, at *4.
Nor can we argue with the district court’s conclusion that
Jackson’s injury is traceable to the leadership committee and its
actions—not just the statute. See id. at *4–5. “The second element
of standing can be referred to as either causation or traceability,
and requires plaintiffs to allege that their injuries are caused by the
conduct they challenge.” Mobile Baykeeper, 175 F.4th at 1323. Jones
is wrong to suggest that any injury Jackson suffers must be from
what the statute allows in the abstract, rather than actions taken by
Jones’s leadership committee. Cf. Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727,
732 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J.) (“The mere presence on the
statute books of an unconstitutional statute . . . does not entitle
anyone to sue.”). The existence of the leadership committee
statute in the Georgia codebook does not cause Jackson’s injury.
The Jones committee’s taking advantage of the uneven playing
field available under that statute does. See Jackson, 2026 WL
781193, at *4–5.
And that injury would be redressed by an order disallowing
the committee from doing just that: using the uneven scheme to
benefit Jones’s campaign. See id. at *5. This is not a close call.
“Indeed, redressability is often just the flip side of causation: If a
defendant’s action causes an injury, enjoining the action or
awarding damages for the action will typically redress that injury.”
Mobile Baykeeper, 175 F.4th at 1323 (quotation omitted). As the
district court explained, the harm posed by the leadership
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12 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

committee’s conduct will cease if Jackson obtains the injunctive
relief he seeks. Jackson, 2026 WL 781193, at *5.
Jackson has shown that he has standing to pursue the
preliminary injunction he seeks.
IV.
This is not the first time that the leadership committee
statute has been challenged. But it is the first time it has arrived
here in time for a decision. We agree with each district court that
has addressed the First Amendment question: our Constitution
does not allow States to favor some candidates over others with
different contribution limits. Whatever the justification (and there
is not much of one here), “allowing the government to set the
terms of the debate is poison, not antidote.” Honeyfund.com Inc. v.
Governor, State of Fla., 94 F.4th 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024). Jackson
is thus likely to succeed in showing that he has suffered a First
Amendment injury.
But that is not the end of the story—we also consider one
other merits-related question. Jackson brought this suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for deprivations of
federal rights by persons acting “under color of” state law. So he
needs to show not only that he likely suffered a constitutional
injury, but also that it is likely that a state actor committed that
deprivation. See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir.
1992). Again, we think it likely that Jackson prevails. Georgia’s
leadership committee statute gives special authority only to select
incumbent officials, and that authority dries up as soon as they no
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 13

longer wield official state power. So although the Jones leadership
committee is formally a private entity, its fundraising advantages
are available only as a consequence of Jones’s status as an
incumbent Lieutenant Governor. That combination is enough to
make its actions in connection with those advantages creditable to
the State for purposes of § 1983.
A.
The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent
application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.” Bennett, 564 U.S. at 734 (quotations omitted). After all, that
protection “was designed to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources, and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (quotations omitted).
What’s more, both political spending and candidate contributions
“fall within the First Amendment’s protection of speech and
political association.” Ala. Democratic Conf. v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 838
F.3d 1057, 1062 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Indeed, such
interests are among “the most fundamental First Amendment
activities.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
Even so, as compared to expenditures, contributions “lie
closer to the edges than to the core of political expression.” Ala.
Democratic Conf., 838 F.3d at 1062–63 (quotation omitted). So while
restrictions on expenditures must survive strict scrutiny,
contribution limits satisfy constitutional review if they are “closely
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14 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

drawn to match a sufficiently important interest.” Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003) (quotations omitted);
see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. Such interests are limited. In fact,
“preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the
only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances.” Ala. Democratic Conf.,
838 F.3d at 1064 (quotation omitted).
No one disputes that the baseline contribution limits
imposed by Georgia’s Campaign Finance Act satisfy that standard.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld “government-imposed
limits on contributions to candidates,” explaining that those
restrictions are typically justified by an interest in combatting
political corruption. Bennett, 564 U.S. at 735, 749; see Buckley, 424
U.S. at 23–25. 7
The leadership committee statute is different. It disrupts the
Georgia scheme’s evenhanded application by providing effectively
unlimited fundraising for some—but not all—candidates. Jones,
through his leadership committee, can accept campaign
contributions in any amount and spend them directly on his own
election. Jackson cannot. He contends that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Davis v. Federal Election Commission all but compels the

7 The leadership committees also have a few other special advantages, most

prominently the ability to fundraise during the annual legislative session when
other officeholders are barred from doing so. See OCGA § 21-5-35(a). Because
Jackson is not an officeholder, he had no limits in that regard. So that provision
is not at issue in this litigation.
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conclusion that this uneven scheme violates his First Amendment
rights. 554 U.S. 724. We agree: such schemes are “antithetical to
the First Amendment.” Id. at 744.
To start, the Jones leadership committee has never even
tried to articulate an anticorruption interest justifying the statutory
scheme. Instead, the committee makes the remarkable assertion
that § 21-5-34.2 “does not implicate First Amendment concerns.”
We would be hard pressed to reach that conclusion even in the first
instance, but Davis has already given us the answer. See id. at 743–
44. There, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
a federal election law that, in its words, sometimes imposed
“different campaign contribution limits on candidates competing
for the same congressional seat.” Id. at 728.
Under the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,” when a
candidate’s personal election spending exceeded a certain amount,
that candidate’s opponent could then receive contributions three
times larger than the ordinary limits. Id. at 729, 736. Because the
self-financed candidate was still subject to the generally applicable
contribution limits, the scheme effectively imposed different
contribution limits “on candidates vying for the same seat.” Id. at
729, 743–44. The differential between the two gave self-funded
candidates a reason to keep their personal spending below the
statutory trigger. Id. at 738–39. That “scheme of discriminatory
contribution limits,” like the one here, was not justified by “any
governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception
of corruption,” and it could not survive First Amendment
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16 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

challenge. Id. at 740. The Court memorably described it as a “drag
on First Amendment rights.” Id. at 739.
Whether before or after Davis, the Supreme Court has
“never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different
contribution limits for candidates who are competing against each
other.” Id. at 738; see also Bennett, 564 U.S. at 736. Neither have we.
In Scott v. Roberts, for example, we rejected a Florida campaign
finance law subsidizing candidates who participated in the state’s
public financing system. 612 F.3d at 1281. The subsidy was
triggered when a nonparticipating candidate exceeded the
statutory expenditure limit; after that, the State gave the
participating candidate matching funds, dollar-for-dollar for any
amount the nonparticipating opponent spent above the threshold.
Id. at 1286. As in Davis, the problem was “the grant of a
competitive advantage”—that is, “an increase in the ability of [the
candidate’s] opponent to speak.” Id. at 1291–92. And there too, the
State could not show that any “anticorruption interest” justified the
statute’s asymmetrical treatment of candidates. Id. at 1292. We
concluded that the plaintiff was “exceedingly likely” to show a First
Amendment violation because “Davis compel[led] this
conclusion.” Id. at 1297.
Here too, the leadership committee scheme “produces
fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive context of
electoral politics.” Davis, 554 U.S. at 739. And it directly affects
speech “at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 17

Before and during the 2026 gubernatorial primary, only Lieutenant
Governor Jones can chair a leadership committee. So only
Lieutenant Governor Jones can use that committee to accept
unlimited contributions to directly further his own campaign.
That places Jackson at a direct disadvantage: he remains subject to
the ordinary contribution limits imposed by Georgia law. The
leadership committee scheme thus imposes—quite directly—
different contribution limits “on candidates vying for the same
seat.” Davis, 554 U.S. at 744. That step is plainly “antithetical to
the First Amendment” under Davis. Id. It is no surprise that each
district court to consider the matter has reached the same answer. 8
The Jones defendants resist this conclusion—though not
with any serious defense of the statute. They offer no justification
for its favoritism in their briefing, and instead contend that the First
Amendment is not implicated because Davis only applies when
uneven contribution limits follow a self-financing trigger. No.
What prompted First Amendment review in Davis was “the grant
of a competitive advantage—an increase in the ability of [the
candidate’s] opponent to speak.” Scott, 612 F.3d at 1291–92; see
Davis, 554 U.S. at 739. Though the particulars differ, the root
problem here is the same. Georgia law gives Jones an
unconstitutional advantage over his competitors in the Republican
primary. See Scott, 612 F.3d at 1291–92. We do not see how the

8 See Perdue, 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1321–27; One Ga., 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1304–07;

Graham, 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1354–56; Jackson, 2026 WL 781193, at *7–8; Safe
Affordable Ga., 2026 WL 1072927, at *5.
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18 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

First Amendment can tolerate an exception that plays favorites
with contribution limits, offering a few candidates unlimited
contributions with no serious justification.
Jackson, in short, has all but conclusively demonstrated that
he is likely to succeed in showing a First Amendment infirmity in
the leadership committee statute’s “discriminatory fundraising
limitations.” See Davis, 554 U.S. at 739. 9
B.
That is not, however, the end of our analysis. Section 1983
allows plaintiffs to hold state officials accountable for depriving
them of rights secured by federal law or the Constitution. So a
plaintiff seeking relief under that statute must show that the
unlawful conduct he challenges “was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130. 10 Traditionally,
that standard is met by proving that the defendant in a § 1983 action
“exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quotation
omitted).

9 Given our resolution, we need not address Jackson’s equal protection claim.

10 This requirement has consistently been treated as equivalent to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement, so we use the terms
interchangeably, and consider both lines of precedent, too. See Focus on the
Fam. v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003).
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That cashes out to two requirements. First, “the deprivation
must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created
by the State.” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130 (quotation omitted). So far,
so good—Georgia law straightforwardly establishes the discordant
contribution-limit carveout that Jackson challenges and that
Jones’s leadership committee exploits. But the second presents a
tougher challenge, at least for Jackson: “the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[M]erely private conduct” cannot
be targeted, “no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quotations
omitted). Put differently, stopping “[i]ndividual invasion of
individual rights” is not the object of § 1983. Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quotation omitted).
Even so, nominally private conduct carried out by a formally
private actor is still actionable under § 1983 when that “conduct is
fairly attributable to the State.” Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50. And when
a state official is involved, the “dispositive issue is whether the
official was acting pursuant to the power he/she possessed by state
authority or acting only as a private individual.” Edwards v. Wallace
Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir. 1995). Though the
Supreme Court has set out certain parameters for deciding this
question, it has cautioned that it would be “an impossible task” to
“fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state
responsibility.” Burton, 365 U.S. at 722 (quotation omitted). The
Court has also emphasized that the “framework of the peculiar
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20 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

facts” in each case will determine whether there is state action. Id.
at 726.
This Court, drawing from Supreme Court case law, has
recognized “three tests for establishing state action by what is
otherwise a private person or entity: the public function test, the
state compulsion test, and the nexus/joint action test.” Harvey, 949
F.2d at 1130. Jackson travels only under the third. The “relevant
inquiry” there “is whether the State has so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with the private parties that it was a
joint participant in the enterprise.” Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue,
241 F.3d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 2001) (alteration adopted and
quotation omitted).
We have cautioned that this “rule language” sometimes
“suffers from a lack of context.” Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686,
696–97 (11th Cir. 2021). At bottom, our precedents show that the
State (or a state official) must have had “some affirmative role” in
bringing about “the particular conduct underlying a claimant’s civil
rights grievance.” Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1348 (emphasis and
quotation omitted); see also Cobb v. Ga. Power Co., 757 F.2d 1248,
1251 (11th Cir. 1985). But we need not find an exact match to a
past case—as both we and the Supreme Court have emphasized,
“this analysis will be heavily fact specific.” Charles, 18 F.4th at 696
(citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 722). That’s especially true here, where
we consider a statute unlike any other the courts have tested.
Jackson has likely met his burden. His primary assertion in
support of finding state action is that the leadership committee
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 21

exists only by virtue of Jones’s status as the Lieutenant Governor.
Absolutely: if Jones were not the Lieutenant Governor, he could
not form a leadership committee. See OCGA § 21-5-34.2(a). And
whenever he “ceases to hold the office,” his committee must either
name another “eligible person” as chairman or dispose of its
remaining assets. Id. § 21-5-34.2(c). Effectively, the committee
must dissolve as soon as Jones is no longer the Lieutenant
Governor. These requirements are a firm signal that the leadership
committee must be acting under color of state law because Jones’s
status—and only his status—enables his leadership committee to
behave in a way that violates Jackson’s constitutional rights.
But what of the fact that when an official campaigns for
office, that conduct is generally considered private rather than
public? See, e.g., Campbell v. Reisch, 986 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2021).
To start, the state action issue only arises when the challenged
conduct is ostensibly private; the question is whether the State or
its officials are so embedded into that conduct that it should be
credited to the State. And the facts here show that the Jones
leadership committee’s fundraising fits the bill. One key difference
between ordinary candidate behavior and the actions challenged in
this lawsuit is that state officials do not—or at least should not—
have special rules that make it easier for them to win elections. So
conduct permitted by those special rules, available only to specified
state actors, is reasonably credited to the State. After all, a private
party’s conduct does not become state action simply because it is
“made possible by Georgia statute.” Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130.
Instead, the State or one of its officials must have taken some action
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22 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

as a “joint participant in the enterprise.” Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1348
(quotation omitted). That’s exactly what happened here.
The Lieutenant Governor himself, a proper defendant in his
official capacity, has made an “active choice to partner with a
private entity in a way that can impart liability” by participating in
the leadership committee enterprise. Charles, 18 F.4th at 696. Jones
as a private actor would have no access to the advantages offered
by a leadership committee. Only Jones as a government actor—
the sitting Lieutenant Governor—can raise unlimited funds and
spend those funds directly on his campaign. This sort of “[m]isuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,
is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.” United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
Does that mean that all campaign action is converted into
official activity? Thankfully not. No case says once an entity is a
state actor for one purpose it is a state actor for all other purposes.
Quite the opposite, in fact: under § 1983, “a private entity may be
designated a state actor for some purposes but still function as a
private actor in other respects.” Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning
Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2010). Take the Supreme
Court’s cases holding that even political parties can be state actors
when state law “prescribes an election process that gives a special
role to [them].” Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573
(2000). In Smith v. Allwright, for example, the Court treated the
Texas Democratic Party’s racially discriminatory primary process
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as state action. 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944). That conclusion did not
mean that everything the Party did took on constitutional
dimensions as an act of the state. Same goes here. Leadership
committee conduct that is not legally attributable to Jones’s status
as an officeholder—actions that any candidate’s campaign
committee could take—likely would not qualify as state action.
Jones pushes back, arguing that Jackson cannot show state
action because he has pointed to nothing suggesting that the State
itself has actively participated in the leadership committee’s raising
and spending funds to support his gubernatorial campaign. This
objection misses the mark. To qualify as a state actor, a private
party’s decisions or purposes need not be formally blessed by the
State or directly benefit the State. Entwinement with a
participating state official’s own ends, lawful or not, is enough:
“The involvement of a state official plainly provides the state action
essential to show a direct violation of petitioner’s [First]
Amendment rights.” Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 n.5
(1978) (alterations adopted and quotation omitted).
So while the State cannot be said to have a particular interest
in supporting the campaign of Burt Jones, its role is not, as the
dissent would put it, “entirely permissive.” Dissenting Op. at 3.
That the leadership committees are formally private cannot
obscure that they are designed under state law “to attain
governmental objectives” and are “directed and controlled” by
state officials. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001); see also Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
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24 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

513 U.S. 374, 398 (1995). For one, the leadership committee
statute’s asymmetric advantages reveal a government policy
favoring a few incumbent officials.11 That conclusion is only
supported by the fact that Georgia has failed to articulate a credible
justification for the statute, and the Jones committee has offered no
justification at all. See Jackson, 2026 WL 781193, at *8. A state
cannot launder impermissible objectives by running them through
a private entity. Under these circumstances, “private use of the
challenged state procedures with the help of state officials
constitutes state action.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
933 (1982).
The Jones leadership committee protests that if this were the
rule, “every Georgia pharmacist would act as an arm of the state
when prescribing controlled substances pursuant to a professional
license.” No. To start, it is obvious that state licensure alone does
not create state action. See Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1132. But if a state
statute created a special class of pharmacies with unique authority,
available if and only if they were owned and operated by the state’s
incumbent Governor or Lieutenant Governor, you can bet that

11 We note that every state official with some high-level role in passing or

signing legislation has the opportunity to be involved in a leadership
committee. See Ga. Const. art. V, § I, para. III (“The Lieutenant Governor
shall be the President of the Senate.”); OCGA § 21-5-34.2(a) (majority and
minority caucus leaders of both legislative houses may form leadership
committees). In contrast, no official without some role in the legislative
process has that opportunity during the primary election.
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there would be a good case for treating those pharmacies’ conduct
as state action.
Going beyond the strawman, this assertion reflects a more
fundamental error. Treating an entity as an arm of the state is
different, both legally and conceptually, than treating certain
actions as creditable to the state in litigation. See, e.g., Walker v.
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 771 F.3d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 2014).
Conflation of these two concepts infuses many of the arguments
against finding state action. The Jones brief, for example, argues
that “the district court’s order dangerously transformed a
committee authorized by state law into one that is an arm of the state
itself,” and “threatens not only conduct protected by the First
Amendment, but every decision of every licensed person or
corporation in Georgia.” Again, no. Neither the district court nor
this one has said that the Jones leadership committee is an “arm of
the state,” with every one of its acts a government act, and all of
the rules that restrict government entities applying to it. And
surely no one is asserting that the Jones leadership committee has
Eleventh Amendment immunity as an alter ego of the State of
Georgia. Finding that the committee’s acts can be attributed to the
State does not mean that the committee is the State.
We close by reemphasizing that our decision is narrow.
Unless courts come across another statute built like this one,
today’s holding is unlikely to have significant grip. After all, only
“by sifting facts and weighing circumstances on a case-by-case basis
can a nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
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26 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

attributed its true significance.” Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
378 (1967) (quotations omitted). Here, the state legislature created,
the state Ethics Commission blesses, and state officials run, these
entities that offer fundraising favoritism to a few incumbent
officials. And the State conditions its statutory favoritism plan on
the direct involvement of an incumbent official during his term of
office. These points are more than enough to construe the Jones
leadership committee’s beyond-the-limits fundraising as state
action. The leadership committee, a formally private actor,
“operates as a willful participant in joint activity” with the State’s
Lieutenant Governor. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (quotation
omitted). This conclusion “looks not to form but to an underlying
reality”: the unconstitutional acts of Jones’s ostensibly private
leadership committee cannot be disentangled from his status as a
state official. Id. at 301 n.4.
The sum of it is this: the leadership committee statute offers
certain extra powers, available to no private citizen, that are
entirely dependent on Jones’s status as Lieutenant Governor.
Jackson has likely shown that, when the Jones leadership
committee exercises those powers, its conduct is fairly attributed
to the State.
C.
Because Jackson has shown a likelihood of success on the
merits, we next consider whether he has met the remaining factors
required to obtain a preliminary injunction. See Otto, 981 F.3d at
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860. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s assessment
of the remaining equitable factors.
First, the district court correctly noted that the “loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Jackson, 2026 WL
781193, at *8 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). The
leadership committee statute prevents Jackson from accepting
campaign contributions on an equal footing with Jones’s leadership
committee—a First Amendment harm that cannot feasibly be
remedied by a post-election monetary judgment. See Scott, 612
F.3d at 1295.
Next, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the balance of harms favors a preliminary
injunction. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 860. Jones points out that an
injunction against his use of committee funds to support his
campaign would decrease his speech during the primary election,
as he “will have less money to support his campaign.” Scott, 612
F.3d at 1296. And he contends that he has “budgeted and allocated
campaign resources in reliance upon the enforceability” of the
leadership committee statute. While we do not doubt that an
injunction in Jackson’s favor will likely cause Jones to speak less,
Jones remains free to receive contributions and make expenditures
through his campaign committee, Burt Jones for Georgia. Yes,
those contributions are limited, but contribution limits have been
in place for much longer in Georgia than the leadership committee
statute has allowed certain candidates to circumvent them.
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28 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

Plus, Jones was on notice “that the [statute] was vulnerable
to legal challenge.” Id. The Northern District of Georgia had
previously concluded, in three separate cases, that the leadership
committee was likely unconstitutional. See Perdue, 584 F. Supp. 3d
at 1327; One Ga., 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1307; Graham, 634 F. Supp. 3d
at 1356. Jones “should have known” since at least 2022 that “he
could not comfortably rely” on his leadership committee to bear
the brunt of his campaign costs. Scott, 612 F.3d at 1296.
Jones also argues that he will be worse off because the
Jackson Campaign continues to outspend him despite being subject
to contribution limits. But we decline to discount Jackson’s harm
just because he exercises his First Amendment “right to spend
personal funds for campaign speech.” Davis, 554 U.S. at 738–39.
And finally, a preliminary injunction that does nothing more than
prevent Jones from continuing to benefit from an uneven
contribution scheme is not contrary to the public interest: “it is in
the public interest to protect First Amendment rights.”
Honeyfund.com, 94 F.4th at 1283. In short, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the public interest would be
served by an injunction.
* * *
We also offer a brief response to the dissenting opinion’s
suggestion that a different method of challenging the leadership
committee statute would be more appropriate.
The dissent surmises that Jackson “could have sought a
remedy against the state officials responsible for enforcing the
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 29

contribution limits against him: members of the State Ethics
Commission.” Dissenting Op. at 5. And it goes on to assert that
“it is not difficult to see why” Jackson did not choose that path. Id.
Jackson’s personal wealth could have something to do with the
remedy he seeks, as the dissent suggests. See id. But it is not our
place to assume so, and Davis makes clear that federal courts
cannot penalize a candidate for self-funding his campaign. See 554
U.S. at 738–39.
In any event, Jackson’s litigation strategy has a proven track
record: the district courts have been granting preliminary
injunctions against leadership committees on this basis since 2022,
shortly after the statute was passed. See Perdue, 584 F. Supp. 3d at
1328–29 (preliminary injunction against Governor Kemp’s
leadership committee in suit by David Perdue); One Ga., 601 F.
Supp. 3d at 1309 (same in suit by Stacey Abrams). In contrast, they
have rejected several candidates’ requests to bar the State from
enforcing its ordinary contribution and coordination limits against
them. See, e.g., Order at 32–34, One Ga., Inc. v. Carr, No. 22-cv-
01130 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2022), Dkt. No. 45 (“This Court will not
rewrite Georgia law to enable One Georgia [the Abrams
committee] to stand in the same shoes as a leadership committee
that, in Plaintiffs’ view, is operating in violation of the First
Amendment.”). So the theory that Jackson raised and that this
Court accepts is not “novel.” Dissenting Op. at 1.
It is also, we think, more likely to be correct. Because we
have identified a constitutional problem with the statute, the
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30 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

remedial question turns on whether Georgia would have “struck
an exception and applied the general rule equally to all, or instead,
would have broadened the exception” to cure the constitutional
defect. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47, 75 (2017). We have
no doubt that the best reading of these statutes is the latter—that
Georgia would preserve “the general rule.” Id.; see also Scott, 612
F.3d at 1298. To adopt the alternative approach would require
deciding that the legislature would prefer to jettison its decades-
old, plainly constitutional, and generally applicable contribution
limits rather than scrap its bespoke exception advantaging a select
set of government officials. We see that as unlikely. And it would
also be inconsistent with our ordinary practice: “when confronting
a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the
problem, severing any problematic portions while leaving the
remainder intact.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (quotations omitted).
The dissent also posits that, in First Amendment cases, the
best remedy is the one that leads to more speech. See Dissenting
Op. at 6. Even if that is generally so as a policy matter, our task
today is deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in
granting this remedy, not whether it could have granted a better
one. And the First Amendment itself takes no side in that debate.
In fact, the Supreme Court has already rejected the argument that
“a court should not cure a First Amendment violation by outlawing
more speech.” Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 591 U.S.
610, 633 (2020) (plurality) (quotation omitted) (The “First
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26-10854 Opinion of the Court 31

Amendment does not tell us which way to cure the unequal
treatment in this case.”).
Both Davis and Scott, our two closest First Amendment
precedents, support this view, too. In each case, the courts
imposed a remedy that resulted in less speech: the complaining
candidates’ opponents could no longer take advantage of the
enhanced fundraising opportunities offered by the constitutionally
invalid statutes. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 744–45; Scott, 612 F.3d at
1296–98. So although campaign spending is plainly considered
speech, that does not decide the question. We do not think, for
example, that courts would hesitate to stop candidates from
spending funds they had unlawfully received in other contexts. See,
e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)–(2) (barring campaign contributions
from foreign nationals).
Davis, as a matter of fact, imposed exactly the same remedy
as we do here—holding all candidates to the ordinary contribution
limits (not applying the exceptional heightened limits to more
candidates). See Davis, 554 U.S. at 744–45. That equivalence belies
the assertion, cobbled together from Davis quotations six pages
apart from one another, that “the ‘obvious remedy’ for a candidate
faced with unequal contribution limits is to seek to ‘raise or
eliminate those limits,’ not to demand that his opponent’s
‘contributions be regulated more strictly.’” Dissenting Op. at 5
(quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 743, 737). The Supreme Court has said
no such thing, in Davis or elsewhere.
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32 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

That alone is enough to reject the suggestion that applying
the same campaign limitation to both Jones and his competitors is
fairly characterized as a prior restraint. See Dissenting Op. at 6–8.
We will not linger on the issue, except to note that the very case
the dissenting opinion cites reveals the argument’s likely infirmity.
In Alexander v. United States, the Supreme Court batted down the
petitioner’s argument that the forfeiture order imposed on his
adult entertainment business was a prior restraint. 509 U.S. 544,
549–50 (1993). No, the Court explained: he was perfectly welcome
to continue his “expressive activities” with other funds. Id. at 550–
51. The same goes for Jones and his leadership committee. The
district court’s order does not ban Jones’s campaign speech; it bans
using funds obtained in violation of the First Amendment to pay
for that speech. In fact, he can still use leadership committee funds
to support other candidates, and he can still use campaign
committee funds to support his own campaign. See OCGA §§ 21-
5-34.2(d), 21-5-3(2). No prior restraint, just the same limits that
apply to everyone else.
Last, we respectfully reject the complaint that this decision
“is all but permanent” because of the timing of the runoff election.
Dissenting Op. at 8. That is the nature of such challenges during
election season; time is short, and all the parties know it. Plus, the
fact that election seasons move quickly is probably the only reason
that Jones ever benefitted from his leadership committee’s unequal
fundraising opportunities in the first place. As we have noted, the
district courts have found that the leadership committee statute is
likely unconstitutional—counting this case, five out of five times
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they have considered the question. See Perdue, 584 F. Supp. 3d at
1321–27; One Ga., 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1304–07; Graham, 634 F. Supp.
3d at 1354–56; Jackson, 2026 WL 781193, at *7–8; Safe Affordable Ga.
v. Kreyenbuhl, No. 25-cv-06985, 2026 WL 1072927, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 27, 2026). But this appeal is the first chance our Court has had
an opportunity to issue a precedential decision.
Today’s decision—unanimous in its important conclusion
that the First Amendment was violated—should come as no
surprise. So anyone relying on the asymmetrical funding scheme
permitted by the leadership committee statute was living on
borrowed time. Jones will now be restrained by the same limits
that have applied to every other candidate in this primary election.
* * *
The State of Georgia created a hand-in-glove campaign
committee for select incumbent officials, and offered those officials
the opportunity to raise (and then spend) funds that their
competitors could not. Jackson has shown that it is likely—very
likely—that the Georgia leadership committee statute’s limited
exception to campaign-funding limits puts him on unequal footing
in violation of the First Amendment. He has also shown it likely
that the Jones leadership committee is a state actor under § 1983,
rather than a completely private party simply making the most of
a system that benefits Jones over his competitors. It is also plain
that the denial of a fair First Amendment playing field in campaign
finance rules creates an irreparable injury, that the balance of
harms weighs in favor of eliminating an unconstitutional
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34 Opinion of the Court 26-10854

advantage, and that the public interest favors a preliminary
injunction that does just that. We therefore AFFIRM the
preliminary injunction.
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26-10854 JORDAN, J., Concurring 1

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I join Judge Grant’s opinion for the Court, and agree that
Mr. Jackson has shown a likelihood of success on his First Amend-
ment claim, including the color of law component. I join the opin-
ion because I believe it is important to provide some guidance to
the bench and bar about the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-
34.2, and without my vote we would be left with a confusing 1-1-1
result.
The majority opinion applies de novo review with respect to
the First Amendment and the color of law issues. As I have stated
elsewhere, however, it often makes doctrinal and practical sense to
conduct abuse of discretion review when assessing likelihood of
success in a preliminary injunction appeal. See Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 2013)
( Jordan, J., concurring); Wood v. Fla. Dep’t of Edu., 142 F.4th 1286,
1294–96 (11th Cir. 2025) ( Jordan, J., dissenting); Fla. Agency for
Health Care Admin. v. Administrator for Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., 161 F.4th 765, 789–91 (11th Cir. 2025) ( Jordan, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court’s cases permit such limited merits re-
view in this procedural posture. And those cases are still good law.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (concluding that
the district court’s determination as to likelihood of success on a
First Amendment challenge to a federal statute “was not an abuse
of discretion”); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 934 (1975)
(finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s grant of a pre-
liminary injunction, and explaining that “[t]his is the extent of our
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2 JORDAN, J., Concurring 26-10854

appellate inquiry, and we therefore ‘intimate no view as to the ulti-
mate merits of respondents’ contentions’”) (citation modified).
Many of our cases also conduct abuse of discretion review
as to likelihood of success. These cases, moreover, span more than
six decades. See, e.g., Wooten v. Ohler, 303 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir.
1962) (“[W]e do not review the intrinsic merits of the case as such.
Rather, our inquiry is whether there has been an abuse of discre-
tion. Our review of the probable merits does not go to the ques-
tion of whether we would ultimately hold that the trial [j]udge was
right or wrong, but only to the ascertainment of whether his action
was within his broad range of discretion.”); Di Giorgio v. Causey, 488
F.2d 527, 528–29 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[O]n an appeal from a preliminary
injunction this Court does not concern itself with the merits of the
controversy . . . . No attention is paid to the merits of the contro-
versy beyond that necessary to determine the presence or absence
of an abuse of discretion.”) (citations omitted); Cafe 207, Inc. v. St.
Johns Cnty., 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993) (addressing a First
Amendment claim: “Whether the district court’s determination of
[substantial likelihood of success] is right or wrong, the record be-
fore us indicates no abuse of discretion.”); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.
v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., LLC, 425 F.3d 964, 970 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in deter-
mining that BellSouth had established a substantial likelihood of
success.”); LSSi Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone LLC, 696 F.3d 1114, 1120
(11th Cir. 2012) (“The first question before us is whether the Dis-
trict Court abused its discretion in concluding that LSSi has shown
‘a substantial likelihood of success on the merits’ of its claim.”)
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26-10854 JORDAN, J., Concurring 3

(internal citation omitted); Grayson v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,
121 F.4th 894, 897 (11th Cir. 2024) (“As to the first preliminary in-
junction prong, the question for us is whether the district court
‘abused its discretion in concluding that [Mr. Grayson] has [not]
shown a “substantial likelihood of success” on the merits of [his
Eighth Amendment] claim.’ . . . . In answering that question, we
do not decide the ultimate merits of Mr. Grayson’s claim.”) (cita-
tions omitted).
In my opinion, such limited review is warranted here. We
are being asked to decide important issues of constitutional law,
related to a novel state election statute, on an expedited timeline in
the midst of a primary election in Georgia. “When a district court,
particularly on a close legal issue of first impression, analyzes
whether the plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits, it is not definitely deciding who wins and who loses;
it is instead weighing the parties’ arguments and making a proba-
bilistic determination about which side is likely to prevail.” Fla.
Agency, 161 F.4th at 790 ( Jordan, J., concurring). I do not see why
we should be doing anything different when we conduct appellate
review of the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.
If the circumstances were different, I would apply abuse of
discretion review with respect to likelihood of success. That would
leave me with the same result—affirming the preliminary injunc-
tion issued by the district court.
For example, on the state action issue, the Supreme Court
has held several times that political parties—which are otherwise
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4 JORDAN, J., Concurring 26-10854

private entities—can be state actors if state law “prescribes an elec-
tion process that gives a special role to [them].” Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000). See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) (holding that the racially discriminatory
“White Primary” conducted by the Texas Democratic Party consti-
tuted state action: “[Texas’] statutory system for the selection of
party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot makes
the party which is required to follow these legislative directions an
agency of the state in so far as it determines the participants in a
primary election. The party takes its character as a state agency
from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not
become matters of private law because they are performed by a
political party.”). Given such decisions, and for the reasons set out
in the majority opinion, I do not believe that the district court com-
mitted a “clear error of judgment,” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d
1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), in concluding that Mr. Jackon
established a likelihood of success on the state action issue.
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26-10854 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 1

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, Dissenting:
I agree with the majority that Georgia’s campaign finance
scheme is likely unconstitutional. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738
(2008); Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1290–92 (11th Cir. 2010). In-
deed, its unconstitutionality is plain. But Georgia officials enforce
that unconstitutional scheme, and Burt Jones’s leadership commit-
tee only benefits from it. So Rick Jackson’s request for preliminary
relief against Jones’s leadership committee targets the wrong de-
fendant. He contests this obvious point with a novel theory of state
action that expands the doctrine to reach what a state permits in-
stead of what it commits. Because the majority erroneously adopts
this theory, I respectfully dissent.
True, the fact that Jackson’s theory is novel does not doom
it. Majority Op. at 20. But a fact-specific inquiry is not a license to
contravene our precedents. And it is not unusual for a government
to implement a campaign finance regime with unequal effects. See
Davis, 554 U.S. at 738; Scott, 612 F.3d at 1291–92. In both Davis and
Scott, the Supreme Court and we decided that the government
could not create a competitive advantage for one candidate by pe-
nalizing the speech of the other. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 742; Scott,
612 F.3d at 1290–91. Yet both suits proceeded against the officials
responsible for enforcing the laws that created those advantages,
not against a committee chaired by the opposing candidate. And
for good reason: a candidate who takes advantage of an unconsti-
tutional system does not thereby become a state actor. It does not
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2 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 26-10854

matter that, in this appeal, the advantaged party happens to be the
incumbent lieutenant governor.
Under our precedent, this appeal is straightforward. Jones’s
leadership committee acts in a private capacity, not as a state actor,
when it supports his campaign for governor. Cf. State v. Meadows,
88 F.4th 1331, 1347 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that “[c]ampaigning
for a specific candidate is not official conduct”); see also Mackey v.
Rising, 106 F.4th 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[A] state-agency official
did not engage in state action when he participated in political ac-
tivities.”); Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (stat-
ing that a sitting president campaigns for office “in an unofficial,
private capacity as office-seeker, not an official capacity as office-
holder” (emphasis added)); Campbell v. Reisch, 986 F.3d 822, 825 (8th
Cir. 2021) (“Running for public office is not state action; it is a pri-
vate activity.”). We have said that candidate speech “during an
election campaign occupies the core of the protection afforded by
the First Amendment.” Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2002) (citation modified). And that principle extends to the en-
joined acts of the leadership committee: both the “solicitation of
campaign funds,” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015),
and the “expenditure of money” in support of a campaign are po-
litical speech, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1976). Campaign
committees too perform both functions. And all candidates, includ-
ing incumbent officials, run their campaign committees in their pri-
vate capacities. Those campaign committees are not state actors.
Jones’s leadership committee is no different.
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26-10854 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 3

That Jones acts in his private capacity makes Jackson’s cho-
sen “joint action” test a non-starter. Jackson may attribute the lead-
ership committee’s conduct to the state only when “the state has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the
private parties that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” Ray-
burn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added) (citation modified); see also Charles v. Johnson, 18
F.4th 686, 696 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the joint action test
requires the “state or its agents” be a “willful participant in joint
activity” with the private actor (citation modified)); Focus on the
Fam. v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir.
2003) (finding state action when “the state, acting through the pri-
vate entity, caused the third party’s harm” (emphasis added)). Jack-
son has not established any state involvement in the leadership
committee’s challenged fundraising and spending, much less the
“pervasive entwinement” required to overcome the leadership
committee’s “private character.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
The state’s role is entirely permissive: it allows the leader-
ship committee to exist. The same can be said of almost any cam-
paign committee created under state law. The state does not play
the “affirmative role” in committee fundraising and spending our
precedents require to establish joint action. Rayburn, 241 F.3d at
1348 (citation modified). At most, the state’s role is limited to giv-
ing permission to some individuals to form leadership committees.
The majority posits that the state permits leadership committees to
advance its interest in “favoring . . . incumbent[s].” Majority Op. at
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4 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 26-10854

24. Setting aside the fact that leadership committees are available
to certain non-incumbents—Jones himself is not an incumbent of
the office he seeks—the state’s motivation for authorizing leader-
ship committees does not speak to whether it has made an “active
choice to partner with” those committees or “conspire[d]” with
them to deny Jackson his rights. Charles, 18 F.4th at 696.
The majority decides that there is an “active choice” here:
the state, through Jones, has partnered with the leadership com-
mittee. In doing so, it decides that Jones’s campaign for governor
is an official act of the Office of Lieutenant Governor. Majority Op.
at 21–22. The majority thus expands official conduct to include the
canonical example of private speech: campaigning for office. There
is no principled reason to do so. The office of lieutenant governor
“as an institution is agnostic about who will occupy” the guberna-
torial office next. Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 4. So “campaigning to gain
that office is not an official act of the office” of lieutenant governor.
Id. If any conduct is unofficial, the act of seeking a new job must
qualify.
Georgia law reflects this reality. The provision allowing the
formation of leadership committees is in the campaign finance
chapter of the election code. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-34.2. The
Lieutenant Governor’s powers, in contrast, are principally found in
Title 28, which speaks to the operation of the General Assembly.
See, e.g., id. §§ 28-4-1(a), 28-5-4(b), 28-5-22, 28-6-8(b)(2), (e); see also
GA. CONST. art. V, § I, para. III (“The Lieutenant Governor shall be
the President of the Senate.”). Other portions of the Georgia Code
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26-10854 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 5

largely speak to his power to appoint members of regulatory bod-
ies. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-575(a)(5), 15-1-21(c)(2), 15-1-
21(c)(5), 31-11-101(a). Within Title 21, the only power conferred
directly on the lieutenant governor is the authority to appoint a
member of the State Election Board if a vacancy occurs when the
General Assembly is not in session. Id. § 21-2-30(b). Nothing else in
Title 21 confers official powers or duties on the Lieutenant Gover-
nor.
To be clear, I would reject Jackson’s claim against Jones’s
leadership committee even if I were unsure that he had any other
avenue for relief from this unconstitutional scheme. Even so, Jack-
son’s ability to seek relief for his constitutional injury does not de-
pend on his novel state action theory. Here, the “obvious remedy”
for a candidate faced with unequal contribution limits is to seek to
“raise or eliminate those limits,” not to demand that his opponent’s
“contributions be regulated more strictly.” Davis, 554 U.S. at 737,
743. Jackson could have sought a remedy against the state officials
responsible for enforcing the contribution limits against him: mem-
bers of the State Ethics Commission. After all, he sued them too.
An injunction barring them from enforcing those limits would
remedy his constitutional injury.
But Jackson did not seek that injunction. And it is not diffi-
cult to see why. As the district court found, Jackson is “outspend-
ing” Jones “by a large margin.” Because Jackson is “self-fund[ing]
his campaign,” it would do him little good to enjoin the enforce-
ment of any contribution limits against him. So he has declined to
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6 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 26-10854

seek the ordinary injunction that would solve his First Amendment
injury. Instead, he seeks, and the majority grants him, an injunction
that erases the well-trodden line between official and unofficial
conduct. Cf. DiDonato v. Panatera, 24 F.4th 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 2022)
(stating that the fact that “one is a state officer does not necessarily
mean that one acts under color of state law” (citation modified)).
If the leadership committee is not a state actor, then the con-
sequences of today’s decision are stark. The majority opinion
blesses a preliminary injunction that directly limits the core politi-
cal speech of one candidate while his opponent speaks unre-
strained. Jones will “speak less” because of the majority’s decision.
Scott, 612 F.3d at 1296. Its provision barring campaign expenditures
imposes on Jones a “prior restraint”: the “most serious and least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” Nebraska Press
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). Such restraints are espe-
cially concerning where the First Amendment “has its fullest and
most urgent application,” in the “conduct of campaigns for political
office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). In these
cases, federal courts should seek to employ “[t]he preferred First
Amendment remedy of more speech, not enforced silence.” Brown
v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (citation modified). Instead, the
majority limits one side’s political speech on the eve of an election.
Davis and Scott do not dictate this result. In both decisions, a
government program penalized a candidate for speaking. See Davis,
554 U.S. at 740 (explaining that the Millionaire’s Amendment “im-
poses a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment
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26-10854 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 7

right to use personal funds for campaign speech”); Scott, 612 F.3d
at 1290 (“[T]he subsidy imposes a burden on nonparticipating can-
didates.”). Because the government’s chosen burden enabled the
candidates’ opponents to speak more, there was no way to remedy
these inequities without causing one candidate to “speak less.”
Scott, 612 F.3d at 1296. We do not face that dilemma today.
Unlike the remedies at issue in Davis and Scott, this injunc-
tion is not limited to “holding all candidates to the ordinary contri-
bution limits.” Majority Op. at 31. It bars Jones’s leadership com-
mittee from “soliciting contributions and making any expenditures
in support” of his campaign. So it is not true that this injunction
“appl[ies] the same campaign limitation to both Jones and his com-
petitors.” Id. at 32. The statute, of course, contains no expenditure
limitation. Jones’s leadership committee and Jackson’s campaign
committee are both free to expend unlimited resources in support
of their campaigns.
This injunction will have the “primary effect” of “re-
strict[ing] the quantity of campaign speech” by Jones. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 39. The majority insists that this limitation is not a “prior
restraint.” Majority Op. at 32. But I have no other term for a “judi-
cial order[] forbidding certain communications when issued in ad-
vance of the time that such communications are to occur.” Alexan-
der v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (ci-
tation modified). Unlike the forfeiture order permitted by Alexan-
der, the restraint on speech the majority blesses is not collateral: it
literally “forbid[s] [Jones’s leadership committee from] engag[ing]
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8 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Dissenting 26-10854

in . . . expressive activities in the future.” Id. at 550–51. Perhaps
some other injunction could leave Jones’s leadership committee
free to “continue [its] expressive activities with other funds,” but
this one does not. Majority Op. at 32 (citation modified).
In this context, a preliminary injunction is all but permanent.
The runoff election is only days away. Even if there were time to
litigate this case to final judgment, Jackson would have no incen-
tive to do so. Our decision today will likely set the rules for the rest
of the campaign.
We should vacate the preliminary injunction. That resolu-
tion would still allow Jackson to seek a remedy against the state
officials he sued. Because the majority instead adopts Jackson’s
novel theory of state action, I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341883. Public record. Not legal advice.