# The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in His Official Capacity as Director of Right of Way v. Jrj Pusok Holdings, LLC

> Texas Supreme Court · June 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341711

## Case

- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 12, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Bland
- **Judges:** Bland; Lehrmann; Devine; Busby; Huddle; Young; Young; Hawkins; Sullivan; Blacklock
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341711

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- emphasizing that Texas law favors settlement
- acknowledging that states may “impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline”

## Opinion text

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0447
══════════

The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in his Official Capacity as
Director of Right of Way,
Petitioners,

v.

JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued November 4, 2025

JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Huddle, and
Justice Young joined.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion.

JUSTICE HAWKINS filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Sullivan joined, and in which Chief Justice Blacklock joined except as to
Part III(A).

The right to own property is “fundamental, natural, inherent,
inalienable, not derived from the legislature and . . . preexist[s] even
constitutions.”1 The Texas Constitution grants the State the power to
interfere with this right only for public uses, subject to providing
adequate compensation to the landowner. When condemned property is
unnecessary for public use, the former owner has a statutory right to
repurchase the property from the State in defined circumstances. In this
case, we decide whether the State may claim immunity when a
landowner invokes this right.
We conclude it cannot. Repurchase claims derive from
constitutional limits placed on the State’s eminent domain power. The
Legislature placed a repurchase right among provisions authorizing
other suits for which the State lacks immunity. It granted trial courts
the power to determine all issues arising under such claims, expressly
including cases against the State. To the extent immunity exists, the
Legislature has waived it for such claims in the circumstances it has
prescribed.
Property Code Chapter 21 sets forth the criteria a landowner
must satisfy to allege a repurchase claim. As to those criteria, we hold
the State’s initiation of a condemnation suit to determine the value of
property it takes sufficiently establishes a taking “through” eminent
domain. A later settlement to fix that value does not waive the
repurchase right. Further, a landowner may repurchase a portion of the
land taken if only that portion is no longer necessary for public use.
Finally, a county court at law has jurisdiction over a repurchase claim.
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals

1 Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).

2
denying the State’s jurisdictional plea as to the landowner’s repurchase
claim.
I
A
Joyce Hutcherson, Rudolph Pusok, and Jimmie Pusok
(collectively, the Landowners) owned acreage in Tomball, Harris
County, Texas. In October 2013, the State notified the Landowners that
it intended to acquire their property for a highway project. The State
offered $496,120, describing the payment as “just compensation . . . in
accordance with State law.” The State outlined the process for accepting
its offer or submitting a counteroffer. It also provided a copy of the
Landowner’s Bill of Rights in accordance with Government Code
Section 402.031 and Property Code Chapter 21.2 The Bill of Rights
states that it “applies to any attempt by the government or a private
entity to take your property.” Pertinently, the Bill of Rights states:
If private property was condemned by a governmental
entity, and the public use for which the property was
acquired is canceled before that property is used for that
public purpose, no actual progress is made toward the
public use within ten years or the property becomes
unnecessary for public use within ten years, landowners
may have the right to repurchase the property for the price

2 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.031(a) (“The attorney general shall prepare

a written statement that includes a bill of rights for a property owner whose
real property may be acquired by a governmental or private entity through the
use of the entity’s eminent domain authority under Chapter 21, Property
Code.”); Tex. Prop. Code § 21.0112(a) (“[T]he entity [with eminent domain
authority] must send by first-class mail or otherwise provide a landowner’s bill
of rights statement provided by Section 402.031, Government Code . . . .”).

3
paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity
acquired the property through eminent domain.3
The Landowners received a final offer from the State in December
2013. The letter repeated the initial offer and further provided: “If this
offer is not accepted within fourteen (14) days from the date of delivery
of this letter, it will be considered as having been rejected. . . . If you
elect to reject this offer, eminent domain proceedings will be initiated by
the State.” The letter included another copy of the Landowner’s Bill of
Rights, as well as a deed the State described as a “proposed instrument
by which the property or property interest would be conveyed to the
State.”
The State petitioned for condemnation in April 2014 with a suit
in a Harris County civil court at law. The State alleged: (1) it intended
to acquire the land for public use; (2) it had sent a copy of the
Landowner’s Bill of Rights; and (3) it had made a bona fide purchase
offer as required by law.
About three weeks later, the State and the Landowners settled on
a value for the condemned land. A special warranty deed conveyed the
property to the State in exchange for $681,705. The deed provides: “The
consideration recited herein represents a settlement and compromise by
all parties as to the value of the property herein conveyed . . . .” The
Landowners agreed not to “seek any additional compensation, damages,
attorney’s fees, or expenses from the State of Texas.” The trial court
granted the State’s motion for nonsuit and dismissed the case in August
2014.

3 Emphasis added.

4
Government officials decided to reroute the highway project,
leaving a portion of the condemned land unused. Counsel for the
Landowners emailed the Department of Transportation, inquiring
whether the State still intended to use that portion of the property. A
representative for the Department’s Right of Way Division responded in
February 2017, stating: “Please see the attached pdf showing what
TxDOT would consider surplus.” When the State refused to sell the
Landowners the identified surplus property, the Landowners assigned
their rights to JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, to pursue a repurchase claim.
B
JRJ sued the State and the Department of Transportation
Director in a different Harris County civil court at law, alleging
violations of JRJ’s repurchase right under Property Code Chapter 21.
The State responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting sovereign
immunity and lack of justiciability. The trial court granted the State’s
plea and dismissed the case.
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of JRJ’s repurchase
claim.4 Relying on a similar case, the court of appeals first held that “a
full reading of Chapter 21, including the purpose of Subchapter E,”
demonstrates the State’s waiver of immunity for repurchase claims.5

4 693 S.W.3d 679, 689 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023). JRJ did

not challenge the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming dismissal
of its additional inverse condemnation and ultra vires claims in this Court. Id.
at 688–89. Accordingly, we do not review those claims. See Tex. R. App.
P. 53.2(g).
5 693 S.W.3d at 683–84 (quoting State v. LBJ/Brookhaven Invs., L.P.,

650 S.W.3d 922, 932 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. denied)).

5
Second, the court reasoned that the State acquired JRJ’s property
“through eminent domain” because the State compelled the transfer by
initiating a condemnation action.6 Finally, in a supplemental opinion
denying the State’s motion for rehearing, the court of appeals concluded
that the Harris County civil court at law had jurisdiction to decide the
repurchase claim.7 We granted the State’s petition for review, in which
it challenges each of these holdings.
II
We first address whether sovereign immunity bars repurchase
claims, conferred as a landowner’s “right,” when the State designates
property as unnecessary for public use.8
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that “no state can be
sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner
indicated by that consent.”9 Although it is the Legislature’s role to waive
sovereign immunity, “it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define
the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under
what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.”10

6 Id. at 685.

7 693 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024).

8 The State properly asserted its immunity defense in a plea to the
jurisdiction. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). Whether a court
has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. City of
Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2020).
9 Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847).

10 Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. 2006).

6
Our analysis begins with an acknowledgment that “the State
derives its authority from ‘the people.’”11 “[T]o waive immunity, consent
to suit must ordinarily be found in a constitutional provision or
legislative enactment.”12 “[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver
of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and
unambiguous language.”13 The Legislature may simply state that
“sovereign immunity is waived” for a particular claim,14 but when it does
not, the rule “cannot be applied so rigidly that the almost certain intent
of the Legislature is disregarded.”15 As always, we consider statutory
language in its full context.16

11 Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. 2003)

(quoting Tex. Const. art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people,
and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for
their benefit.”)).
12 Id.

13 Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034.

14 See, e.g., id. § 554.0035 (“Sovereign immunity is waived and abolished

to the extent of liability for the relief allowed under this chapter for a violation
of this chapter.”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 110.008(a) (“Subject to
Section 110.006, sovereign immunity . . . from liability is waived and abolished
to the extent of liability created by Section 110.005 . . . .”); Tex. Nat. Res. Code
§ 52.035(c) (“The state waives its right to claim sovereign immunity in any
action commenced against the state . . . .”).
15 Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2000)
(quoting City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1995)).
16 See Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 69 (Tex. 2019)
(“Statutes cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed to considerations
evidenced in affiliated statutes.” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539 (1947))).

7
A
Our Constitution recognizes both adequate-compensation and
public-use limits on the State’s eminent domain power.17 Beginning with
the 1876 Constitution, it provided: “No person’s property shall be taken,
damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate
compensation being made . . . .”18 To that end, the Legislature prescribes
a process for adjudicating the “adequate compensation” the State must
pay.19
The past half-century has seen a shift toward strengthening
landowner protections based on the public-use limit to the eminent
domain power. Our early jurisprudence recognized immunity as a
potential defense to suits grounded in the takings clause.20 The law
changed significantly in 1980, however, when our Court recognized
inverse condemnation claims in Steele v. City of Houston.21 We held that
the State has no immunity against condemnation claims when it takes

17 George D. Braden et al., The Constitution of the State of Texas: An

Annotated and Comparative Analysis 63 (1977); see also Repub. Tex. Const. of
1836, Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas
1822–1897, at 1083 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (“Thirteenth. No person’s
particular services shall be demanded, nor property taken or applied to public
use, unless by the consent of himself or his representative, without just
compensation being made therefor according to law.”).
18 Tex. Const. of 1876, art. I, § 17.

19 See Tex. Prop. Code § 21.011.

20 See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 567–68 (Tex. 2012)

(summarizing the history of our eminent domain and inverse condemnation
jurisprudence).
21 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980).

8
property via eminent domain and fails to pay adequate compensation.22
We reasoned that “[t]he Constitution itself is the authorization for
compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of
governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or destruction of
property for public use.”23 From Steele onward, our Court has
acknowledged that “the Takings Clause is self-executing—that it alone
authorizes suit, regardless of whether the Legislature has statutorily
provided for it.”24
In 2003, the Legislature created the first statutory repurchase
right. Appended to the existing Property Code chapter governing
eminent domain, the right applied to property “acquired by a
governmental entity through eminent domain for a public use that was
canceled before the 10th anniversary of the date of acquisition.”25 Under
this version of the statute, the government was required to notify the
property owner that the property was no longer designated for public
use and offer to sell it “for the fair market value of the property at the
time the public use was canceled.”26

22 Id.

23 Id.; see also State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007)
(“[S]overeign immunity does not shield the State from a claim based upon a
taking under Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, known as the
‘takings clause.’”).
24 Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 568.

25 Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen.

Laws 4739, 4739 (amended 2011).
26 Id. at 4740.

9
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Kelo
v. City of New London,27 upholding private economic development as a
valid public use under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.28 In
reaching its controversial holding, however, the Court emphasized that
“nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”29 Over forty states
accepted the invitation and amended their laws. Among these, fifteen
states either created or strengthened the right to repurchase condemned
property no longer intended for public use.30
Texas responded to Kelo in three relevant ways. First, in 2007,
the Legislature proposed expanding the repurchase right and to require
the government to resell the property at the price the government paid
to acquire it, rather than fair market value at the time of repurchase.31
To eliminate any gift clause bar, the Legislature also proposed a
corresponding amendment to the Constitution.32 The Governor vetoed

27 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

28 Id. at 483–84.

29 Id. at 489.

30 See Ala. Code § 11-47-170(c) (2005); Fla. Stat. § 73.013(1)(f)(2) (2006);

Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (2006); Ind. Code § 32-24-1-15 (2006); Iowa Code
§ 6B.56 (2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-1144(a) (2006); La. Const. Ann. art. I,
§ 4(H) (amended 2006); Minn. Stat. § 117.226(a) (2006); Nev. Const. art. I,
§ 22(6) (2008); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.211 (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 27, § 17
(2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 35.385 (2011); S.D. Codified Laws § 11-7-22.2 (2006);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-17-1005(a)–(b) (2014); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-801(d)
(2007).
31 Tex. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

32 Tex. H.J.R. 30, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

10
the statutory amendments, citing cost,33 but the People of Texas
nonetheless voted to amend the Constitution to expressly permit the
repurchase of property “at the price the entity paid at the time of
acquisition” if: “(1) the public use . . . is canceled; (2) no actual progress
is made toward the public use during a prescribed period of time; or
(3) the property is unnecessary for the public use.”34
Second, after the next legislative session, the People of Texas
further amended the Constitution to enshrine additional limits on the
eminent domain power found in Article I, Section 17.35 The limits
focused on the public-use requirement, mandating that a taking must
be for:
(1) the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property,
notwithstanding an incidental use, by:
(A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the
public at large; or
(B) an entity granted the power of eminent domain
under law; or
(2) the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel of
property.36

33 Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

Tex. Const. art. III, § 52j; see also Tex. Leg. Council, Analyses of
34

Proposed Constitutional Amendments 49–55 (2007) (summarizing the history
of Section 52j).
35 Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., § 1.01, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 5655,

5655–56.
36 Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a).

11
Whatever power the State enjoyed in 1876, the People curtailed it in
response to perceived abuses of the public use requirement.37
Finally, building on this history, the Legislature succeeded in
amending Chapter 21 in 2011.38 Like the vetoed 2007 amendment, the
2011 amendments require the governmental entity to resell the property
at “the price paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity
acquired the property through eminent domain.”39 Bearing this history
in mind, we turn to the statutory framework.
B
Chapter 21, Subchapter A provides that a district court may
decide “all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the
assessment of damages,” in a suit involving a claim for property
“occupied by the party under the party’s eminent domain authority”:
A district court may determine all issues, including the
authority to condemn property and the assessment of
damages, in any suit:
(1) in which this state, a political subdivision of this
state, a person, an association of persons, or a
corporation is a party; and
(2) that involves a claim for property or for damages
to property occupied by the party under the

37 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (acknowledging that states may “impose

‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline”); see KMS
Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 194–200 (Tex. 2019)
(Blacklock, J., dissenting) (connecting the dissenting opinions in Kelo to the
Texas constitutional amendments and describing new limitations on the
takings clause as a “judicially administrable legal standard”).
38 Act of May 6, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 81, § 19, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws

354, 361–63 (codified at Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.101–.103).
39 Id.

12
party’s eminent domain authority or for an
injunction to prevent the party from entering or
using the property under the party’s eminent
domain authority.40
Subchapter E, Section 21.101 provides that a person whose
property is acquired “through eminent domain,” as well as that person’s
successors and assigns, are “entitled to repurchase the property” under
certain conditions:
(1) the public use for which the property was acquired
through eminent domain is canceled before the property
is used for that public use;
(2) no actual progress is made toward the public use for
which the property was acquired between the date of
acquisition and the 10th anniversary of that date;
(3) the property becomes unnecessary for the public use for
which the property was acquired, or a substantially
similar public use, before the 10th anniversary of the
date of acquisition;
(4) the entity that acquired the property through eminent
domain:
(A) has an obligation to pay ad valorem taxes on the
acquired property;
(B) has received a tax bill from the taxing authority
for the ad valorem taxes on the acquired
property; and
(C) has failed to pay any ad valorem taxes on the
acquired property before the third anniversary of
the date on which the unpaid taxes became due;
or
(5) the entity:

40 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.003.

13
(A) acquired through eminent domain a fee simple
interest in the property;
(B) has an obligation to pay ad valorem taxes on the
acquired property;
(C) has received a tax bill from the taxing authority
for the ad valorem taxes on the acquired
property; and
(D) has failed to pay any ad valorem taxes on the
acquired property before the third anniversary of
the date on which the unpaid taxes became due.41
Finally, “[a] district court may determine all issues in any suit regarding
the repurchase of a real property interest acquired through eminent
domain.”42
The State contends that these statutes confer jurisdiction over
repurchase claims but grant no waiver of immunity to pursue them
against the State. Despite the recent constitutional amendments, the
State argues that repurchase is a statutory right not found in the
Constitution. JRJ responds that the statute authorizes relief associated
with a waiver of immunity—such as damages—for “all issues” in which
the State occupies property “under its eminent domain authority.”43
Such a reading is consistent with the Constitution’s authorization that
the State offer a repurchase price valued as of the time of acquisition.
We generally find waiver “if the Legislature requires that the
[governmental] entity be joined in a lawsuit even though the entity

41 Id. § 21.101(a).

42 Id. § 21.101(c).

43 Id. § 21.003.

14
would otherwise be immune from suit.”44 We also consider whether the
Legislature “provided an objective limitation on the governmental
entity’s potential liability” as well as “whether the statutory provisions
would serve any purpose absent a waiver of immunity.”45
We conclude that the State is not immune from repurchase
claims.46 First, the Legislature nested the repurchase statute within
existing law governing eminent domain—proceedings from which the
State enjoys no immunity.47 Chapter 21 permits district courts to
“determine all issues . . . in any suit . . . in which this state . . . is a party”
and that involves “a claim for property . . . occupied by the party under
the party’s eminent domain authority.”48 The repurchase statute
implements the 2009 constitutional amendments limiting public use,
just as an inverse-condemnation claim fulfills the
adequate-compensation guarantee. As we reasoned in Hidalgo County

44 Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. 2019)
(alteration in original) (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l
Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 844 (Tex. 2009)).
45 Id. (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 844).

46 See Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 435

(Tex. 2016) (“The judiciary determines the applicability of immunity in the first
instance and delineates its boundaries. If immunity is applicable, then the
judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.” (citation omitted)).
47 See Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 568 (“[T]he Takings Clause is
self-executing . . . it alone authorizes suit, regardless of whether the
Legislature has statutorily provided for it.”).
48 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.003. We also presume that the Legislature acted

with knowledge of our decision in Steele twenty years earlier, in which we held
that no immunity exists against inverse condemnation claims. 603 S.W.2d at
791; see In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. 2012) (“We presume the
Legislature is aware of relevant case law when it enacts or modifies statutes.”).

15
Water Improvement District No. 3 v. Hidalgo County Irrigation District
No. 1,49 the government is not immune from claims on the “back end”
after it takes property without compensation.50 Similarly, the
government is not immune from claims involving condemned property
no longer intended to benefit the public.51 The statute cannot be read
consistently with the Constitution in the absence of a waiver.52
The 2011 statutory amendments make clear that the Legislature
anticipated the State as a defendant in suits to vindicate repurchase
rights. It expressly authorized district courts to “determine all issues in
any suit regarding the repurchase.”53 The State and the dissent reduce
this to jurisdictional language.54 However, the authorization to
“determine all issues” does not only appear in the jurisdictional

49 669 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2023).

50 Id. at 187.

51 We have not been asked to determine whether the public-use
requirement is self-executing. The relationship between the statutory
repurchase right, the public-use requirement, inverse condemnation claims,
and eminent domain proceedings forms the background against which the
Legislature acted.
52 See Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 S.W.3d

845, 850 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]e must look at whether a statute makes any sense if
immunity is not waived.” (quoting Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d at 6)).
53 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(c) (emphasis added).

54 The dissent’s reliance on In re Nestle USA, 359 S.W.3d 207 (Tex.
2012), is misplaced. Post at 16 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The statutes involved
in that case granted “exclusive and original jurisdiction” to hear taxpayer
suits. Nestle USA, 359 S.W.3d at 209–10 (emphasis added). In contrast,
Subchapter E authorizes the courts to “determine all issues” in repurchase
claims, and Chapter 21 also expressly contemplates that courts may assess
damages against the State. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c).

16
subchapter; it also appears in Subchapter E—the right of repurchase—
without jurisdictional limitation.55 In amending a chapter in which the
State enjoys no immunity, while mindful of the People’s desire for
heightened scrutiny of the public use requirement, the Legislature
expressly authorized property owners to seek judicial vindication of the
public use limitation in claims against the State.
Further, Chapter 21 objectively limits the government’s liability
for repurchase claims. Mirroring the Constitution, Section 21.103(b)
provides that “the [condemning] entity shall offer to sell the property
interest . . . for the price paid to the owner . . . at the time the entity
acquired the property through eminent domain.”56 The funds the State
expended to acquire the land are returned to the State, and the property
is returned to the landowners upon payment of those funds.
What the State loses is any appreciation in the property’s value
between the time it was condemned and the repurchase.57 But under the
constitutional and statutory framework, the State was never entitled to
profit from its eminent domain authority. The People amended the
Constitution to permit the landowner to recover the loss of that profit,
with supporters aiming to minimize speculative overuse of
condemnation authority.58 Any liability the repurchase right creates for
the government is both limited and purposeful.

55 See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c).

56 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

57 JRJ also seeks damages, fees, and costs; whether it is entitled to any

of these in a repurchase suit is far from certain.
58 See Tex. Const. art. III, § 52j; Tex. Leg. Council, Analyses of Proposed

Constitutional Amendments 51 (2007) (reporting supporters as arguing “[i]f

17
Finally, the repurchase right serves virtually no purpose absent
a waiver of immunity, distinguishing this case from Texas Department
of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley.59 There, we concluded that a
provision requiring compensation for intergovernmental property
transfers “provides a mechanism” for “budgetary protection” between
and among government agencies but does not waive immunity to permit
one governmental unit to obtain a money judgment against another.60
Much like we reasoned in Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Dallas Area
Rapid Transit in connection with another statute, “[t]he obvious purpose
of [the statute]—indeed, its only apparent purpose—is to provide for
rights that can actually be exercised.”61 The subchapter “creating
specific, restricted ‘rights’” for a landowner to repurchase their formerly
condemned property “cannot reasonably be read to tacitly condition
their exercise on a separate waiver of immunity” when it is directly
linked to a constitutional limit on the State’s power.62

the amendment results in giving certain property owners a windfall from any
increase in the value of the property, the amendment is still fair because it
would be a disincentive to governmental entities taking property they may not
need and may indirectly reduce instances in which property is taken through
eminent domain”).
59 146 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2004).

60 Id. at 643–44.

61 369 S.W.3d at 850.

62 Id. Section 21.102 supports this reading by providing that once
condemned property becomes surplus, the condemning entity “shall” contact
the original owner by certified mail and inform the owner of its right to
repurchase the property.

18
The State and the dissent contend that the repurchase statute is
effective even if the State is immune because some private entities
exercise condemnation authority.63 Initially, however, the repurchase
statute applied only to “property . . . acquired by a governmental
entity”—not by private entities.64 It was not until 2011 that the
Legislature expanded the right to allow landowners to repurchase land
condemned by private entities.65 The Legislature’s later expansion did
not disavow the repurchase right first granted to curb State overreach
in exercising its constitutionally prescribed authority.
Our approach coheres with our reasoning in Texas A&M
University–Kingsville v. Lawson.66 In that case, the statute governing
the underlying claim provided a legislative waiver of immunity.67 The
parties settled, but the plaintiff later sued for breach of the settlement
agreement.68 In rejecting the university’s immunity defense, a plurality
of the Court held that “a governmental entity that settles a suit in which
it lacks immunity cannot claim immunity in a subsequent suit to enforce
the settlement.”69 Similarly, the Landowners in this case ceded their

63 Post at 23–24 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

64 Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen.

Laws 4739, 4739.
65 Act of May 6, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 81, § 19, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws

354, 361.
66 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002) (plurality op.).

67 Id. at 518–19, 521.

68 Id. at 519.

69 Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2019) (citing

Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 522–23).

19
property to the State’s eminent domain power—a power subject to a
public-use limitation. This limitation carries forward in the same way a
waiver of immunity from the underlying claim carried forward in
Lawson.
We cannot ignore Chapter 21’s constitutional overlay, requiring
that the State take property only for public use.70 Over time, this matter
became one of such importance that the People twice amended our
state’s Constitution.71 We hold the State is not immune from Chapter 21
repurchase claims.72
III
We next turn to whether JRJ alleges a repurchase claim
satisfying Chapter 21’s criteria. The State first contends that it did not
acquire the property “through eminent domain,” as required by

70 Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a).

71 See In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142, 158 (Tex. 2024) (“‘Our
guiding principle when interpreting the Texas Constitution is to give effect to
the intent of the voters who adopted it,’ which requires sensitivity to the full
context of the constitutional language and history.” (internal citation omitted)
(quoting Degan v. Bd. of Trs. of Dall. Police & Fire Pension Sys., 594 S.W.3d
309, 313 (Tex. 2020))). Relying on precedent from 1897, the dissent contends
that the State need honor the public use requirement only at the moment of
condemnation. Post at 18–20 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (citing City of San
Antonio v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 434 (1897)). This ignores the obligations
found in the recent amendments to the Texas Constitution limiting State
power with respect to public use.
72 Our holding in this case does not authorize repurchase suits outside

Chapter 21’s strictures. See City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 236
(Tex. 2011) (“The constitution waives immunity for suits brought under the
Takings Clause, but this does not mean that a constitutional suit may be
brought in every instance. . . . When the Legislature creates [an eminent
domain] statutory procedure, recourse may be had to a constitutional suit only
where the procedure proves inadequate . . . .” (citation omitted)).

20
Chapter 21, because it later settled upon the value of the condemned
property with the Landowners. The State next contends that Chapter 21
does not apply when only a portion of the property is no longer necessary
for public use. We address these arguments in turn.
A
A right of repurchase belongs to “[a] person from whom a real
property interest is acquired by an entity through eminent domain for a
public use.”73 The State concedes that it acquired the property for public
use, and it does not dispute that JRJ meets one of the five predicates for
seeking repurchase. The State argues, however, that its acquisition was
not “through eminent domain,” as Chapter 21 requires, because the
Landowners settled with the State on a value for the land after the State
filed suit.
“Through” means “by way of”; “passage into and out of a
treatment, handling, or process”; or is “a function word to indicate
means, agency, or intermediacy.”74 “Eminent domain” is “[t]he inherent
power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,
esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable
compensation for the taking.”75 The logical reading of “through eminent

73 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(a) (emphasis added). The statute’s extension

of the repurchase right to a landowner’s assigns addresses the State’s
argument in its jurisdictional plea that JRJ lacks a justiciable interest.
74 Through, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged

(Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2021); Through, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/through (last visited June 5,
2026).
75 Eminent Domain, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

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domain” is “by means of the State’s power to take private property for
public use.”76
The State and the dissent posit that property is not acquired
“through eminent domain” absent a final judgment adjudicating the
property’s value.77 When analyzing statutes, we presume the
Legislature chose its words with care and that “words not included were
purposefully omitted.”78 The State’s interpretation essentially swaps the
language the Legislature uses—“eminent domain”—for language it did
not use—“condemnation judgment.”79 Eminent domain is not a process
that the State “goes through.”80 Rather, eminent domain is the State’s
power.
A settlement as to the property’s value does not alter the State’s
acquisition of it “through eminent domain.” The deed in this case
acknowledges the Landowners conveyed the property as a result of “ED
proceedings.” The Landowners did not sell the property in an arm’s
length transaction on the open market; rather, the Landowners
surrendered their property in concession to the State’s coercive power.

76 See Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 500 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. 2016) (“If

an undefined term has multiple common meanings, it is not necessarily
ambiguous; rather, we will apply the definition most consistent with the
context of the statutory scheme.”).
77 Post at 25–27 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

78 In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008).

79 See KMS Retail Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d at 183 (“We must enforce the

statute ‘as written’ and ‘refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose.’”
(quoting Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014)
(plurality op.))).
80 Post at 26 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

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Once the State invokes its eminent domain power, landowners
need not proceed to a judgment as to adequate compensation to preserve
their repurchase right.81 The State’s forced transfer via a condemnation
suit is an exercise of its power to obtain the property “through eminent
domain.”82
B
The State next contends that the right of repurchase does not
apply when only a portion of the condemned property is no longer
necessary for public use. Under Section 21.101(a), a landowner is
“entitled to repurchase the property.”83 The phrase “the property” is
used consistently throughout Subchapter E to refer to the “real property
interest . . . acquired by an entity through eminent domain.”84 The State
observes that Section 21.101(a) does not expressly permit the
repurchase of a portion of the property. Neither, however, does the
statute reference “the entire property.” A portion of property is
accurately described as “property.”85 We decline to adopt an
interpretation that limits the right in a manner the Legislature did not
indicate.

81 See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 178 (Tex.

1997) (emphasizing that Texas law favors settlement).
82 We do not address whether other kinds of State action sufficiently

invoke the State’s eminent domain power.
83 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(a).

84 See, e.g., id.; id. §§ 21.102, .1021, .103.

85 See Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “real

property” as “[l]and and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it,
excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land”).

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This case illustrates the repurchase right in practice. The
Department used ninety-seven percent of the condemned property for a
highway project. By the Department’s admission, the remaining three
percent of the property became surplus within ten years of its
acquisition.86 Once the State identifies that condemned property is no
longer required for public use—as it did in this case—the State must
notify the landowner of its repurchase right.87
The State argues that it is difficult to calculate a price for a partial
repurchase. We are not persuaded. The State offered to sell the surplus
portion in this case at its current fair market value, indicating it is
capable of valuation.88 Section 21.103(b) provides the rule for
determining the repurchase price: “the price paid to the owner by the
entity at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent
domain.”89 The State can apply this statutory directive to calculate an
offer price on portions of land it deems unnecessary for public use.

86 A repurchase right exists if “the property becomes unnecessary for

the public use for which the property was acquired, or a substantially similar
public use, before the 10th anniversary of the date of acquisition.” Tex. Prop.
Code § 21.101(a)(3).
87 Id. § 21.102(3).

88 The dissent refers to the State’s offer to sell the property at today’s

fair market value. Post at 17–18 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The State’s offer
aligns with the statute before the post-Kelo constitutional amendments rather
than the current version, which requires it to be valued at the time the State
takes the property. Compare Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2,
sec. 21.103(b), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4739, 4740 (“[T]he governmental entity
shall offer to sell the property interest to the person for the fair market value
of the property at the time the public use was canceled.” (emphasis added)),
with Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).
89 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

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IV
Finally, we address the trial court’s jurisdiction. Chapter 21
provides that “[d]istrict courts and county courts at law have concurrent
jurisdiction in eminent domain cases.”90 The State contends that a
repurchase claim is not an “eminent domain case.”
Article V of the Texas Constitution vests judicial power in various
courts, including this Court, district courts, county courts, and “such
other courts as may be provided by law.”91 “County courts at law are
among ‘such other courts as may be provided by law.’”92 The Legislature
expressly granted such courts concurrent jurisdiction in eminent
domain cases.93 In placing repurchase claims within Chapter 21, and in
granting county courts at law jurisdiction over “eminent domain cases,”
the Legislature made it plain: first, a repurchase claim is a species of an
eminent domain case; and second, county courts at law have concurrent
jurisdiction to hear such a case. Chapter 21 does not parse jurisdiction
depending on the types of claims found within it. Instead,
Sections 21.003 and 21.101(c) grant power to the district courts, each
stating that “[a] district court may determine all issues” in suits
Chapter 21 governs.94 Section 21.001 then grants county courts at law

90 Id. § 21.001.

91 Tex. Const. art. V, § 1.

92 Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez, 669 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex. 2023)
(quoting Tex. Const. art. V, § 1).
93 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.001.

94 Id. §§ 21.003, .101(c).

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commensurate power.95 Together, these provisions vest district courts
and county courts at law with concurrent jurisdiction over eminent
domain cases and to hear and decide “all issues” pertaining to them.96
* * *
The State has no immunity from Chapter 21 claims to repurchase
condemned property no longer necessary for public use. The State’s
exercise of eminent domain power in a condemnation suit is property
acquired “through eminent domain,” regardless of the parties’ later
agreement upon the value of the property taken. Further, Chapter 21
permits the repurchase of a portion of condemned property no longer
necessary for public use. Finally, district courts and county courts at law
have concurrent jurisdiction to hear repurchase claims if other statutory
requirements are met. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court
of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Jane N. Bland
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 12, 2026

95See Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Reese, 146
S.W.2d 519, 524–25 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1940, no writ) (noting that the
county court was historically the exclusive tribunal for initiating and executing
condemnation proceedings and listing Texas precedent).
96 Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c). Harris County Civil Courts at Law

have a jurisdictional limit requiring that the amount in controversy not exceed
$325,000. Tex. Gov’t Code § 25.1032(c). The parties may address the
applicability of this statute on remand.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341711. Public record. Not legal advice.