# Hotard

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · June 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341497

## Case

- **Full name:** Alexander Clark v. Jean Hotard, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** June 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341497

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that this “area is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case”
- holding that school district was not liable under Title VI for the actions of a principal who allegedly prohibited students from speaking Spanish because the school district did not know the principal had engaged in that behavior

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDER CLARK
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 22-326-JWD-RLB
JEAN HOTARD, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 171)
(“MSJ”) filed by Defendants, Jason Ard, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, State of Louisiana (“Sheriff
Ard”); Deputy Calvin Taylor Bowden (“Bowden”); and Deputy Jean Hotard (“Hotard”)
(collectively, the “LPSO Defendants”). Plaintiff Alexander Clark (“Plaintiff” or “Clark”) opposes
the motion. (Doc. 184-2.) LPSO Defendants have filed a reply memorandum. (Doc. 202.) In
response, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Motion to
Strike and Surreply to Defendant’s Reply Brief (Doc. 203), which the Court grants. Oral argument
is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the
arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ MSJ is granted, and all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims against LPSO Defendants are
dismissed with prejudice.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 89) alleges that, on May 24, 2021, “law-
enforcement officers from Livingston Parish and Denham Springs stopped, searched, detained,
harassed, and brutalized Alexander Clark, without probable cause, leaving him severely injured
and unable to earn a living for more than two years.” (FAC ¶¶ 2, 32, Doc. 89.) FAC asserts claims
against the LPSO Defendants and against certain individuals associated with the City of Denham
Springs (“DS Defendants”).1 Plaintiff has settled his claims against the DS Defendants, (Docs.
229, 230, 232, 233), so Plaintiff’s only remaining claims are against the LPSO Defendants.
LPSO Defendants responded to the FAC by filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c).
(Doc. 100.) LPSO Defendants argued that the claims were either barred by Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994), as a result of Plaintiff’s conviction for obstruction of justice arising from the
stop or for failure to state a viable claim. (See Doc. 100-1; see also LPSO Defendants’ Statement
of Uncontested Material Facts (“SUMF”) ¶ 1, Doc. 171-2; Plaintiff’s Opposing Statement of
Material Facts (“POSMF”) ¶ 1, Doc. 194-1 (admitting fact of obstruction of justice conviction but
denying its relevance).)
On October 1, 2024, the Court issued written reasons dismissing most of Plaintiff’s claims
against LPSO Defendants. (Doc. 136.) Specifically, the Court resolved Plaintiff’s claims as
follows:

Counts Claim Defendant(s) Disposition
Count One Section 1983 Hoard and Bowden Heck-Barred
(Fourth Amendment)
False Arrest
Count Two La. Civ. Code art. 2315 Hotard and Sheriff Ard Heck-Barred
False Arrest
Count Three La. Const. Art. I, § 5 & Hotard, Bowden, and Not Considered
La. Civ. Code art. 2315 Sheriff Ard
Excessive Force / Battery
Count Four Section 1983 Hotard, Bowden, and Not Considered
(Fourth Amendment) McCullough
Excessive Force
Count Five La. Civ. Code art. 2315 Hotard and Sheriff Ard Not Considered
Negligent Handcuffing

1 The DS Defendants include: (1) the City of Denham Springs itself (the “City”); (2) the Denham Springs Police Chief
Shannon Womack (“DS Police Chief”); and (3) an officer with the Denham Springs Police Department (“DSPD”)
named Sydney McCullough. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 18–20.)
Count Six Section 1983 Hotard, Bowden, and Heck-Barred
(Fourth Amendment), Sheriff Ard
La. Const. Art. I, § 5, and
La. Civ. Code art. 2315
Unreasonable Search of Persons &
Invasion of Privacy
Count Section 1983 McCullough Not Considered
Seven (Fourth Amendment) (DSPD Deputy)
Bystander Liability
Count Eight Section 1983 Sheriff Ard Dismissed for
(Fourth Amendment— Failure to State
Monell) a Claim
Excessive Force
Count Nine Section 1983 Sheriff Ard Dismissed
(Fourth Amendment— Failure to State
Monell) a Claim
Failure to Investigate
Excessive Force
Count Ten Section 1983 DP Police Chief Not Consideed
(Fourth Amendment—
Monell)
Excessive Force
Count Section 1983 Sheriff Ard and Hotard Heck-Barred
Eleven (Fourth Amendment) and
La. Const. Art. I, § 3
Denial of Equal Protection
Count 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Sheriff Ard NOT Heck-
Twelve (Title VI) Barred
Intentional Race Discrimination
Count Section 1985(3) and Section 1983 Hotard, Sheriff Ard, Heck-Barred
Thirteen (Fourteenth Amendment) DS Police Chief, and
Conspiracy to Violate Equal the City
Protection

Thus, the only remaining claims are: (1) against Hotard: Counts Three, Four, and Five—
that is, excessive force under federal law and battery and negligent handcuffing under state law;
(2) against Bowden: Counts Three and Four—that is, excessive force and battery; and (3) against
Sheriff Ard: vicarious liability under state law and Count Twelve—that is, a Title VI claim for
intentional discrimination.
B. The Traffic Stop Before the Use of Force
On May 24, 2021, around midnight, Hotard stopped Plaintiff at a gas station in Denham
Springs for failing to use his turn signal. (Pl. Stat. of Material Facts (“PSMF”) ¶ 1, Doc. 194-1;
Hotard Dep. 118, Doc. 189-3.) Plaintiff was cooperative as Hotard and Bowden questioned him
and searched his truck for over twenty minutes. (See 3_12021-05-2423-28-36LELLIS.avi (“Video

1”); 4_12021-05-2423-38-00LELLIS.avi (“Video 2”); 5_12021-05-2423-43-00LELLIS.avi
(“Video 3”); 6_12021-05-2423-48-00LELLIS.avi (“Video 4”) at 0:00–2:25).
During the search, Bowden sang to himself the lyrics of a rap song by Gucci Man, saying
specifically “Give me some crack.” (Bowden Dep. 125, Doc. 184-7.) Bowden also sang portions
of a song “Crack” by 2 Chainz during portions of the stop. (Doc. 184-8 at 2.)
Hotard testified that Plaintiff and the car smelled like marijuana. (Hotard Dep. 145, Doc.
184-5.) However, Hotard did not use any field test wipes on any items he questioned Plaintiff
about, such as Plaintiff’s gout medication, Plaintiff’s tools, or Plaintiff’s $20 bill. (Hotard Dep.
146–148, Doc. 184-5.)

The officers examined Plaintiff’s $20 bill, purportedly for drugs, and Bowden said, “Oh
that might actually be sheetrock. That might be sheetrock.” (Bowden Dep. 115, Doc.189-5;
24_12021-05-2500-19-00CBOWDEN.avi (“Bowden Video”), at 1:34).) Someone replied, “Yeah,
but them granules, that ain’t sheetrock. Sheetrock ain’t shiny granules,” and Bowden testified that
was true. (Bowden Dep. 115, Doc. 189-5.)
C. The Use of Force
Video 4 depicts the use of force. Plaintiff appears to yank the $20 bill from one of the
officer’s hands. (Video 4 at 2:25–2:27.) The officers then grab both of Plaintiff’s arms and place
them behind his back. (Id. at 2:27–2:33.) Plaintiff breaks his arms away at one point before the
officers return Plaintiff’s arms to behind his back. (Id. at 2:33–2:41.) Plaintiff is then handcuffed,
(id. at 2:41–2:59), and patted down, (id. at 3:00–3:45), before being placed in the back of the patrol
car, (id. at 3:45–4:10).
Thus, as LPSO Defendants argue, at no time did Hotard or Bowden (a) take Plaintiff to the
ground; (b) strike, kick, or punch Plaintiff; or (c) draw any weapons on Plaintiff. (See id. at 2:25–

3:45.) Plaintiff claims that the deputies pushed him against the truck prior to handcuffing, (Doc.
194-1 at 2), but (a) the video shows that Plaintiff is either pushed back onto the tailgate of the
truck, or sits on the tailgate, as the officers attempt to handcuff him, and (b) any such contact with
the truck is minor and brief. (Id.)
On the whole, the use of force lasted, at most, 35 seconds from the deputies’ initial effort
to handcuff Plaintiff to when they finish handcuffing him. (Id. at 2:25–2:59.) In fact, it appears
that Plaintiff stops struggling about 15 seconds after the initial contact. (Id. at 2:25–2:41.)
Additionally, the Court notes that, in his PSMF, Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants Bowden
and Hotard gave Mr. Clark no time to comply with verbal commands to place his hands behind his

back.” (PSMF ¶ 6, Doc. 194-1.) However, Plaintiff cites for this proposition two seconds of video
from Ex. 7, 1_2021-05-25_00-14-00_CBOWDEN at 0:55–0:57. (PSMF ¶ 6, Doc. 194-1.) This
exhibit was not uploaded into JERS or otherwise submitted by Plaintiffs. (See JERS Confirmation,
Doc. 188-1.) The Court also notes that the other Bowden Video in evidence does not even show
the use of force. Nevertheless, the Court assumes for purposes of this MSJ that the missing video
shows what Plaintiff represents, as it ultimately does not affect the outcome of the motion.
D. The Handcuffing
The parties dispute certain facts about Plaintiff’s handcuffing. Hotard testified that, when
he applied the handcuffs to Clark, he would have checked that the handcuffs were not applied too
tightly and would have double locked the handcuffs to ensure that they did not tighten onto his
wrists following his application. (Hotard Decl. ¶ 5, Doc. 171-3.)
Plaintiff testified that when Hotard came back to the vehicle, Plaintiff asked him if he could
release the handcuffs because his hand was hurting. (Clark Dep. 73, Doc. 171-6.) Plaintiff stated
that “probably ten minutes” passed between the time he was put in the back of the unit and when

he had that discussion with Hotard. (Id. at 73–74.) Hotard did loosen the handcuffs at that time.
(Id. at 74.) Plaintiff asked him to release the cuffs on him because he had no feeling in his hand;
Plaintiff said he felt the pain in his right hand after the handcuffs were put on, but he could not say
exactly when he realized his hand was broken. (Id. at 74.)
One of Plaintiff’s experts, Daniel Busken, testified that, “had Deputy [Hotard] applied the
handcuffs properly, double-locked them, and checked the fit, there would have been no need, as
Mr. Clark alleges, for Deputy Hotard to loosen the handcuffs after Mr. Clark was secured in them
for ten minutes.” (Doc. 183-3 at 26.) Busken further stated that, if Clark[’s] account is correct, then
he had been secured in the handcuffs, which were too tight, for ten minutes, which is enough time,

based upon the research noted previously [in the report], to suffer an injury.” (Doc. 183-3 at 26.)
The injury referenced is “handcuff neuropathy” and “compress[ed] blood vessels and nerves.” (Id.
at 15.)
However, Plaintiff’s doctor was specifically asked if, more likely than not, the handcuff
caused the fracture in Plaintiff’s hand. (Dr. Garon Dep. 21, Doc. 171-7.) Dr. Garon said that was
a false statement; that is, more likely than not the handcuffing would not have caused the fracture.
(Id. at 21–22.) Dr. Garon was also asked whether, more likely than not, the deputies’ act of
grabbing Plaintiff’s hands and wrist to bring them behind his back would have caused a fracture
in the hook of the hamate (i.e., a bone in his hand), and the doctor said it would be “unlikely to
occur in that situation” because “it takes a direct blow to a very specific area in the palm.” (Id. at
22.)
E. Salient Facts to the Discrimination Claim
The parties spill much ink over Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, and the Court will
summarize those arguments below. For present purposes, however, the Court will focus on one

aspect of that claim, which the Court finds dispositive: deliberate indifference.
To support this requirement, Plaintiff principally relies on the declaration of Marjorie J.
Menza, who is one of Clark’s attorneys. (Doc. 184-11.) LPSO Defendants object to this declaration
as a whole in their reply memorandum, (Doc. 202), and the Court will address this motion to strike
below.
For now, the Court summarizes Menza’s declaration as follows: Menza describes efforts
Plaintiff’s counsel has made to obtain data regarding department-wide traffic citation practices for
the LPSO. (Menza Decl. ¶ 2, Doc. 184-11.) Plaintiff made a substantially similar public records
request to the LPSO. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff issued these requests for production and public records

requests on December 23, 2024—over two and a half years after this suit was filed on May 19,
2022, (id. ¶¶ 2–3), and over three and a half years after Plaintiff’s encounter with the LPSO
Defendants, (PSMF ¶ 1, Doc. 194-1; Hotard Dep. 118, Doc. 189-3).
The declaration continues by describing the back and forth between Plaintiff’s counsel and
LPSO Defendants’ attorney regarding the scope, feasibility, and burden of these requests. (Menza
Decl. ¶¶ 4–7, Doc. 184-11.) LPSO Defendants’ counsel explained that LPSO “does not have an
electronic means to search, sort and produce its traffic related incident reports by race and instead,
[LSPO’s attorney] would have to print out reports, redact necessary data as well as manually enter
them into an excel sheet in order for the data to be statistically analyzed.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Traffic
violations where only a traffic ticket is issued by the deputy are scanned by the Sheriff’s secretary
before being sent to the District Attorney, but they are not otherwise maintained in a searchable
database by the LPSO. (Id. ¶ 8.) Menza then says she worked with another ACLU lawyer and
Plaintiff’s other attorneys to “identif[y], via additional public records requests, traffic tickets issued
and available at the Livingston Parish Courthouse for printing.” (Id. ¶ 9.) The ACLU lawyer “then

printed out at the Courthouse scans all LPSO-issued traffic tickets from 2020 and 2021, which
were then sent to Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sarah Abraham, for statistical analysis.” (Id. ¶ 10.) These
documents were then provided to the LPSO. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff argues in his Opposition that all
of this shows that the LPSO “had not looked at the statistics they have available for potential race-
based discrimination, despite being notified that there was a racial discrimination problem in the
department by [Plaintiff’s] complaint in this instant matter as well as public records and discovery
requests.” (Doc. 194 at 32.)
Plaintiff also bases his deliberate indifference argument on Busken’s supplemental report.
Busken there asserts:

Based upon my experience with racial profiling data mandates, it
would have been appropriate for LPSO to have had these numbers
compiled and then analyze the data to ensure officers are following
the policy. Through the discovery materials I have reviewed it is my
understanding that while LPSO maintains a racial profiling policy,
LPSO takes no action to implement that policy by compiling the
numbers or analyzing the data. Merely compiling numbers and filing
them away without any thoughtful analysis or auditing serves no
purpose, nor does it serve the purpose intended by the policy, which
is an examination in an effort to discover any racial profiling.
Without further analysis the numbers speak for themselves.

(Doc. 183-3 at 52–53.) Plaintiff argues in his Opposition, “The LPSO defendants had all of the
data necessary to see and correct racially biased policing in the department and chose not to,
thereby acting with deliberate indifference.” (Doc. 194 at 32.)
II. RULE 56 STANDARD
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states that a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” or by “showing that
the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Thus, “[a] movant for summary judgment need not set forth evidence when the nonmovant
bears the burden of persuasion at trial.” Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 987,
997 (Sth Cir. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“we find no express
or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or
other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”’)). “The moving party may meet its burden
to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the record
contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” /d. (citing Stahl v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (Sth Cir. 2002)).
If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, “its opponent
must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . .

.. The nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)
(cleaned up). The non-mover’s “burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of
evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (Sth Cir. 1994) (cleaned up).

Additionally, “[w]hen evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant
fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not
properly before the district court.” Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (Sth Cir. 2003)
(citing Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (Sth Cir. 1998); Skotak v. Tenneco
Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 916 (Sth Cir. 1992)). “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court
a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary
judgment.” /d. (citing, inter alia, Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458). See also Nissho—Iwai Am. Corp. v.
Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (Sth Cir. 1988) (it is not necessary “that the entire record in the case .

.. be searched and found bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment may
be properly entered”); cf’ United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are
not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”).
Ultimately, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual
disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a
reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party could arrive at a verdict in that party’s favor, the court must
deny the motion. Indeed, even if the moving party comes forward
with an abundance of evidence supporting its theory of the case, the
nonmoving party may nevertheless defeat the motion by countering
with evidence of its own, which, if credited by the fact-finder, would
entitle the nonmoving party to a verdict in its favor. Or, the non-
moving party can defeat the motion by demonstrating that the
evidence tendered by the moving party is itself laced with
contradictions of [material] fact.
Int’! Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (Sth Cir. 1991) (cleaned up).

10

However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record [(as, for instance, by a video)], so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). See also id. at 380–81 (“Respondent’s
version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed

him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed
the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim
1. Parties’ Arguments
a. LPSO Defendants’ Original Memorandum (Doc. 171-1)
LPSO Defendants begins by arguing that Hotard and Bowden are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. (Doc. 171-1 at 10.) These defendants emphasize
that “it has been conclusively decided that the arrest in this case was valid and warranted” because

Plaintiff was convicted of Obstruction of Justice and because the Court already ruled, through its
finding about Heck, that the arrest was supported by probable cause. (Id. at 10–11.) Moreover, it
is per se reasonable to use handcuffs and apply some degree of physical coercion to effectuate an
arrest based on probable cause. (Id. at 11 (citations omitted).) Further, LPSO Defendants had the
right to grab Clark’s arm to try to handcuff him. (Id. at 11–12.)
LPSO Defendants then take those premises and apply them to the video in evidence; they
say that no reasonable jury could conclude that the use of force was excessive, and “certainly, not
every reasonable officer could conclude” same. (Id. at 12.) The Court should reach this conclusion,
even when construing the video in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. (Id.) LPSO Defendants say
the force was only applied for about 25 seconds, was minimal, and was limited to what was
necessary to secure Plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id. at 12–13.)
LPSO Defendants then argue that Hotard and Bowden are entitled to qualified immunity.
“[T]he only force used in this case by [the] Deputies . . . was their grabbing of plaintiff’s wrists to
place his hands behind his back for handcuffing. Plaintiff cannot come forward with any case to

suggest that such force is objectively unreasonable, let alone to establish this ‘beyond debate.’”
(Id. at 14.) The officers did not take plaintiff to the ground, did not place him against the vehicle
or another object, did not punch, kick, or strike plaintiff, and did not draw any weapons. (Id.) “This
was, quite literally, the least amount of force the deputies could have possibly used to place
plaintiff in handcuffs. The deputies did nothing more than take plaintiff’s wrists and draw his arms
behind his back.” (Id.) As a result, LPSO Defendants say, this claim should be dismissed. (Id.)
b. Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 194)
Plaintiff responds that his “constitutional rights were violated during his interaction with
the LPSO.” (Doc. 194 at 11.) Plaintiff focuses on the Graham factors. (Id. at 12.) First, the nature

of the crime is disputed; LPSO Defendants argue they engaged in a search for drugs while Plaintiff
says the search was pretextual. (Id.) There’s also a question of fact on whether Plaintiff was a
threat, particularly in light of his conduct during the lengthy search of his truck and the presence
of multiple officers. (Id. at 12–13.) Plaintiff was also not actively resisting or trying to flee;
Plaintiff asserts that he “had endured approximately 12 minutes of a warrantless search of his
person, jeering by the Defendant Deputies, and several searches of his person without attempting
to flee or resist at any point.” (Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff next argues that LPSO Defendants could not have reasonably believed their
conduct was lawful. (Id. at 13–14.) Plaintiff specifically cites to and discusses Hanks v. Rogers,
853 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2017), and Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009), in support
of his position. (Id. at 14–15.) Plaintiff highlights how (a) the stop was initiated for a minor traffic
violation; (b) there was no reasonable fear of flight; (c) Plaintiff was left unattended, indicating no
concern for a weapon; (d) Plaintiff complied before the use of force, including by exiting the
vehicle and allowing his person and pockets to be searched four times; (e) Plaintiff was elderly

and had a visible limp; and (f) LPSO Defendants used force rather than attempting to speak with
him, de-escalate the situation, or pursue some lesser alternative. (Id. at 14–16.)
Plaintiff then asserts that Hotard and Bowden are not entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at
16–17.) Plaintiff reiterates that this case involved a minor traffic violation and a misdemeanor
conviction for obstruction of justice for taking his $20 bill back from Hotard, after a lengthy
vehicle search and several derogatory comments by Hotard. (Id. at 17–18.) Again, Plaintiff was
not a flight risk, and he was not resisting. (Id. at 18–19 (citing Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332
(5th Cir. 2017); Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 2000); Bone v.
Dunnaway, 657 F. App’x 258 (5th Cir. 2016)).) Plaintiff also relies on his expert, who testified

that the use of force was retaliatory. (Id. at 20.) For all these reasons, Plaintiff says, the MSJ should
be denied on this issue. (Id.)
c. LPSO Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 202)
LPSO Defendants respond that Plaintiff fails to carry his burden of overcoming qualified
immunity. (Doc. 202 at 10.) “Despite plaintiff’s exaggerated attempt to sensationalize this incident
into something more than it was, defendants again refer to the Court to the video of this incident,
which conclusively shows that no excessive force was used on plaintiff at any time by anyone.”
(Id. at 11.) Plaintiff first notes that there is no evidence of any injury; Plaintiff’s doctor rejected
the idea that the incident caused injury to his hand, and there is no medical evidence that his hip
injuries were caused by the incident. (Id. at 12 n.26.) However, LPSO Defendants do not “belabor
the injury issue” since Plaintiff’s claim falls on the other two requirements for excessive force.
(Id.)
LPSO Defendants reiterate that they have the right to use some amount of physical coercion
to effectuate a valid arrest, including by grabbing a noncompliant suspect’s arm. (Id. at 12.) These

defendants next dispute the argument that they weren’t entitled to use force, as they had the right
to arrest Plaintiff and the right to use force flows from that. (Id.) There is no evidence to support
the argument that the arrest was retaliatory, and, in any event, the force amounted only to “placing
plaintiff in handcuffs—nothing more. Quite simply, plaintiff cannot show that his constitutional
rights were violated.” (Id. at 13.)
LPSO Defendants also argue that Hotard and Bowden are entitled to qualified immunity.
(Id.) LPSO Defendants describes Plaintiff’s characterization of his authority “highly
disingenuous.” (Id.) LPSO Defendants then distinguish Trammell, Goodson, Bone, Hanks, and
Deville. (Id. at 13–14.)

Given that the case law so very clearly permits the use of force to
handcuff a person under arrest, and given that the use of force in this
case was no more than was necessary to accomplish the
handcuffing, plaintiff has failed to show that the use of force in this
case was so excessive that no reasonable officer would believe it to
be justified. His cited cases are nothing like this case, all of which
involved a much higher degree of force. Quite simply, plaintiff has
failed to overcome the LPSO Defendant’s invocation of qualified
immunity.

(Id. at 15.)
d. Plaintiff’s Surreply (Doc. 203-2)
Plaintiff’s surreply deals only with the discrimination claim, (see Doc. 203-2), so Plaintiff
offers no new arguments on the issue of excessive force.
2. Applicable Law
a. Qualified Immunity Generally
“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from
civil damages liability ‘as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with
the rights they are alleged to have violated.’” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 185 (5th Cir.

2022) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). “Determining whether an
officer is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry.” Id. “First, we ask whether
the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a federal right. Second, we ask whether the right in
question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, such that the officer was on
notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.” Id. at 185–86 (cleaned up). Courts are “permitted
to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
b. Constitutional Violation

As to the first prong of qualified immunity, “[w]here, as here, the excessive force claim
arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly
characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens
the right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff
must establish: ‘(1) injury[,] (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was
clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.’” Freeman v.
Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007) (Dennis, J.) (quoting Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d
745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005)).
“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the
Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at
stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (cleaned up). “Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-
intensive; whether the force used is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ depends on ‘the facts and

circumstances of each particular case.’” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004)
(observing that this “area is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case”)).
“Factors to consider include ‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “[T]he question
is ‘whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . . seizure.’” Graham,
490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).
“As in other Fourth Amendment contexts . . . , the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive

force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted). “An officer’s evil intentions will
not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an
officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” Id.
Additionally, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Id. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)). “Not every push or shove, even if it
may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. (cleaned up). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Id. at 396–97.
“Handcuffing is a generally accepted technique to conduct an arrest.” Scott v. City of

Mandeville, 69 F.4th 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888,
896 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n nearly every situation where an arrest is authorized . . . handcuffing is
appropriate.” (citation omitted)). Further, “minor, incidental injuries that occur in connection with
the use of handcuffs to effectuate an arrest do not give rise to a constitutional claim for excessive
force.” Id. (citing Freeman, 483 F.3d at 417 (citations omitted)). “[A] standard police technique
becomes excessive if the surrounding circumstances . . . would put a reasonable officer on notice
that an arrestee was particularly susceptible to injury from the standard maneuver.” Id. at 257
(cleaned up).
Thus, for instance, in Scott, the officer “was performing a routine handcuffing technique

when [the plaintiff] began to pull away from his grasp as he repeatedly instructed her to stop
turning away from him.” Id. “The officers then increased their use of force by lifting [plaintiff’s]
twisted right arm and bending her over the police car. This limited use of force was a response to
[plaintiff’s] perceived resistance and was not clearly unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id.
Moreover, the officers were not on notice the plaintiff would suffer an injury from the handcuffing;
though the plaintiff had told the officers that he had recently had a surgery, it was “far from obvious
that the officers would be on notice that [the plaintiff] would be injured if they handcuffed her
because of that surgery,” particularly when she “had kept her hands above her head for a significant
amount of time prior to the arrest and had not shown any visible signs of injury before the arrest.”
Id. “The officer’s limited use of force (in such a short time frame) to restrain [plaintiff] and place
her in handcuffs as a response to [her] perceived resistance does not amount to excessive force.”
Id.
Additionally, “it is hornbook law that ‘the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries
with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.’” Buehler v.

Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 980–81 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; and then quoting
Fulton v. Staats, 41 N.Y. 498, 499 (1869) (Officers may “use as much force as [i]s necessary to
make the arrest.”). And, when evaluating whether an arrestee is resisting, the Court “must measure
the force used under the facts as a reasonable officer would perceive them, not necessarily against
the historical facts.” Id. at 984 (quoting Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Further, “it is reasonable for an officer to attempt to grab a noncompliant suspect’s arm in an
attempt to handcuff the suspect[.]” Trammell, 868 F.3d at 343 n.9 (finding one officer was entitled
to qualified immunity when his “only involvement in the altercation was apparently an attempt to
grab [the plaintiff’s] left arm” and when there was no injury alleged from that officer’s conduct).

c. Clearly Established
Again, “[b]ecause the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was
unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.”
Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at
198). “Clearly established law is determined by controlling authority—or a robust consensus of
persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of
particularity.” Id. (quoting Clarkston v. White, 943 F.3d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 2019)). “For conduct
to be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law, there need not be a case directly
on point, but ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.’” Id. at 173–74 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 577
U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).
Specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment
context, where the [Supreme] Court has recognized that it is
sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant
legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual
situation the officer confronts. . . . Sufficiently specific precedent
involving similar facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise
hazy border between excessive and acceptable force and thereby
provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.
Otherwise, qualified immunity protects actions in the hazy border
between excessive and acceptable force. Thus, qualified immunity
gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments about open legal questions. . . . In short, when
properly applied, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Consequently,
qualified immunity is justified unless no reasonable officer could
have acted as the defendant officers did here, or every reasonable
officer faced with the same facts would not have [acted as the
defendant officers did].

Id. at 174–75 (cleaned up).
3. Analysis
Having carefully considered the matter, the Court finds that Hotard and Bowden are
entitled to qualified immunity. In sum, Plaintiff has not established that every reasonable officer
would know, beyond debate, that their conduct was unlawful under clearly established law.
The Court agrees with LPSO Defendants’ assessment of the caselaw: (1) “[h]andcuffing is
a generally accepted technique to conduct an arrest,” and, it “is appropriate . . . in nearly every
situation where an arrest is authorized,” Scott, 69 F.4th at 256 & n.24 (cleaned up); (2) “the right
to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion
or threat thereof to effect it,” Buehler, 27 F.4th at 980–81; and (3) “it is reasonable for an officer
to attempt to grab a noncompliant suspect’s arm in an attempt to handcuff the suspect[.]”
Trammell, 868 F.3d at 343 n.9. See also Doc. 171-1 at 14 (summarizing this law).
The video shows that Hotard and Bowden acted reasonably within this framework. As the
Court explained in its earlier ruling, Plaintiff was convicted of obstruction of justice, and this
means that, under Heck, Plaintiff is barred from disputing that there was probable cause to arrest
him for yanking the $20 bill from the officer. (See Doc. 136 at 8–9.) The only force used was to
effectuate the handcuffing, and no reasonable juror could conclude that there was anything out-of-

the-ordinary about it. (Video 4 at 2:25–2:59.) All reasonable jurors would conclude from the video
that (a) Plaintiff resisted the officers’ lawful handcuffing, “albeit mildly,” Buehler, 27 F.4th at 984;
(b) the LPSO Defendants did not strike, kick, or punch Plaintiff; (c) they did not draw their
weapons on him; (d) Plaintiff made contact with the truck, but only “mildly” and as a result of his
resisting the officer’s lawful actions; and (e) the entire use of force (such as it was) lasted, at most,
35 seconds. (See Video 4 at 2:25–2:59.)
Plaintiff argues that certain Graham factors weigh in his favor, such as the fact that the
traffic stop and obstruction charge were minor and such as the fact that Plaintiff did not pose an
immediate threat. (See Doc. 194 at 12–13.) However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

identify a sufficiently similar case holding that Hotard and Bowden’s conduct was, beyond debate,
unlawful.
Indeed, the Court finds that this case is easily distinguishable from the cases Plaintiff relies
upon; in those decisions, the officers applied considerably greater force. For instance, in Hanks,
the Fifth Circuit found that questions of fact precluded summary judgment when a plaintiff was
stopped for a minor traffic violation and “took a small lateral step with his left foot” which was
“not accompanied by any obvious signs of violence or flight” but the officer then “administered
[a] ‘half spear’ . . . physical takedown” which resulted in “contusions, acute strain, and bruised
ribs” 853 F.3d at 745–46. Likewise, in Deville, there was a “‘minor traffic violation,’ . . . no signs
of flight or threat,” and plaintiff’s “‘resistance was, at most, passive in that she merely refused to
leave her grandchild and exit the vehicle until [her husband] came to get the child,’” but the officer
“‘engaged in very little, if any, negotiation with [the plaintiff]—and . . . instead quickly resorted
to breaking her driver’s side window and dragging her out of the vehicle.’” Hanks, 853 F.3d at 748
(quoting Deville, 567 F.3d at 167–68).

Unlike Hanks and Deville, here, Plaintiff was not tackled or dragged from the broken
window of a vehicle; rather, the undisputed evidence from the video shows that LPSO Defendants
simply grabbed Plaintiff’s arms and attempted to effectuate a lawful arrest. For the same reasons,
the other decisions cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable. See Trammel, 868 F.3d at 343 (“the law
at the time of Trammel's arrest clearly established that it was objectively unreasonable for several
officers to tackle an individual who was not fleeing, not violent, not aggressive, and only resisted
by pulling his arm away from an officer’s grasp.” (emphasis added)); Bone, 657 F. App’x at 260
(questions of fact preclude summary judgment for excessive force claim where plaintiff “refused
to sign [a] summons, . . . turned around to walk away[,]” and the officer “then ‘forcefully’ grabbed

[the plaintiff] and ‘violently’ slammed her face against a nearby window.” (emphasis added));
Goodson, 202 F.3d at 740 (reversing grant of qualified immunity where plaintiff “suffered a
broken shoulder as a result of being tackled by [the officers], who lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain or frisk him and from whom he was not fleeing.” (emphasis added)).
Rather, again, this case is much closer to the officer in Trammel who was entitled to
qualified immunity and whose “only involvement in the altercation was apparently an attempt to
grab [the plaintiff’s] left arm.” Trammel, 868 F.3d at 343 n.9. The Court concluded that “it [wa]s
reasonable for an officer to attempt to grab a noncompliant suspect’s arm in an attempt to handcuff
the suspect[.]” Id.
Ultimately, “[a] constitutional violation does not occur every time an officer touches
someone.” Carter v. Dupuy, 173 F.4th 561, 564 (5th Cir. 2026) (citing Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d
430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996)).
[A]t the end of the day, the touchstone of our inquiry is simply the
reasonableness of the force employed. To be reasonable is not to be
perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on
the part of . . . officials, giving them fair leeway for enforcing the
law in the community’s protection. Not every push or shove, even if
it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,
violates the Fourth Amendment.

Buehler, 27 F.4th at 981 (cleaned up).
Here, as LPSO Defendants argue, “[t]his was, quite literally, the least amount of force the
deputies could have possibly used to place plaintiff in handcuffs.” (Doc. 171-1 at 14.) The Court
agrees. At the very least, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that “no reasonable officer could have
acted as the defendant officers did here, or every reasonable officer faced with the same facts would
not have [acted as the defendant officers did].” Tucker, 998 F.3d at 174. As a result, the MSJ will
be granted on this issue, and Plaintiff’s excessive force claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Intentional Discrimination
1. Parties’ Arguments
a. LPSO Defendants’ Original Memorandum (Doc. 171-1)
LPSO Defendants argue that the Title VI claim should be dismissed in part for reasons
given in the Court’s ruling on their motion to dismiss. (Doc. 171-1 at 14–15.) First, they say the
claim is barred by Heck. (Id. at 15.) Second, they claim that Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to
support the claim. (Id.)
As to the former, LPSO Defendants explain that the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment/denial of equal protection claim as Heck-barred and stated:
if Plaintiff succeeded in arguing that the stop, search, and force used
during his arrest were all a result of intentional discrimination and
“racial profiling” absent “any appropriate state interest”, and that
Defendants had “insufficient suspicion” to stop or search him, it
could imply the invalidity of his stop, search, and ultimate arrest.

(Id. at 15–16 (quoting Doc. 136 at 9–10).) However, the Court declined to dismiss the Title VI
claim because “[d]efendants do not cite to any binding precedent applying a Heck bar to Title VI
claims” and because the Court was unaware of Fifth Circuit precedent doing so. (Id. at 16 (quoting
Doc. 136 at 10).) While the Court was correct that there is no binding Fifth Circuit case on point,
the same reasoning applies because: (a) the Court said the equal protection claim was barred in
part because it depended on a finding of intentional discrimination, and (b) Title VI also requires
a finding of intentional discrimination. (Id. (citations omitted).) Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has
recognized that the standard for equal protection and Title VI is the same. (Id. at 17.) Thus,
“[b]ecause Title VI requires proof of the same intentional discrimination, success on this claim
would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff’s conviction, warranting dismissal here.” (Id.)
LPSO Defendants next argue that Plaintiff lacks evidence to support this claim. (Id.) They
say Plaintiff must prove that Sheriff Ard “knew of the intentional discrimination but refused to
stop it despite having authority to do so.” (Id. at 18 (quoting Mandawala v. Ne. Baptist Hosp., 16
F.4th 1144, 1150 (5th Cir. 2021)).) This is required when the Plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient
policy of discrimination, and, here, the Court reached that conclusion at the Rule 12 stage. (Id.)
“[P]laintiff has absolutely no evidence that Sheriff Ard had actual knowledge of discrimination
and responded with deliberate indifference.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s expert Mr. Busken concluded that the
information provided by plaintiff’s expert economist “alone does not provide context to better
understand the dynamics which may drive these figures, and this table alone is insufficient to prove
any systemic bias.” (Id. at 19 (quoting Busken Dep. 87–88, Doc. 171-5).) Thus, Plaintiff cannot
establish that Sheriff Ard knew of intentional discrimination. (Id.) LPSO Defendants compare this
case to Washington v. Smith, 639 F. Supp. 3d 625 (E.D. La. 2022), as, there, the plaintiffs also
relied on statistical disparities between arrest and incarceration rates of African American and
Caucasians in Louisiana, among other things, and the Eastern District purportedly dismissed the
claim because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the Sheriff acted with deliberate indifference. (Id.

at 19–20.)
b. Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 194)
Plaintiff acknowledges that he must prove intentional discrimination and that Title VI’s
bar on discrimination is based on the Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. 194 at 23–24 (citations
omitted).) But Plaintiff argues that he has made a prima facie case of discrimination and that LPSO
Defendants misconstrue his statistical evidence. (Id at 26.) Plaintiff says his expert “Dr. Sarah
Abraham provides statistical evidence that the LPSO Defendants demonstrated a clear pattern of
racial discrimination through their policing practices.” (Id.) Here, the search and use of force were
both conducted with racial animus, says Plaintiff. (Id.) Dr. Abraham also provided statistical

evidence and a report purporting to show that “LPSO engages in racist policing practices by pulling
over and ‘up-charging’ Black people at disproportionate rates.” (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff also described
the discriminatory nature of the police conduct in his deposition. (Id.)
Plaintiff next asserts that LPSO Defendants also fail to provide a nondiscriminatory reason
for initiating the traffic stop, as there’s a question of fact as to whether Plaintiff committed a traffic
violation or was convicted of such a crime. (Id. at 28.) Further, statistical evidence undercuts such
a claim. (Id. at 29.) Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Busken, conceded that statistics alone do not prove
systemic bias, but (a) that is not Plaintiff’s burden, and (b) Plaintiff points to other facts to support
his position. (Id.) Washington is ultimately distinguishable because Plaintiff does not rely on a
single conclusory statement but “on statistical evidence, racist remarks during the stop, and
excessive force in arresting him, all building a case that provides ample evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact such that the evidence should be heard by the trier of fact.” (Id. at
30.)
Plaintiff then argues that his Title VI claim is not Heck-barred. (Id.) Here, Plaintiff relies

entirely on the Court’s prior ruling and urges that LPSO Defendants have offered no new evidence
to change that. (Id. at 30–31.) As a result, this is further evidence of discrimination. (Id. at 31.)
Finally, Plaintiff contends that LPSO Defendants were deliberately indifferent. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, the failure to investigate or end discrimination is evidence of deliberate
indifference, and, here, LPSO Defendants have been on notice for over three years, since Plaintiff
filed his complaint in May of 2022. (Id.) Moreover, LPSO Defendants could have learned about
the racism from their own data, but they stated that such statistics could not be produced without
onerous work searching and redacting. (Id. at 31–32 (citing Sneed v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 490
F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1088 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (citing Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999)).) Plaintiff here relies on Menza’s declaration to assert that:
Defendant LPSO’s response to Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that
their office had not looked at the statistics they have available for
potential race-based discrimination, despite being notified that there
was a racial discrimination problem in the department by Mr.
Clark’s complaint in this instant matter as well as his public records
and discovery requests. Mr. Busken also opines that LPSO’s failure
to audit its treatment of Black people, despite such stark statistical
disparities, was inappropriate: * * * The LPSO defendants had all of
the data necessary to see and correct racially biased policing in the
department and chose not to, thereby acting with deliberate
indifference.

(Id. at 32 & nn.91–92).)
c. LPSO Defendants’ Reply Memorandum (Doc. 202)
LPSO Defendants reply first by moving to strike Menza’s declaration. (Doc. 202 at 1.) In
sum, these defendants urge that the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney
from serving as both a witness and counsel in the same case. (Id. at 1–3.)
LPSO Defendants then object to Plaintiff allegedly mischaracterizing Dr. Abraham’s

testimony. (Id. at 6.) LPSO Defendants detail various ways Plaintiff exaggerated Dr. Abraham’s
report and testimony. (Id. at 6–9.) LPSO Defendants also maintain that Plaintiff misconstrues
Bowden’s testimony and the extent to which it purportedly supports a finding of discrimination.
(Id. at 8.)
Moreover, Plaintiff attacks the nature of the search and stop, but this Court has already
found that Plaintiff cannot challenge the validity of the stop based on racial animus or
discrimination due to Heck. (Id. at 8, 16.) LPSO Defendants argue that “Plaintiff provides virtually
no substantive argument as to why Heck should not bar the claim, aside from pointing out that the
Court denied defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this issue.” (Id. at 17.) But, as LPSO Defendants

argue, allowing the claims to proceed would be “wholly incongruent” with the Court’s prior ruling.
(Id.)
In any event, LPSO Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no evidence to support his claim.
(Id.) Plaintiff acknowledges that he must prove intentional discrimination and that the standards
are comparable to § 1983. (Id. at 17–18 (citation omitted).) This includes establishing a policy and
a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy. (Id. at 18 (citation omitted).)
But the Court already concluded in his prior ruling that Plaintiff’s allegations did not survive the
motion to dismiss stage. (Id.)
At this stage, plaintiff is essentially relitigating these issues, yet
without any evidence to support the allegations that were baseless at
the time they were plead. What evidence has plaintiff come forward
with at this point to show that Sheriff Ard has actual or constructive
knowledge of a racially discriminatory policy or practice? What
evidence has plaintiff come forward with to show that there was a
widespread, settled practice or custom sufficient to establish an
official policy of stopping Black persons at a higher rate than
whites?

The simple answer is “none”. Plaintiff has not come forward with
any such evidence. His attempt to support these claims with the
opinions of Dr. Abraham are futile.

(Id. at 18–19.)
“Moreover, even if her analysis was sound (which it [ ]was not), plaintiff has still failed to
show that Sheriff Ard knew of a racial disparity in policing and failed to act.” (Id. at 19.) The
Menza declaration purports to show that Sheriff Ard did not look at the data despite notice, but:
First, this is not evidence of actual notice of racial discrimination by
Sheriff Ard. Second, plaintiff cannot use his own complaint as a
trigger for what LPSO should or should not have done with respect
to racial discrimination. Mr. Clark’s complaint is riddled with
falsehoods and unsubstantiated allegations. Mr. Clark was convicted
for the crimes arising from this event. This very Court has concluded
that [the] plaintiff is barred from arguing that the stop, search, and
force used on plaintiff was a result of racial profiling or
discrimination.

It is nonsensical for plaintiff to argue that LPSO should be liable for
racial discrimination because it did not pull racial statistics
following his lawsuit. This logically makes zero sense. Plaintiff
cannot argue both that Sheriff Ard knew of racial discrimination
before his incident, and is liable because this incident was the event
that provided him notice. Again, plaintiff’s attempt to salvage his
claim should be rejected.

(Id. at 19–20.) LPSO Defendants say Plaintiff’s reliance on Sneed is misplaced because,
purportedly, there, plaintiff had actual notice of the harassment before the incident and yet failed
to act. (Id. at 20.)
LPSO Defendants also dispute Plaintiff’s reliance on Bowden singing the rap song and
making comments about cocaine; “the only person who has drawn a link between crack usage and
the Black community is plaintiff, and no one else.” (Id.) But, LPSO Defendants say, such
comments are ultimately immaterial because the claim is made against Sheriff Ard, and Plaintiff
must show knowledge and deliberate indifference. (Id. at 21.) Subjective belief in discrimination

is not enough. (Id. (citations omitted).)
d. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Strike (Doc. 203-1) and Surreply
(Doc. 203-2)

Plaintiff opposes LPSO Defendant’s motion to strike the Menza declaration on the grounds
that (a) such motions are no longer permitted on summary judgment, (Doc. 203-1 at 8–9); and (b)
the declaration contains no inadmissible testimony because (i) the bar to attorney testimony does
not apply in pretrial matters, and (ii) the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct make this
distinction, (id. at 9–12).
As to the surreply, Plaintiff says that LPSO Defendants’ entire position “boil[s] down to a
single claim: that Dr. Abraham did not analyze the entire universe of ticket data from traffic stops
made by LPSO deputies in Livingston Parish.” (Doc. 203-2 at 2–3.) But Plaintiff responds that
this “ignores the concepts of sampling and significance testing,” which courts have recognized are
“valid methodologies.” (Id. at 3) Plaintiff then details Abraham’s methodology and how it is
reliable. (Id. at 4–5.) Ultimately, “[e]ven if all of [LPSO] Defendants’ objections to the analysis
are valid, they merely demonstrate the existence of disputed material facts as to LPSO’s disparate
treatment of Black motorists that are more appropriately resolved through testimony at trial.” (Id.
at 6.) Putting the merits aside, “the Court should decline to consider Defendants’ untimely and
poorly-disguised Daubert challenge to Dr. Abraham.” (Id.)
2. Applicable Law
Under Section 601, Title VI, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 407 (5th Cir.

2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). “Private individuals can bring suit ‘to enforce § 601 of Title
VI.’” Id. at 408 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001)). But, Title VI “prohibits
only intentional discrimination.” Id. (quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280 (emphasis by Fennell)).
As a result, “[t]o receive compensatory damages, a Title VI plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent.” Id. (quoting Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Thus, “[t]o prevail on a claim for relief under Title VI, a private litigant must prove: (1) that
the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination based on race, color, or national origin; and
(2) that the defendant received federal financial assistance.” Pathria v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci.
Ctr. at S.A., 531 F. App’x 454, 455 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). “Plaintiff's

subjective beliefs do not create an inference of intentional discrimination.” Doan v. Bd. of
Supervisors of La. State Univ., No. 17-3471, 2017 WL 4960266, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 1, 2017)
(citing Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000)). See also Pathria,
531 F. App’x at 456 (“Pathria advances only his subjective belief that committee members failed
to exercise independent judgment when making their decisions, deferring to Serwer’s wishes; this
bare allegation does not meet the Twombly standard.” (citing Byers, 209 F.3d at 427)). “Where a
plaintiff does not allege the existence of a discriminatory policy, he ‘must show that (1) [an]
appropriate person with authority, (2) had actual knowledge of discrimination, and (3) that person
responded with deliberate indifference.’” Washington, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 656–57 (quoting Doan,
2017 WL 4960266, at *2; and then quoting Bhombal v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F. App’x 233,
237 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Because the Bhombals do not allege a discriminatory policy by IISD, they
must plausibly allege that an ‘appropriate person’ in the district—i.e., someone who could take
corrective measures—had ‘actual knowledge’ of intentional discrimination yet responded with
‘deliberate indifference.’”)).

“Mere negligence will not suffice” to establish deliberate indifference. Fennell, 804 F.3d
at 410 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 642; and then citing Sanches v. Carrollton–Farmers Branch
Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[Deliberate Indifference] is a high bar, and
neither negligence nor mere unreasonableness is enough.”). “Accordingly, ‘[o]fficials may avoid
liability under a deliberate indifference standard by responding reasonably to a risk of harm, “even
if the harm ultimately was not averted.”’” Id. (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
220 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2000) (Title IX claim) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844
(1994) (Section 1983 claim))). See also id. at 408 (“the [Supreme] Court’s analysis of what
constitutes intentional sexual discrimination under Title IX directly informs our analysis of what

constitutes intentional racial discrimination under Title VI (and vice versa).” (citation omitted)).
Thus, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837. “[I]t would ‘frustrate the purposes’ of Title IX to permit a damages recovery
against a school district for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student based on principles of
respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a school district official,”
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998), and the same principles apply
for Title VI, see Fennell, 804 F.3d at 408.
3. Analysis
Preliminarily, the Court need not resolve the much-briefed question of whether Menza’s
declaration is admissible. While the Court has doubts about the admissibility of this document,2
the Court finds that, even if it was admissible, Plaintiff’s Title VI claim would still be dismissed.
The Court bases this decision on two reasons. First, the Court agrees with LPSO

Defendants that, upon further consideration, Plaintiff’s Title VI claim is Heck barred. The Court
previously denied LPSO Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim because:
Defendants do not cite to any binding precedent applying a Heck bar
to Title VI claims. (Doc. 100-1 at 7–10.) Nor is the Court aware of
any Fifth Circuit precedent applying a Heck bar to Title VI claims.
Defendants do not move to dismiss Count Twelve on other grounds.
(Id. at 4.)

(Doc. 136 at 10.) LPSO Defendants agree that there is no binding Fifth Circuit case law, (Doc.
171-1 at 16), but they correctly note that this ruling is incongruent with the Court’s decision on the
equal protection claim, (Doc. 202 at 17). There, this Court stated:

2 As Wright and Miller explains:

Attorneys’ affidavits are governed by the same rules that apply to other affidavits
under Rule 56. Thus, an attorney’s affidavit is admissible only to prove facts that
are within the attorney’s personal knowledge and as to which the attorney is
competent to testify; an affidavit stating what the attorney believes or intends to
prove at trial will be disregarded. Expressing an even more restrictive view in one
patent case, Judge John R. Brown of the Fifth Circuit questioned the propriety of
an attorney serving as the vehicle for putting facts, even those within his personal
knowledge, before the court. Judge Brown doubted

that the disposition of patent cases is furthered by counsel being
the personal vehicle by which the “undisputed” facts are put
before the Court. * * * [W]e think it an unnatural, if not virtually
impossible, task for counsel, in his own case, to drop his
garments of advocacy and take on the somber garb of an
objective fact-stater.

[Inglett & Co. v. Everglades Fertilizer Co., 255 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir.
1958).]

10B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2738 (4th ed. 2026).
Defendants further argue that Count Eleven, a § 1983 claim for
denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and La.
Const. Art. I § 3, and Count Thirteen, a §§ 1985(3) and 1983 claim
for conspiracy to violate equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, are Heck-barred. (Doc. 100-1 at 3, 4, 7–13). The Fifth
Circuit has indicated that such equal protection claims, where they
implicate the invalidity of a plaintiff’s conviction, are likewise
barred by Heck. Guerrero v. Travis Cnty., 507 F. App’x 329, 329
(5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that a plaintiff’s gender-
discrimination equal protection challenge was in essence a challenge
to the constitutionality of his conviction). See Kimble v. Jefferson
Par. Sheriff’s Off., No. 22-30078, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 2991 at
*8 n.6, 2023 WL 1793876 at *3 n.6 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2023) (citing
Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.
74, 81-82 (2005)). Here, if Plaintiff succeeded in arguing that the
stop, search, and force used during his arrest were all a result of
intentional discrimination and “racial profiling” absent “any
appropriate state interest”, and that Defendants had “insufficient
suspicion” to stop or search him, it could imply the invalidity of his
stop, search, and ultimate arrest. (Doc. 89 at ¶¶ 307–14.)

(Doc. 136 at 9–10 (emphasis added).) Thus, the Court based its ruling in part on the position that,
if Plaintiff proved that any constitutional violations were the result of “intentional discrimination,”
it would necessarily imply the invalidity of the “stop, search, and ultimate arrest” and thus run
afoul of Heck. (See id.)
But, as explained above, Title VI “prohibits only intentional discrimination,” and “[t]o
receive compensatory damages, a Title VI plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent.” Fennell,
804 F.3d at 408 (cleaned up). Thus, the Court agrees with LPSO Defendants that, for the same
reasons given in the Court’s prior ruling on equal protection, the Title VI claim is Heck-barred.
However, even if the Title VI claim was not Heck-barred, it would still be dismissed
because Plaintiff has failed to create a question of fact on the issue of deliberate indifference. As
explained in the Factual Background supra, Plaintiff points to only two pieces of evidence to
support his deliberate indifference claim: (a) Menza’s declaration, which purports to show that
LPSO “had not looked at the statistics they have available for potential race-based discrimination,
despite being notified that there was a racial discrimination problem in the department by
[Plaintiff’s] complaint in this instant matter as well as public records and discovery requests,”
(Doc. 194 at 32 (citing Menza Decl., Doc. 184-11)), and (b) Busken’s supplemental report, which
purports to show that the “LPSO defendants had all of the data necessary to see and correct racially
biased policing in the department and chose not to, thereby acting with deliberate indifference,”

(id. (citing Doc. 183-3 at 52–53)).
Even if true, neither document establishes deliberate indifference. Again, “the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[I]t would ‘frustrate
the purposes’ of Title IX [and thus Title VI] to permit a damages recovery against a [sheriff] for a
[subordinate’s misconduct] based on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e.,
without actual notice to [the sheriff].” See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285. See also Fennell, 804 F.3d at
408 (recognizing that Title IX law applies to Title VI and vice versa). Plaintiff argues nothing more
than that Sheriff Ard should have known of the alleged discriminatory practices, but such

constructive notice is insufficient under the above case law. Again, “[m]ere negligence will not
suffice” to establish deliberate indifference, which is a “high bar[.]” Fennell, 804 F.3d at 410
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff also argues that Sheriff Ard’s failure to investigate demonstrates his deliberate
indifference, but the Court disagrees. Plaintiff himself argues that Sheriff Ard was first put on
notice by the filing of this lawsuit and by his discovery requests in this case, (Doc. 194 at 31–32),
but Plaintiff’s encounter with the officers took place about a year before he filed suit. As LPSO
Defendants assert: “Plaintiff cannot argue both that Sheriff Ard knew of racial discrimination
before his incident, and is liable because this incident was the event that provided him notice.”
(Doc. 202 at 20.) That is, it makes little sense to hold that Sheriff Ard’s conduct after the lawsuit
somehow contributed, caused, or reflects actual knowledge of conditions before the filing of the
lawsuit.
As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Title VI is Heck-barred, but, even if it was not,
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See also Mohamed for A.M. v. Irving Indep.

Sch. Dist., 252 F. Supp. 3d 602, 628 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (dismissing Title VI claim in part because
the school district could not “be held vicariously liable under Title VI” and in part because “there
are no allegations that any ‘appropriate person’ was aware of unlawful discrimination by Principal
Cummings or any other school administrator and responded with ‘deliberate indifference.’” (citing
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285–88, 290; and then citing Rubio v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist., 475 F. Supp.
2d 1092, 1099 (D. Kan. 2007) (holding that school district was not liable under Title VI for the
actions of a principal who allegedly prohibited students from speaking Spanish because the school
district did not know the principal had engaged in that behavior)). See also Washington, 639 F.
Supp. 3d at 658 (dismissing Title VI claim against Sheriff because single “conclusory allegation

[could not] support an inference that [the Sheriff] knew about intentional racial discrimination, but
nevertheless chose not to act.”). As a result, Plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed.
C. State Law Battery and Negligence Claims
1. Parties’ Arguments
LPSO Defendants next assert that Plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed. (Doc.
171-1 at 20.) These defendants say the key question here is whether the use of force was
reasonable, which is the same standard as applied under federal law. (Id. at 21.) “Again, pointing
to the video, there is absolutely nothing depicted that even remotely suggests that the deputies used
excessive force in restraining plaintiff.” (Id.)
LPSO Defendants argue that “[P]laintiff cannot prove that the manner in which he was
handcuffed by Deputy Hotard failed to confirm to a specific standard, nor can he prove that the
handcuffing was the cause of any injury or damages.” (Id. at 22.) LPSO Defendants point to Hotard
checking the tightness of the handcuffs and loosening them, and then they cite to the testimony of
Plaintiff’s treating physician to show that Plaintiff suffered no injury. (Id. at 22–23.) “[P]laintiff’s

own treating physician has testified that, more likely than not, the handcuffing did not cause the
fracture which necessitated plaintiff’s surgery,” and “Plaintiff has not alleged that any other injury
was caused by the ‘negligent handcuffing.’” (Id. at 24.)
Plaintiff responds that he has suffered more than a de minimis injury and that he in fact
“continues to suffer from two significant physical injuries[.]” (Doc. 194 at 21.) First, his hand was
injured, causing pain and numbness, and it impairs his daily activities. (Id. (citing Pl. Ex. 19 at
Clark-000537–38).) Plaintiff also needed surgery to repair two ligaments on his hand and suffered
a hip injury, which impaired his ability to walk. (Id. (citing Clark Dep. 26, 36).) Further, Plaintiff
continues to suffer some PTSD and other mental anguish. (Id.) Plaintiff also maintains that there

are questions of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s injuries were caused or exacerbated by Hotard’s
conduct. (Id. at 21–23.)
LPSO Defendants reply that the state law claims should be dismissed for similar reasons
as the federal claims. (Doc. 202 at 16.) Here, the force used was reasonable, so there was no battery.
(Id.) Further, “Plaintiff also cannot support a ‘negligent handcuffing’ claim because his own
treating physician has expressly rejected any notion that plaintiff’s hand injuries could have been
caused by this incident.” (Id.)
2. Applicable Law
a. Battery
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 220 provides, “A person shall submit
peaceably to a lawful arrest. The person making a lawful arrest may use reasonable force to effect
the arrest and detention, and also to overcome any resistance or threatened resistance of the person

being arrested or detained.” La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 220. “The use of force by law enforcement
officers must be tested by the ‘reasonable force’ standard established by this article. The test
precludes ‘clearly inappropriate force.’” Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969, 972 (La.
1977) (quoting La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 220, Official Revision Comment (b)).
“The use of force when necessary to make an arrest is a legitimate police function.” Id.
“But if the officers use unreasonable or excessive force, they and their employer are liable for any
injuries which result.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Penn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Off.,
2002-0893 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/03), 843 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (stating that excessive force transforms
authorized use of force into a battery). “Whether the force used is reasonable depends upon the

totality of the facts and circumstances in each case.” Kyle, 353 So. 2d at 973. “A court must
evaluate the officers’ actions against those of ordinary, prudent, and reasonable men placed in the
same position as the officers and with the same knowledge as the officers.” Id. (citations omitted).
“The degree of force employed is a factual issue.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained further:

Several factors to be considered in making this determination are the
known character of the arrestee, the risks and dangers faced by the
officers, the nature of the offense involved, the chance of the
arrestee's escape if the particular means are not employed, the
existence of alternative methods of arrest, the physical size, strength,
and weaponry of the officers as compared to the arrestee, and the
exigencies of the moment.
Id. (citations omitted).
Ultimately, “excessive force claims under both federal and Louisiana law turn on whether
the use of force was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. This has been
widely recognized by [the Fifth Circuit], Louisiana federal district courts, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court.” Shepherd on behalf of Est. of Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 286

(5th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases).
b. Negligence
“The duty-risk analysis is the standard negligence analysis employed in determining
whether to impose liability under” Article 2315. Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 2005-1095
(La. 3/10/06), 923 So. 2d 627, 632–33 (citing Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952 (La.
11/30/94), 646 So. 2d 318, 321). Under this analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements:
(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific
standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant’s conduct failed to
conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the
defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's
injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s substandard
conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of
liability or scope of protection element); and (5) the actual damages
(the damages element).

Id. at 633 (citing Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 4 (La. 1989), reh’g granted on other grounds
and original opinion reinstated as supplemented, 556 So. 2d at 13 (La. 1990)). “A negative answer
to any of the inquiries of the duty-risk analysis results in a determination of no liability.” Id. (citing
Mathieu, 646 So. 2d at 326).
Ultimately, “[n]egligence is a failure to observe or do something that one ought to have
observed and done, and would have done or noticed with ordinary care.” Soileau v. S. Cent. Bell
Tel. Co., 406 So. 2d 182, 183 (La. 1981) (citations omitted). That is, “[i]t is hornbook law that
negligence is the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonable prudent person would
have exercised in a similar situation.” Pizzetta v. Lake Catherine Marina, LLC, 2008-0648 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 9/17/08); 995 So.2d 26, 32 (Tobias, J., concurring) (citations omitted)). Thus, “[u]nder
Louisiana law, a police officer has a duty to act reasonably under the totality of the circumstances.”
Tutrix on behalf of DCJH v. Travis, 595 F. Supp. 3d 488, 513 (M.D. La. 2022) (deGravelles, J.)
(citing Perron v. Travis, No. 20-221, 2021 WL 1187077, at *8 (M.D. La. Mar. 29, 2021) (citing

Mathieu, 646 So. 2d at 325)).
3. Analysis
“The Court need not provide a robust analysis of the state law claims; rather, they largely
rise and fall to the same extent as their corresponding federal claims.” Young v. City of Baton
Rouge, No. 19-886, 2026 WL 540551, at *24 (M.D. La. Feb. 26, 2026) (deGravelles, J.). See also
id. (“Thus, the Court resolves Young’s corresponding state law claims (other than negligence and
IIED) the same way as it did the federal claims.”) (citing in part Imani v. City of Baton Rouge, 614
F. Supp. 3d 306, 381 (M.D. La. 2022) (deGravelles, J.) (“Having carefully considered the matter,
the Court will deny Defendants’ motion, largely for the same reasons the federal excessive force

claims survive. In short, questions of fact preclude summary judgment.”)). Cf. Travis, 595 F. Supp.
3d at 513 (“Plaintiff’s assault, battery, and excessive force claims are essentially state law
corollaries of her § 1983 claims for excessive force. . . . Given the Court's determination that
Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts indicating that Sims did not act reasonably under the
circumstances surrounding the encounter with Whitfield, Plaintiff has stated a viable negligence
claim against Sims under Louisiana law.”).
The Court found above that Hotard was legally entitled to handcuff Plaintiff and to use a
reasonable amount of force to effectuate that arrest, including grabbing Plaintiff’s arm. The Court
said, based on its review of the video, which gave a crystal-clear view of the incident, that: “As
LPSO Defendants argue, ‘[t]his was, quite literally, the least amount of force the deputies could
have possibly used to place plaintiff in handcuffs.’ (Doc. 171-1 at 14.) The Court agrees.” For the
same reasons given above, the Court finds (a) that all reasonable jurors would conclude that the
amount of force used was reasonable; and (b) that no reasonable jury would find that Hotard failed
to act as a reasonably prudent officer under the circumstances. As a result, Plaintiff’s state law

battery and negligent handcuffing claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
D. Vicarious Liability
LPSO Defendants urge that any vicarious liability claim against him should be dismissed,
should the Court dismiss any underlying tort against the deputies. (Id. at 24.) The Court agrees.
See Courville ex rel. Vincent v. City of Lake Charles, 98-73 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 720 So. 2d
789, 800 (“Because we affirm the finding of no negligence on the part of the LCPD officers, the
claim of vicarious liability against the City must fall.”). Cf. Travis, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 514 (finding
that state law vicarious liability claim against sheriff survived because state law negligence claim
against officer survived).

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Motion to Strike and
Surreply to Defendant’s Reply Brief (Doc. 203) filed by Plaintiff Alexander Clark is GRANTED,
and the attached briefs (Docs. 203-1 and 203-2) will be allowed in the record.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 171) filed
by Defendants, Jason Ard, Sheriff of Livingston Parish, State of Louisiana, Deputy Calvin Taylor
Bowden, and Deputy Jean Hotard is GRANTED, and all claims by Plaintiff Alexander Clark
against the LPSO Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that LPSO Defendants’ Motion to Strike Declaration of
Marjorie Menza (Exhibit 13)(Doc. 202 at 1–3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment will be enteredin this case.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, onJune 10, 2026.

S
JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11341497. Public record. Not legal advice.