# ANTHONY GLEN v. ALTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, GREG DENTON, LISA BROWN, and EDDIE THOMAS

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · May 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339242

## Case

- **Full name:** ANTHONY GLEN v. ALTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, GREG DENTON, LISA BROWN, and EDDIE THOMAS
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** May 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANTHONY GLEN,
#Y65347,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-00914-SPM

v.

ALTON HOUSING AUTHORITY,
GREG DENTON,
LISA BROWN, and
EDDIE THOMAS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Anthony Glen, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) who is currently incarcerated at Taylorville Correctional Center, brings this civil action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The Second Amended
Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that on August 14, 2024, in the early morning hours, police officers from
the Alton Police Department executed a search warrant of his home at 775 Oakwood. (Doc. 24, p.
15). At the time the search warrant was executed, Plaintiff had been renting the residence from the
Alton Housing Authority for ten years. (Id. at p. 7). During the search, the house was “completely
damaged.” (Id. at p. 6). The doors and windows were broken, leaving the residence “exposed” and
“opened.” (Id.). When the police completed their search, they turned the house back “over to”
Alton Housing Authority at around 6:00 a.m. (Id.). Staff from the Alton Housing Authority,
however, failed to “board up” and secure the residence. (Id. at p. 7). Greg Denton, the Director of

the Alton Housing Authority, was “onsite” the morning of August 14, 2024. (Id. at p. 6).
Later that day, on August 14, 2024, Plaintiff called Denton from the Madison County jail.
(Doc. 24, p. 11). Plaintiff asked Denton if family members could meet Denton at Plaintiff’s house
to remove personal property. (Id.). Denton denied Plaintiff’s request and told Plaintiff that Plaintiff
“must go through an attorney.” (Id.).
At some point between August 14 and August 15, 2024, Eddie Thomas, a maintenance
employee with the Alton Housing Authority, robbed the residence. (Doc. 24, p. 2, 6). Thomas took
a BBQ grill and other items. (Id. at p. 6). According to Plaintiff, Thomas gave the BBQ grill to a
person named Tolbert. (Id. at p. 2). Plaintiff called the Alton Housing Authority, sometime
between August 15 and August 17, and reported the theft to staff members Krissy and Jessica. (Id.

at p. 6-7). Plaintiff also reported the theft to the Alton Police Department. (Doc. 24, p. 7).
Contrary to his claim that Eddie Thomas came and took his BBQ grill and gave it to
Tolbert, Plaintiff also asserts that Greg Denton and Eddie Thomas allowed Tolbert to come to the
residence and remove the BBQ grill. (Doc. 24, p. 12). Denton told Plaintiff during a phone
conversation, on or around August 16, 2024, about Tolbert taking the grill. (Id.). Denton explained
that Tolbert told Denton that Plaintiff had said it was “okay” for Tolbert to remove the grill. (Id.
at p. 13). Plaintiff asserts that he did not give anyone permission to remove items from his house
and that he had not spoken with Tolbert. (Id. at p. 12, 13). Plaintiff iterates that Denton had
previously told him that he would need to go through an attorney in order to have someone come

to collect his property. (Id. at p. 13).
Plaintiff asserts that the Alton Police report contains conflicting stories regarding the
robbery. (Doc. 24, p. 8). He states that the police report includes a statement from the Alton
Housing Authority Maintenance Supervisor, Darryl. In his statement, Darryl claims that he was in
the residence doing repairs, and he saw a cell phone and two T.V.’s inside the home. (Id.). Darryl

left the residence for a “period of time,” and when he returned, the cellphone and the T.V.’s were
gone. (Id.). Darryl states that he reported the crime. (Id.).
According to Plaintiff, the Alton Police report also records Lisa Brown, the manager of
Alton Housing Authority, as claiming that after the house was secured, she was notified by another
tenant that the residence had been “broken into” and that maintenance workers claim they saw
broken glass on the ground. (Doc. 24, p. 9). Because there is a metal gate that goes over the
windows and locks from the inside, Plaintiff believes that Brown falsified “the truth about how the
break in was discovered.” (Id. at p. 9-10).
DISCUSSION
As in the previous Complaint, Plaintiff does not specify in the Second Amended Complaint

which constitutional right he believes was violated. (See Doc. 24, p. 7, 10, 12). Therefore, because
Plaintiff’s assertions involve the deprivation of his property, the Court will again construe
Plaintiff’s allegations as being brought under the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A violation of the Fourteenth Amendment occurs under Section 1983 when “(1) the
offending conduct was committed by someone who acted under the color of state law; (2) the
actions deprive the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected property interest; and (3) the alleged
deprivation occurred without due process of law.” Germano v. Winnebago Cnty., Ill., 403 F. 3d
926, 927 (7th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff asserts that he was deprived of his property due to various acts by Defendants

Denton, Brown, and Thomas, all of whom were employees of the Alton Housing Authority.
Plaintiff, however, has failed to state a claim because there is no civil rights claim for the
intentional deprivation of property in federal court if the state provides an adequate remedy.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530–36 (1984) (availability of damages remedy in state claims
court is an adequate, post-deprivation remedy). The Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois

provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of
Claims. Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/8 (1995).
Therefore, Plaintiff must pursue any property loss claim in that forum.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring a substantive due process claim, such claim
also fails. “In order to prevail on a substantive due process claim involving a deprivation of a
property interest, a plaintiff must ‘show either the inadequacy of state law remedies or an
independent constitutional violation.’” Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 541 (7th Cir. 2022)
(holding that there was no procedural or substantive due process claim where the plaintiffs were
erroneously told that their vehicles were not at the impound lot and their vehicles were damaged
while at the lot (quoting Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 326 (7th Cir.1996))). Plaintiff

has not pled facts implicating a fundamental right, other than wrongful deprivation of his property,
and he “cannot show the inadequacy of state law remedies.” (Id.). See also Lee v. City of Chicago,
330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). The Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Denton,
Brown, and Thomas are therefore dismissed.
Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against the Alton Housing Authority. He again does
not allege facts allowing the plausible inference that his constitutional rights were violated as a
result of a municipality’s policy or custom. See Monell v. Dept’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). In fact, Plaintiff seems to allege that Brown acted contrary to policy by failing to direct
maintenance workers to board up his residence, which is something that the Alton Housing

Authority “has done on other housing unit[s].” (Doc. 24, p. 10). See Powell v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 2025 WL 1795104, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2025). Accordingly, any intended claim
against the Alton Housing Authority is dismissed.
Because Plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim against any of the Defendants,
the Second Amended Complaint does not survive screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and shall be

dismissed. When a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the plaintiff
is ordinarily given an opportunity to amend the complaint in order to correct the deficiencies. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend need not be granted if it is clear that any
amendment would be futile. See Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th
695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021); Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013); Garcia v. City of
Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1994). This is Plaintiff’s second attempt to state a claim, and
he again is unsuccessful. Accordingly, the Court finds that any further amendment of Plaintiff’s
claims in this action would be futile. The dismissal of this case will be with prejudice and without
leave to amend.
DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 24) and this entire
action are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The Court considers the dismissal of this action as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the case
was filed. Therefore, the filing fee remains due and payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien
v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff may appeal this Order by filing a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty
days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If he does choose to appeal, he will be
liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R.

APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008);
Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. Moreover, if the
appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another “strike.” A proper and timely
motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days

after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 20, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339242. Public record. Not legal advice.