# LANE

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · April 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339097

## Case

- **Full name:** Carl Lane v. Z. Moslak, Chief Hearing Examiner; Randy Irwin, Superintendent; I. Gustafson, Deputy Superintendent; J. Blicha, Deputy Superintendent; J. Alexander, Major of Unit Management; A. Eisenman, Corrections Classification Program Manager; D. Muntz, Hearing Examiner; and C. Burkhardt, Correctional Officer
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339097

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE
CARL LANE, )
)
Plaintiff ) 1:25-CV-00224-SPB
)
vs. ) SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
) United States District Judge
Z. MOSLAK, CHIEF HEARING )
EXAMINER; RANDY IRWIN, ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO
SUPERINTENDENT; I. GUSTAFSON, ) Chief United States Magistrate Judge
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT; J. )
BLICHA, DEPUTY ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUPERINTENDENT; J. ) ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
ALEXANDER, MAJOR OF UNIT ) DISMISS
MANAGEMENT; A. EISENMAN, )
CORRECTIONS CLASSIFICATION )
PROGRAM MANAGER; D. MUNTZ, ) RE: ECF NO. 11
HEARING EXAMINER; AND C. )
BURKHARDT, CORRECTIONAL )
OFFICER, )
)
Defendants
I, Recommendation
The Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint is before the
undersigned for report and recommendation. For the reasons explained below, it is
respectfully recommended that the motion be GRANTED.
II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural Background
Plaintiff Carl Lane (“Lane”), formerly an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at its State Correctional Institution

at Forest (““SCI-Forest”)!, commenced this action in the Court of Common Pleas of
Forest County, Pennsylvania, against eight SCI-Forest officials to recover damages
and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment and his First Amendment right to be free from
retaliation for engaging in protected conduct.?, Defendants removed this case to this
Court on July 18, 2025. See ECF No. 2. Lane’s Complaint remains the operative
pleading before the Court. ECF No. 2-1. It asserts two claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1983: Count 1, an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against all
Defendants; and Count 2, a First Amendment retaliation claim against all
Defendants. Lane seeks compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief.
The Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that
(1) the Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim because the conditions
of Lane’s confinement in the RHU did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment;
(2) the Complaint fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim because it does
not allege facts to support that Lane engaged in protected conduct; and (8) Lane’s
claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See ECF No. 12 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss). The

1 Lane was an inmate at SCI-Forest during the events relevant to this action. He remains in the
custody of the DOC but is currently housed at the State Correctional Institution in Benner Township.
2 The eight Defendants are: (1) Chief Hearing Examiner Zachary Moslak; (2) Former Superintendent
Randy Irwin; (3) Deputy Superintendent Ian Gustafson; (4) Deputy Superintendent De John Blicha;
(5) Major of Unit Management Jennifer Alexander; (6) Corrections Classification Program Manager
Amanda Eisenman; (7) Hearing Examiner Diane Muntz; and (8) Correctional Officer Corey Burkhardt.
See ECF No 2-1.

motion has been fully briefed. See ECF No. 12 (Defendants’ brief); ECF No. 18
(Lane’s brief).
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.
1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true
all factual allegations of the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003). In making
its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the
plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present
factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)).
Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it
fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
at 570.
While a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations to survive a
motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. Id. at 555. A
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” /d. (citing
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept
inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts alleged in the

complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor must the court accept
legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;
McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to
dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in the pleading
at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences,
unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.”
Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).
Finally, because Lane is proceeding pro se, his Complaint will be held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read his pro se pleading to
state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite his failure
to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence
construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555
(3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be unartfully drawn and should
be read “with a measure of tolerance”). But “any pleading must still contain sufficient
factual allegations that, when accepted as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd,
826 Fed. Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

C. Factual Allegations
For purposes of the pending motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the
following factual allegations of the Complaint.
On September 3, 2023, at approximately 7:35 p.m., Lane was locked in his
assigned cell, FB1004, lying down and listening to music on his personal tablet device.
ECF No. 2-1, § 18.3 At this time, all F-unit cell doors were opened remotely from the
unit control booth to allow inmates participating in dayroom and unit yard activities
to return to their assigned cells. Before Lane could get up from his bed to close the
cell door, inmate Skylar Shaffer (QC9375, assigned to cell FB2044) entered Lane’s
cell, attacked him with an improvised weapon, and demanded Lane’s tablet device.
Lane, semi-conscious and unable to flee or summon help because Shaffer blocked both
the cell door and the emergency call button, was forced to defend himself.
Two minutes later, around 7:37 p.m., Defendant Burkhardt responded to the
disturbance, separating Lane and Shaffer. Both inmates were taken to the infirmary,
where they were photographed, assessed, treated, and cleared for medical release.
They were then escorted to J-Unit and confined under pre-hearing confinement
status pending service of their respective misconduct reports.
Officer Burkhardt issued DOC Form DC-141 #D451643 charging Shaffer with
Class 1 misconduct for “fighting” and “presence in an unauthorized area” for entering
Lane’s cell. Shaffer was also charged with “possession of contraband” after an after-

3 The relevant factual allegations are in paragraphs 13-34 of Lane’s Complaint (ECF No. 2-1).
Citations to the pleading are omitted except for quoted allegations.

incident inspection of cell FB1004 revealed the improvised weapon—a D-sized
battery tied in a sock—on the floor.
Burkhardt later issued DOC Form DC-141 #D561644 charging Lane with
Class 1 misconduct for “fighting” and for “possession of contraband” related to
Shaffer’s improvised weapon found on the floor of Lane’s cell. Burkhardt thus treated
Lane and Shaffer as mutual combatants and equal rule violators. Lane alleges that
Burkhardt failed to protect him and refused to investigate the incident. He also
alleges that Burkhardt denied the SCI-Forest Security Office the opportunity to
investigate before issuing Lane’s misconduct report.
On September 4, 2023, the SCI-Forest Security Office investigated the attack.
On September 8, 2023, at 9:10 a.m., Lane appeared at a disciplinary hearing before
Officer Muntz regarding misconduct report #D561643. Shaffer pled guilty to
“fighting” and “possession of contraband.” Muntz imposed sanctions on Shaffer
totaling 90 days in the RHU. At 9:24a.m., Muntz dismissed without prejudice Lane’s
misconduct report #D561644 as it had not been approved by Captain Clouser as
required by DOC policy DC-ADM 801.
On September 11, 2023, Officer Burkhardt re-charged Lane with DC-141
#D068689. On September 25, 2023, Lane appeared before Officer Muntz, entered not
guilty pleas, and submitted a written account of the incident with Shaffer. Officer
Muntz interrupted Lane, stating, “...but you fought back, you cannot fight back.”
Officer Muntz found Lane guilty of “fighting,” but he dismissed the “possession of

contraband” charge. Officer Muntz sanctioned Lane to 30 days of confinement in the
RHU.
On September 18, 2023, Lane submitted a first-level appeal to the Prison
Review Committee (“PRC”), arguing that the 30-day disciplinary custody sanction
was disproportionate because his conduct constituted self-defense. On September 19,

2023, Defendants Eisenman, Alexander, Blicha, and Gustafson, as members of the
PRC, upheld the guilty finding and denied Lane’s request to reduce the misconduct
from Class 1 to Class 2. Lane timely submitted a second-level appeal to Defendant
Irwin on September 21, 2023. On September 29, 2023, Irwin denied the appeal □□□ □
form response that did not specifically address the issues Lane had raised. On
October 1, 2023, Lane timely submitted his final-level appeal to the DOC Office of
Chief Hearing Examiner. On October 25, 2023, Defendant Moslak denied the appeal
via form response, which Lane asserts failed to address the raised issues. As a result
of the disciplinary hearing conviction, Lane was denied parole.
D. Discussion
1. The Complaint fails to allege facts to state a claim for cruel and
unusual punishment based on Lane’s placement in the RHU.
Lane’s Complaint alleges that the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by confining him in the RHU for thirty days as punishment for engaging in
self-defense against another inmate’s attacks. See ECF No. 2-1, § 37. The Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes duties on prison
officials to provide prisoners with the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). To state an Eighth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must allege facts, which if
proven, support two findings: (1) the deprivation to which the plaintiff was subjected
was “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,” and “(2) the ‘prison official [had] a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The first element of the test can be satisfied in either of
two ways. First, it is met when an inmate is deprived of “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” See id. (citing Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 299
(1991)). Alternatively, it is satisfied when an inmate “is incarcerated under
conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm.” Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
974 F.3d 431, 441 (8d Cir. 2020) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934
F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although an inmate
need not show actual injury to satisfy the first element of the claim, only “extreme
deprivations” support a sufficiently serious deprivation. Fantone v. Herbik, 528 Fed.
Appx. 128, 127 (8d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992)).
“The second element is satisfied when an inmate shows that prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of
confinement that violated the inmate’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Wilson, 501
U.S. at 302-03).
“[Bly virtue of their convictions, inmates must expect significant restrictions,
inherent in prison life, on rights and privileges free citizens take for granted.”
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39-40 (2002). Furthermore, “prisoners have no inherent

constitutional right to placement in any particular prison, to any security
classification, or to any particular housing assignment.” Myers v. Folerezell, 2023 WL
8478013, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2023) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245
(1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S.
236, 243 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976)). See also, Podhorn v.
Grondolsky, 350 Fed. Appx. 618, 620 (3d Cir. 2009) (reiterating that “prisoners have
no constitutional right to be assigned to a particular institution, facility or
rehabilitative program”). Accordingly, the Defendants’ placement of Lane in
disciplinary custody cannot support an Eighth Amendment claim absent factual
allegations to demonstrate that the Defendants denied him the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities or incarcerated him under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm. His allegations support no such finding. Not only does the
Complaint allege no facts regarding the conditions of Lane’s confinement in the RHU,
but his brief concedes that those conditions did not violate his rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Instead, he alleges only that he was wrongfully confined in the RHU.
See ECF No. 18, § 2. Because the Complaint acknowledges that Lane was not
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the RHU, it fails to state
an Eighth Amendment claim against any Defendant, and this claim should be
dismissed with prejudice.
2. The Complaint fails to allege that Lane engaged in protected conduct
to support a First Amendment retaliation claim.
To establish illegal retaliation in the prison context, a plaintiff must allege
facts to support that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he

suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison a official; and (3) his constitutionally
protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the official’s decision to
take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (8d Cir. 2001). Lane premises his retaliation
claim on the proposition that engaging in self-defense is a constitutionally protected
activity. See ECF No. 2-1, § 38. He is incorrect. Prisoners have no constitutional
right to self-defense. See Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1994)
(prisoners do not have a fundamental right to defend charges of misconduct in prison
disciplinary proceedings on the basis that they acted in self-defense). Accordingly,
prison officials may impose sanctions against an inmate for fighting even where the
inmate acted in self-defense. See id.
To the extent Lane relies on the Second Amendment to the Constitution as
support for a fundamental right to defend oneself, his reliance is misplaced. In
District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment “confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms” for traditionally
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). But
this holding addressed gun rights of individuals outside of prison. It did not
pronounce a constitutional right of self-defense. And, in any event, imprisonment
necessarily entails that an inmate lose many of the rights ordinary citizens enjoy.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525
(1984). “[P]risons must be able to curtail a prisoner’s constitutional rights not only to
further correctional goals, such as retribution or deterrence, but also to serve

10

institutional objectives, the most basic of which is the internal security of the prisons
themselves.” Rowe, 17 F.3d at 1049 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-24
(1974)). Regarding inmate-on-inmate violence, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights focus on the obligation of prison official to respond to such threats, not on any
right of inmates to engage in self-defense. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833
(1994) (prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from known risks of harm by
other inmates). Lane cannot base the “protected conduct” element of his retaliation
claim on his engaging in self-defense, as no such federal constitutional right exists.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Lane’s First Amendment claim against
Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
3. The Eleventh Amendment bars Lane’s official capacity claims for
compensatory damages.
Lane’s Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages against
Defendants in their respective official and individual capacities, as well as
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. To the extent he seeks money damages
against the Defendants in their official capacities, his claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes actions for money damages in the federal
courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting in their official
capacities. See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania);
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman □□□
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity). The
DOC is an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and, as such, it and its
agents and employees acting in their official capacities are immune from monetary
11

damages. See Brown v. Smith, 2019 WL 2411749 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019). It is
therefore recommended that Lane’s claims for monetary relief against the
Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice.4
E. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants’
motion to dismiss be GRANTED, and that Plaintiffs claims be dismissed. It is further
recommended that the Court dismiss Lane’s claims with prejudice because any
attempt to amend would be futile. Lane cannot cure the deficiency of his Eighth
Amendment claim because he conceded that he does not challenge his conditions of
confinement in the RHU as cruel and unusual, but only challenges the misconduct
finding that resulted in his placement in the RHU. He cannot cure the deficiency of
his First Amendment retaliation claim because he bases that claim on a
constitutional right—the right of a prisoner to engage in self-defense—that does not
exist.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties may
seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and
Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and
Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days

4 The Eleventh Amendment does not bar official-capacity claims for injunctive relief. Accordingly,
Lane’s request that his disciplinary hearing conviction be expunged from his institutional record (ECF
No. 2-1, p. 8) is not barred. However, because the Complaint fails to state any constitutional claim,
any request for injunctive relief also fails.

12

from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v.
Lehman, 637 F.8d 187, 194 n.7 (8d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (8d Cir.
2007).
DATED this 29th day of April 2026.

BY THE COURT:
nage
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339097. Public record. Not legal advice.