# Boyd

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · April 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339047

## Case

- **Full name:** Ezekiel J. Boyd, Jr. v. Summa Health, Brian Duman
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339047

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting “[t]he rule that the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely related to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

EZEKIEL J. BOYD, JR., ) CASE NO. 5:25-CV-01544-JRA
)

) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
Plaintiff,
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

)
v.
) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) CARMEN E. HENDERSON
SUMMA HEALTH, BRIAN DUMAN,
)
) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants, )

I. Introduction
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Ezekiel J. Boyd, Jr.’s Motion for partial summary
judgment and Defendants Summa Health’s and Brian Duman’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. (ECF Nos. 14, 15). The motions were referred to the undersigned for preparation of a
report and recommendation. (ECF No. 20). For the reasons explained herein, it is recommended
that the Court GRANT Defendants’ motion, DENY Plaintiff’s motion, and DISMISS the claims
in the amended complaint.
II. Procedural History
On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against his employer, Summa Health,
and Brian Duman, a protective services officer also employed by Summa Health, asserting six
claims for relief: (1) hostile work environment under Title VII; (2) retaliation under Title VII; (3)
race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5)
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law; and (6) negligent retention and
supervision under Ohio law. (ECF No. 1-6). Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint,
adding four additional claims to those raised in the initial complaint: (1) malicious prosecution
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Duman; (2) malicious prosecution under Ohio law against Duman;
(3) retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment against Duman; and (4) Monell

liability against Summa Health. (ECF No. 3). Defendants filed an answer to the amended
complaint on October 3, 2025, “expressly reserv[ing] the right to respond to the original Complaint
in the event the Court determines that the Amended Complaint constitutes a supplemental pleading
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), rather than an amended pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).” (ECF
No. 11). Defendants manually filed two exhibits in support of their answer. (See id. at 3; ECF No.
13).
On October 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed his motion for partial summary judgment on the
discrete issue of whether Duman “had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop, detain, and arrest
[Plaintiff] on March 13, 2025 for ‘Criminal Damaging.’” (ECF No. 14). The motion is fully
briefed. (ECF Nos. 14, 17, 19). One week after Plaintiff filed his motion, Defendants filed their

motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the amended complaint, arguing Duman had probable
cause for stopping Plaintiff such that his claims cannot survive and Duman is entitled to qualified
immunity. (ECF No. 15). Defendants’ motion is also fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 15, 16, 18).
III. Standards of Review
A. Judgment on the Pleadings
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but
early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “To survive a
Rule 12(c) motion, a complaint ‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Franz v. Oxford Cmty. Sch. Dist., 132 F.4th 447, 451
(6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). When a defendant asserts
qualified immunity at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must plausibly allege particular facts
supporting an inference that the defendant violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id.
Generally, courts “may only review the pleadings, any attachments to those pleadings, and

documents that are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim or are matters
of public record” in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97
F.4th 995, 1002 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). However, “where a complaint even implicitly
relies on a video,” and especially in cases where qualified immunity may apply, courts may
consider video footage over the pleadings when the videos are clear and blatantly contradict or
utterly discredit the plaintiff’s version of events. Id. (citation modified) (citing Bell v. City of
Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2022)).
B. Summary Judgment
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or
defense—or part of each claim or defense—on which summary
judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court “must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party.” France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 624 (6th Cir. 2016). “The inquiry is
whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 624-25. For claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States and that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law. Id.
IV. Analysis
Although Plaintiff filed his motion for partial summary judgment before Defendants filed
their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the undersigned will consider Defendant’s motion
first.
A. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
1. Relevant Factual Background

“On March 13, 2025, at approximately 12:16 a.m., Duman initiated a traffic stop of
Plaintiff’s vehicle on the grounds of Akron City Hospital, 525 East Market Street, Akron, Ohio.”
(ECF No. 3, PageID #: 38). “Duman alleged Plaintiff had driven on private grass, constituting
criminal damaging.” (Id.). Plaintiff was ultimately “handcuffed, detained, and held for an hour or
less before release.” (Id.).
The dashcam video from Duman’s vehicle largely confirms these allegations. (See ECF
No. 11, Ex. A). The video shows a vehicle driving over a narrow walkway, with its tires veering
off the path and on to the grass. The vehicle is stopped by officers and the driver is initially told
he was stopped based on suspected criminal damaging. Ultimately, after being handcuffed for
approximately forty-five minutes, the driver is released with a summons to appear in court on

charges of obstructing official business.
Plaintiff was charged with obstructing official business, but the charge was dismissed on
May 13, 2025. (ECF No. 3, PageID #: 38). “On May 25, 2025 at 12:26 a.m. [Duman] conducted
a Search on the L.E.A.D.s Data base using Plaintiffs Name and Social security Number.” (Id.).
“On June 6, 2025, Duman, with knowledge of the prior dismissal, filed a new criminal charge
against Plaintiff for reckless operation … based on the same March 13 incident.” (Id.). Plaintiff
had previously filed four internal harassment complaints against Duman concerning his
misconduct at the hospital. (Id.).
In a magistrate’s decision dated October 6, 2025, Magistrate Scott A. Newman
recommended that Plaintiff be found guilty of violating Ohio Revised Code § 4511.201 because
he “operated his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” (ECF
No. 15-1 at 9).1 Additionally, Magistrate Newman recommended that Plaintiff be found guilty of

violating Ohio Revised Code § 4503.21(A)(1) because plaintiff failed to display a registered
license plate on his vehicle. (Id.). On January 12, 2026, Judge Ron Cable adopted the magistrate’s
decision, found Plaintiff guilty of both violations, and sentenced him to pay a $69.00 fine and court
costs. Ohio v. Boyd, Case No. 25TR06464 (Akron Mun. Ct. Jan. 12, 2026).
2. Discussion
In the amended complaint,2 Plaintiff brings malicious prosecution claims under both state
and federal law, asserting that “[t]he later charge of reckless operation lacked probable cause and
was brought with actual malice.” (ECF No. 3, PageID #: 41). He further alleges that the reckless
operation charge was an adverse, retaliatory action linked to his complaints against Duman, and
that Summa Health failed to supervise, train, or discipline Duman despite Plaintiff’s repeated

complaints. (Id. at PageID #: 41-42).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims under both federal and state
law fail because “video footage shows Plaintiff driving over a pedestrian walkway and sod,
providing probable cause for the initial stop and citations.” (ECF No. 15 at PageID #: 111). To
the extent Plaintiff’s claims are based on his citations for reckless operation and expired

1 While this document was not attached to the pleadings, the Court may “take judicial notice of matters of public
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint.” Elec. Merch. Sys.
LLC v. Gaal, 58 F.4th 877, 883 (6th Cir. 2023). Thus, the undersigned takes judicial notice of the court filings in the
Akron Municipal Court proceedings.
2 Because Defendants’ motion challenges only the amended complaint, the undersigned does not address whether the
amended complaint superseded or merely supplemented the original complaint or whether the additional claims in the
original complaint remain pending as such is beyond the scope of the current referral.
registration, Defendants argue “those claims fail for an additional reason—[Plaintiff] was found
guilty of both offenses.” (Id. at PageID #111-12). Defendants also argue that the existence of
probable cause defeats Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. (Id. at PageID #: 112-13).
Since a finding that probable cause existed would amount to a conclusion that no constitutional

violation occurred, Defendants also argue that Duman is entitled to qualified immunity and Summa
Health cannot be liable under Monell liability. (Id. at PageID #: 113-14). Additionally, Defendants
argue Duman is entitled to statutory immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03 because
Plaintiff failed to plead facts supporting that Duman acted with malicious intent. (Id.).
In response, Plaintiff presents a variety of arguments that seem to extend beyond the
probable cause issue. He first challenges Defendants’ assertion that he was “briefly detained” and
argues that he was arrested, and Defendants should be sanctioned for this misrepresentation. (ECF
No. 16 at 1, 3-6). He next argues there were no signs on the pathway indicating that it was
restricted and could not be driven on. (Id. at 6-8). Plaintiff argues that the subsequent charges for
reckless operation and display of tags cannot retroactively create probable cause for the stop and

his conviction on those charges is not final since it is on appeal. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff then raises the
LEADs search and argues that Defendants’ representation that Duman conducted the search based
on a prosecutor’s request is based on a bare assertion lacking evidence, and the search violated
Plaintiff’s right to privacy. (Id. at 10-15). Plaintiff asserts that Duman had a retaliatory motive for
conducting the LEADS search based on the alleged pattern of harassment Plaintiff experienced.
(Id. at 16-17). Plaintiff argues that his false arrest of criminal damaging absent probable cause
justifies denial of qualified immunity to Duman and imposition of Monell liability against Summa
Health. (Id. at 18).
Defendants reply that “Plaintiff relies on conclusory allegations, immaterial factual
disputes, and arguments that do not preclude judgment under Rule 12(c).” (ECF No. 18 at 1).
They argue that whether Plaintiff was arrested or detained is immaterial because the dispositive
issue is whether probable cause existed for the stop and citations, and the video evidence

establishes that Plaintiff drove over the pedestrian walkway and over sod on hospital property.
(Id.). They argue that “[t]he video evidence supports Sergeant Duman’s belief that Plaintiff may
have caused damage by driving over the sod and walkway—an observation that, standing alone,
justified the stop” and the subsequent citations resulted from the same conduct that was observed
by Duman. (Id. at 2). Defendants assert that it is immaterial that Plaintiff’s convictions are on
appeal because he cannot show favorable termination of the proceedings and his retaliation and
LEADS search theories are irrelevant to whether probable cause existed. (Id. at 3).
As Defendants argue, the existence of probable cause impacts each of Plaintiff’s claims.
First, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there

was no probable cause for the prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceedings, the
plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial arrest; and (4) the criminal
proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. France, 836 F.3d at 625 (emphasis added). If
there is no constitutional violation, any municipal liability claims necessarily fail. Boykin v. Van
Buren Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007). Malicious prosecution under Ohio law “requires
proof of three essential elements: (1) malice in instituting or continuing the prosecution, (2) lack
of probable cause, and (3) termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused.” Froehlich v.
Ohio Dep't of Mental Health, 2007-Ohio-4161, ¶ 10 (quotation marks omitted). And “[t]he
presence of probable cause to arrest generally defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.”
Grady v. Cratsenburg, No. 25-1321, 2026 WL 800415, at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026) (citing Nieves
v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 405 (2019)).
“Probable cause is a ‘low bar.’” Frenchko v. Monroe, 160 F.4th 784, 796 (6th Cir. 2025).
It “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant

a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit
an offense.” France, 836 F.3d at 626. “An objective, not a subjective, standard applies. The
question is whether the observable circumstances justify an arrest; the officer’s subjective reason
for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable
cause.” Barrera v. City of Mount Pleasant, 12 F.4th 617, 620 (6th Cir. 2021); see Lang v. City of
Kalamazoo, 744 F. App'x 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2018) (“If the circumstances, viewed objectively,
support a finding of probable cause, the arrest is proper, irrespective of the officer's actual
motives.”).
Here, the undersigned agrees with Defendants that probable cause existed for Duman to
stop Plaintiff’s vehicle. The initial justification for the stop was criminal damaging, which is

defined as knowingly causing or creating a substantial risk of physical harm to any property of
another without the other person’s consent. Ohio Rev. Code § 2909.06(A). The video evidence
attached to Defendants’ answer shows Plaintiff driving over a narrow path that is not wide enough
for a vehicle. The vehicle veers off of the path at least once, with its tires appearing to go over the
grass. This is sufficient to satisfy the low bar of probable cause. It is irrelevant that Plaintiff was
ultimately charged with obstructing justice rather than criminal damaging. See Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004) (rejecting “[t]he rule that the offense establishing probable
cause must be ‘closely related to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the
arresting officer at the time of arrest”). This is because “[e]venhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend
upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.” Id.
Because probable cause existed, Plaintiff’s federal and state malicious prosecution claims,
his First Amendment retaliation claim, and Monell liability claim all fail. Thus, it is recommended

that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted and the claims in the amended
complaint be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiff seeks “partial summary judgment on the discrete issue of whether Defendant’s
employee, Protective Service Officer Duman S-14, had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop,
detain, and arrest Mr. Boyd on March 13, 2025 for ‘Criminal Damaging.’” (ECF No. 14 at 1).
Plaintiff argues Duman stopped him based on “suspicion … the Vehicle traveling on the stone and
gravel pavement may of caused damage to the grass,” but aerial video of Summa’s property
establishes the trajectory of Plaintiff’s vehicle and the trajectory of the tire tracks in the grass. (Id.
at 2-3). He asserts that Duman stopped him “without more than the suspicion the vehicle may of

caused damage to the adjacent grass” such that probable cause did not exist. (Id. at 3-4).
The undersigned has already determined that Duman had probable cause to support the
stop. None of Plaintiff’s arguments in support of partial summary judgment alter this conclusion.
Probable cause is a low bar that merely requires an officer to have knowledge of facts and
circumstances to support a belief that the suspect was, is, or was about to engage in criminal
conduct. Frenchko, 160 F.4th at 796; France, 836 F.3d at 626. Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments,
the dashcam footage from Duman’s vehicle shows that Plaintiff’s vehicle was wider than the
concrete path and that it veered off the pathway at least once, such that Duman had probable cause
to believe that Plaintiff engaged in criminal damaging. The fact that the prosecutor ultimately
decided not to pursue the charges or that subsequent investigation may have indicated that actual
damage did not occur does not alter that the facts known to Duman at the time of the stop amounted
to probable cause.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied.
V. Recommendation
Because probable cause existed for the traffic stop and the existence of probable cause
defeats each of the claims in the amended complaint, I recommend that Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 15) be granted, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment (ECF No. 14) be denied, and the claims in the amended complaint be dismissed.

Dated: April 24, 2026
s/ Carmen E. Henderson
CARMEN E, HENDERSON
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Courts
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file objections
within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Berkshire v.
Beauvais, 928 F. 3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2019).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11339047. Public record. Not legal advice.