# Garcia

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · April 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338923

## Case

- **Full name:** Giresse Arsel Tamnou Ngajie v. Eliazar Garcia et al
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338923

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely issued.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

GIRESSE ARSEL TAMNOU NGAJIE CASE NO. 1:26-CV-01367 SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

ELIAZAR GARCIA ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction [doc. 2] filed by Giresse Arsel Tamnou Ngajie. Mr. Ngajie, who is represented
by counsel, has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his overstay in
detention under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See doc. 1. He alleges that he was
taken into immigration custody in July 2025 and remains detained, with a removal order
entered in October 2025 and timely appealed in November 2025. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3. The
Automated Case Information website maintained by the Executive Office of Immigration
Review confirms that his appeal is still pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”). See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (accessed April 29, 2026).
An applicant for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction
must demonstrate each of the following: (1) a substantial likelihood that his cause will
succeed on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not
granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction
might do to the opposing party, and (4) that granting the injunction will not disserve the
public interest. Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE Processing Ctr., 353 F.Supp.3d 518,
521 (W.D. La. 2018) (citing Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430
(5th Cir. 1981)). The decision of whether to grant or deny a TRO lies in the district court's

discretion. Moore v. Brown, 868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts should deny such
motions more often than not. Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D.
La. 1999) (explaining that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely
issued.”); see also Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX LLC, 2025 WL 2429087, at *2
(W.D. Tex. 2025) (holding that the extraordinary relief under Rule 65 must be
“unequivocally show[n].”); Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“Only under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse the denial of a
preliminary injunction.”).
Petitioner’s request fails at the first step because he has not shown a likelihood of
success on the merits. Petitioner contends that his detention has been prolonged without
justification, citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Section 1231(a)(1)(A) of Title

8 of the United States Code provides that the government has a 90-day “removal period”
to remove an alien ordered removed from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
During the removal period, the alien must be detained. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). After
the expiration of the removal period, the government may continue to detain an
inadmissible or criminal alien or release her subject to conditions of release. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(6). To facilitate “uniform administration in the federal courts,” the United States
Supreme Court recognized a six-month “presumptively reasonable period of detention.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. This period begins on the date the order of removal becomes
administratively final.! Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 317, 318 (Sth Cir. 2011) (“It
is presumptively constitutional for an alien to be detained for six months after a final order
of removal.”’). A removal order becomes administratively final “upon the earlier of—(i) a
determination by the [BIA] affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in
which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the [BIA].” 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(47)(B); see also Lopez Acosta v. Rosen, 832 F. App’x 891, 891 (5th Cir. 2021).
Because Mr. Ngajie has a pending appeal, his removal order is not final and any challenge
to the length of his detention under Zadvydas is premature. The court therefore ORDERS
that the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [doc. 2] be DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on the 29th day of April, 2026.

t/
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

| The removal period may also begin on the later of (1) the date of a court’s final order, “[i]f the removal order is
judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien,” or (2) the date the alien is released from
non-immigration detention or confinement. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii). Neither of these circumstances applies

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338923. Public record. Not legal advice.