# CARR

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · May 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338910

## Case

- **Full name:** Dylan Alexander Carr v. Deputy Mathew S. Lunardini
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DYLAN ALEXANDER CARR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) Civil Action No, 2:26-cv-00002
) Judge D. Brooks Smith
) Sitting by Designation
DEPUTY MATHEW S. LUNARDINI, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM and ORDER OF COURT
SMITH, Circuit Judge,!
Plaintiff Dylan Carr, proceeding pro se, brings this civil-rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Deputy Mathew S. Lunardini, an Allegheny
County Deputy Sheriff. The case arises from Carr’s arrest after he took photographs
inside the Allegheny County Family Law Center. Carr alleges that Lunardini lacked
probable cause to arrest him because his conduct did not violate 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
5103.1, the statute under which he was initially charged. Lunardini moved to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because the facts alleged in the

Amended Complaint establish probable cause as a matter of law, Carr has not stated

' By order dated December 19, 2025, the Honorable Michael A. Chagares, Chief
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, designated and assigned
Circuit Judge D. Brooks Smith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(b) to hold court in the
Western District of Pennsylvania.

a federal constitutional claim. And because his state-law claims likewise require the
absence of probable cause, they fail as well. The Motion will therefore be granted,
and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Background?
On June 27, 2025, Plaintiff Dylan Alexander Carr entered the Allegheny
County Family Law Center. Compl. §3.A. Just inside the building entrance, the first-
floor lobby contained signage referring to Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103.1. Jd. § 3.F. That
statute prohibits, absent court approval or authorization by rule, the “use[] or
operat[ion] [of] a device to capture, record, transmit or broadcast a photograph,
video, motion picture or audio of a proceeding or person within a judicial facility or
in an area adjacent to or immediately surrounding a judicial facility.” 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 5103.1(a).? While standing in the lobby, Carr used his cellular telephone to
photograph the front desk and security checkpoint areas. Compl. § 3.C.
Shortly thereafter, Deputy Lunardini detained Carr. /d. § 3.1. Carr was then
placed under arrest and charged with violating § 5103.1. Id. 3.J—L. On August 21,
2025, that charge was withdrawn and replaced with a summary disorderly-conduct

* Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the following
facts are drawn from Carr’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22, (‘Compl.”), and
accepted as true. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
> The statute defines “judicial facility” as “a courtroom, hearing room or judicial
chambers used by the court to conduct trials or hearings or any other court-related
business or any other room made available to interview witnesses.” Jd. § 5103.1(c).

charge. Jd. § 3.M. Carr was initially found guilty by a Magistrate, but he appealed to
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which entered a not-guilty verdict

on October 15, 2025. ECF No. 1-5 at 8; Compl. □□□ 3.N—P.
Carr then filed this civil action against Lunardini in his individual capacity.’
The Amended Complaint asserts four claims: a Fourth Amendment claim for false

atrest and unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983; a Pennsylvania false-arrest/false-
imprisonment claim; and a Pennsylvania malicious-prosecution claim. Jd. 9 4.A—
D. Each claim rests on the same central premise: that Lunardini lacked probable
cause to arrest Carr and initiate charges against him for taking photographs in the
Family Law Center lobby while no courtroom proceeding was occurring. Jd. □□
4.A.2—5, 4.B.2-3, 4.C.2, 4.D.2.
Lunardini moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and filed a brief in support. ECF Nos. 24, 25. Carr opposed

“ Carr initially filed his complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, naming as defendants Allegheny County, Allegheny County
Sheriff’s Office, and Lunardini. ECF No. 1-4. After the case was removed to this
Court, ECF No. 1, Carr amended his complaint, retaining only Lunardini as a
defendant. Compl. { 2.

the motion, ECF No. 26, and Lunardini replied, ECF No. 27. The motion is now ripe
for disposition.°

II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency
of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (d Cir. 1993). In resolving
such a motion, a district court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at
210. However, it need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted
inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Baraka v.
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Pa. Prison
Soc’y v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 233 (3d Cir. 2010) (“While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” (citation omitted)).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US. 544,
555, 570 (2007). That standard requires more than “a sheer possibility that a

> This Court has jurisdiction over Carr’s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1441 and supplemental jurisdiction over Carr’s state-law claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367.

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
plaintiff must plead sufficient factual content “that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd.
Generally, a district court must afford a plaintiff proceeding pro se some
“procedural flexibility” when reviewing and interpreting his pleadings. Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). I must, therefore,
“liberally construe” Carr’s pleadings. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.
2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is well-
established.”). Nonetheless, even though he is proceeding pro se, Carr “still must
allege sufficient facts in [his] complaint[] to support a claim.” Mala, 704 F.3d at 245.

Il. Analysis
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Carr must allege that a person acting
under color of state law deprived him ofa right secured by the Constitution or federal
law. West v. Atkins, 487 US. 42, 48 (1988). Here, there is no dispute that Lunardini
acted under color of state law when he detained and arrested Carr.® This case
therefore turns on whether Carr has plausibly alleged a constitutional violation.

® See id. at 49 (“[A]cting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a §
1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).

To plead a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution,
Carr must allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that, among other things,
Lunardini acted without probable cause. Spiker v. Allegheny Cnty. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 920 F. Supp. 2d 580, 594 (W.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Spiker v.
Whittaker, 553 F. App’x 275 (3d Cir. 2014). Probable cause exists when “the facts
and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is
being committed by the person to be arrested.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190,
200 (3d Cir. 2020). Although probable cause is often a question for the jury, a court

may decide the issue as a matter of law when, accepting the plaintiffs version of
facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that probable cause was lacking. Merkle v.
Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788-89 (3d Cir. 2000).
That is the case here. Carr does not dispute that he took two photographs
inside the Family Law Center lobby. Compl. | 3.C. Nor does he dispute that the
lobby contained signage referencing 18 Cons. Stat. § 5103.1. /d. § 3.F. Instead, he
contends that probable cause did not exist because § 5103.1 did not, in fact, reach
his conduct. See Resp. Br., ECF No. 26, at 13-16.’ In his view, the public lobby was

7 Plaintiff’s response brief is not paginated. All pin-citations to Plaintiff’s response
brief refer to pages as a reader would sequentially count them from the beginning of
the document.

neither a “judicial facility” nor “an area adjacent to or immediately surrounding a
judicial facility” covered under the statute.
Even assuming Carr is correct concerning the statute’s ultimate scope, that
does not by itself resolve the probable-cause question. Probable cause does not
require certainty that the suspect committed an offense. See Dist. of Columbia. v.
Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (emphasizing that probable cause “requires only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity” and “is not a high bar.” (citation omitted)). Nor does it require an arresting
officer to resolve every statutory ambiguity that may later bear on guilt. Indeed,
probable cause “can rest on a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal
prohibition” so long as that mistake is reasonable. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 US.
54, 60 (2014) (holding that the Fourth Amendment “tolerates [] reasonable mistakes”
of both fact and law (emphasis omitted)).
The question, then, is whether the facts known at the time to Lunardini would
have warranted a reasonable officer in believing that Carr’s conduct fell within the

scope of § 5103.1—irrespective of whether that belief turned out to be accurate.
Harvard, 973 F3d at 200. I conclude that such a belief would have been reasonable.
Carr took photographs inside the Family Law Center, a court-related facility, and did

so in a lobby that contained signage referencing § 5103.1. And Carr himself
acknowledges that the statute’s “applicability to the [] public-access lobby is not

self-evident and depends upon [] interpretive questions regarding the meaning of
‘judicial facility.’” Resp. at 14; see also id. at 15 (“[W]hether the specific lobby
location constitutes a ‘judicial facility’ under 18 Pa. C.S. § 5103.1... is not self-
evident[.]’”). That argument may explain why Carr believes he did not violate the

statute. But it likewise confirms that the statute’s application to the lobby was, at
minimum, open to reasonable debate. And where the statute’s application was
reasonably debatable, Lunardini’s belief that it applied was not unreasonable. Carr
therefore has not plausibly alleged that Lunardini acted without probable cause.®
Because the existence of probable cause defeats both federal claims, Counts I and II
will be dismissed.’

Lunardini also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because, even if his
conduct violated Carr’s constitutional rights, those rights were not clearly
established. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) at 4-5. Because I
conclude that Carr has not plausibly alleged a violation of his constitutional rights, I
need not reach whether any such rights were clearly established.
I will dismiss Carr’s claims with prejudice. Generally, “[i]n pro se civil rights
actions, ‘district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is
requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim.’” Coleman v. Acad.
Bus. LLC, 858 F. App’x 584, 585 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v.
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007)). However, a court
need not grant leave to amend when amendment would be futile. Fletcher-Harlee,
482 F.3d at 251. Here, because I conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Carr
as a matter of law, amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hayt, Hayt &
Landau, LLC, 2021 WL 531961, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2021) (dismissing with
prejudice because plaintiff’s claims “fail as a matter of law,” making amendment
futile); Bradshaw v. Pennsylvania State Univ. 2011 WL 1288681, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 5, 2011) (same).

Carr’s state-law claims fail for the same reason. Under Pennsylvania law, to
prevail on a claim of false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the arresting
officer “did not have probable cause to make an arrest.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh,
537 Pa. 68, 76 (1994). Likewise, to maintain a claim for malicious prosecution under
Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the defendant instituted
proceedings against the plaintiff “without probable cause.” Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs & Helpers, Loc. Union 249, 518 Pa. 517, 520-21 (1988). Because the
pleaded facts establish probable cause as a matter of law, Counts III and IV will be
dismissed as well.

Accordingly, the following order is entered:

ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th of May, 2026, for the reasons set forth herein, IT IS
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED, and
the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22) is DISMISSED with prejudice.

/s/ D. Brooks Smith

D. Brooks Smith
United States Circuit Judge
Sitting by Designation

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338910. Public record. Not legal advice.