# Rodriguez

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · April 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338898

## Case

- **Full name:** Hiran Rodriguez v. New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission for the Port of New Orleans
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338898

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HIRAN RODRIGUEZ CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 26-713

NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC BELT SECTION "N" (3)
RAILROAD COMMISSION FOR
THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se Plaintiff Hiran Rodriguez filed this lawsuit against Defendant, New
Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission for the Port of New Orleans (“Commission”)
based on an alleged pattern of train “horn blasting.”1
Plaintiff alleges that he lives near railroad tracks operated by the Defendant.
He alleges violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
He also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his First
Amendment rights.2 Additionally, Plaintiff brings nuisance, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligence, and negligent supervision claims under Louisiana
law.3
The Court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in this
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Summons has not issued, however, to allow the
Court to review Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine whether it satisfies the

1 R. Doc. 1.
2 Id. ¶¶ 63–83.
3 Id. ¶¶ 84–113.
1
requirements of the federal in forma pauperis statute. For the reasons below, the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint such that it should
be dismissed without prejudice.

I. Standard of Law
“There is no absolute right to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in civil
matters; rather it is a privilege extended to those unable to pay filing fees when the
action is not frivolous or malicious.” Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116
(5th Cir. 1969). “It is left to the discretion of the court to which the application is
made to determine whether the petition on its face is frivolous or lacking in merit.”

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires summary dismissal sua sponte should the
Court determine that a case is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted. It provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have
been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that--
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). A complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted when it does not contain “sufficient factual
2
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Rogers
v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)).

Additionally, federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Perez v. McCreary, Veselka, Bragg & Allen, P.C., 45 F.4th 816,
821 (5th Cir. 2022). As the Supreme Court has explained:
The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction
are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Section 1331 provides for
‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, § 1332 for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’
jurisdiction. A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she
pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the
United States. She invokes § 1332 jurisdiction when she presents a
claim between parties of diverse citizenship that exceeds the required
jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000.

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). Because “subject-matter jurisdiction
. . . involves a court’s power to hear a case, [it] can never be forfeited or
waived.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). Federal
courts thus “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any
party.” Id. (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). “If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Subject-matter jurisdiction is absent
when it relies on a putative federal claim that is “so attenuated and unsubstantial as
to be absolutely devoid of merit.” Atakapa Indian de Creole Nation v. Louisiana, 943
F.3d 1004, 1005 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson,
3
Miss., 565 F.2d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 1977)).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges that between August 2024 and the present, there have been

“over 70 separate train horn incidents near his residence,” as detailed in an “incident
log.”4 Plaintiff characterizes the use of the train horns as “harassment activity.”5
Plaintiff alleges that he has a “documented psychiatric disability,” of which he has
informed the Commission.6 Plaintiff maintains that a particularly “loud train horn
blast” on June 1, 2025, was an “attack” that required him to visit an emergency room.7
That visit, in turn, resulted in Plaintiff’s involuntary hospitalization for ten days at

a behavioral health facility.8
Plaintiff identifies several instances in which a train allegedly operated by
Commission crew engaged in horn blasts near his residence.9 Plaintiff also alleges
that while was parked near a McDonald’s restaurant on August 16, 2025, a particular
train associated with the Commission engaged in “horn blasts.”10 Plaintiff also

4 Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff also alleged that there were “over 150 separate train horn
incidents near his residence” during this same period. Id. The discrepancy in the
number of alleged horn blasts does not affect the instant Report and
Recommendation.
5 Id. ¶ 17.
6 Id. ¶ 9.
7 Id. ¶ 20, 23.
8 Id. ¶ 21.
9 See, e.g., id. ¶ 32.
10 Id. ¶¶ 26, 27.
4
identifies certain “horn blast incidents” that took place in other circumstances, such
as while trains were crossing the Huey P. Long Bridge.11
Plaintiff submitted written complains to Commission management.12 Plaintiff

alleges that the “excessive horn operations” continued despite these complaints.13
Plaintiff alleges that the Commission ultimately instructed him to cease his
harassing, abusive, and threatening conduct.14 In addition to complaining to the
Commission, Plaintiff also filed complaints with the Federal Railroad
Administration15 and the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office.16
Plaintiff brings two federal claims. His ADA claim is based on the

Commission’s alleged refusal to “cease the conduct that was exacerbating his
disability.”17 Construed generously, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the Commission
should have accommodated Plaintiff by ceasing the alleged horn blast harassment.18
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim under § 1983 is based on the allegation that the
Commission’s threat of calling “appropriate authorities” and taking legal action was
an unlawful response to his complaints of harassing horn activity.19 According to

11 Id. ¶ 37.
12 Id. ¶ 36.
13 Id. ¶ 111.
14 Id. ¶¶ 38–43.
15 Plaintiff alleges that he filed “a formal ADA and safety complaint with the Federal
Railroad Administration.” Id. ¶ 30.
16 Id. ¶ 47.
17 Id. ¶ 69.
18 Id. ¶ 71.
19 Id. ¶ 78.
5
Plaintiff, the Commission’s general counsel “adopted a policy of dismissing Plaintiff’s
complaints as ‘unfounded’ and characterize[ed] Plaintiff’s protected activity as
‘threatening correspondence’ that must ‘cease.’”20 For the reasons below, both of

Plaintiff’s federal claims are so lacking in merit that they do not give rise to federal
question jurisdiction.
A. Plaintiff’s putative ADA claim lacks any merit.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Title II of the ADA. “To make out a claim
under Title II, [Plaintiff] had to show: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a
disability; (2) that he was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of,
services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or was

otherwise being discriminated against; and (3) that such discrimination is because of
his disability.” Luke v. Texas, 46 F.4th 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
12132 and Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff’s vague allegations do not establish that he is a qualified individual
with a disability. Even if this could be corrected through amendment, however, there
are other reasons that his claims inevitably fail as a matter of law. Plaintiff is not

alleging that the Commission “excluded [him] from participation in or [] denied the
benefits of” any of the Commission’s public services. See id.; Frame v. City of
Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 226 (5th Cir. 2011) (defining “public service”). Thus, there is

20 Id. ¶ 82.
6
no link between the harm alleged by Plaintiff and the conduct to which the ADA is
directed.
Moreover, even construed generously, the Complaint does not indicate that

Plaintiff’s disability caused the alleged harassment. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges
that his June 2025 involuntary hospitalization, which Plaintiff attributes to the horn
blasting, put the Commission on notice of his disability.21 Similarly, Plaintiff’s
allegation that he informed the Commission of his disability in August and November
2025 confirms that his disability was not the cause of the alleged harassment.22 Thus,
Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails as a matter of law.23

B. Plaintiff’s putative First Amendment claim lacks any merit.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant retaliated against him for exercising his
First Amendment rights. “It is well-settled that a municipality or local government
unit cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Jones v. New
Orleans Pub. Belt R.R., No. 14-2412, 2015 WL 365562, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2015)
(citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Rather, a
governmental entity is liable under § 1983 when a constitutional tort is caused

through the execution of a policy or custom of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at

21 Id. ¶ 10.
22 Id. ¶ 9.
23 Plaintiff’s claim of intentional disability discrimination arises from the same
failure-to-accommodate theory and fails for the same reasons. See id. ¶ 72. And if
Plaintiff is asserting a disparate-treatment claim, that claim fails because there is no
employment relationship.
7
691. “To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an
official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force
behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d

838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).
While Plaintiff identifies some alleged actions taken by Defendant, Plaintiff’s
complaint lacks any well-plead factual allegations relative to an official custom or
policy that served as a moving force behind the alleged violation of his First
Amendment rights. Accordingly, his § 1983 claim should be dismissed. Moreover,
amendment would be futile, including because Plaintiff has not suffered an adverse

employment action nor been deprived of a government benefit based on his speech.
See Petrie v. Salame, 546 F. App’x 466, 469 (5th Cir. 2013) (“To establish a Section
1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, Petrie must prove: “(1) the plaintiff suffered
an adverse employment decision . . . .”) (quotation omitted); see also Planned
Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. Texas, Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d 343, 348–49 (5th
Cir. 2012) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). In short, the conduct
of which Plaintiff complains does not bear any relationship to a cognizable First

Amendment claim.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s putative federal claims are so devoid of merit
and attenuated from the statutes at issue that they do not give rise to subject-matter

8
jurisdiction. Atakapa Indian de Creole Nation, 943 F.3d at 1005.24 To the extent
Plaintiff has a cognizable claim (which appears doubtful), he must pursue it in state
court.
RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's lawsuit be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served
with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) superseded by statute on other grounds.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30‘ day of April, 2026.

C J. Zea
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

24 In the alternative, even if these federal claims had some marginal connection to
the underlying statutes such that subject-matter jurisdiction exists, dismissal of
these claims would remain appropriate for the reasons set forth above. In that case,
the only remaining claims would be ones brought under Louisiana law such that the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would be discretionary.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338898. Public record. Not legal advice.