# KITTRELL

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338871

## Case

- **Full name:** Andre Kittrell v. Lieutenant Oliver and Terri Sechrengost
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338871

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the verb “shall” denotes a mandatory requirement of a prison’s grievance system
- finding a process was a dead end where the plaintiff’s grievances were ignored multiple times
- finding that a grievance process was a dead end where prison officials failed to respond to grievances within the timeframe mandated by their own policy

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANDRE KITTRELL, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-0811
:
LIEUTENANT OLIVER and TERRI :
SECHRENGOST, :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

KENNEY, J. March 3, 2026
Defendants Lieutenant Oliver and Terri Sechrengost (captioned incorrectly as “Terry”)
move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Andre Kittrell’s federal law claims for deliberate
indifference and state law claim for medical negligence, ECF No. 82 (the “Motion”). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with
respect to Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Court will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim against Defendant Sechrengost and will therefore
dismiss that claim without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Andre Kittrell, a former inmate at State Correctional Institution – Houtzdale (“SCI
Houtzdale”), filed a pro se Complaint against forty-two defendants alleging claims for deliberate
indifference and medical malpractice relating to a knee injury and rectal bleeding. ECF No. 2.1
Plaintiff’s claims against most of the Defendants have been dismissed by the Court. See ECF Nos.

1 Plaintiff attempted to file an Amended Complaint in this action, ECF No. 65, but the Court
ordered that the Amended Complaint be stricken because it was “‘redundant’ and ‘immaterial’
with respect to the remaining Defendants and claims in this case,” ECF No. 70 at 1. Accordingly,
the original Complaint (ECF No. 2) is the operative complaint. See id. at 2.
7, 56, 58, 60. The only remaining claims are (1) deliberate indifference claims against Lt. Oliver
and Terri Sechrengost, and (2) a negligence claim against Terri Sechrengost relating only to
Plaintiff’s knee injury. See id. The facts underlying these claims are further described below.
Plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his left knee following a car accident on August 29,

2019. ECF No. 86 at 17. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a torn anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”)
and given a metal knee brace to stabilize his knee. Id. Plaintiff wore the metal knee brace during
his time at George W. Hill Correctional Facility from August 2019 to May 2021. Id. In May 2021,
Plaintiff was transferred to SCI Houtzdale and upon his arrival, Defendant Lt. Oliver confiscated
the metal knee brace because it contained metal bars that could potentially be made into a weapon.
Id.; ECF No. 82-4 at 2. In exchange, Defendant Oliver provided Plaintiff with a soft knee sleeve
and crutches. ECF No. 86 at 18. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Oliver stated that he would send
a medical request regarding the use of Plaintiff’s metal knee brace but Plaintiff never received
permission to use his metal knee brace during the entirety of his incarceration at SCI Houtzdale.
Id. Plaintiff states that the soft knee sleeve he was given as an alternative provided significantly

less support and stability than the metal knee brace. Id.
On July 13, 2021, Plaintiff was taken to Penn State Orthopedics and seen by Dr. Bader,
who examined Plaintiff’s knee and recommended that he receive a follow-up MRI. Id. On
September 28, 2021, Plaintiff received an MRI of his left knee at UPMC Altoona. Id.; ECF No.
82-3. The results of this MRI showed that Plaintiff’s ACL was “intact” and did not require surgery
or further orthopedic follow-up. ECF No. 86 at 18; ECF No. 82-2 at 2. Concerned about the
accuracy of the September 2021 MRI, Plaintiff wrote letters to Dr. Bader’s office seeking
clarification about his medical condition and inquiring about follow-up care. ECF No. 86 at 18. In
November 2021, Dr. Bader’s office informed SCI Houtzdale of Plaintiff’s outreach, after which
Defendant Terri Sechrengost instructed Plaintiff not to contact Dr. Bader directly. Id. Defendant
Sechrengost told Plaintiff that he was not allowed to communicate directly with outside medical
providers and had to utilize the prison’s medical department for such communications instead. Id.
During his time at SCI Houtzdale, Plaintiff filed several grievances regarding his medical

care at the prison, including the two grievances relevant to the instant Motion: (1) Grievance No.
953241, filed on November 3, 2021, regarding Plaintiff’s alleged lack of access to Dr. Bader and
denial of proper orthopedic follow-up after his September 2021 MRI; and (2) Grievance No.
964185, filed on January 13, 2022, regarding ongoing medical issues with Plaintiff’s left knee. Id.
at 19; see ECF Nos. 82-6, 82-7. Plaintiff appealed Grievance No. 953241 through two rounds of
appeals in the prison system and received a final appeal decision, which denied his grievance and
requested relief because upon a review of Plaintiff’s medical record, “it was determined that the
medical care provided was reasonable and appropriate.” ECF No. 82-6 at 2. As to Grievance No.
964185, Plaintiff attempted to appeal it to final review but his appeal was dismissed because the
grievance was not submitted properly for initial review. ECF No. 82-7 at 2.

On March 1, 2023, in connection with the above events, Plaintiff filed a complaint against
forty-two defendants, asserting claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and for medical negligence. ECF No. 2. The Court has
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against most of the Defendants at different times over the course of
this litigation.2 The only claims remaining are constitutional claims for deliberate indifference

2 Following an initial screening of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, the Court permitted service of (1)
the § 1983 deliberate indifference claims against Lt. Oliver, PA Nicholson, Dr. Little, Wellpath,
Terry Sechrengost, Dr. Bader, UPMC Altoona, and Dr. Tokhi; and (2) the negligence or medical
malpractice claims against Sechrengost, Dr. Bader, UPMC Altoona, and Dr. Tokhi, based on
Plaintiff’s knee injury only, and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against all other Defendants. ECF No.
6 at 29; ECF No. 7. On November 16, 2023, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Little, Nicholson, and Wellpath. ECF No. 56. On November 21, 2023, the Court
against Defendants Oliver and Sechrengost, and a state law claim for medical negligence against
Sechrengost. On October 13, 2025, Defendants Oliver and Sechrengost moved for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims against them. ECF No. 82. On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed
his opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 86. The Motion is now

ripe for adjudication.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts must view the record “in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir.
2020). However, “[s]peculation” and “conclusory allegations” are insufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Ultimately, only disputes based on
which a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” can support the denial of
a motion for summary judgment. Id. (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
Defendants Lt. Oliver and Terri Sechrengost move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
federal claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and failure to establish his claims
on the merits. ECF No. 82 at 8–11, 15–17. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s federal claims are
barred by qualified immunity. Id. at 11–12. As to Plaintiff’s state law claim against Defendant
Sechrengost, Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that this claim is barred by
sovereign immunity and fails on the merits. Id. at 12–14. Because the Court will grant Defendants’

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against UPMC Altoona and Dr. Tokhi. ECF No. 58. And on November
30, 2023, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Bader. ECF No. 60.
Motion as to Plaintiff’s federal claims, and there are no factors that justify retaining jurisdiction,
the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law
claim.
A. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner
must properly exhaust all administrative remedies that are “available”—that is, remedies that are
“capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of.” Webb v. Dep’t of Just., 117
F.4th 560, 567 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 464–
65 (2025). Proper exhaustion gives prisons an opportunity to resolve complaints internally, screen
out claims that lack merit, and develop an administrative record to assist in any later litigation. See
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 (2001). In order to properly exhaust, “a prisoner must
complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,
including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 88 (2006); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (explaining the Supreme Court’s

holding in Woodford). The applicable procedural rules a prisoner must follow to properly exhaust
“are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.
And so, the Court turns to the grievance process available to inmates at SCI Houtzdale to determine
whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies.
The formal procedure through which inmates in the custody of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections may seek resolution of problems arising during their term of
confinement is known as the Inmate Grievance System. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Grievance
System, DC-ADM 804 (effective May 1, 2015). The Inmate Grievance System requires an inmate
to file a grievance within fifteen working days of the underlying event, using the designated
grievance form. Id. §§ 1(A)(5), 1(A)(8). If that deadline is missed, the inmate may request an
extension by submitting a written explanation to the Facility Grievance Coordinator, who may
grant additional time. Id. § 1(C)(2). This extension request is part of the grievance process and
must be used once any temporary obstacle is removed. See Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 255, 263–65

(3d Cir. 2024) (inmate who lacked writing materials was required to seek an extension once he
procured writing implements). Failure to request an extension or pursue the required appeals
means the inmate has not fully exhausted the administrative remedies available under Policy 804.
See id.; see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 217–18 (explaining that the proper exhaustion requirement is
“not satisfied when grievances [are] dismissed because prisoners had missed deadlines set by the
grievance policy”).
The Inmate Grievance System consists of an initial review stage and two rounds of appeals.
DC-ADM 804 §§ 1(C), 2(A), 2(B). The initial grievance “must include a statement of the facts,”
which “shall include the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the
grievance.” Id. § 1(A)(11). The initial grievance also “shall identify individuals directly involved

in the event(s).” Id. The grievance policy provides that “[a]ny grievance based on separate events
must be presented separately, unless it is necessary to combine the issues to support the claim.” Id.
§ 1(A)(14). If the initial grievance is not properly submitted in accordance with the procedures of
the Inmate Grievance System, the grievance will be rejected and the inmate may re-submit the
grievance or appeal the rejected grievance. Id. §§ 1(A)(20)–(21), 1(C)(4). At each stage of appeal,
the appeal must be made in accordance with the Inmate Grievance System’s “procedures manual”
and must comply with all procedures for each earlier step in the review process. Id. §§ 2(A)(2)(b),
2(B)(1)(d). Indeed, “[f]ailure to comply may result in the appeal being dismissed.” Id. § 2(B)(1)(f).
Here, Plaintiff filed two grievances relating to his knee injury: (1) Grievance No. 953241,
filed on November 3, 2021, claims that the September 2021 MRI showing a normal result was
erroneous and requests that Plaintiff be permitted to see the email from Dr. Bader stating that there
is no further need for follow-up, ECF No. 82-6 at 17–19; and (2) Grievance No. 964185, filed on

January 13, 2022, details an allegedly inadequate visit with the prison’s medical department,
complains of persistent pain in his knee, and continues to dispute the accuracy of the September
2021 MRI results, ECF No. 82-7 at 3–4. Plaintiff appealed the first grievance, No. 953241, to the
final review stage, see ECF No. 82-6 at 2, but his appeal of the second grievance, No. 964185, was
dismissed for “failure to comply with the provisions of the DC-ADM 804,” ECF No. 82-7 at 2.
Specifically, Grievance No. 964185 complained of multiple events, disputed previous grievance
decisions, and described events that were not within fifteen working days of the date of the
grievance. Id. at 5.
In any case, neither Grievance No. 953241 nor Grievance No. 964185 mentions Defendant
Oliver’s confiscation of Plaintiff’s metal knee brace or Defendant Sechrengost’s instruction to

Plaintiff not to contact Dr. Bader’s office. See ECF Nos. 82-6, 82-7. Pursuant to the Inmate
Grievance System, Plaintiff was required to file a grievance pertaining to each of these incidents
within fifteen working days of the underlying event. See DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(8); id. § 1(A)(11)(a)
–(b) (the grievance “shall include the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave
rise to the grievance” and “shall identify individuals directly involved in the event(s)”); see also
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the verb “shall” denotes a
mandatory requirement of a prison’s grievance system). Plaintiff does not argue in his summary
judgment briefing that he filed any grievances pertaining to these two events. See ECF No. 86 at
13–15. Rather, Plaintiff contends that administrative remedies were unavailable to him and
exhaustion should be excused because further grievances would have been futile. Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized three scenarios where an administrative remedy,
though formally in place, is not “available.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016). These

include when the administrative remedy “operates as a simple dead end,” is “so opaque that it
becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,” or when prison officials “thwart inmates from
taking advantage of [it] through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Rinaldi v.
United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44). Plaintiff
fails to show that the grievance process at SCI Houtzdale operated as a “dead end” or was “so
opaque that it [became], practically speaking, incapable of use.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643. For
example, Plaintiff does not claim in his briefing that he unsuccessfully attempted to file grievances
or that he filed grievances and received no response. See, e.g., Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356,
365–66 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding that a grievance process was a dead end where prison officials
failed to respond to grievances within the timeframe mandated by their own policy); Bond v.

Horne, 553 F. App’x 219, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding a process was a dead end where the
plaintiff’s grievances were ignored multiple times). Plaintiff has demonstrated that he understands
the Inmate Grievance System, having utilized it to submit a grievance in connection with his
September 2021 MRI result and having seen it through to a final review decision. See ECF No.
82-6. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that the prison’s grievance process was unavailable to him.
To establish that prison officials thwarted him from making use of an administrative
remedy, an inmate must show that officials affirmatively blocked his use of the grievance process
“through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 644; Brown v. Croak,
312 F.3d 109, 112–13 (3d Cir. 2002) (dispute of fact existed as to whether prison staff thwarted
inmate from exhausting remedies by telling the inmate to wait to file a grievance after an
investigation concluded). Here, Plaintiff does not point to any instances of prison officials blocking
his use of the Inmate Grievance System, such as making threats or providing misleading
instructions that prevented him from filing grievances about the confiscation of his metal knee

brace or Defendant Sechrengost’s directive to not contact Dr. Bader. The record therefore does not
support that prison officials thwarted Plaintiff’s ability to file grievances. With respect to
Plaintiff’s futility argument, the fact that one of Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his medical
condition was denied after final review (Grievance No. 953241) and the other was dismissed for
failure to comply with submission guidelines (Grievance No. 964185) does not show that further
grievances would have been futile. At any rate, the Third Circuit does not recognize a futility
exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Banks v. Roberts, 251 F. App’x 774, 776 (3d
Cir. 2007) (noting “this Court’s bright line rule that ‘completely precludes a futility exception to
[the PLRA’s] mandatory exhaustion requirement’” (alteration in original)) (quoting Nyhuis v.
Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 2000)); Harrell v. Barbeau, No. 19-cv-2083, 2020 WL 6047562,

at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2020) (recognizing that there is no futility exception to the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement).
As such, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to Defendant
Oliver’s confiscation of his metal knee brace and Defendant Sechrengost’s instruction to not
contact Dr. Bader. Plaintiff also cannot show that his failure to exhaust should be excused due to
the unavailability of administrative remedies or prison officials thwarting his use of the grievance
process. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants Oliver and Sechrengost
as to Plaintiff’s claims under federal law.
B. Plaintiff Produced No Evidence that Defendants Acted with Deliberate
Indifference
Even if Plaintiff can be found to have properly exhausted his claims against Defendants
Oliver and Sechrengost based on the two grievances he did file or that his failure to exhaust was
excused, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims would still fail on the merits. To survive summary
judgment on an Eighth Amendment constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical
treatment, a prisoner must put forward evidence indicating that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835
(1994); see also Baumgardner v. Ebbert, 535 F. App’x 72, 75 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “A
medical need is serious . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment

or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.
1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946
F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a serious medical need exists where “failure to treat
can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury, or death”). Here,
Plaintiff’s knee injury involving a torn ACL is a serious medical need. See Romero v. Ahsan, 827
F. App’x 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is clear that [Plaintiff’s] injury—involving a torn anterior
cruciate ligament (ACL), meniscal tear, and other knee damage—constituted a serious medical
condition that was diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

To establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Defendants’ alleged deliberate
indifference of this serious medical need, Plaintiff needed to point to evidence of the Defendants’
subjective awareness of his medical need. “‘[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than
mere negligence’ and is a subjective standard that requires the official to both ‘be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’ and to ‘also
draw the inference.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 538 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–37). Deliberate indifference is demonstrated, for example, “where the
prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to

provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents
a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d
192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not offered any evidence showing that Defendants Oliver
and Sechrengost (1) knew of a need for medical treatment but intentionally refused to provide it;
(2) delayed necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevented Plaintiff
from receiving necessary medical treatment. With regards to Defendant Oliver, Plaintiff argues
that “Lt. Oliver knew Plaintiff had a serious knee injury requiring orthopedic support, as evidenced
by the prescribed metal brace Plaintiff was wearing” and “Lt. Oliver knew or should have known
that a soft knee sleeve provides substantially less support and protection than a rigid metal

immobilizer.” ECF No. 86 at 9. Other than making conclusory statements about what Defendant
Oliver purportedly knew about Plaintiff’s condition, Plaintiff provides no evidence from which a
factfinder could deduce that Defendant Oliver knew that Plaintiff’s metal knee brace was a
necessary medical treatment and intentionally refused to provide it. For example, Plaintiff does
not produce any evidence indicating that the metal knee brace was prescribed by a medical
provider or that a medical provider conveyed to Defendant Oliver that the metal knee brace was
medically necessary.
With regards to Defendant Sechrengost, Plaintiff claims that her instruction to Plaintiff not
to contact Dr. Bader interfered with his medical care and constituted deliberate indifference
because “[b]y preventing Plaintiff from contacting Dr. Bader, Sechrengost effectively blocked
Plaintiff’s ability to obtain a second opinion or clarification about his orthopedic care.” Id. at 10.
Defendants argue that Sechrengost did not have the authority to prevent Plaintiff from contacting
anyone, including an external medical provider, ECF No. 82 at 10, but regardless of whether

Sechrengost actually had the power to stop Plaintiff from contacting Dr. Bader, Sechrengost’s
instruction to Plaintiff not to contact Dr. Bader did not affect the medical care that Plaintiff
received during his time at SCI Houtzdale. In fact, by the time Plaintiff reached out to Dr. Bader—
which was before Defendant Sechrengost instructed him not to—Dr. Bader had already reviewed
the results of Plaintiff’s September 2021 MRI and determined that he did not need to see Plaintiff
for a follow-up appointment.3 ECF No. 82-2 at 2. And even after this incident, Plaintiff continued
to be seen by the prison’s medical department, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s second grievance, which
complained of certain behaviors by prison personnel during a sick call that Plaintiff attended. ECF
No. 82-7 at 3.
Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence showing that Defendants Oliver

and Sechrengost acted with deliberate indifference regarding his medical needs, summary
judgment would also be properly granted on the merits in favor of Defendants. Based on the
Court’s conclusions regarding exhaustion and the merits of Plaintiff’s federal law claims, the Court
will not comment on Defendants’ arguments as to the applicability of qualified immunity.

3 Earlier in this action, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference against Dr.
Bader for changing his recommended course of treatment after reviewing the September 2021
MRI, finding that Plaintiff alleged mere disagreement with his medical treatment in his Complaint.
ECF No. 59 at 10. “[T]he deliberate indifference standard affords considerable latitude to prison
medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients,”
and a court “must disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of [their]
particular course of treatment so long as it remains a question of sound professional judgment.”
Pearson, 850 F.3d at 538 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim Against Defendant Sechrengost Is Dismissed
Having granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s federal law claims, the
Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim against
Defendant Sechrengost. When a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original

jurisdiction before trial, it must decline to adjudicate the remaining state law claims “unless
considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness” support retaining jurisdiction.
Talley, 111 F.4th at 266 n.6 (citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the Court
will grant summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s federal law claims, no
claims remain over which there is original jurisdiction and considerations of “judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness” do not support retaining jurisdiction. The case is at the summary
judgment stage, no significant judicial resources have been expended on the state law claim, and
there is no indication that requiring Plaintiff to proceed in state court would be so unfair or
inconvenient as to justify retaining jurisdiction.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to support his medical negligence claim against Defendant

Sechrengost with a Certificate of Merit, even after the Court granted him two extensions of time
to do so. See ECF Nos. 34, 43. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 requires that a plaintiff
bringing a claim of medical malpractice or medical negligence file a certificate of merit “with the
complaint or within sixty days after the filing of the complaint.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a). Rule
1042.3 is a substantive state law that applies in federal courts, to both represented plaintiffs and
pro se plaintiffs. Perez v. Griffin, 304 F. App’x 72, 74–75 (3d Cir. 2008). This Court has previously
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims of medical malpractice against other Defendants for failing to file the
required certificate of merit and providing no reasonable excuse for noncompliance. See ECF No.
55 at 11; ECF No. 57 at 9; ECF No. 59 at 13. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not file a
certificate of merit and does not oppose dismissal of his state law claim against Sechrengost. ECF
No. 86 at 15.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s medical negligence claim against Defendant
Sechrengost.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 82) as to Plaintiff’s federal law claims. The Court will decline supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state law claim for medical negligence against Defendant Sechrengost and dismiss
it without prejudice. If Plaintiff chooses to file his state claim for medical negligence in state
court, he is directed to be mindful of the fact that his deadline for doing so has been paused
during the course of this lawsuit and for 30 days after this Court issues the present Opinion.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
An accompanying Order will follow.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Chad F. Kenney

CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338871. Public record. Not legal advice.