# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338626

## Case

- **Full name:** Quintaurus L. Johnson v. Department of Juvenile Justice, Andrew Correa, Matthew Clark, Rosa Ardito, Paul Sheffer and Sean Skillern
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338626

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that complaints regarding office conditions did not relate to employment practices forbidden under Title VII, and therefore such complaints are not “statutorily protected expressions”
- finding that due to a lack of evidence of race discrimination, the plaintiff’s “belief that race discrimination had occurred was not objectively reasonable”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-CV-02195-WFJ-NHA

DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, ANDREW CORREA,
MATTHEW CLARK, and
ROSA ARDITO, PAUL SHEFFER
and SEAN SKILLERN,

Defendants.
___________________________________/

ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Florida Department of Juvenile Justice
(“DJJ”) and Andrew Correa, Matthew Clark, Rosa Ardito, Paul Sheffer, and Sean
Skillern’s (jointly, the “Individual Defendants”) motions for summary judgment.
Dkts. 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115. Plaintiff Quintaurus L. Johnson, proceeding pro
se, has filed responses in opposition, Dkts. 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 159, 161, and
Defendants have replied. Dkts. 152, 153, 154, 155, 156. Relevant evidence has been
provided by both parties. Dkts. 104, 113, 151. After careful consideration, the Court
grants Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual History

In 2015, Plaintiff was hired by DJJ as a juvenile probation officer (“JPO”) and
remains employed in this same position. Dkt. 104-1 at 10:2–13. According to
Plaintiff, the position’s responsibilities include monitoring and supervising youth

sentenced to probation, with duties performed both in the office and in the field. Dkt.
104-1 at 16:11–12, 17:6–8.
On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against DJJ, alleging sex discrimination,

naming his then supervisor and Chief, who are not parties to the present litigation.
Dkt. 104-7.
From September 2021 until November 2022, Defendant Ardito held the

position of Juvenile Probation Officer Supervisor (“JPOS”) for Plaintiff’s team. Dkt.
108-1 ¶ 1. In that capacity, she directly supervised Plaintiff’s team. Id.
On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff received a counseling memo from Defendant
Ardito. Dkt. 113-2. This memo was prompted by an incident in which a youth

assigned to Plaintiff was involved in the murder of another individual. Dkt. 104-1 at
45:19–21, 50:7–24. Plaintiff’s case notes for this youth were consequently audited
and reportedly found to be deficient. Dkt. 104-2 ¶ 3. Specifically, it was found that

Plaintiff did not adhere to DJJ policy by failing to timely refer this youth to certain
services and by missing a monthly face-to-face contact with the youth. Dkt. 113.
Plaintiff claims that this counseling memo constituted “baseless disciplinary action.”

Dkt. 36 ¶ 18. An EEOC investigator later found that there was “no evidence
gathered” to show that this counseling memo was “based on retaliation.” Dkt. 36-1
at 4–5.

On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff made a complaint to HR regarding “the
administration and [his] supervisor” at the time, Defendant Ardito. Id. at 17. No
details are on the record regarding the subject of this complaint.
On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff documented in his case notes that he conducted a

home visit for a youth assigned to him. Dkt. 104-8 at 1. On April 25, 2022, the
youth’s mother called Defendant Ardito to report that their video surveillance on
April 20 showed that Plaintiff did not attempt a home visit at any point. Id. Defendant

Ardito made a report to the DJJ’s Central Communications Center (“CCC”) hotline
regarding this reported discrepancy and apparent falsification. Id. (this report stated,
“[Defendant Ardito] was contacted by the mother of [the youth], and alleged that
[Plaintiff] did not conduct a home visit on 4/20/22. According to the mother, she

reviewed her home video surveillance and it does not show [Plaintiff] coming by the
residence on that documented date. [Plaintiff] documented in the case notes that a
home visit was conducted on 4/20/22.”).
Once the report was made, Defendant Ardito was not involved in the ensuing
investigation. See id. (showing Defendant Ardito’s involvement limited to her being

the “Reporting Person”); see also Dkt. 104-2 ¶ 4. Plaintiff claims that Defendant
Ardito initiated this CCC report against him “without justification, triggering
unwarranted scrutiny,” Dkt. 36 ¶ 13, and that she “ignore[ed] evidence provided by

Plaintiff on May 9, 2022,” Dkt. 146-1 ¶ 6, which consisted of an email to Defendant
Ardito where Plaintiff claims that the youth’s mother initially filed this report as
“retaliation for [Plaintiff] reporting her to DCF.” Dkt 151-2 at 19.
On May 3, 2022, Defendant Ardito provided Plaintiff with a notice regarding

the complaint and ongoing investigation, advising him that the investigation did not
imply that he was guilty of wrongdoing. Dkt. 113-3. Plaintiff refused to sign this
notice. Id. at 2. An EEOC investigator later found that there was “no evidence

gathered” to show that this notice was “based on retaliation”; instead, its purpose
was merely to “inform [Plaintiff] of the complaint received.” Dkt. 36-1. Ultimately,
the investigation ended with no further action being taken because “there was not
enough evidence to support or refute the mother’s allegations,” as the “surveillance

video she reportedly viewed to make her claim [was] no longer available.” Dkt. 104-
8 at 2.
Shortly after Plaintiff was advised of the investigation, he approached

Defendant Ardito’s office and stated that he would take action if she reported him to
the CCC again. Dkt. 104-2 ¶ 5 (Defendant Ardito claims that Plaintiff said that if she
reported him again “there was going to be a problem”); Dkt. 151-2 at 10 (Plaintiff

claims that he said the “next time you report me I am going to report you and
administration to Tallahassee”). Defendant Ardito felt threatened by Plaintiff, so she
reported the incident to her supervisor and to the CCC, but no action was taken

because Plaintiff’s statement lacked specificity. Dkt. 104-2 ¶ 5; Dkt. 146-1 ¶ 8 (“The
CCC . . . determined the June 2, 2022, incident was ‘non-reportable’ because it
lacked a specific threat.”). Defendant’s supervisor eventually provided Plaintiff with
an Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) referral due to this incident. Dkt. 104-2

¶ 5. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ardito “fabricated claims of hostility to justify
[the] EAP referral.” Dkt. 36 ¶ 14.
On June 16, 2022, Plaintiff acknowledged the receipt of a performance

evaluation drafted by Defendant Ardito. Dkt. 104-9 at 6. Defendant Ardito scored
Plaintiff’s performance as 3.25 out of 5, indicating “satisfactory” performance, and
provided areas for improvement. Id. (“There have been some client complaints that
he can be hard to get in touch with and some requests to be switched to another JPO

due to this. [Plaintiff] could improve his customer service skills by returning phone
calls in a timely manner.”). Plaintiff challenged this evaluation, but it was eventually
reviewed and approved both by Defendant Ardito’s supervisor and the second-level

supervisor. Dkt. 104-2 ¶ 6. Plaintiff claims that this evaluation constituted a
“retaliatory negative performance review . . . , filled with inaccuracies, deliberately
aimed at discrediting the Plaintiff’s work.” Dkt. 36 ¶ 128. Plaintiff has compared

this performance evaluation with one received on June 22, 2021, which scored
Plaintiff’s performance as 4.50 out of 5, indicating “outstanding” performance. Dkt.
151-2 at 27–30. An EEOC investigator later found that “there was no evidence

gathered to show that [the] lower performance plan appraisal . . . [was] based on
retaliation,” and that “it is not unusual for ratings to increase or decrease each
performance year.” Dkt. 36-1.
On August 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed an additional charge with the EEOC,

alleging retaliation by certain DJJ employees for his filing of the previous charge of
harassment. Dkt. 104-10. This is the EEOC charge that gave rise to the present case.
See Dkt. 36 ¶ 19 (“The EEOC completed its investigation in May 2024 and issued a

Right-to-Sue letter soon after, enabling the Plaintiff to pursue his claims in court.”)
The entirety of Plaintiff’s 2022 charge reads as follows:
I began employment with the Department of Juvenile Justice on July
21, 2015, as a Juvenile Probation Officer. I continue to be harassed
since filing a previous charge. I believe I am being “pushed out” by my
new supervisor and management due to action being taken against me,
for having a current lawsuit and for making complaints of harassment
since filing with the EEOC. On my 2021 Annual Performance
Appraisal I scored a 4.2 [sic] (Outstanding), however my most recent
Performance Appraisal in June 2022, I received a score of 3.2 [sic]
(Average) by Supervisor Rosa Ardito. I have recently received 2
counseling’s and have had 5 meetings with management and union
regarding accusations of allegedly falsifying reports, failure to make
contact, and not always being at work, which I denied. I was accused
of having “a rough couple of years” and that I may need therapy. I
believe I am being targeted for termination and nothing is being done
to resolve the issues. I believe I have been retaliated against for
complaining of the continued harassment and filing a previous charge
with the EEOC in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended.

Dkt. 104-10.
From March 2023 until October 2024, Defendant Correa held the position of
Assistant Chief Probation Officer. Dkt. 104-3 ¶ 1. In this capacity, he served as a
supervisor over Plaintiff’s team. Id.
In March 2023, Plaintiff applied for the position of Assistant Chief Probation
Officer. Dkt. 115-1 ¶ 53. The only applicants considered were those with DJJ
supervisory experience, which excluded Plaintiff, who had none. Id.; Dkt. 113-1 at
3. Plaintiff also applied for the position of Chief Probation Officer. Dkt. 115-1 ¶ 54.
The only applicants considered were those with at least three years of supervisory
experience, which similarly excluded Plaintiff. Id.; Dkt. 113-1 at 3. Plaintiff
therefore did not receive either the Assistant Chief or the Chief Probation Officer

position. Dkt. 115-1 ¶¶ 53–54.
In June 2023, while serving as Assistant Chief Probation Officer, Defendant
Correa was a member of an interview board for the position of Operations

Coordinator, a position Plaintiff applied for. Dkt. 104-3 ¶ 4; Dkt. 113-1 at 2. After
interviewing Plaintiff for the position along with other qualified applicants, the
interview board selected an applicant other than Plaintiff who Defendants claim
“scored higher and performed better in the interview than all other interviewees.”
Dkt. 104-3 ¶ 4; see Dkt. 113-1 at 2; see also Dkts. 113-5, 113-6 (showing the resumes

for Plaintiff and the selected applicant). However, internal documents show that the
selected applicant and Plaintiff both received the same score—25.00, Dkt. 151-6 at
3, and that Plaintiff had a veteran’s preference applied to his application. Id. at 6.

From March 2024 until January 2025, Defendant Clark held the position of
Juvenile Probation Officer Supervisor for Plaintiff’s team. Dkt. 104-4 ¶ 1. In that
capacity, he directly supervised Plaintiff’s team. Id. On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff
made a complaint to Defendant Correa regarding Defendant Clark, alleging

micromanagement and harassment. Dkt. 36-1 at 18–19.
On May 10, 2024, the EEOC generated a right to sue letter for Plaintiff’s 2022
EEOC Charge. Dkt. 104-11. Acting upon this letter, Plaintiff began litigating the

present case on August 5, 2024. Dkt. 1-1. Proceeding without counsel, Plaintiff sued
DJJ and certain employees in Florida state court. Id. at 1–22. On September 17, 2024,
this case was then removed to federal court. Dkt. 1.
At some point during his supervision of Plaintiff, Defendant Clark had issues

with Plaintiff’s job performance, which Clark discussed with him. Dkt. 104-4 ¶ 2.
For example, Defendant Clark reported that the family of a youth assigned to
Plaintiff complained they were not being properly visited in accordance with DJJ

policies. Id. ¶ 3. According to Defendant Clark, the family disputed Plaintiff’s case
notes that reflected proper visitation. Id. When Defendant Clark met with Plaintiff
to discuss this issue, Plaintiff walked out of the meeting and refused to return. Id.

Later, Defendant Clark reportedly discovered discrepancies in Plaintiff’s timesheet.
Id. ¶ 4. When Plaintiff met with DJJ management about the matter, he again walked
out of the meeting. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the allegations of improper visitation and

timesheet discrepancies were “baseless claims used to intimidate him.” Dkt. 145-1
¶¶ 4–5.
On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint with HR regarding Defendant
Clark, alleging micromanagement, harassment, and falsification. Dkt. 36-1 at 15–

16; Dkt. 151-1 at 12–13. Also in June 2024, Defendant Correa attended a meeting
where a discrepancy with Plaintiff’s time sheet submissions was discussed with
Plaintiff and his direct supervisor, Defendant Clark. Dkt. 104-3 ¶ 3 (listing the date

of this meeting as April or May 2024); Dkt. 151-1 at 16–17 (listing the date of this
meeting as June 2024 and recounting Plaintiff’s contemporaneous recollection).
Plaintiff’s timesheet allegedly did not match his documented case notes and he was
told that working extra time that is not documented could be perceived as

falsification and that his time worked needed to be reflected on his timesheet. Dkt.
104-3 ¶ 3; Dkt. 151-1 at 16–17 (“If you’re working extra, that needs to be reflected
. . . even if we owe you money.”). Plaintiff claims that such allegations regarding his

timesheet were “fabricated.” See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 25, 79, 99, 107.
In mid-2024, Defendant Clark drafted a performance evaluation for Plaintiff.
Dkt. 104-4 ¶ 5. Defendant Clark initially scored Plaintiff’s performance as 1 out of

5. See id. (“Based upon my experience supervising [Plaintiff], I wanted to score him
under a three (out of five)[.]”); Dkt. 151-1 at 23 (describing the initial performance
evaluation as rating Plaintiff with “all 1’s”). After Plaintiff complained about the

score, Dkt. 104-1 at 41:12–42:5, Defendant Clark learned that he could not maintain
the initial rating because the prior year’s evaluation lacked objective performance
goals against which Plaintiff’s current performance could be assessed. Dkt. 104-4 ¶
5. Therefore, Defendant Clark ultimately scored Plaintiff’s performance as 3 out of

5, or “meeting expectations.” See id.; Dkt. 104-1 at 41:12–42:5.
On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff made a complaint to HR regarding Defendant
Clark, alleging an unfair performance evaluation. Dkt. 36-1 at 20. On September 30,

2024, Plaintiff made a complaint to HR regarding Defendant Clark, alleging
unwarranted criticism, baseless accusations, and a toxic work environment. Id. at
12–13; Dkt. 151-1 at 34–35. HR found that the allegations were “not based on a
protected class as defined by applicable civil rights laws.” Dkt. 36-1 at 11; Dkt. 151-

1 at 35.
From October 2024, Defendant Sheffer has served as the acting Chief over
Plaintiff’s team, in addition to his position as Chief Probation Officer. Dkt. 104-6 ¶
1. He remains employed in this position. Id. In this capacity, he directly supervises
Plaintiff’s team. Id.

On October 9, 2024, while Defendant Sheffer was acting Bureau Chief,
Hurricane Milton damaged certain DJJ offices, and employees, including Plaintiff,
were moved to temporary remote status while an alternative office location was

secured. Id. ¶ 2; Dkt. 104-13 at 1. On November 20, 2024, Plaintiff voiced concerns
to Defendant Sheffer by email about overcrowding and safety violations, sanitation
and hygiene deficiencies, and inadequate ventilation and water damage concerns.
Dkt. 104-13 at 1; Dkt. 151-1 at 8–9. On December 5, 2024, Plaintiff emailed further

concerns regarding mold and COVID-19 exposure, Dkt. 104-13 at 1–2, on
December 6, 2024, Plaintiff reiterated similar health-related concerns, Dkt. 151-1 at
10, and on December 18, 2024, Plaintiff further mentioned a lack of organization,

ineffective communication, micromanagement, distrust, unfair workloads, and
unprofessional behavior. Dkt. 104-13 at 2.
In December 2024, Plaintiff submitted an ADA accommodation request,
which was temporarily granted during its consideration. Dkt. 104-6 ¶ 2. On January

16, 2025, Defendant Sheffer provided Plaintiff with notice that his teleworking
accommodations were revoked because further accommodations would be “unduly
extensive, substantial or disruptive, or fundamentally alter the nature or operation of

DJJ business.” Dkt. 104-12 (quoting EEOC guidance document on ADA
implementation). The notice stated that DJJ was “unable to accommodate
[Plaintiff’s] request at this time due to there being no legitimate concerns which have

not been addressed.” Id. Plaintiff claims that this revocation was “clearly retaliatory
in nature.” Dkt. 36 ¶ 115.
On the same day, Defendant Sheffer responded in writing to Plaintiff to

further address his concerns and explain the revocation of his accommodations. Dkt.
104-13 at 1–3. Defendant Sheffer stated that the workplace was assessed and
regularly cleaned, all relevant regulations were followed, and that all workplace
concerns had been promptly addressed. Id. Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations of unfair

workloads, Defendant Sheffer reported to Plaintiff that the case assignments for
Plaintiff’s team appeared reasonably balanced—Plaintiff landed approximately in
the middle of the distribution with 14 new assignments, while other team members

had 10, 12, and 15 new assignments. Id. at 2; see Dkt. 104-15 at 3.
On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a health-related complaint regarding
workplace conditions to the Florida Department of Health. Dkt. 151-5 at 25–26. On
February 5, 2025, Plaintiff authored an internal complaint against Defendant

Sheffer. Dkt. 104-1 at 62:10–14. No evidence is on the record regarding the details
of this internal memo.1

1 In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that this memo alleged “hostile work environment, racial
discrimination, and retaliation.” Dkt. 36 ¶ 40. Aside from this claim, no supporting evidence has been provided by
Plaintiff. The Court is left with no evidence substantiating the details of this internal memo. Although the Court views
all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court declines to credit this unsupported
On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), alleging color discrimination,

disability discrimination, and retaliation at the new office location by both
Defendants Clark and Sheffer. Dkt. 104-14. Plaintiff did not check the box for race
discrimination. Id. Specifically regarding retaliation, he alleged excessive case

assignments and being forced to return to the workplace. Id. The FCHR provided
Plaintiff with a determination of no reasonable cause on August 4, 2025. Dkt. 104-
16.
On March 5 and March 12, 2025, Plaintiff made further complaints to

Defendant Sheffer about unfair workloads, workplace concerns, and retaliation. Dkt.
104-15. Defendant Sheffer responded on March 18, 2025, by again explaining that
all concerns had been addressed. Id. at 2–3. Defendant Sheffer further analyzed

Plaintiff’s workload as of March 18, 2025, finding that Plaintiff was assigned 13
new assignments, while other team members had 11 and 14; furthermore, it was
found that Plaintiff had a total of 45 probation cases assigned to him, while other
team members had 47 and 50 probation cases assigned to them. Dkt. 104-15.

Plaintiff’s workload again appeared to land in the middle of the distribution. Plaintiff

allegation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation modified)
(“For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record. For instance, mere conclusions
and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”).
maintains that he was subjected to “increased workloads” as retaliation for protected
expression. See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 37, 41, 66, 69, 71, 81.

On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff received an oral reprimand from his supervisor
at the time, which alleged that he violated certain standards related to poor
performance, negligence, inefficiency or inability to perform duties,

insubordination, and violation of law or agency rules. Dkt. 151-5 at 38. Specifically,
it was claimed that Plaintiff failed to complete numerous overdue assignments
provided to him. See id. at 38–39 (listing 18 different cases where Plaintiff failed to
complete required assignments). Plaintiff failed to request assistance when it was

offered, and instead appears to have threatened disciplinary action. See id. at 36–37
(“This is my last warning before I escalate this issue to headquarters. . . . If you don’t
want to be in the mix I suggest you refrain from appearing to single me out.”).

Due to these assignments not being completed in the necessary timeframe,
Plaintiff was provided with the oral reprimand in “an effort to correct the . . .
unacceptable behavior.” Id. at 41. During a meeting to discuss this reprimand,
Plaintiff reportedly walked out of the meeting saying “we are not doing this,” then

returned to tell his supervisor that she was “going to regret doing this.” Dkt. 151-6
at 45. His supervisor felt threatened and made a report of this behavior. Id. at 31.
Lakeland Police later found that “[n]o threat was made,” and that the supervisor “just
wanted to notify police.” Id. at 37. Plaintiff refused to sign a notice of investigation
dated April 14, 2025, regarding this incident. Id. at 46.

At some point following the oral reprimand, Plaintiff submitted a complaint
to HR regarding his assignments. He alleged “targeted discipline cloaked in policy,
performance mischaracterized to justify punishment, and retaliation disguised as

routine oversight.” Dkt. 151-5 at 33–35.
On March 31, 2025, the parent of two youths reported to DJJ that Plaintiff
failed to meet with them in person, and only communicated over the phone. Dkt.
151-6 at 43. Furthermore, the parent expressed concern regarding the delays in

Plaintiff’s responses, the failure to provide certain information to the youth, and
Plaintiff’s agitation when the parent requested to speak with his supervisor. Id.
Plaintiff refused to sign a notice of investigation dated April 14, 2025, regarding this

incident. Id. at 44.
On April 1, 2025, before being appointed to his current position, Defendant
Skillern was brought into a meeting by the current supervisor for Plaintiff’s team.
Dkt. 151-4 at 7. In attendance at the meeting were a youth assigned to Plaintiff and

the youth’s grandmother. Id. The grandmother complained about certain aspects of
Plaintiff’s job performance, including “failure to remove the youth’s cell phone as
ordered by the court, lack of home visits, refusal to communicate with her regarding

[the youth’s] progress, failure to speak with guardian when visiting the school, and
failure to hold the youth accountable to the terms of her probation.” Id.; Dkt. 151-6
at 41. She was given a grievance form to complete, detailing her complaints in

writing. Dkt. 151-4 at 7; see Dkt. 104-1 at 105:1–9. Immediately after this meeting,
Plaintiff reportedly “contacted the grandmother of [the youth] and spoke to [her] and
accused her of lying,” after which the grandmother requested that Plaintiff no longer

contact her. Dkt. 151-6 at 41. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Skillern “induce[d]
[the] client’s guardian to file a grievance against the Plaintiff—a tactic clearly
intended to undermine the Plaintiff’s credibility and chill his protected speech.” Dkt.
36 ¶ 110. Plaintiff refused to sign a notice of investigation dated April 14, 2025,

regarding this incident. Dkt. 151-6 at 42.
From April 4, 2025, Defendant Skillern has held the position of Juvenile
Probation Officer Supervisor. Dkt. 104-5 ¶ 1; Dkt. 151-6 at 18 ¶ 11. He remains

employed in this position. Dkt. 104-5 ¶ 1. In this capacity, he directly supervises
Plaintiff’s team. Id.
Shortly after being appointed as Juvenile Probation Supervisor, Defendant
Skillern signed off on the revocation of Plaintiff’s telework accommodation. Dkt.

110-1 ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. 104-1 at 108:6–14. This revocation was decided upon by
Plaintiff’s former supervisor due to the aforementioned oral reprimand received by
Plaintiff; Defendant Skillern was not involved in the decision. Id. Plaintiff submitted
multiple complaints to HR objecting to this revocation on April 17 and 18, 2025, in
which Plaintiff made claims of ADA-related retaliation. Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11.

On April 20, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Florida Inspector
General. Plaintiff complained that his separate DJJ Office of Inspector General
whistleblower complaint was disclosed in the present litigation. Dkt. 151-6 at 11–

12.
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff has filed four complaints here. Dkts. 20, 21, 35, 36. Plaintiff’s Third
Amended Complaint brings the present claims. Dkt. 36. Against DJJ are claims of:

Retaliation under Title VII (Count I); Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment under
Title VII (Count III); Retaliatory Failure to Promote under Title VII (Count IV);
Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Count V); and Violation of the Florida Whistleblower

Act (Count VII). Id. Against the Individual Defendants is a single claim of First
Amendment Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II). Id. The Court previously
dismissed Count VI. Dkt. 24; Dkt. 36 at 34–35 (“[Count VI] was previously
dismissed by the Court. It is included herein solely to preserve the procedural history

of the case. Plaintiff does not reassert this claim and does not seek relief under this
Count in the Third Amended Complaint.”). Plaintiff claims that the retaliation has
continued during the pendency of this case. See Dkt. 36 ¶ 2.
The Court’s Case Management & Scheduling Order initially set the discovery
cut-off for June 20, 2025. Dkt. 29. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery on

May 24, 2025, Dkt. 45, which made June 23, 2025, the response deadline for
Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (providing 30 days to respond). Plaintiff
then filed a motion seeking to shorten Defendants’ response deadline so that Plaintiff

could have an opportunity to compel further responses before the discovery cut-off.
Dkt. 50. This motion was denied by the Magistrate Judge, as it was found to be
“Plaintiff's responsibility to timely serve his discovery requests such that responses
would be due within the discovery period.” Dkt. 51. However, the Magistrate Judge

later granted Plaintiff’s motion to extend the discovery period and thus extended the
cut-off to June 24, 2025, “for the limited purpose of permitting Defendants to
respond to Plaintiff’s May 24, 2025, Requests for Admission.” Dkt. 58. The cut-off

for “all other discovery and all motions to compel not related to those requests for
admissions [was to] remain June 20, 2025.” Id.
The Court notes that Plaintiff filed multiple ensuing discovery-related
motions, including further motions to compel and motions for sanctions, see Dkts.

45, 64, 74, 83, 85, 92, 117, 118, 126, 127, which led the Court to issue orders
compelling DJJ to properly respond to discovery requests. See Dkts. 79, 91, 94, 121,
125, 132. DJJ’s failures concerned documents without required metadata,

incomplete production, and inadequate privilege logs. Dkt. 132 at 2–5. At the time
summary judgment motions and responses were filed, the only missing discovery
was the metadata associated with select emails. Dkt. 125 at 8. On October 28, 2025,

the Magistrate Judge determined that DJJ was responsible for noncompliance and
found sanctions warranted, ordering DJJ to pay Plaintiff’s requested $600 in
sanctions, Dkt. 132 at 7, which was timely paid. Dkt. 134. On November 13, 2025,

the Magistrate Judge reiterated that the “cut-off for discovery and all motions to
compel . . . was June 20, 2025.” Dkt. 138. It was concluded that the Court had “ruled
on all outstanding discovery issues,” and that “[n]o further discovery motions or
notices should be filed in this action.” Id.

After Defendants filed the present motions, Plaintiff’s initial responsive filing
failed to address to the merits of Defendants’ motions, did not contest Defendants’
accompanying statements of facts, see Dkts. 106-1, 107-1, 108-1, 109-1, 110-1, 115-

1, and failed to include a separate Statement of Disputed Facts. See Dkt. 119.
Plaintiff instead utilized his response to merely raise further discovery-related
objections pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), Dkt. 119, which were untimely in light
of the resolution of all outstanding discovery issues. Dkt. 138. Pursuant to Eleventh

Circuit caselaw noting that courts “should be particularly careful to ensure proper
notice to a pro se litigant,” Horton v. Gilchrist, 128 F.4th 1221, 1226 (11th Cir.
2025) (quoting Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1368 (11th Cir.

2007)); see Couch v. Clark, 725 F. App’x 808 (11th Cir. 2018), the Court notified
Plaintiff of his deficient response and allowed him additional time to file a
substantive response to avoid the Court deeming the material facts of Defendants’

motions as admitted. Dkt. 141. Plaintiff did so, and filed relevant responses, Dkts.
145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 161, and evidence. Dkt. 151.2
Plaintiff’s response to Defendant DJJ’s Motion for Summary Judgment

regarding Count I, III, IV, V, and VII was then struck by the Court, Dkt. 158, as it
cited to hallucinated cases. See Dkt. 150 at 7, 13, 16 (citing Watson v. Amedisys
Holding, LLC, 298 F. App’x 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2008), Martin v. Dep’t of
Corrections, 682 So. 2d 331, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), and Campbell v. DCF, 201

So. 3d 164, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), which are non-existent). The Court granted
Plaintiff leave to refile his response with proper citations, Dkt. 158, and he did so.
Dkt. 159.

LEGAL STANDARD
A district court should grant summary judgment when it determines that there
are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material if it may “affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

2 In Plaintiff’s most recent responses, he continues to raise issues related to discovery. See, e.g., Dkt. 145 at 17; Dkt.
146 at 14–16; Dkt. 147 at 18–19; Dkt. 148 at 16; Dkt. 149 at 12–13; Dkt. 150 at 16–18; Dkt. 159 at 16–18; Dkt. 160
at 4; Dkt. 161 at 16; Dkt. 167 at 5. In light of the aforementioned holdings, the Court declines to consider these issues.
A genuine dispute means evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The burden of a moving party “varies depending on which party would bear
the burden of proof on a disputed issue at trial.” Poer v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n,
100 F.4th 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Fitzpatrick v. City of Atl., 2 F.3d 1112,

1115 (11th Cir. 1993)). “With regard to issues on which the non-moving party bears
the burden of proof, the moving party need not support its motion with evidence
negating the opponent’s claim.” Cohen v. United Am. Bank of Cent. Fla., 83 F.3d
1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation modified). Instead, the moving party “has the

burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case or
showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving party's
case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir.

2013).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157–58 (1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372

F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, although a pro se complainant “is entitled
to a liberal interpretation” of his pleading, he is not excused from meeting the
“essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a
genuine issue as to a fact material to his case.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667,
670 (11th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION
I. Count I: Retaliation under Title VII
Defendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count I, which alleges “unlawful

retaliation against the Plaintiff for his protected whistleblowing activities” under
Title VII. Dkt. 36 ¶ 93.
Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee “because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII], or because he

has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A
plaintiff may support a claim of retaliation by offering either direct or circumstantial

evidence. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004).
In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation—as is the case here—the Court
evaluates the claim by using the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, a

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Young v. UPS, 575
U.S. 206, 213 (2015). A prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII requires the
plaintiff to establish that “(1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression . . . ; (2)

he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally
related to the protected expression.” Rosado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of the Navy, 127 F.4th
858, 876 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). If a prima facie case of retaliation is

established, the burden then shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. Berman v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 160 F.3d 697, 702 (11th Cir. 1998).

Alternatively, “an employee may always prove a claim of discrimination by
presenting sufficient evidence that would ‘permit[] a reasonable factfinder to find
that the employer [discriminated] against the employee,’” even if the employee does
not rely on the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Melton v. I-10 Truck

Ctr. Inc, No. 23-14175, 2026 WL 319183, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (quoting
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2023)).
a. Statutorily Protected Expression

The first element of a prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII is a
“statutorily protected expression,” which is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). See
E.E.O.C. v. Total System Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000). Under
this statute, an employer may not discriminate against an employee because “he has

made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII],” (participation clause), or because “he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]”

(opposition clause). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); see Total System Servs., 221 F.3d at
1174. The participation clause “protects proceedings and activities which occur in
conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC,” requiring the

plaintiff to have “participat[ed] in the machinery set up by Title VII to enforce its
provisions.” Total System Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174 (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that the May 28, 2019, EEOC

charge, the August 12, 2022, EEOC charge, and the August 5, 2024, initiation of the
present litigation, which arose from the 2022 EEOC charge, are certainly considered
“statutorily protected expression” under the participation clause. See Vincent v.
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 152 F.4th 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2025) (holding that

“protected activity includes . . . filing formal EEOC complaints”); Total System
Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174 (“[The participation] clause protects proceedings and
activities which occur in conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge with

the EEOC.”); see also Tolar v. Marion Bank and Tr., Co., 378 F. Supp. 3d 1103,
1122 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (citing Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc.,
234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000)) (“Filing a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC or filing a subsequent Title VII lawsuit constitutes statutorily protected

participation activity.”).
Plaintiff describes further acts by him that are alleged to be “statutorily
protected expressions,” which the Court will analyze under the opposition clause.

The opposition clause prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee
because the employee opposed an “unlawful employment practice” under Title VII.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). The Court finds that, amidst the myriad of complaints

made by Plaintiff, most fall outside the purview of Title VII.
Plaintiff made complaints on the following dates: June 3, 2022, complaint
with no details on the record, Dkt. 36-1 at 17; March 27, 2024, complaint alleging

micromanagement, id. at 18–19; June 6, 2024, complaint alleging micromanagement
and falsification; Dkt. 151-1 at 12–13; August 19, 2024, complaint alleging an unfair
performance evaluation, Dkt. 36-1 at 20; September 30, 2024, complaint regarding
unwarranted criticism, baseless accusations, and a toxic work environment, id. at

12–13; Dkt. 151-1 at 34–35; November 20, 2024, complaint alleging issues with
safety and hygiene in the office, Dkt. 104-13 at 1; Dkt. 151-1 at 8–9; December 5,
2024, complaint alleging issues with mold and COVID-19 in the office, Dkt. 104-

13 at 1–2; December 6, 2024, complaint regarding health-related concerns, Dkt. 151-
1 at 10; December 18, 2024, complaint alleging lack of organization, ineffective
communication, micromanagement, and unfair workloads, Dkt. 104-13 at 2; January
23, 2025, complaint to the Florida Department of Health regarding health-related

concerns, Dkt. 151-5 at 25–26; February 5, 2025, complaint with no details on the
record, Dkt. 104-1 at 62:10–14; March 5 and 12, 2025, complaints alleging unfair
workloads and issues with safety and hygiene in the office, Dkt. 104-15; April 17

and 18, 2025, complaints alleging ADA-related retaliation, Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11; and
April 20, 2025, complaint to the Florida Inspector General regarding the use of
Plaintiff’s whistleblower complaint in the present litigation. Dkt. 151-6 at 11–12.

Although Plaintiff has certainly expressed opposition in these complaints to
certain aspects of DJJ’s work culture and environment, these concerns are not related
to unlawful employment practices under Title VII, as they did not mention race,

color, religion, sex, national origin, opposition to Title VII employment
discrimination, or the submission or support of a complaint about Title VII
employment discrimination. Therefore, these complaints fall outside the purview of
Title VII and were not “statutorily protected expressions.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

3(a); see also Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th
Cir. 1995) (“Unfair treatment, absent discrimination based on race, sex, or national
origin, is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”); Jeronimus v. Polk

Cnty. Opportunity Council, Inc., 145 F. App’x 319, 326 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding
that complaints regarding being “singled out,” being subjected to “a campaign of
harassment,” and working in a “hostile environment” were not “statutorily protected
expression[s]” because the plaintiff “never suggested that this treatment was in any

way related to his race or sex”); Duncan v. Madison Cnty., 272 F. App’x 859, 863
(11th Cir. 2008) (finding that complaints regarding office conditions did not relate
to employment practices forbidden under Title VII, and therefore such complaints

are not “statutorily protected expressions”).
While some of the aforementioned complaints mentioned retaliation, none
were specifically related to Title VII employment discrimination. See, e.g., Dkt. 36-

1 at 20 (alleging retaliation related to unspecified former complaints—“This is a
classic example of retaliation given that I reported [Defendant Clark] previously and
others.”); Dkt. 151-1 at 12–13 (alleging general retaliation, not related to anything

specific—“More so [Defendant Clark] have [sic] demonstrated a pattern of
harassment and have engaged in retaliatory harassment.”); Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11
(alleging ADA-related retaliation—“[T]he revocation of my telework previleges
may constitute retaliation in violation of [the ADA]). However, at some point

following the March 27, 2025, oral reprimand, Plaintiff complained to HR regarding
the various reprimands than he had received. Id. at 33–35. He claimed that these
were “textbook adverse employment action[s] following protected activity under . .

. Title VII[.]” Id. at 34. The reference to retaliation under Title VII is sufficient to be
considered a “statutorily protected expression.”
The remaining complaint left to be analyzed under the opposition clause is
Plaintiff’s February 7, 2025, charge filed with the FCHR. Dkt. 104-14. Although this

complaint does allege color discrimination, which is an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII—to establish that this was a “statutorily protected
expression,” Plaintiff must further demonstrate “that he subjectively (that is, in good

faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices,
[and] that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record
presented.” Harrison v. Belk, Inc., 748 F. App’x 936, 943 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Butler v. Ala. DOT, 536 F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2008)). “Thus, [Plaintiff] must
allege both that he honestly believed [DJJ] was engaged in unlawful employment
practices, and that his belief was objectively reasonable.” Ceus v. City of Tampa,

803 F. App’x 235, 245 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Furcron, 843 F.3d at 1311).
“Objective belief is measured against the controlling substantive law.” Id. (citing
Butler, 536 F.3d at 1214).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegation of color discrimination was not

objectively reasonable in light of the facts presented, as the only aspect of the FCHR
charge that mentions color merely states that “there appears to be a clear and
deliberate pattern of targeting individuals of color in the decision-making process,

reinforcing the discriminatory and retaliatory practices within the [DJJ’s]
workplace.” Dkt. 104-14 at 2. Plaintiff provided no supporting facts or further
elaboration. Because Title VII color discrimination requires more than mere
allegations, see Word v. AT&T, 576 F. App’x 908, 914 (11th Cir. 2014), the Court

finds Plaintiff’s subjective belief that DJJ was engaging in color-based employment
discrimination was not objectively reasonable. See Butler, 536 F.3d at 1213; see also
Muhammad v. Audio Visual Servs. Grp., 380 F. App’x 864, 873 (11th Cir. 2010)

(finding that due to a lack of evidence of race discrimination, the plaintiff’s “belief
that race discrimination had occurred was not objectively reasonable”). Plaintiff
further alleges disability discrimination in this charge, Dkt. 104-14 at 1, but this falls

outside the purview of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (listing the protected classes as “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”
and not disability). The Court thus finds that the February 7, 2025, FCHR charge

was not a “statutorily protected expression.”
Therefore, the only “statutorily protected expressions” sufficient for the first
element of the prima facie case of retaliation are the following: the May 28, 2019,
EEOC charge, the August 12, 2022, EEOC charge, the August 5, 2024, initiation of

the present litigation, and the complaint that occurred at some point following the
March 27, 2025, oral reprimand.
b. Adverse Employment Actions & Causation

The second element of a prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII requires
a plaintiff to establish an “adverse employment action.” Burlington N. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citation modified). The third element then requires that any
adverse action be shown to be causally related to the statutorily protected expression.

Rosado, 127 F.4th at 876. The Eleventh Circuit has construed the causation element
“broadly,” requiring that “a plaintiff need only demonstrate ‘that the protected
activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.’” Debe v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 860 F. App’x 637, 639 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Shotz v. City of
Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1180 n.30 (11th Cir. 2003)). But, to the extent the
only link proffered between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action is “temporal proximity,” the temporal proximity must be “very close” to infer
causation. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)) (holding that a

three-month period between the expression and the adverse action was not “very
close”). “If there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and the
adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, the
complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211,

1220 (11th Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim of Title VII retaliation fails to provide any argument
regarding a nexus and has instead offered only conclusory statements. See Dkt. 36

¶¶ 92–94. Construing the Plaintiff’s pleading liberally, the Court interprets his claim
of Title VII retaliation to rely wholly on temporal proximity to establish causation—
i.e., Plaintiff appears to claim that causation exists because he was subject to adverse
employment action after he engaged in protected activities.

The first protected activity was Plaintiff’s May 28, 2019, EEOC charge. Dkt.
104-7. The claimed adverse employment action closest in time to this charge is the
January 20, 2022, counseling memo he received from Defendant Ardito. See Dkt.

113-2. Without analyzing whether this action by Defendant Ardito constitutes an
adverse employment action, the Court finds that these two events—thirty-one
months apart—do not have temporal proximity sufficient to establish causation. See

Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation as to the 2019 EEOC charge.
The next protected activity was Plaintiff’s August 12, 2022, EEOC charge.

Dkt. 104-10. The claimed adverse employment action that is closest in time to this
charge is the March 2023 denials of the Assistant Chief and Chief Probation Officer
positions. See Dkt. 113-1 at 3; Dkt. 115-1 ¶¶ 53–54. Without analyzing whether
these actions constitute adverse employment actions, the Court finds that these

events—at least six months apart—do not have sufficient temporal proximity
sufficient to establish causation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Thus, Plaintiff fails
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation as to the 2022 EEOC charge.

The next protected activity was the initiation of the present litigation on
August 5, 2024. Dkt. 1-1. The claimed adverse employment actions that are closest
in time to this charge are Defendant Clark’s discussions with Plaintiff about his job
performance, Dkt. 104-4 ¶¶ 2–4, Defendant Clark’s performance evaluation, id. ¶ 5;

see Dkt. 151-1 at 23, and the January 16, 2025, revocation of Plaintiff’s teleworking
accommodations. Dkt. 104-12. As an initial matter, without analyzing whether the
revocation of accommodations constitutes an adverse employment action, the Court

finds that the August 5, 2024, initiation of litigation and the January 16, 2025,
revocation—five months apart—do not have sufficient temporal proximity to
establish causation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. This sets the outer bound of what

is considered temporally proximate, and thus only Defendant Clark’s discussions
and his performance evaluation need be analyzed.
Defendant Clark’s discussions with Plaintiff were described as occurring

“during his time as Plaintiff’s supervisor,” Dkt. 104-4 ¶ 2, and Defendant Clark held
this position from March 2024 until January 2025. Id. ¶ 1. Furthermore, Defendant
Clark’s performance evaluation is described as occurring in “mid-2024.” Id. ¶ 5. A
specific date has not been established by either party for either of these actions—

therefore, the Court resolves this ambiguity in favor of Plaintiff, see Adickes, 398
U.S. at 157–58; Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1280, and will construe these actions as
occurring within a time considered temporally proximate to the initiation of

litigation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364.
If Defendant Clark’s discussions with Plaintiff and performance evaluation
are construed as temporally proximate to statutorily protected activity, the Court
must then address the second element to determine if these actions constitute

“adverse employment actions” sufficient to establish a prima facie retaliation case.
See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. To establish the second element, “a plaintiff must
show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially

adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. The Eleventh
Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court’s standard in Burlington to “strongly

suggest[] that it is for a jury to decide whether anything more than the most petty
and trivial actions against an employee should be considered ‘materially adverse’ to
[the plaintiff] and thus constitute an adverse employment actions.” Crawford v.

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 n.13 (11th Cir. 2008).
Although the Court does not find Defendant Clark’s performance evaluation
to be “materially adverse,” see Rainey v. Holder, 412 F. App’x 235, 238 (11th Cir.
2011) (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2001))

(“[W]hen a lower performance evaluation does not result in a ‘loss of pay or benefits
or further discipline,’ it does not constitute an adverse employment action.’”), the
Court does find Defendant Clark’s discussions with Plaintiff about his job

performance to be “materially adverse,” as these discussions were more than mere
petty and trivial actions, Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974 n.13, and “well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. Thus, the Court considers these

discussions to be an “adverse employment action” sufficient for establishing a prima
facie case for retaliation.
The final protected activity was the complaint to HR regarding the oral

reprimand that occurred at some point following March 27, 2025. Dkt. 151-5 at 33–
35. Because no date is provided for this complaint, the Court resolves this ambiguity
in favor of Plaintiff, see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157–58; Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1280,

and will consider all following actions as temporally proximate. See Thomas, 506
F.3d at 1364. The potential adverse employment actions are thus the three notices of
investigation Plaintiff received on April 14, 2025, Dkt. 151-6 at 41–46, and the

revocation of Plaintiff’s teleworking accommodations resulting from his oral
reprimand. Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11.
The Court finds the notices and revocation to be “materially adverse,” as these
were more than mere petty and trivial actions, Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974 n.13, and

“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. Thus, the Court considers these to
be “adverse employment actions” sufficient for establishing a prima facie case for

retaliation.
c. Legitimate Non-Retaliatory Reason
The burden, therefore, shifts to Defendant DJJ to articulate a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the discussions, notices, and revocation. Berman, 160 F.3d at

702; see Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983)
(noting that “the defendant’s burden is merely one of production, not proof,” and is
“exceedingly light”); see also on Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d

1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738
F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984)) (holding that employers are free to take adverse
employment actions for “a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous

facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.”).
Regarding the discussions, at least two instances led to Defendant Clark’s
discussions with Plaintiff about his job performance. Dkt. 104-4 ¶¶ 3–4. First,

Defendant Clark “learned [that] a family of a youth assigned to [Plaintiff’s]
supervision complained they were not being properly visited in accordance with DJJ
policies. They disputed [Plaintiff’s] case notes that reflected proper visitation.” Id. ¶
3. Additionally, Defendant Clark discovered “discrepancies in [Plaintiff’s]

timesheet.” Id. ¶ 19. The Court finds each of these to be legitimate and non-
retaliatory reasons for Defendant Clark’s discussions with Plaintiff regarding job
performance. In response, Plaintiff has argued that the articulated reasoning is

fabricated. Dkt. 150-1 at 5–7. The Court rejects this attempted refutation.
Regarding the notices of investigation, each had independent causes. One of
the notices was related to Plaintiff reportedly telling his supervisor that she was
“going to regret” providing him with his oral reprimand, which she perceived as a

threat. Dkt. 151-6 at 45. Another of the notices was related to a report made to DJJ
by the parent of two youths alleging that Plaintiff failed to meet with them in person,
was delayed in his responses, failed to provide certain information, and became

agitated when the parent requested to speak with his supervisor. Id. at 43. The last
notice was related to another report made to DJJ by the grandmother of a youth
regarding Plaintiff’s alleged “failure to remove the youth’s cell phone as ordered by

the court, lack of home visits, refusal to communicate with her regarding [the
youth’s] progress, failure to speak with guardian when visiting the school, and
failure to hold the youth accountable to the terms of her probation.” Dkt. 151-4 at 7;

Dkt. 151-6 at 41. The Court finds each of these to be legitimate and non-retaliatory
reasons for the notices. Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence to refute the reasoning
articulated in each of the notices. See id. at 41–46.
Regarding the revocation of Plaintiff’s teleworking accommodations, this

resulted directly from his oral reprimand. Dkt. 110-1 ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. 104-1 at 108:6–
14. Plaintiff was reprimanded regarding his reported violation of certain standards
related to job performance; specifically, it was claimed that Plaintiff failed to

complete numerous overdue assignments. See Dkt. 151-5 at 38–39. The oral
reprimand was reportedly provided to Plaintiff in “an effort to correct the . . .
unacceptable behavior.” Id. at 41. The Court finds this to be a legitimate and non-
retaliatory reason for the revocation. In response, Plaintiff has argued that the

articulated reasoning is contrived merely to justify the retaliation. Dkt. 150-1 at 8.
The Court rejects this attempted refutation.
Because DJJ articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its

conduct, Plaintiff cannot prevail under the McDonnell Douglas framework unless he
identifies substantial evidence that DJJ’s reasoning was pretextual. Plaintiff fails to
satisfy this burden. Therefore, Defendant DJJ has successfully rebutted Plaintiff’s

prima facie case of retaliation.
d. Convincing Mosaic
The Court lastly turns to the metaphor of the convincing mosaic, but this

argument is likewise availing. Even under a “looser frame,” Melton, 2026 WL
319183, at *5, Plaintiff must still “put forward enough evidence for a reasonable jury
to conclude that illegal [retaliation] occurred.” McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th
1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2024). He has not done so.

Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that Defendant DJJ is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury
could find that Plaintiff was a victim of illegal retaliation under Title VII.

II. Count III: Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment under Title VII
Defendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count III, which alleges a
retaliatory hostile work environment under Title VII due to “continuous and
pervasive harassment as retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint.” Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 124–

131.
Although a “retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claim is somewhat of a
hybrid of a traditional protected-characteristic-based hostile-work-environment

claim and a traditional retaliation claim,” the Eleventh Circuit uses the same standard
to assess both Title VII retaliation claims and Title VII retaliatory work environment
claims. Buckley v. Sec’y of Army, 97 F.4th 784, 799 (11th Cir. 2024); see Debe, 860

F. App’x at 640 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d
855, 862-63 (11th Cir. 2020)) (holding that courts should “analyze retaliatory hostile
work environment or retaliatory harassment claims like retaliation claims”); see also

Curet v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., No. 8:21-cv-1801-VMC-TGW,
2022 WL 4464751, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 26, 2022) (“Retaliatory hostile work
environment claims are analyzed under the same standard as retaliation claims[.]”).
However, unlike Title VII retaliation claims, which are based on discrete acts, Title

VII retaliatory hostile work environment claims consider the “totality of events that
allegedly create[d] a hostile work environment,” Curet, 2022 WL 4464751, at *6,
similar to the more lenient “convincing mosaic” standard.

As with Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, the Court considers Plaintiff’s
“statutorily protected expression” to be the May 28, 2019, EEOC charge, the August
12, 2022, EEOC charge, the August 5, 2024, initiation of the present litigation, and
the complaint regarding the oral reprimand that occurred at some point following

March 27, 2025. Plaintiff claims that the retaliatory harassment consisted of
“excessive micromanagement, unwarranted scrutiny, baseless disciplinary actions,
and negative performance reviews,” as well as “public humiliation.” Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 124–

131.
First, regarding “excessive micromanagement,” Plaintiff alleges that DJJ
supervisors “imposed unreasonable demands, monitored [him] excessively, and

unjustly increased his workload.” Dkt. 36 ¶ 127. Plaintiff has failed to provide
sufficient evidence of excessive monitoring. As to unreasonable demands, the only
evidence that the Court construes as supporting this claim is the complaint made to

HR regarding the oral reprimand that occurred at some point following March 27,
2025. Dkt. 151-5 at 33–35. This complaint describes a tight one-week timeline to
complete numerous overdue assignments. Id. at 33–35, 36–37. However, Plaintiff
was offered the assistance of other JPOs to help complete this timeline—it appears

he never requested this proposed assistance. See id. at 36–37. With respect to the
alleged unjust increase in his workload—two separate analyses by Defendant
Sheffer found that Plaintiff’s workload was in the middle of the distribution, as

compared to his coworkers. Dkt. 104-13 at 1–3; Dkt. 104-15.
Next, regarding “unwarranted scrutiny,” “baseless disciplinary actions,” and
“public humiliation,” Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to “unfounded
investigations and reprimands” and “ambush-style meetings.” Dkt. 36 ¶ 129. There

are multiple instances that may fit these claims, but Plaintiff has failed to provide
evidence that any of them were unjustified. On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff received
a counseling memo from Defendant Ardito regarding an audit of his case notes that

revealed certain deficiencies. Dkt. 113-2. On April 25, 2022, the mother of a youth
assigned to Plaintiff filed a complaint with DJJ, alleging that Plaintiff’s case notes
were falsified—this required Defendant Ardito to file a report with DJJ’s CCC

hotline. Dkt. 104-8 at 1. Defendant Ardito notified Plaintiff that CCC initiated an
investigation. Dkt. 113-3. Following this notification, Plaintiff confronted
Defendant Ardito in what was perceived as a threatening manner, and was thus

provided with an Employee Assistance Program referral. Dkt. 104-2 ¶ 5. In June
2024, DJJ supervisors met with Plaintiff to discuss discrepancies between his time
sheet submissions and his documented case notes. 104-3 ¶ 3; Dkt. 151-1 at 16–17.
During his supervision of Plaintiff, Defendant Clark discussed job performance

issues with Plaintiff, such as complaints he received from the family of a youth
assigned to Plaintiff regarding insufficient visitation. Dkt. 104-4 ¶¶ 2–4. On April
14, 2024, Plaintiff received three notices of investigation, of which their respective

causes have already been discussed in a previous analysis. Dkt. 151-6 at 45–46.
Lastly, regarding “negative performance reviews,” Plaintiff alleges that
“Defendant Ardito authored a retaliatory negative performance review in 2022,
filled with inaccuracies, deliberately aimed at discrediting the Plaintiff’s work.” Dkt.

36 ¶ 128. Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of inaccuracies regarding the 2022
performance evaluation. Defendant Ardito scored Plaintiff’s performance as 3.25
out of 5, indicating “satisfactory” performance. Dkt. 104-9. Defendant Ardito listed

several areas for improvement, including communication. Id. After reviewing this
matter, an EEOC investigator opined that “it is not unusual for ratings to increase or
decrease each performance year.” Dkt. 36-1.

Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff was subject to harassment due to
the totality of instances detailed, and even if the Court were to find that this claimed
harassment was “not wholly unrelated” to Plaintiff’s protected activities, Debe, 860

F. App’x at 639 (quoting Shotz, 344 F.3d at 1180 n.30), the Court still finds that
legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons have been articulated for each interaction, as
articulated above. This is sufficient to rebut any prima facie case that might be
established. Plaintiff has failed to refute the articulated reasoning.

Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that Defendant DJJ is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury
could return a verdict for Plaintiff regarding the Title VII claim of retaliatory hostile

work environment. Defendant DJJ’s motion for summary judgment is thus granted
as to Count III.
III. Count IV: Retaliatory Failure to Promote under Title VII
Defendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count IV, which alleges failure

to promote under Title VII done “in retaliation for whistleblowing.” Id. ¶ 141.
To bring a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC. Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir.

2004). Because of this exhaustion requirement, “a plaintiff's judicial complaint is
limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected
to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 1280 (citation modified). “The

facts alleged in the charge matter most for determining what can reasonably be
expected to grow out of an EEOC charge.” Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th
1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022).

Plaintiff’s 2022 EEOC charge, from which this case arose, mentions general
claims of retaliation and harassment—specifically, Plaintiff mentions lower
performance evaluations, counseling memos, meetings, and a comment being made
to him about therapy. Dkt. 104-10. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about Defendant

DJJ’s hiring practices. See id. This is to be expected, as the denials of the Assistant
Chief Probation Officer, Chief Probation Officer, and Operations Coordinator
positions took place the year following the 2022 EEOC charge. Dkt. 115-1 ¶¶ 33,

53–54. Plaintiff failed to amend his 2022 EEOC charge to add any mention of these
denials.
Therefore, even under the “liberal EEOC charge strictures,” Gregory, 355
F.3d at 1280, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies regarding his retaliatory failure to promote claim, as this claim could not
be reasonably expected to grow out of the facts described in the 2022 EEOC charge.
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendant

DJJ is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury could return a
verdict for Plaintiff regarding the Title VII claim of retaliatory failure to promote.
Defendant DJJ’s motion for summary judgment is thus granted as to Count IV.

IV. Count VII: Violation of the Florida Whistleblower Act
Defendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count VII, which alleges
retaliation against Plaintiff for “exposing unethical conduct” in violation of the

Florida Whistleblower Act (“FWA”). Id. ¶ 150.
The FWA prohibits the state from retaliating against an employee for
disclosing violations of law, threats to public welfare, or acts of gross
mismanagement, fraud, abuse, or neglect by the state. Fla. Stat. § 112.3187.

Specifically, the FWA protects the disclosure of “[a]ny violation or suspected
violation of any federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation,” Fla. Stat. §
112.3187(5), and thus covers a broader range than Title VII retaliation protection,

which is limited to disclosures of those types of discrimination protected by Title
VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (listing the protected
classes as “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that FWA claims and Title VII retaliation

claims are governed by the same standard. Ray v. City of Tallahassee, 664 F. App’x
816, 818 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Claims under the [FWA] . . . are governed by the burden-
shifting standard for Title VII retaliation claims.”); see McAlpin v. Town of Sneads,
61 F.4th 916, 927 (11th Cir. 2023) (utilizing the Title VII retaliation standard for
FWA claims).

Thus, because Plaintiff’s FWA claim is governed by the same fact pattern and
standard as Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, the Court restates and incorporates
the analysis of Count I. This resolves all aspects of Plaintiff’s FWA claim covered

by the prior Title VII analysis—including all allegations of retaliation except for
those disability-related allegations of Plaintiff’s February 7, 2025, FCHR charge.
Dkt. 104-14 at 1. Although the disability-related allegation fell outside the purview
of Title VII, it would be considered a “statutorily protected expression” under the

FWA, as the FWA protects the disclosure of a suspected violation of any state law
to an investigative body like the FCHR, Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(5), (6), and Plaintiff’s
FCHR charge alleged discrimination in violation of “Chapter 760 of the Florida Civil

Rights Act,” among other laws. Dkt. 104-14 at 1.
With the disability-related allegation of Plaintiff’s FCHR charge considered a
“statutorily protected expression” sufficient for the first element, the Court proceeds
to an analysis of adverse employment actions and causation. Here, like in Count I,

Plaintiff has failed to provide any argument regarding a nexus and has instead
offered only conclusory statements. See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 150–52. The Court thus
similarly interprets the FWA claim to rely wholly on temporal proximity to establish

causation.
The actions that were temporally proximate to Plaintiff’s FCHR charge are as
follows: on March 27, 2025, when Plaintiff received an oral reprimand, Dkt. 151-5

at 38–41; on April 1, 2025, when the grandmother of a youth assigned to Plaintiff
was given a grievance form after making a complaint about Plaintiff, Dkt. 151-4 at
7; Dkt. 151-6 at 41–42; on April 14, 2025, when Plaintiff received three notices of

investigation; Dkt. 151-6 at 41–46; and the revocation of Plaintiff’s teleworking
accommodations resulting from his oral reprimand. Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11.
Even if the Court were to determine that these actions constituted “adverse
employment actions” sufficient to satisfy the second element and establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, the Court still finds that legitimate and non-retaliatory
reasons have been articulated sufficient to rebut a prima facie case—namely that the
oral reprimand was based upon Plaintiff’s failure to complete numerous overdue

assignments within the required timeframe, Dkt. 151-5 at 38–41; the grievance form
was provided in direct response to allegations that Plaintiff failed to properly
supervise a youth, Dkt. 151-6 at 41; the three notices of investigation were given for
reasons already discussed in a previous analysis, Dkt. 151-6 at 45–46; and the

revocation of Plaintiff’s teleworking accommodations was related to the
aforementioned oral reprimand. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. The Court further finds that Plaintiff
has failed to put forward sufficient evidence to establish a “convincing mosaic” of

retaliation under the FWA.
Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that Defendant DJJ is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury

could return a verdict for Plaintiff regarding the FWA retaliation claim. Defendant
DJJ’s motion for summary judgment is thus granted as to Count VII.
V. Count II: First Amendment Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Individual Defendants seek summary judgment on Count II, which
alleges retaliation against Plaintiff for claimed protected activities in violation of the
First Amendment under § 1983. Dkt. 36 at 23. The Individual Defendants argue that
summary judgment should be granted as to this claim because they are each entitled

to qualified immunity. Dkt. 106 at 7–8; Dkt. 107 at 6–7; Dkt. 108 at 8–9; Dkt. 109
at 7–8; Dkt. 110 at 7–8.
The defense of qualified immunity shields “government officials performing

discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818,
(1982); see Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012). To receive

qualified immunity, an official must first “establish that he or she acted within the
scope of discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.”
Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Once

this showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that “(1) the defendant
violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation.” Id. at 1340–41 (quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)).
As an initial matter, there is no dispute that the Individual Defendants were
acting within the scope of their discretionary authority as employees of DJJ. Dkt. 36

¶¶ 96, 116, 123. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that the Individual Defendants were
“acting under color of state law” when they took their allegedly violative actions. Id.
¶ 96. As such, Plaintiff has the burden to show that the Individual Defendants
violated the decedent’s First Amendment right against retaliation and that this right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
a. First Amendment Violation
The “First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain

circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Lindke v.
Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 196–97 (2024) (citation modified). The state employer must
not take an “adverse employment action,” which involves an “important condition
of employment” and is likely to “chill the exercise of constitutionally protected

speech.” Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 618–19 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted).3 When bringing a First Amendment § 1983 claim for retaliation, courts

3 In Bell v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 6 F.4th 1374, 1377 (11th Cir. 2021), the Eleventh Circuit held that although Title
VII retaliation claims are now governed by the more lenient “might have dissuaded” standard for adverse employment
actions, see Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, First Amendment § 1983 retaliation claims remain subject to the higher
Stavropoulos requirement that the adverse employment action must “involve an important condition of employment.”
apply a “four-stage analysis.” Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 617
(11th Cir. 2015). The third stage requires a plaintiff to show that his speech was a

“substantial motivating factor” in the adverse employment action. Id. at 618.
Here, even if the Court were to grant the first two stages—including that the
actions of the Individual Defendants were sufficient to meet the higher First

Amendment standard for “adverse employment actions”—Plaintiff has failed to
establish the third element. He fails to establish any causal relationship by providing
no evidence of protected speech playing a “substantial role” in these alleged adverse
actions. Instead, Plaintiff has relied wholly on temporal proximity. See, e.g., Dkt. 36

¶¶ 101 (“Correa’s actions intensified immediately after the Plaintiff’s reports to
Tallahassee in 2024, exposing systemic failures and misconduct within the
Department.”), 105 (“Ardito’s retaliatory conduct began after the Plaintiff reported

systemic corruption within DJJ.”), 108 (“Clark’s actions escalated after the
Plaintiff’s protected reports to HR and the EEOC.”), 112 (“Sheffer’s actions
occurred shortly after and in direct response to the Plaintiff’s constitutionally
protected speech.”). Therefore, without evaluating the first two stages of the First

Amendment retaliation analysis, Plaintiff has failed to establish the third element, an
essential part of this claim.4 The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of

361 F.3d at 619. Therefore, a First Amendment § 1983 retaliation claim imposes a higher burden on the plaintiff for
establishing an “adverse employment action” than a Title VII retaliation claim.
4 “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
material fact and that Plaintiff’s First Amendment right against retaliation was thus
not violated.

b. Clearly Established Right
To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must establish both that there
was a violation of his constitutional rights and that the right was “clearly established”

at the time of the Individual Defendants’ alleged violations. Robinson, 46 F.4th at
1340. Because the Court has concluded that the Individual Defendants did not
violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment right against retaliation, there is no need to
address the “clearly established” prong. Id.

The Court finds no genuine issues of material fact and that the Individual
Defendants are entitled qualified immunity as to Count II, based on the undisputed
record.

VI. Count V: Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Because the purpose of a preliminary injunction is “merely to preserve the
relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held,” Univ. of Tex.
v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981), and all claims are now resolved by

to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be ‘no
genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ P. 56(c)); see McGee, 719 F.3d at 1242 (“[The moving party] has the burden of either negating an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving party's
case.”)
summary judgment in favor of Defendants—the Court finds Plaintiff’s request for
preliminary injunctive relief to be moot.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant Florida Department of Juvenile Justice’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED as to Counts I, III, IV, and VII. Dkt. 115.
2. Defendants Andrew Correa, Matthew Clark, Rosa Ardito, Paul Sheffer, and
Sean Skillern’s Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED as to Count II.
Dkts. 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115.

3. Plaintiff’s request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Count V) is MOOT.
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final summary judgment in favor of
Defendants Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Andrew Correa, Matthew

Clark, Rosa Ardito, Paul Sheffer, and Sean Skillern and against Plaintiff
Quintaurus L. Johnson, and is DIRECTED to terminate all pending motions and
deadlines and to close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on February 19, 2026.

/s/ William F. Jung
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11338626. Public record. Not legal advice.