# Opinion

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11337895

## Case

- **Full name:** Aaron Albert Mitchell, Jr. v. Township of Willingboro, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11337895

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that plaintiffs must show that a municipal policy or custom was the proximate cause of their injuries
- finding that “[t]he State of New Jersey provides a full judicial mechanism for challenging adverse zoning decisions”
- discussing the pending state-court appeal

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AARON ALBERT MITCHELL,
JR., Case No. 24–cv–07167–ESK–SAK
Plaintiff,
v. OPINION
TOWNSHIP OF WILLINGBORO,
et al.,
Defendants.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against him based upon his
disability when they denied his applications to construct a nonconforming
accessory structure that he could have used to store property that was in an
existing garage, so that he could park his car in the existing garage. Because
plaintiff fails to adequately link defendants’ actions to his alleged harms,
defendants’ motion to dismiss will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Aaron Albert Mitchell, Jr. owns a single-family house in
Willingboro Township, New Jersey (Township). The property is in an R-2
residential zoning district. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 24.)

1 The facts are taken from Mitchell’s second amended complaint (Complaint)
(ECF No. 55 (Compl.)), which is the operative complaint.
A. Plaintiff’s Zoning Applications
In early 2022, Mitchell applied to the Township Zoning Board of
Adjustment (“Board”) for approval to construct a large, detached accessory
structure on his property. Mitchell sought a use variance and related bulk
variances to construct an “L-shaped” detached accessory structure to store work
equipment, tools, lawn equipment, collector vehicles, and other personal
property. (Compl. ¶¶ 30–33.)
The Board conducted a public hearing on Mitchell’s first application on
May 4, 2022. Following the hearing, the Board denied the application. That
denial was memorialized by Resolution No. ZB-2022-7, adopted on July 6, 2022.
(ECF No. 59–2 pp. 3–17 (First Denial).)
Mitchell submitted a second application seeking approval for a detached
accessory structure of similar size. The Board conducted a public hearing on
the second application on October 5, 2022 and again denied the requested relief.
The denial was memorialized by Resolution No. ZB-2022-9, adopted on
November 9, 2022. (ECF No. 59–2 pp. 18–33 (Second Denial).)
B. Alleged Discrimination and Municipal
Conduct
Mitchell alleges that the denials of his zoning applications constituted
discrimination based on disability and a failure to provide reasonable
accommodations in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(NJLAD). (Compl. ¶¶ 68–92.) He contends that the variances were necessary
to afford him equal use and enjoyment of his dwelling. (Id.)
Mitchell further alleges that Township officials, including Zoning Officer
Theodore Evans and Construction Official Steve Buchhofer, engaged in
improper conduct in connection with zoning enforcement and administration.
(Id. ¶¶ 40–55.) He asserts that officials entered his property without
authorization, failed to follow zoning procedures, and deprived him of due
process. (Id. ¶¶ 96–123.)
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mitchell commenced this action on June 26, 2024. (ECF No. 1) and filed
the operative Complaint on April 7, 2025 (see Compl.).
Mitchell asserts claims for violation of: (1) the FHA; (2) the ADA; (3) the
NJLAD; (4) the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law (NJMLUL); (5) the Fourth
Amendment; and (6) the Fourteenth Amendment. Mitchell also asserts claims
for (7) defamation and emotional distress; and seeks (8) declaratory judgment;
and (9) an injunction. (See id. ¶¶ 89–150.)
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint (Motion) (ECF No. 59
(Mot.)), along with a brief in support of the Motion (ECF No. 59–1 (Defs’ Br.).).
Mitchell filed a brief opposing the Motion. (ECF No. 60 (Opp’n Br.).)
Defendants filed a reply in further support of their Motion. (ECF No. 61
(Reply).) I held a hearing (Hearing) on a prior iteration of the Motion on March
7, 2025. (ECF No. 50; see ECF No. 53 (Hearing Tr.).)
II. STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Makky v. Chertoff, 489 F. Supp. 2d 421, 429 (D.N.J. 2007). A motion
to dismiss may be granted only if the plaintiff has failed to set forth fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests that make such a claim
plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Although Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it requires
“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps.
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). First, it must
“tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675. Second, it should identify allegations that, “because they are
no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” (Id. at
679). Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “[A] complaint’s allegations of historical
fact continue to enjoy a highly favorable standard of review at the motion-to-
dismiss stage of proceedings.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 790.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6) because: (1) the Complaint is still an impermissible
shotgun pleading (Defs’ Br. pp. 17–20); (2) the FHA and ADA claims are time
barred (id. pp. 20–22); and (3) for various reasons, the Complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id. pp. 23–42.)2

2 In support of the Motion, defendants submitted the resolutions denying
Mitchell’s applications and the transcript of the Hearing (ECF No. 59–2), items which
are not included in the Complaint. When resolving a motion to dismiss, courts may
consider matters of public record and documents “integral to or explicitly relied upon
in the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d
Cir. 1997). The Hearing transcript is a matter of public record. And Mitchell
expressly challenges the denials in the Complaint. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] court may consider
an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a
motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document. Otherwise, a
plaintiff with a legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by
failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied.”). Accordingly, I will
consider these documents to resolve the Motion.
A. Statute of Limitations (First and Second
Counts)
To dismiss a claim at the pleadings stage because it is barred by a statute
of limitations, the time bar must be clear on the face of the complaint. See
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014). A statute of limitations
defense is required to be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer
however, defendant may raise a limitations defense by motion under Rule
12(b)(6) only if “the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the
cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.” Hanna
v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir.1975)).
Courts will not dismiss cases based on a statute of limitations defense
unless a “plaintiff effectively [pleads himself] out of court by alleging facts that
[are] sufficient to establish the defense.” See Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 252
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 n. 1
(7th Cir 2006)); compare, e.g., Doe v. Hosbach, 24–4756, 2025 WL 2444239, at
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2025) (refusing to assume a plaintiff’s birthday because it is
not the plaintiff’s burden to anticipate and refute affirmative defenses), with
Barker v. United Airlines, Inc., 23–3065, 2024 WL 378633, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 1,
2024) (finding claim time-barred when an email integral to the plaintiff’s claims
conclusively established the date of accrual outside the statute of limitations).
Here, the parties agree that Mitchell’s FHA and ADA claims are subject
to a two-year statute of limitations. (Defs’ Br. p. 20; Opp’n Br. p. 11.) But they
disagree on when the two-year period accrued. Defendants argue that
Mitchell’s claims accrued on May 4, 2022 when “[his] initial land use application
was denied by the [Board].” (Defs’ Br. p. 21.) Mitchell asserts that “the relief
sought against the municipal defendant[s] relates to [the October 2022] denial,
and not the earlier denial in May of 2022,” and as such, all his claims “accrued
sometime after October 5, 2022.” (Opp’n Br. p. 11; Compl. ¶ 88.)
The Complaint does not establish that Mitchell filed outside the
limitations period. Defendants refer to the Board’s denial of Mitchell’s first
land use application, “which undisputably occurred on May 4, 2022.” (Reply
p. 12.) The only mention of this time period in the Complaint is where Mitchell
notes how he “was denied and told he need[ed] to make more changes to his
application and proposed accessory structure,” and that he was allegedly
“unaware of what a reasonable accommodation … is.” (Compl. ¶ 22.)
Accepting its allegations as true, the Complaint does not establish that Mitchell
brought his claims outside the statute of limitations. See Hanna, 514 F.2d at
1094. Because there is nothing on the face of the Complaint where Mitchell
pleads himself out of this case, defendants’ Motion will be denied as to the
statute of limitations argument. See Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 252.
B. Failure to State Substantive FHA and
ADA Claims
“A plaintiff may prove a violation of the FHAA, ADA or Rehabilitation Act
in one of three ways: (1) showing disparate treatment, also termed intentional
discrimination, (2) showing disparate impact, or (3) showing a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations.” Lapid Ventures, LLC v. Twp. of Piscataway, No.
10–6219, 2011 WL 2429314, at *5 (D.N.J. June 13, 2011). Under the third
method, a viable claim under the FHA or ADA requires plaintiff to allege that
“the requested accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary to (3) afford
[persons with disabilities] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.”
Lapid-Laurel LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442,
457 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Further, the plaintiff in a
reasonable accommodations case “must establish a nexus between the
accommodations that he or she is requesting, and their necessity for providing
handicapped individuals an ‘equal opportunity’ to use and enjoy housing.” Id.
at 459.
Mitchell asserts that the Board denied his applications to build the
accessory structure but did not require the owner of a different property to
follow the same procedures as Mitchell. (Compl. ¶ 90.) Mitchell further
argues that defendants failed to change their policy and practice to
accommodate his disability. (Id. ¶ 96.) As a result, Mitchell alleges, he “is
unable to enjoy the intended use of his [p]roperty and dwelling nor is given an
equal opportunity to enter and exit his home safely, and [is prevented] from
having the ability to maintain his property by limiting his storage and access
to the tools and equipment necessary to maintain his property.” (Id. ¶ 97.) In
short, defendants actions allegedly “den[y] [Mitchell] an equal opportunity to
be self-sufficient.” (Id.; see also id. ¶ 105.)
Defendants counter that Mitchell is asking for special treatment to build
a structure to store his tools and not seeking equal opportunity to use and enjoy
his dwelling. (Defs’ Br. p. 22.)
Defendants have the better of the arguments. As I noted at the Hearing,
Mitchell’s request is to be able to build a nonconforming accessory structure to
store items currently in his garage, so he can then park his car in the garage.
(See Hearing Tr. pp. 5–6.) This Court has declined to find equal opportunity
violations in similar cases. See Sporn v. Ocean Colony Condo. Ass’n, 173 F.
Supp. 2d 244, 250 (D.N.J. 2001). In Sporn, the plaintiff was a condominium
owner with a disability who requested an accessible parking space closer to the
entrance of his building. Id. The condominium association offered Sporn an
accessible space so long as he complied with the association’s parking policy and
gave up his deeded non-accessible space. Id. He refused, and sued the
association, claiming it failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. Id.
The Court determined that Sporn actually wanted to have two spaces to
accommodate visiting family members—meaning that his “request for
‘reasonable accommodation’ was really a request for accommodation coupled
with a demand for special treatment.” Id.
Here, Mitchell is not seeking an “accommodation” so he can have a space
to park his car closer to his house. He already has a garage where he can park
close to the house. Instead, Mitchell wants additional space to store items that
are in his garage. He is not asking the Township for an accommodation that
would then permit him to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his
dwelling, but rather for special treatment in constructing an additional
structure to store his other items.
Mitchell’s reliance on an alleged need for a therapy pool is of no moment.
(Opp’n Br. pp. 12–14.) “[A] federal court reviewing an FHAA reasonable
accommodations challenge to a decision of a local land use board … should limit
their review to the materials that were presented to the local land use board”
except in circumstances not presented here. Lapid-Laurel LLC, 284 F.3d at
450. Although the Complaint attempts to link Mitchell’s need for a therapy
pool to the denial of his applications, nothing in the Board’s denial reflects any
consideration of Mitchell’s therapy pool. (See generally Second Denial.) As I
noted at the Hearing, the Court has to consider Mitchell’s application in its
totality. (Hearing Tr. p. 7:13–25.) Nothing in the record shows that the
Board denied Mitchell’s application based on consideration of his therapy pool.
Rather, the Board stated that Mitchell wanted a new garage “so he can move
all of the contents out of the attached two car garage into the new proposed
detached garage.” (Second Denial p. 22.)
Because Mitchell has not shown the required nexus between his requested
accommodations and their necessity to provide him equal opportunity to use
and enjoy his dwelling, the Motion will be granted as to the First and Second
Counts of the Complaint.
C. Sixth Count (Fourteenth Amendment)
1. Monell Liability
“[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton,
Oh. v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). The Court’s “first inquiry in any case
alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a
direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Id.; see also Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914
F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that plaintiffs must show that a municipal
policy or custom was the proximate cause of their injuries). As a part of this,
plaintiffs necessarily “must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly
that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658
(3d Cir. 2009).
“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of
conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-
settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon,
915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).
Here, Mitchell broadly alleges that defendants violated his due process
and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Compl.
¶ 130.) However, Mitchell has not identified any Township policy or custom
that gave rise to his alleged injuries. Instead, Mitchell makes conclusory
allegations that the Township failed to train its board members not to
discriminate against individuals with disabilities. (Compl. ¶ 125.) But these
allegations are not enough. “Monell’s rule that a city is not liable under § 1983
unless a municipal policy causes a constitutional deprivation will not be
satisfied by merely alleging that the existing training program for a class of
employees … represents a policy for which the city is responsible.” City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
Mitchell relies almost entirely on a single allegedly comparable property.
Mitchell alleges that another property owner was allowed to construct a non-
conforming accessory structure without undergoing the same zoning process
required of him. (Compl. ¶ 130.) But allegations of one comparator property
do not plausibly establish a municipal custom or policy. See City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (explaining that a custom is a
“widespread practice”); Solomon v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 143 F. App’x 447,
457 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A custom under Monell can usually not be established by a
one-time occurrence.”) And even if they could, the Complaint provides no facts
establishing that the comparator property was similarly situated to Mitchell’s
property “in all relevant aspects,” as required to establish an Equal Protection
claim. See Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008).
Finally, Mitchell has not shown that any policy or custom proximately caused
his injuries. See Est. of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798.
Because Mitchell does not identify a Township policy or custom that
deprived him of his constitutional rights, Mitchell has failed to establish a
Monell claim against the Township.
2. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from “depriv[ing] any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. “A procedural due process claim is subject to a ‘two-stage’ inquiry: (1)
whether the plaintiff has a property interest protected by procedural due
process, and (2) what procedures constitute ‘due process of law.” Schmidt v.
Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 2011) (other internal quotations omitted).
”A state provides constitutionally adequate procedural due process when it
provides reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a government body,
whether or not the plaintiff avails [themself] of the provided appeal
mechanism.” Mendoza v. Larotonda, 270 F. App’x 157, 158–59 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, the Sixth Count of the Complaint alleges that defendants took
intentional acts “to deny [Mitchell] exercise of his due process rights under the
[NJ]MLUL regarding procedures, and his due process and appeal rights of the
Board’s actions to the local municipal council and to the New Jersey Superior
Court,” and that these acts “were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Compl. ¶¶ 123–24.) Defendants
question whether Mitchell has asserted a property interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and argue that even if Mitchell
had such a protected interest, New Jersey state law provides adequate
remedies. (Id. pp. 30–31.) Mitchell counters that even though Mitchell had
“the technical right to file an action in the Superior Court and then to appeal
any unfavorable ruling from that court to the Appellate Division, defendants’
violation of the process owed to [Mitchell] under the [NJ]MLUL effectively
robbed him of a meaningful recourse under State law.” (Opp’n Br. p. 17.)
I agree with defendants. Assuming, without deciding, that Mitchell had
a constitutionally protected property interest, New Jersey provides adequate
procedural due process to rectify errors by local zoning boards. See John E.
Long, Inc. v. Borough of Ringwood, 61 F. Supp. 2d 273, 279 (D.N.J. 1998)
(finding that “[t]he State of New Jersey provides a full judicial mechanism for
challenging adverse zoning decisions”). Specifically, local zoning boards can
decide appeals of zoning officer’s enforcement of a zoning ordinance, interpret
the zoning law, and grant variances and other relief. See id. If parties
disagree with a zoning board, they can seek review, a hearing, and relief by
filing a complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law division. Id.; see also
N.J. Court Rule 4:69 (Actions in Lieu of Prerogative Writs).
Mitchell argues that John E. Long, Inc. should not apply here because
defendants’ alleged delays in producing a signed resolution and transcript
“effectively thwarted plaintiff’s right to meaningful review.” (Opp’n p. 17.)
But Mitchell offers no authority to support his claim that New Jersey lacks
adequate procedural measures to challenge zoning board decisions. In fact, he
admits that he is availing himself of state remedies through the New Jersey
court system. (See id. (discussing the pending state-court appeal).)
Consequently, I agree with the conclusion in John E. Long, Inc. and find that
Mitchell has failed to establish his procedural due process claims. See De
Sapio Props. #Six, Inc. v. Alexandria Twp., No. 16–5770, 2017 WL 1591849, at
*5 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017) (dismissing procedural due process claims when the
plaintiffs failed to articulate why the court should abandon John E. Long, Inc.
and other precedent).
Accordingly, the Motion will be granted as to the Sixth Count.
D. Fifth Count (Fourth Amendment)
1. Severance
Rule 21 provides: “On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on
just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. “The decision to sever a claim or to try it separately
is left to the discretion of the trial court.” Rodin Properties-Shore Mall, N.V.
v. Cushman & Wakefield of Pa., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 709, 721 (D.N.J. 1999).
An order severing claims effectively “transform[s] the claims into an entirely
independent action with an independent case number and an independent
judgment.” Id. “[W]hen a court ‘severs’ a claim against a defendant under
Rule 21, the suit simply continues against the severed defendant in another
guise.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, “[t]he
statute of limitations is held in abeyance, and the severed suit can proceed so
long as it initially was filed within the limitations period.” Id.
“In evaluating whether to sever a party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 21, courts have construed Rule 20(a) as establishing a two-part test,
both parts are required for joinder to be permitted.” Ksepka v. U.S. Postal
Serv., No. 24–301, 2025 WL 226332, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2025),
reconsideration denied, 2025 WL 958913 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2025), and report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2244620 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2025). ”First,
claims brought against defendants to be joined must stem from the same
transaction or occurrence, and second, they must share a common question of
law or fact.” Emmanouil v. Roggio, No. 06–1068, 2007 WL 1174876, at *4
(D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2007).
Here, Mitchell’s Fourth Amendment claim stems from a January 12, 2024
incident where Evans allegedly trespassed onto Mitchell’s property beyond the
rear privacy fence after placing a stop work order on Mitchell’s front kitchen
window. (Compl. ¶¶ 52–54.) Conversely, all the remaining claims arise from
the Board’s denial of Mitchell’s variance application in October 2022. Because
the Fourth Amendment claim results from a different transaction or occurrence
from all other claims, in the interests of judicial economy, I will sever the Fifth
Count, and Mitchell, if he chooses to pursue the claim, shall file an amended
complaint.3
E. Remaining State-Law Claims
As all the federal claims in the Complaint have been dismissed or severed,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining state

3 Defendants argue that each count of the Complaint fails to differentiate
between the actions of each defendant. I do not have to address this argument
because the only remaining federal claims (the Fifth Count relating to the trespass
onto Mitchell’s property) will be severed.
claims. Accordingly, the remaining state claims will be dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to the First, Second, and Sixth
Counts, which are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice as to all defendants.
The Court declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the State Law
Claims, which are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Fifth Count (Fourth Amendment claim) is hereby
SEVERED. An order accompanies this opinion.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: March 11, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11337895. Public record. Not legal advice.