# Paul

> District Court, D. Oregon · May 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11337883

## Case

- **Full name:** Samuel Paul v. Dan Rayfield, in his official capacity; Michelle Enfield, individually and in her official capacity; Brandon Kelly, individually and in his official capacity; Washington County, a municipal entity; Colette Peters, in her individual capacity; and Does 1–10
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** May 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11337883

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “state officials are ‘persons’ under § 1983 when sued for prospective injunctive relief”
- holding that “state officials are ‘persons’ under § 1983 when sued for prospective injunctive relief”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

SAMUEL PAUL,
Case No. 3:25-cv-02139-AB
Plaintiff,
OPINION & ORDER
v.

DAN RAYFIELD, in his official capacity;
MICHELLE ENFIELD, individually and in
her official capacity; BRANDON KELLY,
individually and in his official capacity;
WASHINGTON COUNTY, a municipal
entity; COLETTE PETERS, in her individual
capacity; and DOES 1–10,

Defendants.
Samuel Paul

Self-represented

Kristen Hoffmeyer
Oregon Department of Justice, Trial Division
100 SW Market St.
Portland, OR 97201

Attorney for Defendants Rayfield, Enfield, Kelly, and Peters

David C. Lewis
Washington County Counsel
155 N First Ave, MS 24
Hillsboro, OR 97035

Attorney for Defendant Washington County

BAGGIO, District Judge:

Self-represented Plaintiff Samuel Paul brings this action against Defendants Dan
Rayfield, Michelle Enfield, Brandon Kelly, Colette Peters (the “State Defendants”), and
Washington County. Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his
rights under the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, as well as one claim alleging Monell liability against Defendant Washington
County. Compl. ¶¶ 26–50, ECF No. 1. Defendant Washington County and the State Defendants
filed separate motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them. Def. Washington Cnty. Mot.
Dismiss (“Def. Cnty. Mot.”), ECF No. 9; State Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“State Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF
No. 15. For the reasons below, the Court grants both motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he was convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict in Washington
County Circuit Court before the United States Supreme Court held Oregon’s nonunanimous jury
law1 unconstitutional. Compl. ¶¶ 12–13; see also Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 90 (2020)
(“A jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict.”). During Plaintiff’s incarceration,
he alleges that he was compelled to perform labor for which he received no income and which
included being deployed as an inmate firefighter during the 2020 wildfire season in Oregon.
Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17, 19.

Plaintiff alleges that he was released from physical custody on October 27, 2020, but that
the State of Oregon “continued to impose post-prison supervision until October 26, 2023 . . . .”
Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff also alleges that his criminal case was re-opened after Ramos, and on
November 28, 2023, Washington County Circuit Court “entered a new judgment . . . dropping all
Assault charges for lack of evidence and reducing the original Robbery conviction to a 6-Month
offense . . . .” Id. ¶ 14.
Plaintiff also alleges that he “applied for compensation under Oregon Senate Bill
[(“SB”)] 1584 (2022), which created a process to compensate individuals whose convictions
were vacated due to unconstitutional jury verdicts.” Id. ¶ 22 (emphasis omitted). While pursuing

his SB 1584 action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Enfield, on behalf of the State of Oregon,
opposed Plaintiff’s request and “relied on demonstrably false assertions that no legislative
history existed for [SB] 1584 and that the law’s sponsors’ intent could not be considered.” Id. ¶¶
22–23. On August 20, 2025, Plaintiff alleges that Washington County Circuit Court “granted the
State’s Motion to Dismiss, adopting the Oregon DOJ’s arguments and ignoring the record
demonstrating Plaintiff’s continuing injury.” Id. ¶ 24 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff alleges that

1 See Or. Const. art. I, § 11 (providing “that in the circuit court ten members of the jury
may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree
murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict . . . .”).
Defendants’ actions described here “collectively reflect a continuous pattern of constitutional
violations . . . .” Id. ¶ 25.
STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of the claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When evaluating the

sufficiency of a complaint’s factual allegations, the court must accept all material facts alleged in
the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. In other words, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief and contain “well-
pleaded facts” that “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct . . . .”

Id. at 679. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted if a plaintiff alleges the
“grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” with nothing “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Courts must liberally construe pleadings filed by self-represented litigants. Wolfe v.
Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, a court cannot dismiss a self-
represented litigant’s complaint without first explaining to the plaintiff the deficiencies of the
complaint and providing an opportunity to amend. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th
Cir. 1992). Dismissal of a self-represented litigant’s complaint without leave to amend is proper
only if it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. Lucas
v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
Defendant Washington County moves to dismiss claims against it because, among other
reasons, “Plaintiff fails to allege any facts establishing claims for relief against Washington

County.” Def. Cnty. Mot. 2. The State Defendants move to dismiss claims against them because,
among other reasons, each State Defendant is entitled to prosecutorial, sovereign, or qualified
immunity. State Defs.’ Mot. 2. For the reasons below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims
against all Defendants without leave to amend.
I. Defendant Washington County
Defendant Washington County moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it because
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts regarding Washington County. Def. Cnty. Mot. 2. The Court
agrees.2
Oregon’s Court Reform Act of 1983 unified the court system and transferred the

employment of trial court staff and judges from counties to the state. Or. Rev. Stat § (“ORS”)
8.235; see also Or. AFSCME Council 75 v. Or. Jud. Dep’t—Yamhill Cnty., 304 Or. App. 794,
796–98, 469 P.3d 812 (2020) (“Beginning in 1983, the legislature consolidated Oregon’s trial
courts . . . into a single unified court system funded directly by the state and administered
centrally on a statewide basis.”). As a result of this statutory change, “[t]rial court employees
ceased to be employees of the individual counties in which they worked and instead became

2 The Court does not reach the parties’ arguments regarding whether Plaintiff’s claims are
time-barred or precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. See Def. Cnty. Mot. 6–9; State Defs.’
Mot. 2. Nor does the Court reach the parties’ argument regarding the Heck doctrine, insufficient
service of process, personal jurisdiction, or mootness. Def. Cnty. Mot. 9–12; State Defs.’ Mot. 2.
employees of the state.” AFSCME, 304 Or. App. at 797, 801–03 (describing internal court
administration); see also ORS 1.001 (“[I]t is in the best interests of the people of this state that
the judicial branch of state government, including the . . . circuit courts, be funded and operated
at the state level.”). Similarly, district attorneys are officers of the state. Or. Const. art. VII
(Original), § 17; see also State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 245, 630 P.2d 810 (1981) (“District

attorneys are state officers applying statewide, not local law.”); State ex rel. Rosenblum v. Nisley,
367 Or. 78, 85, 473 P.3d 46 (2020) (“District attorneys in Oregon are state officers.”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Washington County “maintained policies, customs,
and practices that resulted in prosecutions and convictions based on non-unanimous juries, and
failed to implement mandatory review or correction procedures after Ramos . . . thereby
preserving unconstitutional convictions.” Compl. ¶ 43. But Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Washington County fail as a matter of law because the policies and customs that Plaintiff
challenges are not those of Defendant Washington County. Rather, Plaintiff appears to challenge
the policies of Washington County Circuit Court and the Washington County District Attorney’s

Office, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 43, neither of which is an entity which the Defendant County
administers. Because Plaintiff does not allege facts concerning Washington County, the Court
dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Washington County.
II. Defendant Enfield
The State Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Enfield
because Defendant Enfield is entitled to “absolute immunity for any conduct involved in
discharging [her] official litigation-related duties for the State during the course of active or
potential litigation.” State Defs.’ Mot. 5. The Court agrees.
“An attorney in the Attorney General’s Office is immune from lawsuits for any action
[she] commits while discharging [her] official litigation-related duties, whether sued in [her]
official or individual capacity.” Read v. Haley, No. 3:12-CV-02021-MO, 2013 WL 1562938, at
*9 (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2013), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2016). This immunity does not apply
to actions that are “wholly unrelated to or outside of [the attorney’s] official duties.” Id. (quoting

Bly–Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Enfield “relied on demonstrably false assertions
that no legislative history existed for [SB] 1584 and that the law’s sponsors’ intent could not be
considered.” Compl. ¶ 23. Because Plaintiff only challenges Defendant Enfield’s official duties
as Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) (that is, litigating against Plaintiff’s underlying SB 1584
petition), Defendant Enfield is entitled to absolute immunity. See Read, 2013 WL 1562938, at *9
(“[The plaintiff’s] sole allegation against [the AAG defendant] relates exclusively to actions that
[the AAG defendant] allegedly performed while discharging his official duties as a [Senior
AAG]. As a result, [the AAG defendant] is entitled to absolute immunity on [the plaintiff’s] due

process claim . . . .”). To the extent Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendant Rayfield
because his name also appears on the filings in the underlying SB 1584 petition, the Court
dismisses Defendant Rayfield for the same reasons it dismisses Defendant Enfield. See Lewis
Decl. Ex. 3, at 7 (motion to dismiss in the underlying SB 1584 petition), ECF No. 10-3;3 see also

3 Citations to the Lewis Declaration and its attached exhibits refer to the PDF page
number in the CM/ECF filing. Consistent with the parties’ requests, the Court takes judicial
notice of the filings in Plaintiff’s underlying state petition for wrongful conviction, including
Plaintiff’s SB 1584 petition and judgment dismissing said petition. See Khoja v. Orexigen
Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Judicial notice . . . permits a court to
notice an adjudicative fact if it is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.’ . . . A fact is ‘not subject to
reasonable dispute’ if it is ‘generally known,’ or ‘can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–
(2))); see also State Defs.’ Mot. 4 n.1 (requesting judicial notice of judgment docketed in
Compl. ¶ 7 (“The Attorney General is responsible for supervising Assistant Attorneys General
and for directing the legal positions and enforcement decisions of the Oregon Department of
Justice (“DOJ”), including matters arising under Oregon [SB] 1584.”).
III. Official Capacities (Defendants Rayfield & Kelly)
The State Defendants argue that Defendants Rayfield and Kelly (acting in their official

capacities) should be dismissed because they are not “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.
State Defs.’ Mot. 6. The Court agrees.
State officials sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons for purposes of
§ 1983 actions. See Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 (1997); see also
Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 162 (2017) (“In an official-capacity claim, the relief sought is
only nominally against the official and in fact is against the official’s office and thus the
sovereign itself.”). State officials sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief,
however, are persons for purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 n.10 (1989); Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that “state

officials are ‘persons’ under § 1983 when sued for prospective injunctive relief”). The same is
not true for officials sued in their official capacity for retrospective relief. See Lund v. Cowan, 5
F.4th 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from bringing
lawsuits against a state for money damages or other retrospective relief.” (quoting Ariz. Students’
Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016)).
Here, Plaintiff may not seek damages from Defendants Rayfield or Kelly in their official
capacity. Much of Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief is retrospective in nature. See, e.g.,

Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case); Pl.’s Resp. State Defs.’ Mot. 3–4 (requesting judicial notice
of general judgment entered in Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case), ECF No. 17.
Compl. ¶¶ 49(b)–(c) (requesting corrections in Plaintiff’s state and federal wage records and
retractions of “false or misleading statements made in opposition to Plaintiff’s SB 1584 claim”).
As explained above, such relief is unavailable in a § 1983 claim. To the extent Plaintiff seeks
prospective injunctive relief, “the Eleventh Amendment allows only prospective injunctive relief
to prevent an ongoing violation of federal law.” Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab’y, 131

F.3d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff here alleges no ongoing violation of Ramos or any other
federal law. Indeed, the parties’ filings suggest that Plaintiff already received all the relief to
which he was entitled. See Compl. ¶ 14 (alleging that Washington County Circuit Court “entered
a new judgment . . . dropping all Assault charges for lack of evidence and reducing the original
Robbery conviction to a 6-Month offense”); Lewis Decl. Ex. 2, at 2–4 (stipulated general
judgment, dated April 27, 2023, vacating convictions by nonunanimous jury), ECF No. 10-2;
Lewis Decl. Ex. 5 (finding that Plaintiff “does not qualify for compensation” under SB 1584),
ECF No. 10-5. The Court therefore finds that prospective injunctive relief is also inappropriate
here.

Because Plaintiff cannot obtain the requested relief from these Defendants acting in their
official capacity, the Court dismisses Defendant Rayfield and Defendant Kelly to the extent
Plaintiff brings this action against them in their official capacities.
IV. Qualified Immunity (Defendants Kelly & Peters)
The State Defendants argue that Defendants Kelly and Peters (acting in their individual
capacities) are entitled to qualified immunity because “[r]easonable officials, standing in the
shoes of these Defendants, would not have thought that the actions they allegedly took violated
Plaintiff’s rights.” State Defs.’ Mot. 7. The Court agrees.
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability under § 1983 ‘unless (1)
they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct
was clearly established at the time.’” Cuevas v. City of Tulare, 107 F.4th 894, 898 (9th Cir.
2024) (quoting Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2023)). As to the first prong,
“whether a constitutional right was violated . . . is a question of fact.” Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro.

Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009). As to the second prong, “the ‘clearly
established’ inquiry is a question of law that only a judge can decide.” Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d
817, 821 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts have discretion in deciding which prong to address first but
should choose “the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient
disposition of each case.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).
To facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of this case, the Court starts with the second
prong of the qualified immunity test. For a right to be clearly established, it must be “sufficiently
clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11–12 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards,

566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). In conducting this analysis, courts must “not . . . define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
Doing so “avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular
circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). “The
plaintiff bears the burden of ‘point[ing] to prior case law that articulates a constitutional rule
specific enough to alert these [state actors] in this case that their particular conduct was
unlawful.’” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Sharp v. Cnty. of
Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 2017)).
The Court notes at the outset that it is unclear from Plaintiff’s Complaint what
Defendants Kelly or Peters did that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.4 To the extent that
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kelly and Peters were also responsible for his allegedly
unlawful incarceration, the Court finds that the law was not established until April 20, 2020, that
Plaintiff’s conviction by way of a nonunanimous jury was unconstitutional. See Ramos, 590 U.S.

at 93 (“[I]f the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a
conviction in federal court, it requires no less in state court.”). Indeed, the law at the time of
Plaintiff’s conviction was that Oregon’s nonunanimous jury law was constitutional. See Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 590 U.S. at 93. While Plaintiff was
released from physical custody on October 27, 2020, Compl. ¶ 21, it was not until 2022 that the
Oregon Supreme Court ruled that retroactive post-conviction relief is required—under Oregon
law—for a violation of the right to a unanimous jury verdict, Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or. 604,
607, 523 P.3d 86 (2022). The Court therefore finds that the law was not clearly established at the
time of Plaintiff’s conviction that the State Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Therefore, Defendants Kelly and Peters are entitled to qualified immunity here.
///

4 Even if Defendants Kelly and Peters were not entitled to qualified immunity, the Court
adds that Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts as to either Defendant. As stated above, a
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff
must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Here, Plaintiff’s only allegation against
Defendant Kelly is that he “is the Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections
[(“ODOC”)].” Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegation regarding Defendant
Peters. To the extent Plaintiff attributes the actions of ODOC to Defendants Kelly and Peters, the
Court also finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege how ODOC was responsible for his
conviction by way of a nonunanimous jury, or that ODOC was responsible for terminating his
incarceration after Ramos was decided.
IV. Leave to Amend
The Court finds that it is “absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect[s]” in
Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Washington County because Plaintiff only challenges the
conduct of state employees and officials. Garity v. APWU Nat’l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854
(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lucas, 66 F.3d at 248). Therefore, the Court dismisses Defendant
Washington County with prejudice. Because Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the State
Defendants are precluded by the various immunity doctrines discussed above, the Court also
finds that amendment cannot cure the pleading defects in Plaintiff's Complaint as to the State
Defendants and accordingly dismisses the State Defendants with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant Washington County’s Motion to Dismiss [9]. The Court
also GRANTS the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [15].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 25th day of May, 2026.

United States District Judge

12 — OPINION & ORDER

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11337883. Public record. Not legal advice.