# People v. Zeasley CA2/6

> California Court of Appeal · June 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11336511

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** June 1, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 6/1/26 P. v. Zeasley CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B339294
(Super. Ct. Nos. 21CR01138,
Plaintiff and Respondent, 20CR07707)
(Santa Barbara County)
v.

KEITH STEPHEN RAY
ZEASLEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

Keith Stephen Ray Zeasley appeals from the judgment
after a jury convicted him of assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4); count
1), four counts of attempting to dissuade a witness from
prosecuting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2); counts 2, 4, 8, and 9),
three counts of attempted criminal threats (§§ 664, 422; counts 3,
5, and 7), dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd.
(c)(1); count 6), knowingly and maliciously dissuading a witness

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); count 11),2 and 38
misdemeanor counts of contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1);
counts 12–50). The jury also found true that Zeasley had
suffered a prior serious felony and one strike prior within the
“Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12,
subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)). The court found true circumstances in
aggravation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2), (b)(3).) The
trial court sentenced Zeasley to 36 years in state prison, which
included a one-year consecutive sentence for violation of
probation in another case (20CR07707).
Zeasley contends his convictions on counts 1 through 9 and
11 should be reversed because the court admitted improper
opinion testimony regarding intimate partner battering. We
direct correction of the abstract and otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Zeasley and B.M. began a dating relationship in 2019.
They argued frequently and Zeasley would “hit[], chok[e], [and]
stomp[] [her] out.”
In February 2021, Zeasley moved in with B.M. after he was
released from jail for a prior domestic violence incident involving
B.M. One evening, Zeasley and B.M. began arguing about a text
message she had received from a man she was dating while
Zeasley was in jail. Zeasley “sock[ed]” B.M. in the head, pulled
her hair, threw a bicycle at her, and “stomped” her head into the
floor. He also kicked B.M., removed her clothes, poured dirty

2 The abstract of judgment erroneously lists count 11 as
subdivision (b)(2) rather than subdivision (a)(2) of section 136.1.
We direct the clerk of the superior court to issue a corrected
abstract.

2
mop water over her, and hit her with closed fists. A friend of
B.M. was present and witnessed the attack.
Shortly thereafter, law enforcement arrived at B.M.’s
apartment. B.M. denied that Zeasley had assaulted her because
she did not want “to get him in trouble.” Zeasley was arrested
and called B.M. 20 to 30 times from the jail. He left multiple
messages for her, stating, “Why aren’t you answering your phone,
bitch?” and “You put[] me in fucking jail, you stupid bitch.”
B.M. refused to testify at Zeasley’s preliminary hearing
because she was still dating him and did not want to “see him get
put away.” At trial, B.M. testified because she “wanted to speak
[her] truth.”
Zeasley had previously assaulted B.M. in July 2019. A
neighbor called law enforcement because they heard B.M.
“screaming through the wall.” B.M. was severely bruised and
taken to the hospital. B.M. obtained an emergency protective
order.
Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed a motion in limine to
allow District Attorney Investigator Megan Harrison to testify as
an expert witness about domestic violence. In response to
defense counsel’s request for an offer of proof, the prosecutor said
Harrison would “address common domestic violence themes,
including recanting victims, the cycle of violence, the power and
control wheel, and misconceptions about victim behavior.” The
trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection under Evidence
Code section 352. Counsel did not object to Harrison’s
qualifications.
During the prosecution’s case in chief, Harrison testified
that she had worked as a police officer for 12 years prior to
working as a district attorney investigator. She also said that

3
she had testified as an expert in “areas of domestic violence and
strangulation.” Harrison had investigated “over 700” domestic
violence cases, including directly contacting victims and abusers.
She worked with probation officers, interviewed doctors and
nurses who treat victims of domestic violence, and “worked very
closely” with the nonprofit organization Domestic Violence
Solutions. Harrison also taught classes “in the areas of domestic
violence.”
Harrison completed police academy training in 2010, an
eight-hour course on domestic violence at the district attorney’s
office in 2016, and a 36-hour domestic violence strangulation
seminar. She learned about “the cycle of violence as well as the
power and control wheel.”
Based on her “experience in handling the domestic violence
cases,” Harrison testified there were misconceptions about the
reactions of victims of domestic violence. Misconceptions include
believing that victims would leave their abusers immediately if
there was abuse, not recognizing that victims return to their
abusers even after reporting abuse, and underestimating how
hard it is for victims to leave their abusers. Harrison said it is
“very common” for victims to recant. Victims “feel
embarrassment” when having to testify and “sometimes” are not
“forthcoming to law enforcement.”
Harrison testified about the three phases comprising the
cycle of violence in a domestic violence relationship. The first is a
“tension building phase” where there is “emotional verbal abuse.”
The second consists of an incident of physical abuse, followed by a
third “honeymoon” phase. Harrison had personally observed this
cycle in cases she had investigated. Among the approximately
700 cases that she worked on, Harrison estimated that victims

4
left after the first incident of abuse in only half a dozen cases.
Harrison said, “the Cycle of Violence occurs in my experience in
almost every situation of physical abuse.”
With respect to the power and control wheel, Harrison said
there were certain tactics that abusers used to “develop the
power and control over another in a domestic violence
relationship.” These tactics include “coercion and threats,
intimidation, emotional abuse, economic abuse, societal privilege,
minimizing, denying, and blaming.” But she said, “every
relationship is different” and “not all eight are present all the
time.” Harrison observed these “power and control dynamics” in
the cases she investigated.
Harrison acknowledged that she did not “know anything
about the facts of this specific case,” and had not reviewed the
police reports, jail calls, or photographs. Her testimony was
based on her “expertise on domestic violence” cases, not any
personal knowledge. On cross-examination, Harrison admitted
that she did not have any professional affiliations with domestic
violence outside of law enforcement. She also admitted that she
had not spoken at any conferences or published any papers
regarding domestic violence.
The trial court instructed the jury that Harrison’s
testimony “about intimate partner battering is not evidence that
[Zeasley] committed any of the crimes charged against him.” The
jury could consider such testimony “only in deciding whether or
not [B.M.’s] conduct was consistent with someone who has been
abused and in evaluating the believable [sic] of her testimony.”

5
(CALCRIM No. 850; People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073,
1088, fn. 5.)
DISCUSSION
Harrison’s testimony
Zeasley contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
allowing Harrison to testify as an expert on domestic violence
because she was not qualified to do so. We are not persuaded.
Evidence Code section 1107 expressly authorizes the
admission of expert testimony “regarding intimate partner
battering and its effects, including the nature and effect of
physical, emotional, or mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions,
or behavior of victims of domestic violence.” (Evid. Code, § 1107,
subd. (a).) The offering party must establish the “proper
qualifications of the expert witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd.
(b).) “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if [they] ha[ve]
special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
sufficient to qualify [them] as an expert on the subject to which
[their] testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).)
“Whether a [witness] qualifies as an expert in a particular case
depends on the facts of that case and the witness’[s]
qualifications.” (People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 39.)
A trial court has “considerable latitude in determining”
whether a witness has the requisite qualifications and we uphold
that determination “unless a manifest abuse of discretion is
shown.” (People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 357.) A manifest
abuse of discretion is shown only if “ ‘ “ ‘the evidence shows that
[the] witness clearly lacks qualification as an expert.’ ” ’ ” (People
v. Dowl (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1079, 1089 (Dowl), italics omitted.)
“ ‘ “Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the
subject to entitle [their] opinion to go to the jury, the question of

6
the degree of [their] knowledge goes more to the weight of the
evidence than its admissibility.” ’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18
Cal.4th 297, 322 (Bolin).) The trial court did not abuse its
discretion here.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Zeasley failed to object to Harrison’s qualifications. He
properly concedes his contention is forfeited. (People v. Stevens
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333; see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) But
Zeasley raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to avoid
forfeiture. To prevail, Zeasley must demonstrate that counsel’s
performance was deficient and prejudicial. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–692; People v. Mickel (2016)
2 Cal.5th 181, 198 (Mickel).) An ineffective assistance claim fails
upon a defective showing of either component. (People v. Holt
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.) And here, Zeasley cannot establish
either component.
Zeasley cannot show that counsel’s performance was
deficient because such an objection would have been meritless,
and there was no manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court
in permitting Harrison’s testimony. (Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 198.) Evidence Code section 720 is phrased in the disjunctive
“or,” allowing the offering party to establish an expert’s
qualifications through their “special knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.” Harrison testified about her “experience”
investigating more than 700 domestic violence cases during
which she interviewed abusers, victims, and first responders.
She also testified about her training, misconceptions about
victims of domestic violence, and explained how she observed
dynamics in the cycle of violence and power and control wheel
play out in the hundreds of cases she investigated. On this

7
record, we cannot conclude that Harrison “clearly” lacked the
qualifications to testify about intimate partner battering. (Dowl,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1089.)
An expert witness may be qualified through their
“experience.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) Contrary to Zeasley’s
contentions, an expert witness need not possess formal education
in intimate partner battering, have associated professional
affiliations, spoken at conferences, or published papers on the
topic to qualify as an expert under Evidence Code section 1107.
(See People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1298–1302 [police
officer expert testimony on delayed reporting of child sexual
abuse]; People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 944–946 [police
sergeant expert testimony on gang culture]; People v. Cruz (1968)
260 Cal.App.2d 55, 58–59 [police sergeant expert testimony on
evidence of drug use].)
Here, Harrison possessed the requisite experience to testify
as an expert regarding intimate partner battering. To the extent
Zeasley contends that Harrison’s qualifications are
underwhelming, those criticisms go to the weight of her
testimony, not admissibility. (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 322.)
Defense counsel did not ignore the issue of Harrison’s
qualifications but focused his cross-examination on the limits of
her education and training. As the trial court instructed, judging
the credibility and believability of expert witness testimony was
for the jury to decide. And the jury was instructed they were not
required to accept Harrison’s testimony.
Nor can Zeasley show prejudice. Harrison admitted that
she had no personal knowledge about the case, and the trial court
properly instructed the jury that Harrison’s testimony was not
evidence that Zeasley committed any of the crimes. And

8
prejudice was not shown because the evidence establishing
counts 1 through 9 and 11 was overwhelming. (People v. Hines
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1030.) This evidence included B.M.’s
testimony, the testimony of her friend who witnessed the attack,
the recordings of Zeasley’s telephone calls, and the evidence of
prior incidents of domestic violence (Evid. Code, § 1109). In our
view, there is no reasonable probability that Zeasley would have
obtained a “more favorable” result if Harrison’s testimony had
not been admitted. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the superior court
shall correct the abstract of judgment to show that count 11 is a
conviction of subdivision (a)(2) of section 136.1, and forward a
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

9
Brian E. Hill and Jean Dandona, Judges

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Deepti Vaadyala and Stephen
Svetich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11336511. Public record. Not legal advice.