# People v. Demolle

> California Supreme Court · June 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335516

## Case

- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 1, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ALEX DEMOLLE,
Defendant and Appellant.

S159120

Alameda County Superior Court
140729

June 1, 2026

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins*
concurred.

Justice Liu filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

Justice Evans filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

*
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
S159120

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

On July 23, 1999, 11-year-old Jaquita Mack went
missing.1 Her body was discovered the next day on a hillside in
Oakland. Two weeks later, defendant Alex Demolle confessed
to raping and strangling Jaquita. After hearing this confession
and other evidence, a jury convicted defendant of first degree
murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.)2 The jury also found true two
special circumstance allegations: murder during the
commission of a rape (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C)) and murder
during the commission of a lewd and lascivious act on a person
under the age of 14 (id., subd. (a)(17)(E)). The jury returned a
sentence of death, which the trial court imposed. This automatic
appeal follows.
We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Evidence at the Guilt Phase
The evidence introduced by the prosecution established
that Jaquita lived with her aunt and court-appointed legal
guardian, Verna White. However, in July 1999, she was visiting
her biological parents, James Mack and Kenya White, staying

1
Both parties refer to the victim by her first name. We do
the same.
2
All further unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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with them at their house on East 29th Street in Oakland. James
Mack and Kenya White were no longer in a romantic
relationship, and James Mack’s girlfriend, Chris Aubrey, was
also residing at the house on East 29th Street.
Around 5:00 p.m. on Friday, July 23, 1999, Jaquita left the
house to ride her bicycle to a nearby store. At some point,
Aubrey realized Jaquita had been gone for a long time. Aubrey
went to look for Jaquita. While doing so, she encountered
defendant, who lived around the corner from East 29th Street in
an apartment complex on Fruitvale Avenue. She asked if he had
seen Jaquita, giving a description of both Jaquita and the bicycle
she was riding. Defendant denied having seen Jaquita. Aubrey
subsequently called the police to report Jaquita missing.
The police discovered Jaquita’s body the next day on a
hillside about a mile from her parents’ house. Her body was
wrapped in a sheet, her midriff was exposed, and her pants were
low on her pelvis and irregularly laced.
Doctor Sharon Van Meter conducted an autopsy. She
determined that Jaquita had died from “[a]sphyxia due to
strangulation.” Van Meter collected vaginal and rectal swabs
from Jaquita’s body. Sperm was detected from both swabs, and
a DNA profile was created from the rectal swab.
On August 3, 1999, Oakland Police Sergeant Derwin
Longmire, the lead detective on Jaquita’s case, was conducting
a neighborhood canvass around the area of East 29th Street and
Fruitvale Avenue. Longmire explained that a canvass “is a door-
to-door search where [police] officers . . . go to each residence . . .
[¶] . . . knock on the door and talk to the residents.” As part of
this canvass, Longmire spoke to defendant briefly. Defendant

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told Longmire that he had seen Jaquita “earlier in the day”
before she was reported missing.
Three days later, on August 6, 1999, Longmire knocked on
defendant’s door to follow up on the conversation. Defendant
answered the door and invited Longmire in. Defendant told
Longmire that he “saw [Jaquita] late in the evening [of July 23],
that she had fallen off her bike and that he helped her up, that
just a few minutes after that . . . an aunt [Chris Aubrey], came
around the corner looking for her, and that ultimately he had
left the residence and went on to Lake Tahoe.” Longmire asked
defendant if he would be willing to accompany him to the police
station to memorialize defendant’s statement. Defendant
agreed and brought along his three-year-old daughter. While at
the police station, Longmire asked if defendant would consent
to give a blood sample. Defendant initially refused but
subsequently agreed. After audio taping defendant’s interview,
Longmire took defendant and his daughter to a hospital, where
defendant had his blood drawn. Defendant and his daughter
then returned home.
The DNA profile generated from defendant’s blood sample
matched that of the sperm recovered from Jaquita’s body. An
expert testified that “[t]he . . . profile of the semen of the rectal
swab [collected from Jaquita’s body] [wa]s indistinguishable
within the match criteria of the laboratory from the . . . profile
of Alex Demolle.”
Based on the DNA match, the police arrested defendant
on August 8, 1999. On the same day, defendant confessed to
raping, strangling, and disposing of Jaquita’s body. In two
statements, one taken by Longmire and the other by a deputy

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district attorney, defendant gave the following account of the
day of Jaquita’s death.
In July 1999, defendant was living in an apartment
complex on Fruitvale Avenue with his wife and three-year-old
daughter. He was home alone on the afternoon of July 23,
waiting to be picked up by two friends for a trip to Lake Tahoe.
At some point around 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., defendant was
outside his apartment and saw Jaquita, whom he claimed to
have never met before. Defendant was feeling nauseous because
of some food that he had consumed earlier and went back inside
to take a nap. Sometime between 6:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.,
defendant was outside again and saw Jaquita falling off her
bicycle. He helped pick up the bicycle, and Jaquita rode off.
Some minutes thereafter, a person defendant identified as
Jaquita’s aunt — but who was in fact Aubrey — came by and
asked if defendant had seen “a little girl riding a pink . . . bike.”
Defendant said yes and told Aubrey to look at a spot “around the
corner” where the local children are known to congregate.
Aubrey left. Defendant then sat down by his front door to play
video games. Shortly thereafter, Jaquita rode by on her bicycle.
Seeing defendant playing his video games, Jaquita stopped and
asked if she could play. Defendant said yes and invited her in.
She came into the apartment, bringing her bicycle with her.
Defendant closed the door behind her.
Once inside the apartment, Jaquita sat down on a
mattress in the living room and began playing a video game.
Defendant sat next to her. At some point, he touched her arm
and legs. She looked at him and went back to the video game.
He touched her again, this time either closer to her breasts or
between her legs. She got up to leave. He pushed her down and
pulled down her pants. Then with her legs held up in the air,

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defendant inserted his penis into Jaquita’s vagina, moving in
and out a few times. Jaquita was crying and making “little
whimpering noises,” with her hands up, “petrified” “[l]ike if a
dog was coming up [and] she was trying to keep her hands from
getting . . . bit.” After about 20 seconds, defendant pulled his
penis out of Jaquita’s vagina and ejaculated in the process.
Defendant was nervous and scared. He thought “about
[his] daughter and [his] life,” “[his] family and how
embarrassing this was,” and he did not “want to go to jail.” He
“wrapped [his] hands around [Jaquita’s] throat” and “squeez[ed]
her whole neck.” Jaquita was crying; she did not scream or fight
back. Defendant continued strangling Jaquita for about 15 to
20 minutes. When defendant let go of her neck, Jaquita’s eyes
were wide open and she was dead.
Defendant wrapped Jaquita’s body with a bedsheet. He
lowered her body about five feet out of a window and dropped it
onto the ground. He threw out her bicycle over his back fence.
Defendant then went to his next-door neighbor, Delores Hill,
and asked to borrow her car so he could visit an aunt. Hill lent
him her car. Demolle took Jaquita’s body to the car, placing it
on the floorboard of the front passenger seat. Just as he was
getting into the car, the two friends whom defendant had been
waiting for arrived. Defendant told them he would be back
shortly. Defendant drove away, stopping at a hillside that he
recognized, and there he “swung” Jaquita’s body “five feet to the
grass.”
After disposing of the body, defendant drove back to his
apartment and left with his friends. He spent the night at their
house with the intention of leaving for Lake Tahoe in the
morning. In the middle of the night, one of defendant’s two

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friends took defendant back home because he was sick with a
stomach flu. By the next morning, defendant was feeling better
and left for his trip to Lake Tahoe as planned. Defendant
returned to his Oakland apartment after the trip and was
arrested two weeks later.
Other evidence corroborated defendant’s account. Hill,
defendant’s next-door neighbor, testified that he had borrowed
her car the day of Jaquita’s disappearance. Hill also testified
that the day before he was arrested, defendant told Hill he could
not have killed Jaquita because choking somebody “takes a long
time” and “he didn’t have time to commit a crime like that.” One
of the friends who picked up defendant for the trip to Lake
Tahoe likewise testified to a time frame of events consistent
with defendant’s account. Jaquita’s bicycle was found in the
backyard of a property abutting defendant’s apartment complex,
a location consistent with where defendant said he had
discarded the bicycle.
The defense presented no evidence at the guilt phase.
B. Evidence at the Penalty Phase
1. Prosecution case
The prosecution introduced victim impact evidence and
testimony regarding two incidents of “criminal activity by the
defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or
violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use
force or violence.” (§ 190.3.) These two incidents consisted of an
unadjudicated battery that defendant committed against Robert
Barnes when defendant was a minor and an unadjudicated
criminal threat defendant made against Jeff Samuel about a
year before Jaquita’s killing.

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Jaquita’s family members — Verna White, Jaquita’s aunt
and legal guardian; Jasmine White, Verna White’s daughter
and Jaquita’s cousin; and Khena White, Jaquita’s brother —
gave victim impact evidence. They described what Jaquita was
like, their close relationship with her, and the impact of her
death on their family.
Jaquita’s fifth-grade teacher — Christine Mohler — also
testified about her relationship with Jaquita and how Jaquita’s
death impacted her. Mohler testified that in her first year as a
teacher, she taught Jaquita’s fifth-grade class. Mohler
developed a “special bond” with Jaquita and “spent the most
time with [her], just working with her academically and trying
to find ways to motivate her.” Mohler testified regarding how
Jaquita’s murder continued to affect her, stating that she saw
the “effects of it in [her] parenting” and that Jaquita’s death was
“just something you don’t leave behind in your life.”
2. Defense case
A total of 29 witnesses testified on defendant’s behalf,
including his father, mother, paternal aunt, paternal uncle,
maternal aunt, uncle-in-law, cousin, nephew, junior high school
teacher, various clergy and church members, multiple friends,
four deputy sheriffs working in the jails where defendant was
housed, and a former prison warden.
Family members and friends painted the following picture
of defendant. He was born in 1975 in New Orleans to Adam
Marcell Encalade, Sr. and Mary Ann Demolle. When he was
born, defendant suffered a staph infection that required him to
stay in the hospital for a month. Encalade worked as a
fisherman and was gone from the home most of the time. When
defendant was two and a half years old, his mother left Encalade

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and moved with her children to Oakland, California, where her
family was. Defendant grew up in a big extended family. He
was friendly and helpful, often helping to watch the children of
family, friends, and fellow church members. Defendant was
devoted to his daughter and served as her primary caregiver.
Defendant loved fishing and frequently took his daughter
fishing with him.
Witnesses testified that based on what they knew of
defendant, they were shocked to learn that he had committed
the crimes charged. They loved defendant and would miss him
if he were executed.
The deputy sheriffs testified that during his time in
custody, defendant was well behaved and was “never a
disciplinary problem.” One of the witnesses, Daniel Vasquez,
testified to the conditions that a prisoner like defendant would
experience if he were sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole. Based on his experience, an interview with defendant,
and his study of defendant’s incarceration records, Vasquez
opined that he had “no concerns” about defendant “being the
type of prisoner who would typically lash out or do some harm
to others.”
The prosecution cross-examined some of the witnesses.
The prosecution confronted Vasquez with the fact that
defendant’s record showed two rule violations and elicited the
admission that “[f]uture human behavior of an individual can be
difficult to predict.” The prosecution also presented evidence
that defendant had been arrested in Oakland for attempting to
break into a minivan, and the incident occurred as he was
leaving a church youth group meeting. The prosecution used
the incident to impeach the testimony of a pastor who had

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offered a favorable opinion of defendant based on his
participation in the church youth group.
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury returned
a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to
modify the verdict and sentenced defendant to death.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Guilt Phase Issues
1. Denial of motion to suppress
a. Background
Defendant contends that he was unlawfully detained by
law enforcement and his subsequent consent to a blood draw
was tainted by this illegal conduct. According to defendant, all
incriminating evidence obtained thereafter constituted “the
fruits of his unlawful detention and thus should have been
suppressed.”
Defendant raised this argument prior to trial by filing a
motion to suppress under section 1538.5. (See § 1538.5,
subd. (a)(1)–(A) [“A defendant may move . . . to suppress as
evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of
a search or seizure [if]: [¶] . . . [t]he search or seizure without a
warrant was unreasonable”].) The magistrate held a
preliminary hearing at which Longmire and Bruce Brock, a
police sergeant who was present during defendant’s August 6
interview, testified to the circumstances surrounding
defendant’s consent to give blood.
According to Longmire, he first encountered defendant
during a neighborhood canvass on August 3, 1999. Defendant
told Longmire that he had seen Jaquita on the day of her
disappearance. Three days later, Longmire was back

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

canvassing the area and knocked on defendant’s door. As he had
been on August 3, Longmire was wearing “dress shoes, slacks,
shirt, tie” and possibly “a jacket” but not a formal police uniform.
When defendant opened the door, Longmire asked if he could
speak with him “a little bit more” about Jaquita’s
disappearance. Defendant “said yes, opened the door wide, and
invited [Longmire] into his home.”
After defendant and Longmire sat down at defendant’s
kitchen table, defendant volunteered that he had seen Jaquita
“shortly before dark” on the day of her disappearance. Jaquita
had fallen off her bicycle; defendant went to help her, lifting the
bicycle and righting it, after which Jaquita rode off. Sometime
into the conversation, Longmire asked defendant if he would be
willing to come down to the police station because Longmire
“wanted to memorialize the statement that [defendant] had just
given” but did not “have a recording device” with him.
Defendant agreed to go with Longmire but said he had his three-
year-old daughter at home with him. Longmire said it was “all
right” if defendant brought his daughter with him. Longmire
informed defendant that “kids come down quite often when
[they] interview people” and defendant’s daughter “would either
sit in with [them] or sit with somebody watching her and she
would be okay.” Defendant agreed to accompany Longmire to
the police station.
Longmire, defendant, and defendant’s daughter then
walked to Longmire’s police car, which was unmarked and had
no “cage” or “locked area in the back.” Defendant opened the
right rear door to the vehicle, fastened his daughter into the seat
with the seat belt, and then got into the front passenger seat.
Longmire drove to the police station, which was about two miles
away from defendant’s residence. Upon arrival, defendant got

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out of the car, helped his daughter out, and followed Longmire
into the police station’s homicide section. Longmire “unlocked
the door to the homicide section,” and the three entered.
Longmire then guided defendant to one of the interview
rooms, Room 203. Room 203 was about eight feet wide by eight
feet long. It had windows along two of its walls and a door that
contains a “large glass plate.” Inside Room 203 was “office-type
furniture,” including file cabinets, a table, and chairs. The door
to Room 203 could be locked, and “if the door is locked from the
outside you need a key to unlock it from the interior to get
outside.”
While defendant remained in the room, Longmire exited
Room 203 and locked the door. Longmire explained that he did
so because homicide investigators store their weapons in the
unlocked drawers of their desks outside of Room 203. It was
therefore “very important to be sure that you control the
movement of all people coming into that office” and “you can’t do
that if you’ve got people walking in and out of rooms where
weapons are being stored and unattended.” Longmire further
explained that his concern was not based on anything that
defendant said or did, and he would have had this safety and
security concern regardless of who was inside Room 203.
Longmire went to his desk, secured his firearm, and asked
Sergeant Brock to assist in conducting the interview. The two
officers then returned to Room 203. An interview log indicates
that Longmire’s initial arrival to Room 203 occurred at
10:55 a.m., and Longmire testified that he was gone from the
room for “a minute” before returning with Brock.
Longmire and Brock began interviewing defendant.
Longmire could not recall whether defendant’s daughter was

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also present in Room 203. “Two or three minutes” into the
interview, around 10:59 a.m., Longmire read defendant his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
The form Longmire used informed defendant of “the right to
remain silent,” “the right to talk to a lawyer and have him
present,” and the right to an appointed attorney. Defendant
waived his rights and initialed a waiver form confirming that he
understood his rights and, “[h]aving these rights in mind,”
wished to talk to the investigators. Longmire testified that,
although defendant was not a suspect, he provided the Miranda
advisement “as a prophylactic measure in the event that
[defendant] gave incriminating information.”
Sometime between 11:15 a.m. and 11:35 a.m., Longmire
asked defendant whether he would agree to give a blood sample.
In the course of investigating Jaquita’s murder, Longmire had
previously obtained blood samples from other individuals. By
soliciting a sample from defendant, Longmire believed he could
“either secure a suspect” or “just as importantly . . . eliminate
those people that could have potentially been the donor or the
suspect” and thus “free [Longmire] to start . . . looking [in] other
places.” Defendant declined to provide blood, explaining that he
was afraid of needles.
At 11:45 a.m., the investigators decided to take a short
break. They left Room 203, and the door was locked while the
investigators were gone. At this time, Longmire and Brock also
decided to “put [defendant’s] statement on tape.”
Accordingly, at 11:54 a.m., the officers walked defendant
to a different interview room, Room 201. Room 201 was roughly
eight feet by six feet. It had no windows, and the door only had
a small eyehole. The door to Room 201 also locked automatically

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whenever it was closed. Despite the locking mechanism,
Longmire testified that “there would be no indication to the
person sitting in the room that the doors in fact locked” and “the
only way [a person] would know is if [he or she] tried to open the
door.”
“Somewhere between moving from [Room] 203 to 201,”
Longmire told defendant that “it would be better if [they] left
[defendant’s daughter] outside of the interview” room. The
police “were going to record [defendant’s] statement on tape, and
oftentimes children have a difficult time sitting through without
making noises.”
After placing defendant in Room 201, Longmire again left,
and the door locked automatically behind him. The interview in
Room 201 started at 12:10 p.m. However, “four or five minutes”
before the formal interview began, defendant knocked on the
door and Longmire answered.3 While the two were standing

3
More precisely, Longmire said, “There was a period
probably four or five minutes before I returned to the room
where Mr. Demolle knocked on the door and I came back to
answer.” Longmire’s statement was given in the context of the
following exchange:
“Q. And during that period of time [in between when
Longmire left and 12:10 p.m. when the interview began]
Mr. Demolle was locked in the room by himself?
“A. For the majority of that time, yes. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Q. During some period of that time he was not locked in
the room[?]
“A. You asked if he was alone for that entire time and I
said for the majority of the time, yes.

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with the door open, defendant asked Longmire “how long it
would be.” Longmire responded that “it would be just a short
while.” Defendant also asked about his daughter, “want[ing] to
know where she was, if she was okay.” Longmire said she “was
right there in the office with the secretary and she was fine.”
Defendant “seemed to be okay” with Longmire’s response.
Although Longmire could not recall the exact sequence of
events, he testified he thought that it was at this time — when
defendant knocked on the door and the two men spoke at the
doorway — that defendant “talked a little bit about having a
party the next day and wanting to prepare for the party.”
Afterward, Brock walked up and the men entered the room.
Longmire again approached defendant about giving a
blood sample. This time, defendant “said he would do it.” At
12:13 p.m., defendant signed a “consent to search” form. The
consent form reflects that defendant agreed to a search of his
residence and “my blood sample being taken.” The form also
states, “I have been told that I have a right to refuse to allow the
police to search my person or my property” and “I have given my
consent voluntarily without threats or promises.” Defendant
signed the form, and it was witnessed by Longmire and Brock.
Longmire stated that defendant did not appear to be under the

“Q. When during that period from 11:54 till 12:10 was he
not alone?
“A. There was a period probably four or five minutes
before I returned to the room where Mr. Demolle knocked on the
door and I came back to answer. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Q. So that conversation [at the doorway] occurred very
close to the end of that . . . 16-minute period between 11:54 and
12:10.
“A. Yes.”

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influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other substance when he
provided his consent.
At 12:22 p.m., the tape recorder was turned on and the
taped portion of the interview began. The prosecution played a
portion of the recording during the preliminary hearing and
entered a transcript of the recorded interview into evidence.
The interview began with the officers obtaining biographical
information from defendant. Longmire then stated, “Now, what
we’d like to do is . . . go on tape here as we are, and chronicle the
events leading um, up to the disappearance of . . . the young
Jaquita Mack on [¶] . . . [¶] the 23rd of ah, July, okay?” After
defendant responded, “Alright,” Longmire continued, “Now if
you will, I’m just gonna let you in your words um, tell us about
that evening in respects to Jaquita.” Defendant subsequently
volunteered detailed, lengthy answers about his interaction
with Jaquita and what he did in the hours thereafter. In
response to defendant’s answers, Longmire generally replied,
“Okay” and asked follow-up questions.
Brock also participated in the questioning. The officer
asked a series of questions that he directed defendant to answer
“yes” or “no.” Brock phrased his request as follows: “You know
I got some questions and kind of, I have a weird way of asking
questions if you don’t, if you can bare [sic] with me for a second.
[¶] . . . [¶] Can you, you do me a favor and if you could answer
them like yes and no. ’Cause I just kind of wanna see how you
respond to them? Fair enough?” Defendant responded, “Okay.”
Brock subsequently asked defendant some innocuous questions
(e.g., “Is your name Alex . . . Demolle?”) and requested that
defendant “purposely lie to [him] if [he] can” on some of the
queries (e.g., “is my shirt red?”). Brock also asked defendant
questions directly related to Jaquita’s death. Before the first of

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these questions, Brock said, “Now some of these . . . I, you know,
you have [to] understand the nature of this investigation.”
Brock then asked, “did you murder Jaquita Mack,” to which
defendant answered, “No.” Brock asked these “yes” or “no”
questions twice, the second time closer to the end of the
interview. Defendant denied any involvement in Jaquita’s
killing.
Toward the end of the interview, Longmire orally
confirmed that defendant was “willing to consent to giving
[them] a sample of [his] blood.” Defendant responded, “I don’t
have no problems. I mean if that’s going just, you know, help
out. . . . I have no problems.” Defendant reiterated he had
signed the consent form and had not “been forced to give” his
statement.
The taped portion of the interview ended at 12:55 p.m.
Following the interview, Longmire, Brock, defendant, and
defendant’s daughter drove to a hospital to have defendant’s
blood drawn. Defendant “appeared to be quite relaxed”; he “sat
in the back seat, sang along with songs that were on the radio”
and was “real lighthearted.” Defendant had his blood taken
shortly after arriving at the hospital. He and his daughter
returned home after this August 6 blood draw. Two days later,
when the DNA from defendant’s blood was found to match with
the DNA from the semen recovered from Jaquita’s body, police
officers arrested defendant at his residence.
Sergeant Brock gave a similar account of his interaction
with defendant on August 6. Brock confirmed that shortly
before the taped portion of the interview began, Longmire asked
defendant if he would mind giving a blood sample; when

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defendant agreed, Longmire filled out the consent form and
defendant signed it.
After hearing the evidence, the magistrate denied the
motion to suppress. In explaining its reasoning, the court noted
that it had reviewed “cases that were on point on the custody
issue.” The court stated that in those cases “we do not have the
benefit of a statement from the defendant” — presumably
because the defendant did not testify at the preliminary
hearing — “so we are left to surmise and speculate from the
circumstances what the state of mind of the defendant is, and it
seems to hinge upon whether or not the defendant thought he
was in custody.” The court next enumerated the bases it relied
upon in denying the motion. First, it observed that the defense
attempted to distinguish prior case law by relying on the fact
defendant was given Miranda warnings. However, the court
stated that it understood Longmire to have given such warnings
merely as a “precaution[].” “Secondly,” continued the court, “I
did review the transcript and I did not find the interrogation to
be particularly accusatory.” “Thirdly,” the court emphasized
that when defendant and Longmire stood talking at the door of
Room 201, “they talked about [defendant’s] return to his home,
the fact that he had a party to prepare for the next day. So to
me that tells me that [defendant] is aware that he is returning
to his home, he is not in a custody situation, and similarly,
shortly thereafter Detective Longmire informs him that they are
going to take him to the hospital and then take him home.”
Finally, “most important” to the magistrate was “the presence
of the child” because the magistrate did “not think that a
reasonable person, knowing the child was at the police
station . . . that a reasonable person would believe himself to be
in custody with no provision being made for the child.”

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Defendant contested the magistrate’s ruling by filing a
motion under section 995 before the superior court. (See § 995,
subd. (a) [“the indictment or information shall be set aside by
the court in which the defendant is arraigned, upon his or her
motion . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [if] the defendant had been committed
without reasonable or probable cause”].) After hearing
arguments from the parties and taking into consideration “the
totality of the circumstances,” the superior court denied the
motion.
b. Analysis
Defendant argues his “consent to provide a blood sample
was obtained during his unlawful seizure and detention in
violation of the Fourth Amendment,” and thus “the results of the
blood test and [his] subsequent incriminating statements”
should have been suppressed. We reject defendant’s claim.
“Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three
broad categories ranging from the least to the most intrusive:
consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty
whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that
are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal
arrests or comparable restraints on an individual’s liberty.” (In
re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821 (Manuel G.).)
Defendant concedes that his initial decision to go to the police
station was consensual.4 The primary question we address here
is whether subsequent circumstances transformed the

4
“Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. [Citation.] Unlike detentions, they
require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime.” (Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at
p. 821.)

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PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

consensual encounter into an unlawful seizure or detention
under the Fourth Amendment. (See People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 341 (Zamudio) [“Consent that is the product of
an illegal detention is not voluntary and is ineffective to justify
a search or seizure”].)
A person has been seized or detained when a reasonable
person would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate the
encounter. (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974, 979–
980; accord, United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544,
554 (Mendenhall); People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 267
(Boyer) [“[T]he test of detention under the Fourth Amendment
is whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would
have felt free to leave”].)5

5
We have previously described “the test for determining
whether a person was seized under the Fourth Amendment or
was in . . . custody [such that a Miranda advisement is required
as being] essentially the same: whether a reasonable person
would have felt he or she was at liberty to leave or to decline the
officers’ requests” for cooperation. (People v. Kopatz (2015)
61 Cal.4th 62, 80, italics added (Kopatz).) In light of this
overlap, although defendant does not premise his claim on any
alleged violation of Miranda, in addressing his argument we
consider decisions that have addressed similar claims premised
on the Fourth Amendment and alleged violations of a
defendant’s Miranda rights. We need not consider whether
different analyses would be required under other circumstances
not present here. (See People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098,
1114–1115 (Holloway) [applying the same analysis to reject a
defendant’s arguments that he was in custody both under the
Fourth Amendment and for purposes of Miranda]; but see
Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499, 509 [“Not all restraints on
freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of
Miranda. . . . ‘[T]he freedom-of-movement test identifies only a

19
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Where, as here, a magistrate rules on a motion to suppress
under section 1538.5 raised at a preliminary hearing, the
magistrate “sits as the finder of fact with the power to judge
credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
inferences.” (People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238,
1244.) The superior court ruling on a subsequent motion under
section 995 sits as a reviewing court, drawing every legitimate
inference in favor of the magistrate’s determination; the
superior court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
magistrate on issues of credibility or reweigh the evidence. (See
People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718.) On review of the
superior court’s ruling, we in effect disregard the ruling of the
superior court and directly review the determination of the
magistrate. (Ibid.; People v. Hawkins (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
194, 200 [“When a motion to suppress evidence under section
1538.5 is denied at the preliminary hearing and reviewed by the
trial court in a section 995 proceeding, even though the appeal
is from the trial court, we, in effect, review the magistrate’s
decision directly, deferring to the magistrate’s factual
findings”].) We draw all presumptions in favor of the
magistrate’s express or implied factual determinations and
must uphold them if they are supported by substantial evidence
(Laiwa, at p. 718), but we exercise our independent judgment in
determining the ultimate constitutional question of whether a

necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody’ ”];
People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491 [similar]; People v.
Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405 [“Whether an
individual has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes and whether that individual is in custody for Miranda
purposes are two different issues”].)

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PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

seizure occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
(Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 342.)
Applying these standards, we conclude defendant was not
unlawfully detained when he consented to a blood draw.
Preliminarily, the fact that Longmire first encountered
defendant during a neighborhood canvass, while not specifically
looking for him, would have reasonably conveyed to defendant
that he was not a suspect at the time. Moreover, the informal
nature of this first meeting plausibly informed how defendant
perceived Longmire on the day of the interview three days later.
We further agree with defendant’s concession that his
decision to accompany Longmire to the police station for
questioning on August 6 was consensual. After defendant
described an innocuous encounter with the victim, Longmire
asked if defendant was willing to go to the station to
memorialize the statement. The police officer was wearing plain
clothes and displayed no overt sign of authority, e.g., flashing
his badge or firearm. Defendant agreed, and along with his
young daughter, walked freely to the officer’s unmarked vehicle.
Defendant rode in the front passenger seat of the vehicle and
freely walked into the police station behind the police officer
upon arrival. At no point was defendant patted down for
weapons, handcuffed, or subjected to bodily restraints. (See
Kopatz, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 80 [in determining whether a
defendant was seized, noting as relevant the fact that “officers
did not handcuff defendant or display any weapons,”
“[d]efendant walked unassisted to the patrol car,” “[t]he officers
did not frisk or search defendant before he entered the patrol
car,” and “[t]he drive to the station was only 10 minutes, and
defendant did not voice any complaints or opposition”].) As in
Zamudio, the evidence in the record here “supports the

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PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

conclusion that there was no threat or application of force, no
intimidating movement, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking
of exits, and no command associated with the officers’ request
that defendant come to the police station.” (Zamudio, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 344; see ibid. [concluding a defendant was not
detained for Fourth Amendment purposes].)
Nothing occurred at the police station to transform
defendant’s voluntary encounter into a coercive one in which a
reasonable person in defendant’s situation would not feel free to
leave or otherwise terminate the interview.6 Once at the
station, defendant — as the magistrate found — was not
subjected to “hostile, menacing, or accusatory” questioning.
(Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 345.) Substantial evidence
supports the magistrate’s finding that the questioning was not
accusatory. The transcript of the recorded interview, which the
magistrate reviewed, reveals that after obtaining some
background information from defendant, Longmire began the
questioning by asking defendant to “tell us” “in your words”
“about that evening” that Jaquita disappeared. Defendant
provided lengthy responses, in which he volunteered various

6
We assume for present purposes that activity occurring
after defendant’s consent was first obtained is relevant to our
analysis. (Compare Kopatz, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 79 [“the test
for determining if a seizure occurred is whether, ‘ “in view of all
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave” ’ ”
(italics added)] with People v. 48,715 United States
Currency (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1514 [concluding that a
subsequent detention “did not terminate” a prior consent
because “[e]ven if we were to find the detention here illegal, it
did not produce or lead to the search”].) We conclude that there
was no detention at any juncture here.

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PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

details, many of which were not directly elicited by the
questions. Although the officers asked for clarification at times,
they never contradicted defendant’s statements or implied that
they did not believe his account. The officers simply responded
“Okay” or asked another question after defendant gave a
response.
Although defendant claims “the magistrate overlooked the
series of questions Brock asked” defendant, the record does not
support this contention. The magistrate expressly noted having
reviewed the transcript of the recorded interview, and we
decline to speculate that the magistrate overlooked portions of
that interview. And even considering these questions, we are
convinced the magistrate was correct in concluding that the
interview was not “particularly accusatory.”7 Brock prefaced his
questions by asking defendant to “bare [sic] with” his “weird . . .
way of asking questions,” to “do [him] a favor and . . . answer
them like yes and no.” When Brock asked defendant about
Jaquita’s killing directly, he first asked defendant to
“understand the nature of this investigation.” In response to
being asked if he killed Jaquita, defendant answered, “No,” and
Brock simply said, “Okay,” before continuing with the next
question. Defendant exhibited no difference in tone of voice or
the speed at which he responded when answering questions
about Jaquita’s homicide than he did when responding to other
questions. The bulk of the conversation consists of defendant’s

7
To the extent defendant asserts that the police “had
requested to tape-record only” Brock’s “accusatory” or
“adversarial” questioning of him, the record refutes his
assertion. (Italics added.) Longmire’s queries to defendant were
also recorded, and Brock’s questioning did not occur until
14 pages into the 19-page transcript of the recorded interview.

23
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

narrative of his interaction with the victim. Brock briefly asked
defendant twice if he murdered Jaquita; he was never subjected
to extensive questioning, accusations, threats, or intimidation.
(See Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 345 [“Although the
officers told defendant about the discrepancies between his
statements and his wife’s, they did not make accusations
against him”]; People v. Spears (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1, 25–26
[“The tone of the officers throughout the interview was
courteous and polite. At no time did the officers attempt to
threaten or intimidate appellant [citation], nor did they lead
him to believe that he was a suspect in the murder, that they
considered him to be guilty, or that they had the evidence to
prove his guilt in court. [Citation.] In sum, although the
questions were detailed, they were not accusatory in nature”];
People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 402 [similar].)
All told, the officers simply accepted defendant’s answers,
made no indication that they disbelieved him, and adopted a
measured, polite tone, at one point phrasing their request for
defendant’s cooperation as “do[ing] [the officer] a favor” by
answering yes-or-no questions. Under these circumstances, a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would have felt free to
leave or otherwise terminate the encounter. (See, e.g., Kopatz,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 81; Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
p. 1115; Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 345; see also People v.
Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 832 (Stansbury) [a Miranda
custody case in which we stated “the nature of the interview in
this case, which was brief and not accusatory, would not convey
to the reasonable person the impression that he or she was in
custody”]; compare Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 268 [concluding
that “the situation quickly ripened into a full-blown arrest
inside the station house” when, among other things, the

24
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

defendant “was subjected to more than an hour of directly
accusatory questioning, in which [the interrogating officer]
repeatedly told him — falsely — that the police knew he was the
killer, had all the necessary evidence, intended to charge him
with the crimes, and would prove his guilt in court”]; People v.
Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1163 [“Given the officers’
repeated rejection of defendant’s story, a reasonable person
eventually would have realized that telling the ‘truth’ meant
admitting the officers’ information was correct and explaining
how and why one was involved and that until this ‘truth’ came
out, he or she could not leave”].)8
In addition, the record establishes that defendant
understood he would be going home after his interaction with
the police, as would a reasonable person in his situation. As the
magistrate noted, during a conversation with Longmire at the
doorway of Room 201, defendant asked how long the interview
would take and said he was “having a party the next day and
want[ed] to prepare for the party.” The conversation indicates
defendant expected to go home shortly after the interview, with
time to prepare for a party that would take place the next day.
(See People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1401 (Leonard)
[“defendant’s comments [indicating that he felt ‘ “free to go” ’]

8
Defendant also contends the magistrate’s findings should
be rejected because the magistrate erroneously applied a
subjective standard rather than an objective test examining
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave or end the
questioning. In denying defendant’s motion to suppress,
however, the magistrate specifically stated that it did not think
“a reasonable person would believe himself to be in custody”
under the circumstances — indicating it was applying the
correct, objective test.

25
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

reinforce our view that a reasonable person in his position would
have felt free to leave”].)
A reasonable person in the same situation would have
shared defendant’s understanding that he was going home
shortly. As the magistrate observed, the record supports a
finding that “Detective Longmire inform[ed] [defendant] that
they [were] going to take him to the hospital and then take him
home.” During his testimony at the preliminary hearing,
Longmire stated he told defendant that “we were going to tape
the statement and we’d step out and then we would take him
home — to the hospital.”
The parties dispute whether Longmire’s testimony that
they “would take him home” was a misstatement, i.e., whether
Longmire had intended only to say that they “would take
him . . . to the hospital” and immediately corrected himself after
saying they “would take him home.” The Attorney General
argues that, regardless of any ambiguity in Longmire’s
statement, “everyone who was present in court during
Longmire’s preliminary examination testimony, including
defense counsel, understood Longmire to have testified that he
told [defendant] he would take him to the hospital and then
home.” In support, the Attorney General cites numerous
references in defendant’s own trial court briefing reflecting this
understanding. Defendant responds that even if Longmire did
tell defendant that he would take him home, the statement was
made only after defendant’s consent to give blood was obtained
and “Longmire’s statement that he would take him home . . .
[was] conditioned on [defendant’s] consent to make a taped
statement and give a blood sample.”

26
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The record does not support the contention that Longmire
suggested to defendant he would not take defendant home
unless defendant agreed “to make a taped statement and give a
blood sample.” In fact, defendant orally confirmed toward the
end of the recorded interview that he voluntarily consented and
was not coerced. Defendant’s contentions at most amount to an
argument that Longmire gave ambiguous testimony regarding
what he told defendant. But we defer to the magistrate’s
resolution of such facts when, as here, the record supports the
magistrate’s finding. (See Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 342;
see also People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979 (Tully) [on
review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, “ ‘[w]e
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the order denying
the motion to suppress’ ”].) Furthermore, defendant did, in fact,
return home after his trip to the police station and the hospital
for a blood draw. The fact that the officers allowed defendant to
go home after the interview, and remain at large for two days,
tends to corroborate their account of the tenor of their
interactions with defendant as being inconsistent with any
detention. (See Kopatz, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 81–82;
Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1401; Oregon v. Mathiason
(1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495.)
The magistrate also found it significant that defendant
voluntarily brought his young child to the police station with
him. As the magistrate explained, a reasonable person,
“knowing [a] child . . . had accompanied him to the police
station,” would not “believe himself to be in custody with no
provision being made for the child.” We agree. A reasonable
person would understand that a police station is generally ill
equipped to take care of a young child over an extended period
of time, and the fact that a child was present while the sole

27
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

person responsible for her care was being questioned supports
an inference that the questioning would not be prolonged and
the person was free to leave and continue caring for the child.
Defendant disagrees, instead contending that “a person
could reasonably have concluded the police were actually
detaining him and planned to call a relative or even Child
Protective Services to care for his daughter once they were at
the station.” But there was no discussion of any plan to call
Child Protective Services or make any alternative arrangements
for the care of defendant’s child, and the magistrate was not
required to draw the unsupported inference defendant
advances.
Defendant also contends that a “confluence” of additional
factors supports his argument that a reasonable person in his
situation would not have felt free to leave. We disagree with
defendant’s assessment.
First, defendant focuses on his separation from his
daughter during his interview. Defendant asserts “[h]e was not
told he could join his daughter and she was not brought to him,
but instead he was told she was being looked after until the
police put his statement on tape.” “Under those circumstances,”
defendant contends, a reasonable person would feel that “[i]f he
refused to consent or to answer questions, the taping might
never be over, the police would keep him separated from his
daughter, and he would not be free to leave.” But there is no
evidence that the police ever implied defendant would only be
reunited with his daughter if he consented to the blood draw.
When defendant agreed to go to the police station with his
daughter, he was told that she “would either sit in with [him and
Longmire] or sit with somebody watching her.” The fact that his

28
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

daughter ended up “sit[ting] with somebody watching her” at
the police station could not have reasonably surprised defendant
or caused a reasonable person in his situation to conclude the
encounter was no longer voluntary and they were no longer free
to leave or cease cooperating. In addition, when defendant
asked about his daughter’s whereabouts and was told that “she
was right there in the office with the secretary and she was fine,”
defendant “seemed to be okay with that” and was not “upset” or
“frustrated.” And the police had previously provided a
reasonable explanation why a three-year-old child would not be
present during the recorded interview, i.e., the police “were
going to record [defendant’s] statement on tape, and oftentimes
children have a difficult time sitting through without making
noises.” This record does not support defendant’s assertion that
a reasonable person in this situation would conclude they would
only be reunited with their child if they consented to a blood
draw.
Second, defendant contends that the provision of Miranda
warnings shortly after he was brought to the station “would
have sent a strong signal that he was being detained.” Whether
a subject was provided with Miranda advisements is one factor
that we consider in analyzing whether the subject was in
custody. (See Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 268 [treating the fact
that the defendant “was informed of his Miranda rights” as a
factor supporting the conclusion that he was under arrest];
Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 344 [that the “[d]efendant was
not given his Miranda rights” is a circumstance indicating that

29
PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

he “was not detained within [the] meaning of the Fourth
Amendment”].)9 But it is not dispositive.
We consider on a case-by-case basis whether the giving of
a Miranda warning that is not legally required contributes to a
seizure finding under the Fourth Amendment. (Caldwell v.
State (Fla. 2010) 41 So.3d 188, 202 (Caldwell).) Although “the
reading of Miranda warnings during a consensual police
encounter might add to the coercive nature of that encounter
under at least some circumstances” (ibid.), in this case,
Longmire’s advisement did not transform defendant’s
interaction with law enforcement into a Fourth Amendment
detention.
As discussed, defendant went to the police station
voluntarily and was not detained during the car ride or the walk
to the police station’s homicide section. Defendant arrived at

9
In Stansbury, we disapproved of Boyer to the extent its
language — stating that a defendant “was informed of his
Miranda rights, an indication that the officers themselves
believed the situation might be tantamount to custody” (Boyer,
supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 268) — “may be read to suggest that an
officer’s subjective focus of suspicion is an independently
relevant factor in establishing custody for the purposes of
Miranda.” (Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 830, fn. 1.) We
reiterated, however, that “evidence of the officer’s subjective
suspicions or beliefs is relevant . . . ‘if the officer’s views or
beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under
interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person
in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’ ”
(Id. at p. 830.) In other words, advising a defendant of his or her
Miranda rights can be relevant in this context not because it
goes to the police officer’s subjective state of mind, but because
it can have the effect of conveying to a reasonable listener, under
a given set of circumstances, that he or she is not free to leave
or otherwise end the encounter with law enforcement.

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PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

the police station around 10:55 a.m. and was read his Miranda
rights approximately five minutes thereafter. Accordingly, a
very short period of time elapsed between defendant’s arrival at
the police station and when he was given Miranda warnings.
No substantive questioning took place in the interim.
A reasonable person would have felt free to leave or
terminate the encounter after being Mirandized under the
circumstances presented here. Longmire testified he advised
defendant of his Miranda rights simply as a “prophylactic
measure in the event that [defendant] gave incriminating
information.” Because Longmire did not inform defendant of his
intention, we do not consider Longmire’s “ ‘uncommunicated
state of mind.’ ” (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 341; ibid. [“an
‘officer’s uncommunicated state of mind . . . [is] irrelevant’ ”].)
However, Longmire’s other actions — his polite requests, the
tone of the interview he conducted, the nonconfrontational
nature of the questioning, and the fact that he ultimately
allowed defendant to return home — are consistent with his
statement that defendant was not being detained. (See
Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 830 [“evidence of the officer’s
subjective suspicions or beliefs is relevant . . . ‘if the officer’s
views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual
under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable
person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to
leave’ ”]; Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 575, fn. 7;
Caldwell, supra, 41 So.3d at p. 203 [“the circumstances of the
encounter after the warnings indicate that the tenor of the
conversation remained consensual. . . . [The defendant] was
also aware, due to the Miranda warnings, that he had the right
to remain silent”].)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Third, defendant contends he was “secured in locked
rooms and his movement was thereby restrained.” As
previously noted, defendant was placed in two different
interview rooms. One room was bigger, with a window and
“office-type furniture.” The other was smaller and had no
window. Both rooms were capable of being locked.
The parties center their dispute on whether defendant
knew the rooms were locked. (See Green v. Superior Court
(1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 134, 135 (Green) [in determining whether
interviews were “ ‘custodial’ ” for Miranda purposes we noted
that a factor favoring the conclusion that the defendant was in
custody is “the interviews took place in a locked room,” but we
then observed that “[t]he record . . . does not reveal whether
defendant realized the room was locked”].) The Attorney
General maintains that the record does not demonstrate
“whether [defendant] knew the interview room doors were
locked.” Defendant, on the other hand, states that his actions —
including his knocking on the door of Room 201 — showed he
did realize he was locked inside the interview rooms.
Even if defendant was aware that the rooms were locked,
however, the fact that he was in a locked room is not enough in
itself to establish that he was detained. (See People v.
Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 403 [a Miranda custody case in
which we stated “the fact that [the defendant] was questioned
in the police station’s polygraph examination room does not
necessarily require a finding of custody, even if the room was in
a secure area”]; Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 834 [“although
defendant had been admitted to the jail section of the police
station through locked doors and would have needed assistance
to leave the facility, these facts alone do not establish that he
was in custody”]; In re Kenneth S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 54, 65

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

[“While the interview was conducted in a section of the police
station to which the public was not given free access, and
respondent would have required the accompaniment of an
officer to leave, this was insufficient to have led a reasonable
person in respondent’s position to understand that he was in
custody [for Miranda purposes]”].) Here, as in Stansbury,
although defendant was in locked spaces and “would have
needed assistance to leave the facility,” “[t]here is no evidence to
indicate that a reasonable person in his position would feel that
[such] assistance . . . would not be forthcoming.” (Stansbury, at
p. 834.)
Furthermore, the fact that defendant was left alone in the
rooms for brief periods does not mean he was unlawfully
detained. Although Longmire left the interview rooms more
than once, he returned within minutes each time. Even when
he was not present in the room, Longmire was in close proximity
and attentive to defendant, as indicated by the fact that he came
back when defendant knocked. Although defendant argues that
he “could have been knocking for as long as five minutes before
Longmire returned,” the record does not support his argument.
Defendant bases his contention on Longmire’s statement that
“[t]here was a period probably four or five minutes before I
returned to the room where Mr. Demolle knocked on the door
and I came back to answer.” However, Longmire’s statement
was given in response to a question asking, “When during that
period from 11:54 [a.m.] till 12:10 [p.m.] was he not alone?”
After Longmire answered as described above, counsel then
followed up, “So that conversation [at the doorway] occurred
very close to the end of that . . . 16-minute period between 11:54
[a.m.] and 12:10 [p.m.],” and Longmire replied, “Yes.” The
statement defendant relies upon therefore referred to Longmire

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PEOPLE v. DEMOLLE
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

returning to the room four or five minutes before 12:10 p.m., in
response to defendant’s knocking. We do not understand
Longmire’s statement to mean that defendant was knocking for
four or five minutes before Longmire responded.
Moreover, there is no indication that Longmire “would not
have let defendant leave during that period [that he was in a
locked room alone] — even to go to the bathroom — without
having first” obtained authorization from someone else. (Green,
supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 136.) Given the other circumstances
associated with defendant’s presence at the police station, a
reasonable person would not have felt that “assistance in
leaving the facility would not be forthcoming” simply because
Longmire (and Brock) had momentarily left the interview
rooms. (Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 834.)
Fourth, defendant contends that he was never told “he
could leave at any time, or that he had a right to refuse his
consent.” This argument does little to advance defendant’s case.
We do not understand defendant as arguing that his consent
was actually involuntary. Instead, his claim remains that his
consent was the product of an illegal detention. Insofar as the
failure to inform defendant that he could leave or refuse the
officers’ requests is relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry,
we conclude that in light of the other surrounding
circumstances, the absence of such an advisement does not
compel the conclusion that he was detained. (See Zamudio,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 346 [explaining that while the
“defendant also notes that the officers never told him he did not
have to talk or go with them, or that he was free to leave” the
United States Supreme Court “has ‘rejected . . . the suggestion
that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to
refuse’ police requests” and “[n]o ‘presumption of invalidity

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attaches if a citizen consented without explicit notification that
he or she was free to refuse to cooperate’ ”] see also Mendenhall,
supra, 446 U.S. at p. 555 [“Our conclusion that no seizure
occurred is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not
expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to
cooperate with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her
responses does not depend upon her having been so
informed”].)10
In sum, we conclude that defendant’s encounter with the
police on August 6 was consensual and he was not illegally
detained when he consented to have his blood drawn.
Accordingly, his motion to suppress was properly denied.
2. Alleged juror bias
a. Background
Defendant raises several claims relating to the alleged
bias of Juror No. 7. During voir dire, the trial court impressed

10
Furthermore, the record supports the conclusion that
defendant did, in fact, know that “he had a right to refuse his
consent,” as he exercised that right earlier in the interview. (See
United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 206 [“ ‘knowledge
of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into
account’ ” when assessing whether a suspicionless search was
voluntary]; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704.)
When Longmire first asked for defendant’s consent to do a blood
draw, defendant declined, and the interview proceeded in the
same manner as before. When defendant subsequently agreed
to a blood draw, he stated that although he did not like needles,
he had “no problems [giving blood] if that’s going [to] . . . help
out.” These circumstances support the conclusion that
defendant knew he could refuse to give his consent without
consequence, and that when he consented, he did so to “help out”
rather than because he reasonably thought he would be
detained until he agreed to the blood draw.

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upon prospective jurors the need to be fair, and as part of its
effort, gave an example of a case where the court recused itself
after concluding it could not be fair in a particular case. The
court told panels of the venire some version of the following:
“I’m starting my 24th year now as a judge and I’ve tried
hundreds of cases, all in the criminal area, and I’ve seen the
worst of the worst. However, I’m also an animal lover. One of
the first cases I was given had to do with a case that dealt with
cruelty to animals. While we were putting on this hearing and
I’m sitting there and I’m already figuring what I’m going to
sentence this person to before anybody ever found him guilty. I
realized that and so I called the lawyers together and I said, you
know what? You need to try this before somebody else because
I’m not going to be able to be fair. I recused myself and the case
went somewhere. To this day, I will not take a case that deals
with that. Now, I can handle a lot of other different types of
cases, but that’s just one based on the way I perceive things and
how I feel about things that I know I can’t be fair.”
In her oral examination, Juror No. 7 confirmed her ability
to be fair in the present case although it involved the rape and
killing of an 11-year-old girl, and the juror taught kindergarten
through eighth grade students. The juror said, “I feel that every
human life is important. So to me, kid, child, adult, doesn’t
really matter.” However, she continued, “If this was an animal
case, I absolutely would have a problem with an animal. I
volunteer at an animal shelter and I [don’t] know whether it’s
right or wrong, it just would really bother me if it was . . . I don’t
think I could be impartial if it came to an animal.” Defense
counsel subsequently discussed this topic with Juror No. 7,
asking, “You indicated . . . that you could be impartial in this
case. But if it were an animal involved, you might not be

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impartial.” Juror No. 7 confirmed, “I just love animals. And
they just have a different place in my heart than, I guess, people
do. They don’t always get . . . . I think it’s hard for me because
I work at a shelter that I feel bad for them.” Juror No. 7 also
stated that “growing up,” she “always had several dogs,”
“[s]ometimes hamsters,” and “[o]ne time chickens.”
During the guilt phase, one of the witnesses, Delores Hill,
testified to defendant’s activities around the time Jaquita went
missing. Hill stated defendant was “hanging out in front,
playing with his BB gun or playing music.” When the prosecutor
followed up by inquiring, “You say playing with a BB gun, what
do you mean about that,” Hill responded that defendant “had a
BB gun that he would play with. He would shoot at the fence or
in the air, shoot at birds, things like that.” (Italics added.) With
the jury still present, defense counsel moved to strike the
testimony about shooting at birds and stated defendant never
“hit a bird.” The trial court granted the motion. Upon cross-
examination of Hill, defense counsel elicited from her that
“during the entire time [Hill] knew [defendant]” she had not
known him “to do physical harm to any living creature, animal,
fish, person, anybody, anything,” “[n]ot even an ant.”
Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for
a mistrial or “alternatively . . . taking Juror Number Seven off
the panel [and] replacing her with an alternate.” In support of
his motion, counsel asserted that when the prosecutor “asked
the question about shooting at the birds, [Juror No. 7] was
crying after she heard that.” The trial court disputed defense
counsel’s observation, stating “I’ve been observing this juror
pretty closely and . . . I didn’t see her crying and I didn’t see
her . . . stop taking notes [or] . . . do anything other than [what]

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she’s been doing. She sits closest to me and I did not observe
any unusual behavior on her part.”
The prosecutor, too, stated he did not see Juror No. 7
display any unusual behavior. The prosecutor also explained
his purpose for eliciting Hill’s testimony. First, the prosecutor
wanted to “establish that in the . . . hours leading up to the
offense, that the defendant was his normal, happy self,”
engaging in “normal activities,” “to counter any kind of claim
later that something was wrong with him medically or
physically that day because he was vomiting.” Second, the
prosecutor intended to lay a foundation to rebut, as necessary,
defendant’s statement that he had never seen Jaquita before the
day he raped and killed her. According to the prosecutor,
Jaquita had told one of her classmates about “this weird
neighbor [who] would shoot at birds with his BB gun” and “that
weird neighbor had tried to talk to her . . . and she . . . rebuffed
him.” The prosecutor was uncertain that he would pursue the
issue with the classmate but wanted to have the information
“out there, depending upon what develops.” Ultimately, the
prosecution did not introduce any further testimony involving
defendant shooting at birds.
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial and,
implicitly, the motion to replace Juror No. 7. In its ruling, the
court emphasized that it had stricken the testimony, that jurors
would be instructed “to treat [the stricken testimony] as [if] they
haven’t heard it,” that defense counsel “got the same witness to
testify she never saw [defendant] hurt anything,” and the court
did not observe any signs of emotional distress on the part of the
juror. Nonetheless, the court stated it “will consider any
[special] instruction” on the issue that counsel wished to
propose. The court, however, cautioned the defense to “keep[] in

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mind that counsel” acted “at their own risk draw[ing] attention
to something that’s not that big a deal probably in light of the
crime that’s been charged and the circumstances of the crime.”
The subject of defendant shooting at birds was not
mentioned again in front of the jury, and defense counsel did not
propose any special instruction concerning the issue. At the end
of both the guilt and penalty phases, the court included in its
instructions CALJIC No. 1.02, which in relevant part states, “Do
not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence that was
rejected, or any evidence that was stricken by the court; treat it
as though you had never heard of it.” The court also instructed
the jury with the standard instructions that directed jurors to
“accept and follow the law,” not to be influenced by prejudice,
and to base their deliberations “solely upon the evidence
properly admitted during the trial.”
b. Analysis
Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible
error in (1) denying his motion for a mistrial, (2) refusing to
discharge Juror No. 7, and (3) failing to conduct an adequate
inquiry to determine whether Juror No. 7 should have been
discharged.
i. Mistrial
“[A] mistrial should be granted ‘only when “ ‘a party’s
chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably
damaged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 873
(Burgener).) In addition, “ ‘ “A mistrial should be granted if the
court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by
admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular
incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative
matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion

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in ruling on mistrial motions.” ’ ” (People v. Lucero (2000)
23 Cal.4th 692, 713–714 (Lucero); accord, People v. Jablonski
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 828 (Jablonski) [“Denial of a motion for a
mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion”].)
We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court
acted within its discretion in concluding that the challenged
testimony here — that defendant used his BB gun to “shoot at
birds” — did not irreparably damage defendant’s ability to
receive a fair trial (see Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 873) or
result in incurable prejudice to defendant (see Lucero, supra,
23 Cal.4th at p. 714). The testimony was brief, and it was
immediately stricken by the trial court. The court later
instructed the jury to consider only evidence that was properly
admitted, and not to let prejudice affect its decision. We
presume the jury followed these instructions. (People v. Beck
and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 634.) Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its considerable
discretion in denying defendant’s mistrial motion. (See People
v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 764–765 [defendant failed to
show that testimony describing someone as his “ ‘henchman’ ”
caused him incurable prejudice, where testimony was fleeting
and stricken by the trial court]; Burgener, at p. 874 [“We do not
agree the isolated references to an escape, immediately followed
by an admonition to disregard them, mandated a mistrial”]; id.
at pp. 875–876 [same, regarding evidence of an uncharged
shooting]; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 839
[upholding the trial court’s denial of a mistrial motion when the
court inadvertently failed to strike a statement because “at no
time during the subsequent progress of the trial was the jury’s
attention recalled to the statement, whether by an (undesired)
admonishment, argument of counsel, or otherwise”; the

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statement was “amply rebutted”; and “the jury was not told a
damaging falsehood”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771,
838 [when the challenged evidence “was withdrawn, and the
jury admonished to disregard it,” the “danger of prejudice” is
“reduc[ed]”].)
Defendant nonetheless contends that the testimony here
had a prejudicial impact because of Juror No. 7’s particular love
of animals. He reasons that the testimony that was elicited
“would trigger [this] specific juror’s previously-declared bias and
thus impede her ability to be impartial.” We reject defendant’s
claim that Juror No. 7 was unable to be impartial in this case.
After the trial court discussed a case involving animal cruelty,
Juror No. 7 indicated that she “would have a problem” with an
“animal case.” But defendant’s capital trial did not require the
jury to determine any issues involving defendant’s treatment of
animals, and the court could have readily deemed this capital
matter as not amounting to an “animal case.” Far from
evidencing bias, as the trial court and the prosecutor observed,
Juror No. 7 appeared unaffected by the testimony that
defendant shot at birds. (Cf. People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th
398, 461; People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989 (Beeler)
[stating that “the trial court was in the best position to observe
the juror’s demeanor” in determining whether to discharge the
juror].)
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by considering Juror No. 7’s reaction and
noting that it did not observe Juror No. 7 crying or acting
abnormally when Hill testified that defendant shot at birds.
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by “simply
rel[ying] on its own observations of Juror [No.] 7’s demeanor”
and failing to consider “the state of mind of the juror and not the

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judge” in ruling on the mistrial motion. But not only is it
appropriate for the court to make such an observation (People v.
Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 461; Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 989), the court also made clear the information was relevant
because defense counsel had made a contrary assertion. It was
defense counsel who first contended that Juror No. 7 “was
crying after she heard” Hill’s testimony. The court disputed the
accuracy of counsel’s statement, remarking, “[Juror No. 7] sits
closest to me and I did not observe any unusual behavior on her
part.” Although the court later “reiterat[ed]” its observation, it
did not deny defendant’s mistrial motion on that basis alone.
Instead, the court emphasized that it had stricken the testimony
and would inform jurors “that a motion to strike means to treat
[the testimony] as [though] they haven’t heard it.”
Further, although stopping short of accusing the
prosecutor of misconduct, defendant contends the prosecutor
“intentionally elicited the prejudicial testimony.” Defendant
does not explain how this framing materially alters the analysis.
We have found that even when “the prosecutor’s questions
elicited [the] defendant’s [inappropriate] testimony” and “the
prosecutor’s questions were improper,” that circumstance is not
a ground in itself to find that a court “abuse[d] its discretion in
denying [a] mistrial motion.” (People v. O’Malley (2016)
62 Cal.4th 944, 998–999 (O’Malley).) Ultimately, defendant’s
contention that the prosecutor acted deliberately does not
persuade us that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
motion for mistrial.
Defendant further argues that the instruction to disregard
the stricken testimony could not have cured the prejudice
caused by Hill’s testimony. (See Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at
p. 713 [“ ‘ “A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised

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of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or
instruction” ’ ”].) “There is a difference,” defendant contends,
“between instructing the jury generally that improperly
admitted evidence should be ignored and attempting to cure an
individual juror’s personal biases with such an instruction.”
Defendant’s argument presupposes that Juror No. 7 was
personally biased against defendant because of Hill’s testimony.
As discussed, the trial court acted well within its discretion in
rejecting defendant’s argument. (See People v. Chatman (2006)
38 Cal.4th 344, 369–370 [“Whether a particular incident is
incurably prejudicial requires a nuanced, fact-based analysis”
that “is entrusted [to the trial court’s] broad discretion”].)
Defendant also observes that the trial court “cautioned
[defense] counsel multiple times that . . . an instruction”
directing the jury to disregard Hill’s testimony “would only
highlight [the] prejudicial testimony.” According to defendant,
the court’s statement demonstrates that “the trial court itself
had grave doubts as to whether the prejudice was curable by
instruction.” Defendant misreads the record. While the court
told defense counsel that a special instruction would be “at
[counsel’s] own risk,” the court reasoned the “risk” was that
counsel may “draw[] attention to something that’s not that big a
deal.” The court did not imply that the stricken testimony was
prejudicial, or that the jury would be unable to comply with an
instruction to disregard the testimony. (See People v.
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 454 [presuming that the jury
followed the trial court’s admonition even when the admonition
was “not to watch television” and “[d]efense counsel
characterized [the idea that jurors followed the instruction] as
‘wishful thinking’ and moved for a mistrial”]; O’Malley, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 999 [the challenged testimony “was not so

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necessarily prejudicial that we should set aside the normal
presumption that the jury followed the court’s admonition”].)
We conclude the isolated comment regarding defendant
using his BB gun to shoot at birds did not mandate a mistrial.
The challenged testimony was brief (consisting of three words in
total); isolated (no other mention of defendant shooting at birds
was made during the remainder of the trial); explained away (by
the witness’s statement she had never seen defendant hurt any
animals); and stricken from the record (immediately after the
testimony was offered and the defense objected); also, jurors
were twice instructed to treat the testimony “as though [they]
had never heard of it.” (CALJIC No. 1.02.)
Because we conclude the trial court could reasonably find
that defendant’s chances of receiving a fair trial were not
irreparably damaged by the testimony regarding his shooting at
birds, we also conclude the court’s denial of the mistrial motion
did not violate defendant’s right to due process and to a fair and
reliable penalty determination. (See People v. Bolden (2002)
29 Cal.4th 515, 555 [finding no due process violation in a trial
court’s denial of a mistrial motion based on a brief reference to
a defendant’s parole status; the challenged testimony “was not
significant in the context of the entire guilt trial, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant’s
chances of receiving a fair trial had not been irreparably
damaged”].)
ii. Discharge of juror
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
discharge Juror No. 7 pursuant to section 1089, which provides
in relevant part, “If at any time, whether before or after the final
submission of the case to the jury, a juror . . . upon other good

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cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or
her duty, . . . the court may order the juror to be
discharged . . . .”
“ ‘Before an appellate court will find error in failing to
excuse a seated juror, the juror’s inability to perform a juror’s
functions must be shown by the record to be a “demonstrable
reality.” The court will not presume bias, and will uphold the
trial court’s exercise of discretion on whether a seated juror
should be discharged for good cause under section 1089 if
supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Jablonski, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 807.)
We conclude the trial court’s decision to retain Juror No. 7
is supported by substantial evidence that the juror did not
display actual bias against defendant and was able to be
impartial in this case. As discussed, the testimony regarding
defendant’s shooting at birds did not turn this capital matter
into an animal-related case. Juror No. 7 stated, “If this was an
animal case, I absolutely would have a problem with an animal,”
after hearing the court discuss a case involving animal cruelty.
Against that backdrop, the trial court could have reasonably
understood the juror’s inability to be impartial as triggered only
when the matter at hand involved charges of animal
mistreatment — not when, as here, there was a single remark
about defendant shooting at birds with a BB gun. Moreover, in
the context of a capital trial for the murder of an 11-year-old girl,
it is hard to imagine that even a staunch animal lover would
have been distracted by a brief, immediately struck, and
promptly rebutted statement that defendant would “shoot at
birds.”

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Because the trial court could have reasonably determined
that Juror No. 7’s inability to perform the functions of a juror
was not shown to be a demonstrable reality, there was no error
in failing to discharge her. (See People v. Martinez (2010)
47 Cal.4th 911, 943 [upholding the trial court’s decision not to
discharge a juror when “[t]he record before us does not show that
[the juror’s] interaction with [an investigator working for the
District Attorney] caused her to learn more about defendant’s
juvenile record” and “[t]herefore, defendant fails to show that
she was unable to fulfill her functions as a juror”]; Jablonski,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 807; Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 989.)
In maintaining that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to discharge Juror No. 7, defendant again argues that the
court should have declared a mistrial and contends that
“Juror 7’s statements unequivocally demonstrate that she
would have been subject to a challenge for cause [during jury
selection] had the defense known that the prosecutor intended
to present evidence showing [defendant] spent his days shooting
at birds . . . and based on the record, such challenge would have
been granted.” But whether defense counsel would have
challenged Juror No. 7 for cause is not dispositive of whether
Juror No. 7 harbored bias. It does not affect our substantial
evidence analysis nor alter our conclusion that the evidence
supports the trial court’s decision to retain the juror.
iii. Failure to conduct further inquiry
While maintaining that the record “clearly indicates”
Juror No. 7 was subject to dismissal, defendant argues in the
alternative that if we find “the record is insufficient to establish
that Juror 7 was actually biased,” then we should conclude “the
trial court committed reversible error” “in failing to conduct any

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inquiry into the juror’s state of mind before denying the motion
for her discharge.” Because “no trial court action by the defense
[is] required to preserve [a] claim” that “the trial court erred by
failing, sua sponte, to conduct an adequate inquiry” in this
respect, we review defendant’s contention despite his failure to
request an inquiry at trial. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th
401, 506–507 (Cowan).)
“The decision whether to investigate the possibility of
juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct . . . rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The court does
not abuse its discretion simply because it fails to investigate any
and all new information obtained about a juror during trial. [¶]
As our cases make clear, a hearing is required only where the
court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would
constitute ‘good cause’ to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his
duties and would justify his removal from the case.” (People v.
Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343 (Ray).)
We conclude that defendant has not pointed to any
information possessed by the trial court that, “if proven to be
true,” would establish that Juror No. 7 was biased against him.
(Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 343.) Defendant simply relies on
the juror’s voir dire answers and Hill’s testimony that defendant
shot at birds to assert “the trial court was aware that Juror 7
might not be able to remain fair and impartial.” The court heard
Juror No. 7’s voir dire responses and Hill’s challenged
statement, and it observed Juror No. 7’s demeanor after hearing
Hill’s testimony. Based on this evidence, the court struck Hill’s
statement but declined to declare a mistrial or discharge Juror
No. 7.

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This record fails to establish the trial court abused its
discretion by not inquiring further into Juror No. 7’s ability to
deliberate fairly. This case is analogous to others in which we
have upheld a trial court’s decision not to conduct such inquiries.
In Cowan, for example, the court had information that a juror
was sitting “ ‘right next’ ” to two of the defendant’s family
members who were also witnesses and who were talking with
one another. (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 504; see id. at
p. 507.) The defendant there argued the trial court should have
“conduct[ed] an investigation adequate to determine if Juror
No. 045829 had been speaking with defendant’s family members
or had overheard anything connected with the trial.” (Id. at
p. 505.) We found no merit to the claim, reasoning that “[a]t
best, the trial court possessed ambiguous information
suggesting that Juror No. 045829 may or may not have been
talking to defendant’s relatives who also were witnesses at the
penalty phase.” (Id. at p. 507.) Given such “ambiguous
information,” “the court reasonably could have concluded that
there were no grounds for believing good cause to excuse Juror
No. 045829 might exist.” (Id. at pp. 507, 508.)
Similarly, in People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 675,
jurors may have been exposed to statements extraneous to the
record, as “two police officers were discussing material
contained in their police reports . . . in the hallway where jurors
could overhear them.” The defendant complained, and the court
admonished the jury “ ‘not to consider anything that’s said
outside the courtroom.’ ” (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant
contended the court should have gone further and investigated
because jurors “might have heard a discussion so prejudicial
that no admonition could cure it.” (Ibid.) We rejected the claim.
We found the court did not have any information that would

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obligate it to inquire further, and “any prejudice that may have
arisen [from the jurors overhearing the officers] was cured by
events immediately following defendant’s complaint to the
court, which strictly admonished the jurors not to consider
anything they might hear beyond the witness stand.” (Id. at
p. 676; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1349
(Bradford) [concluding it was “apparent the trial court
reasonably determined that a further interruption in the
proceedings to address the matter [of a juror sleeping during two
days of trial] was not justified by the conduct thus far exhibited
by the juror” and that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by not conducting an inquiry”]; Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 344
[affirming a trial court’s decision not to conduct a further
inquiry when the court learned that one of the jurors worked at
the same high school attended by a victim’s daughter].)
We thus conclude the court did not err by failing to conduct
a sua sponte inquiry regarding Juror No. 7’s ability to remain
impartial after Hill’s brief and isolated testimony.
3. Admission of testimony regarding extramarital
affair
a. Background
Defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by
allowing Hill, defendant’s neighbor, to testify that she had an
extramarital relationship with him. As previously explained,
Hill testified that she had lent defendant her car, which he then
used to transport and dump Jaquita’s body. After providing his
recorded statement to the police, defendant told Hill he could
not have killed Jaquita because “he didn’t have time to commit
a crime like that.” According to Hill, defendant explained that
strangling someone “takes a long time,” “30, 45 minutes,

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sometimes up to an hour.” Hill did not report this statement to
law enforcement until September 2006, shortly before
defendant’s trial began, even though she reported defendant’s
borrowing of her car as soon as the police arrested him in August
1999.11
The prosecution filed a pretrial motion seeking permission
to introduce at trial the fact that Hill and defendant, who was
married, had sexual relations. The prosecution argued the
sexual relationship was relevant to explain (1) why defendant
told Hill he could not have killed Jaquita, and (2) why Hill did
not immediately report the information to the police. The
defense objected, stating that the evidence was irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial. The defense characterized the “affair” as
“very minor,” noting Hill and defendant “two times . . . had some
intimacy, but . . . they were very quick and not very
meaningful.” According to the defense, because the jury was
going to learn that Hill was “a neighbor” and “a good friend,” it
did not need to know other details of her relationship with
defendant.
After considering the parties’ respective arguments, the
court ruled it would not permit the prosecution to introduce the
fact that defendant had extramarital affairs with multiple
women. However, the court stated it would allow Hill to testify
about her affair with defendant. The court found defendant’s
“relationship with Ms. Hill [to be] probative as to her motive for

11
Defendant states that Hill disclosed the information eight
years after his arrest. The record shows that a period of about
seven years and one month had elapsed in between defendant’s
arrest and when Hill related to law enforcement the substance
of her conversation with defendant.

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why she said what she said and when she said it.” Regarding
prejudice, the court referenced former president Bill Clinton and
stated that in its view, “in this day and time a short-term
extramarital affair is not going to cast somebody in such a
negative light that it’s going to inflame or impassion the jury
against the defendant.” The court thus found that “the
probative value [of Hill’s relationship with defendant] outweighs
the prejudicial effect insofar as it goes to her interest, bias or
motive for telling the police [officer] what she told him and when
she told him.” The court indicated that it “would be open to a
limiting instruction to be given to the jury” concerning the
proper purposes for which jurors could consider Hill’s testimony.
At trial, the prosecution elicited from Hill details
concerning defendant’s activities on the day that Jaquita went
missing and shortly thereafter. Hill testified that she was
defendant’s next-door neighbor, that she was home on the day
of Jaquita’s disappearance, and that as it got dark that day, she
heard music from defendant’s apartment being turned up in
volume and put on repeat play. Around this time, Hill also
heard a “very loud” noise from defendant’s apartment “that
woke [her] up,” but when she went to check, defendant told her
he did not hear any noise and she should “go back to sleep.” A
short time later, defendant came to Hill’s apartment, “hyper,”
“in a rush,” and asked to borrow her car so that he could visit a
sick aunt. Hill lent defendant her car, and he left and came back
in about 20 minutes, at which point “[h]e was calm like
everything was okay.” Hill further testified that she talked to
the police the day that defendant was arrested and told officers
about lending defendant her car and hearing the loud noise.
Hill also provided an account of events that occurred after
Jaquita was killed. Hill testified that the day before he was

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arrested, defendant told her about his trip to the police station
to give a memorialized statement. During this conversation,
defendant denied his involvement in Jaquita’s killing, stating,
“[I]t couldn’t have been him, because he didn’t have time to
commit a crime like that.” Defendant asked Hill if she knew
“how long it takes to actually choke somebody.” When Hill said
she did not, defendant explained “that it’s a lot longer than what
they think it is on T.V. It’s not just a couple minutes.” As
defendant related to Hill, “you have to choke them and then they
pass out first. And then after that, their heart is still beating so
you have to keep choking them until their heart stop[s]. . . . [I]t
takes a long time . . . 30, 45 minutes, sometimes up to an hour
to do it.” Hill testified she told a friend what defendant said to
her.
The prosecutor elicited from Hill that when she talked to
the police after defendant’s arrest, she did not disclose what
defendant said about the time that it takes to choke someone,
and in fact, withheld the information for seven years. When
asked why she did not come forward with the information
earlier, Hill responded, “I didn’t want to really be tied into it like
that. I didn’t want to be, you know, like — like I had something
to do with it or [was] involved or knew something more . . .
because I had contacts, sexual contact, with [defendant], I didn’t
want that out there. So I just didn’t say anything at that time.”
The prosecutor clarified that Hill was “worried” that, because of
her sexual relationship with defendant, “somebody might think
[¶] . . . [¶] that [she] had involvement in this [crime].”
Regarding the “sexual contact” between Hill and
defendant, Hill had earlier testified that she had two sexual
encounters with defendant “a few months prior” to Jaquita’s
disappearance. The sexual nature of the relationship evidently

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ceased after the second incident, and Hill was “okay . . . talking
with [defendant] and interacting with him” afterward.
After Hill’s testimony concluded, the defense explained it
did not want a limiting instruction because it “felt [an
instruction] would unduly emphasize the fact that [defendant]
cheated on his wife and therefore, it would be better just to let
it go.” Accordingly, no instruction was given on this subject.
b. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred in not finding
evidence of his extramarital relationship inadmissible either
because it was irrelevant or because it should have been
excluded under Evidence Code section 352. We review the trial
court’s decision to admit Hill’s testimony for abuse of discretion.
(See, e.g., People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 491.)
As the trial court noted, the fact that defendant and Hill
had a sexual relationship was relevant to Hill’s credibility on the
stand, including her testimony that defendant told her it takes
“30, 45 minutes, sometimes up to an hour” to fatally choke
someone.12 In particular, defendant’s and Hill’s intimate
relationship could have bolstered Hill’s credibility by explaining

12
The time it takes to manually strangle someone is, in turn,
relevant to establish the elements of premeditation and intent
to kill. (See, e.g., People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020
[“While ligature strangulation may not always evidence a
premeditated murder [citation], the jury could have viewed the
strangulation as a deliberate manner of killing sufficient to
indicate a ‘preconceived design’ ”].) Because defendant pleaded
not guilty at trial, the People were “obliged to present during the
guilt phase competent, admissible evidence establishing the
essential elements of the crimes with which [he] was charged.”
(Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 188.)

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why defendant “would say these things” to her and why she did
not disclose the information to the police for seven years.
Although defendant maintains he and Hill were friends, thus
explaining why he would have this conversation with her, one
could reasonably conclude that friends who had a sexual
relationship were more likely to confide in each other. Their
relationship was also relevant to explain why Hill refrained
from telling the police about defendant’s statements. Hill
testified she was concerned that if people knew what defendant
had told her and knew that she and defendant had a sexual
relationship, they would think she was involved in the crime.
The trial court therefore did not err in concluding that
Hill’s sexual contact with defendant was relevant. (See Evid.
Code, §§ 210 [“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including
evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay
declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action” (italics added)]; 780 [identifying a nonexhaustive list
of factors “the court or jury may consider in determining the
credibility of a witness,” including “[t]he existence or
nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive”]; People v.
Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337 [“In determining the
credibility of a witness, the jury may consider any matter that
has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness
of his testimony at the hearing, including but not limited to: . . .
the existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other
motive; . . . and his admission of untruthfulness”]; People v.
Sweeney (1960) 55 Cal.2d 27, 41 (Sweeney) [“The challenged
evidence was properly admissible as bearing on the interest and
bias of [a witness] and was not rendered improper because it
disclosed defendant’s extramarital relationship. The state of

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mind of a witness as to bias, prejudice, interest involved,
friendship or hostility toward a party are all proper subjects for
investigation in the trial of a case”].)
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the possibility of undue prejudice.
(See Evid. Code, § 352.) Section 352 of the Evidence Code
“authorizes the exclusion of evidence by the trial court when its
probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ The ‘undue
prejudice’ that Evidence Code section 352 is concerned with ‘ “is
that which ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against
the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect
on the issues.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186,
222 (Pineda).) Hill’s testimony on the subject of the sexual
relationship was brief, amounting to about two pages of
transcript in testimony that spanned over 30 pages. The affair
itself was of limited duration. In concluding that evidence of
such “a short-term extramarital affair” was not so unduly
prejudicial as to require its exclusion, the court expressly stated
it had weighed the probative value of the evidence against any
prejudicial effect, indicated it would consider a limiting
instruction, and excluded evidence of defendant’s other
extramarital affairs. In sum, the court conscientiously
considered the issue and acted within its discretion in admitting
Hill’s testimony. (See Sweeney, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 41–42
[“ ‘[The] admission of . . . evidence [bearing on the interest and
bias of a witness] is error only where it bears no materiality to
the issues involved in the case’ ”].)

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Defendant fails to advance a persuasive basis to conclude
the trial court erred in admitting the challenged testimony.
Defendant asserts that People v. Houston (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 279, a case the prosecution cited to the trial
court, is distinguishable from the circumstances of his case. In
Houston, we affirmed the trial court’s decision to permit two
witnesses to each testify “at trial that she had had an affair with
[the defendant] during [the defendant’s] marriage to [his wife],”
whom he was charged with having murdered. (Id. at p. 285; see
id. at p. 283.) We concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion “pursuant to [Evidence Code] section 352 in
admitting any of the extramarital affairs evidence.” (Id. at
p. 308.) We do not need to resolve whether Houston is
instructive in the matter before us. Regardless of whether
Houston is on all fours with this case, the trial court did not rely
on Houston in making its ruling, and neither do we.
Defendant also contends that the reliability of Hill’s
testimony could have been corroborated in other ways, including
by calling to the stand Hill’s friend with whom she shared the
conversation she had with defendant. But the possibility that
other testimony might have served a similar purpose does not
establish that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence of Hill’s and defendant’s relationship. (See People v.
Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1138 [“where, as here, the
prosecution must convince the fact finder, beyond reasonable
doubt, of charges and allegations the defendant has not
conceded, it need not sanitize its case by presenting only enough
evidence to meet bare legal sufficiency”].)
Finally, defendant asserts the trial court misjudged the
potential for prejudice. To support his assertion, defendant cites
a Gallup poll purportedly demonstrating that “adultery was

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morally unacceptable for an overwhelming majority of the
American public.” But even if we were to assume that adultery
is commonly regarded as morally unacceptable, that would not
be determinative of whether under the particular facts
presented here, the probative value of Hill’s testimony on this
subject was substantially outweighed by the threat of undue
prejudice occasioned by its introduction. (See, e.g., People v.
Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 609 (Jones).)
Defendant also stresses that because he was “defending
against capital charges” and “sex crimes,” evidence concerning
any “sexual misbehavior . . . has an enormous potential for
prejudice.” The trial court, however, could have reasonably
concluded that evidence of a consensual sexual relationship with
an adult is distinct from the rape of an 11-year-old girl, such
that any potential of undue prejudice was not so great as to
require exclusion of the former simply because defendant was
accused of the latter. Within the context of this case, evidence
of Hill’s and defendant’s relationship was not the sort of
evidence that “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias
against the defendant as an individual and which has very little
effect on the issues.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Pineda, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 222.)
B. Penalty Phase Issues
1. Admission of victim impact evidence
a. Background
The prosecution offered victim impact evidence at the
penalty phase by introducing testimony from three of Jaquita’s
family members and her fifth-grade teacher, Christine Mohler.
Because whether and how Mohler would testify was a
contested issue below, the prosecution made an extensive offer
of proof. According to the prosecution, Mohler would testify that

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she had “a very special relationship with Jaquita” and “Jaquita
was her favorite student.” To illustrate the “importance of
Jaquita in [Mohler’s] life,” Mohler would relate that she talked
to her husband about Jaquita. As another example of the impact
Jaquita had on Mohler’s life, Mohler would testify that in an
end-of-year presentation to colleagues, she used journal entries
written by Jaquita “to talk about the importance of not giving
up and labeling kids.” The prosecution made a similar
argument regarding a report card that Mohler had prepared for
Jaquita. More generally, the prosecution argued that Mohler’s
testimony would demonstrate for the jury the impact that
Jaquita’s death had on the communities that were most
important to her: “her family and . . . her school.”
The defense sought to exclude Mohler’s testimony on the
ground that Mohler was “not really family or close enough.”
Alternatively, the defense argued Mohler’s testimony should be
kept “narrow” and neither the journal entries nor the report
card should be introduced.
After considering the parties’ arguments, the court ruled
it would allow Mohler to testify along the lines of the proffer.
The court explained that the subjects covered by Mohler’s
testimony were “directly related to [defendant’s] moral
culpability.” Given that “elementary school is [one] area of [a
child’s] community” and teachers develop “a close affinity” with
their students, the court discerned “nothing inflammatory or
outrageous about having a [fifth] grader’s elementary school
teacher come and talk about what she meant to her as a teacher,
what she meant to the class and allow her to comment on the
impact of having her taken from her classmates and from her
teacher, particularly in light of the fact [that] if you look at the

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victim’s writings it’s apparent that there was a closeness
between [Jaquita and Mohler].”
Mohler testified consistently with the offer of proof. At the
beginning of her testimony, Mohler provided some biographical
details, telling the jury where she lived and that she was
married and had children. Mohler volunteered that she was a
teacher, at which point the prosecution asked for her
educational background “for her to be able to be a teacher.” The
defense objected; the trial court overruled the objection, and
Mohler informed the jury she “went to college and got a college
degree . . . [and] had to take teaching classes and do student
teaching.”
Regarding her relationship with Jaquita, Mohler testified
that during her first year as a teacher, she taught Jaquita’s fifth
grade class. Mohler told the jury that Jaquita “was living with
her aunt . . . [because] her parents weren’t able to take care of
her,” that she “struggled” academically as “[s]chool did not come
easy for her,” but that she was “bubbly and just really
personable” and “she really was motivated and worked hard and
tried to get through some of the things she struggled with.”
Mohler also described her relationship with Jaquita,
stating she “spent the most time with Jaquita” during the school
year, “working with her . . . and trying to find ways to motivate
her.” Mohler admitted she was “a very idealistic first-year
teacher” and she “saw so much potential in [Jaquita].” Mohler
“invested . . . time” “discussing [Jaquita] with other
teachers, . . . [and] trying to come up with strategies to help her
succeed.” Mohler’s mother, who was also a teacher, came to
Mohler’s classroom and “worked one on one” with the students,
including Jaquita. Mohler’s interest in Jaquita carried “beyond

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the classroom,” as she would discuss Jaquita with her husband,
both when Jaquita was “funny” and “bubbly” but also when she
was “really sad and down” and Mohler “felt like [she] couldn’t
get through to her.” Mohler explained she felt “a special bond”
with Jaquita.
At the end of her first year of teaching, Mohler made a
presentation to her fellow teachers; Jaquita was Mohler’s “main
motivation” for the presentation because Mohler “learned so
much through the year through working with her.” As part of
this presentation, Mohler used two journal entries Jaquita had
written in class. Over unsuccessful objections by the defense,
Mohler read the journal entries to the jury. In the first entry,
Jaquita wrote that her “secret dream is to be a president for the
United States.” She wrote that although “people call [her]
stupid,” she thought she was “smart enough to be a president . . .
if [she] do[es] [her] hardest and . . . keep[s] on trying.” The
second journal entry Jaquita wrote was directly addressed to
Mohler and expressed her appreciation for Mohler’s efforts to
“make [her] learn more and let [her] write neater, plus help [her]
know how to read.” With permission from the court and over a
defense objection, the prosecution also showed an image of a
report card that Mohler had prepared for Jaquita. Mohler read
a comment she had written on the report card noting Jaquita
had made “noticeable improvements.”
Turning to the events surrounding Jaquita’s death,
Mohler testified that it was “devastating” to hear Jaquita had
been killed. Mohler was teaching summer school when she got
the news, and she talked to students who knew Jaquita. Mohler
told the jury that she remembered the students “holding back
their tears” and “consoling them during that time.” Mohler
explained that she was “grateful” to move away from the

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community after Jaquita’s death because she “couldn’t handle
the pain and it was hard to see the kids” who were Jaquita’s
friends. When asked how Jaquita’s death has affected her,
Mohler revealed that it affected both her teaching and her
parenting. Mohler concluded her testimony by stating that
Jaquita’s killing was “something you never forget” and
“something you don’t leave behind in your life.”
b. Analysis
Defendant makes two broad claims concerning the
admission of Mohler’s testimony as victim impact evidence.
First, defendant contends that the standard California
courts apply in evaluating the admissibility of victim impact
evidence falls short of what is demanded under the federal
Constitution. He asserts that to correct this misalignment, we
should repudiate our precedents and “limit victim impact
testimony to surviving victims of the crime itself, family
members or to those who have a strictly familial-type
relationship with the victim.”
These contentions lack merit. The United States Supreme
Court has held that “a State may properly conclude that for the
jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability
and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing
phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.”
(Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825 (Payne).)
Accordingly, unless “evidence is introduced that is so unduly
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair”
(ibid.), a state may “choose[] to permit the admission of victim
impact evidence” (id. at p. 827). In other words, “victim impact
evidence is only barred by the federal Constitution if it is so

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unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally
unfair.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 138 (Simon).)
In addition to this federal constitutional requirement,
“California law provides . . . that victim impact evidence is
admissible under section 190.3, factor (a) as a ‘circumstance of
the crime.’ [Citation.] Pursuant to factor (a), trial courts may
allow emotional though relevant evidence, but not irrelevant
information or inflammatory rhetoric that elicits purely
emotional or irrational responses from the jury.” (Simon, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 138.) We have said the federal constitutional and
state statutory standards under which victim impact evidence
may be admitted are “consistent” with one another. (E.g., People
v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 781 (Dykes); People v. Lewis and
Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056 (Lewis and Oliver) [“The
federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is ‘so
unduly prejudicial’ as to render the trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’
[Citation.] State law is consistent with these principles”].)
While acknowledging our precedent on this point,
defendant nonetheless claims that the two standards materially
differ. According to defendant, “There is a distinction between
evidence so minimal in probative value that it is not worth the
risk of prejudice that its introduction might engender and thus
is ‘unduly’ prejudicial, and evidence that is both so unrelated to
the defendant’s culpability and so enormously prejudicial that a
juror’s reaction to it in the context of a given case would be
‘purely irrational.’ ” He further contends that “this Court, in
practice,” has applied only the purportedly lower “purely
irrational” requirement imposed by state law in considering
challenges to the introduction of victim impact evidence.

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Contrary to defendant’s assertion, we have expressly
stated that we assess the admission of victim impact evidence
under both the federal and state standards. (See, e.g., People v.
Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 45 (Romero and Self) [“We
conclude neither the federal nor the state standard was violated
here”]; People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 298 (Verdugo)
[same]; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 792 [same];
Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1057 [“The victim
impact evidence presented here satisfied Payne and did not
surpass constitutional limits. Nor was such evidence excessive,
inflammatory, or otherwise prejudicial under state law”]; see
also Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 141 [“The victim impact
evidence was not unduly prejudicial because the testimony did
not invite the jury to form an ‘ “irrational, purely subjective
response” ’ ”]; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 646
(Taylor) [“Here, the victim impact evidence was neither unduly
prejudicial nor so inflammatory that it invited the jury to make
its penalty determination on a purely irrational basis”].) And
despite his contentions, defendant has identified no case in
which the admitted victim impact evidence should have been
excluded in accordance with federal constitutional demands
even though it passed muster under the state standard.
Because defendant fails to show that our jurisprudence on
victim impact testimony is constitutionally infirm, we decline
“to reconsider and/or limit [our] reading of Payne to hold that
victim impact evidence by individuals other than surviving
victims or family members is inadmissible.” “At core, the
holding in Payne rests on the premise that victim impact
evidence is permissible because the evidence is ‘designed to
show . . . each victim’s “uniqueness as an individual human
being” ’ and, in so doing, demonstrate ‘the specific harm caused

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by the crime in question.’ [Citation.] Given this rationale, it is
difficult to discern why, under Payne, a victim’s ‘ “uniqueness as
an individual human being” ’ may be attested to only by family
members, and not . . . by a victim’s colleagues and close friends,”
or here, a teacher with a close connection to the victim. (People
v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1025 (Ramirez); see also
Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 783 [rejecting the defendant’s
claim that we must “limit[] victim-impact evidence to
evidence . . . given by a family member who was at the scene of
the crime or immediately thereafter” and finding no error in the
admission of the testimony of a victim’s teacher]; see id. at
p. 782.)
In short, we have “ ‘repeatedly rejected’ ” invitations to
limit victim impact evidence to testimony by a victim’s family
members or those who were present at the crime scene
(Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1024; see ibid. [collecting
cases]), and we reach the same conclusion here. (See also People
v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 246 (Trinh) [“Neither the United
States Supreme Court nor this court has ever identified a
constitutional or statutory basis for so constraining the
permissible scope of victim impact testimony”].)
Defendant contends that by refusing to impose such
limits, we are “so widely open[ing] the door” that “any and all
forms of evidence purporting to show any and all ‘devastating
effects of a capital crime’ on anyone considered to be a part of
the victim’s ‘community,’ or on the general community as a
whole, is admissible.” We disagree. As discussed, the trial court
here carefully considered the scope of Mohler’s proposed
testimony. It permitted her to testify upon finding (1) that the
testimony was not “inflammatory or outrageous,” and (2) that
Mohler and the victim shared a special “closeness.” In short,

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Mohler was not just “anyone” in Jaquita’s community, and her
testimony does not amount to “any and all forms of evidence.”
Nor is it evidence so “unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair” (Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825).
Second, in the alternative, defendant asks us to find that
Mohler’s testimony “was inadmissible in whole or in part”
because it “went far beyond the reasonably foreseeable and
immediate impact of Jaquita’s murder.” The argument that
victim impact evidence must be limited to facts known or
reasonably foreseeable to a defendant “has not been accepted by
this court and is not now the law.” (People v. Thomas (2012)
54 Cal.4th 908, 941; see also Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 141
[“we have rejected these arguments — and we have done so
repeatedly”]; Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 48; Trinh,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 246 [“[The defendant] contends victim
impact testimony should have been confined to effects that were
known or reasonably should have been known by [the
defendant] at the time of the crimes or were part of the proof of
the underlying charges. We have repeatedly rejected this limit
as neither constitutionally nor statutorily warranted”]; People v.
Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1219; Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th
at p. 299; Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 647; Lewis and Oliver,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1057.) Our position on this issue is
consonant with that of the

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335516. Public record. Not legal advice.