# Ice

> District Court, D. Oregon · May 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335348

## Case

- **Full name:** Shelly I. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** May 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335348

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting a reviewing court must consider all pages in an ALJ’s decision
- holding that even when the ALJ commits legal error, a court will “uphold the decision where that error is harmless”
- noting that even if an ALJ’s decision is explained with “less-than-ideal clarity,” any error is harmless so long as the agency’s path may be reasonably discerned

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

SHELLY I.,1

Plaintiff, Case No. 6:25-cv-00524-AP

v. OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.
_____________________________

POTTER, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Shelly I. brings this action for judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying her application for disability
insurance benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner erred when (1) the ALJ failed to provide clear and
convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, (2) the ALJ found the
medical opinion of Joeth Ryan, PA-C, only partly persuasive, and (3) the ALJ rejected the lay
testimony of Plaintiff’s spouse. Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 14. For the reasons outlined below, the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

1 In the interest of privacy, this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial of the
last name of the non-governmental party in this case and any immediate family members of that
party.

1 – OPINION AND ORDER
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on August 03, 2023, alleging disability since December
31, 2020. Tr. 18, 212–19. Her claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 113,
119, 127, 131, 135, 139. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ and appeared via telephone
before the Honorable MaryKay Rauenzahn on October 24, 2024. Tr. 142–43, 37–62. After the
hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to November 03, 2022. Tr. 18, 263. In a
written decision dated December 09, 2024, ALJ Rauenzahn determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. 15–36. Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals
Council; the Appeals Council declined. Tr. 207–08, 1–6. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review.
Plaintiff was 44 years old on her amended alleged onset of disability date. See Tr. 28. She
alleges disability due to bipolar 1 disorder, depression, mania, ADHD, fibromyalgia, Barrett’s
esophagus, PTSD, insomnia, morbid obesity, sleep disorder, GERD, migraines, IBS, hematuria,
breathing problems, and shoulder problems. Tr. 65. Plaintiff has at least a high school education

and prior work experience as a caregiver, custodian, housekeeper, and office worker. Tr. 28,
284–85.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court reviews de novo an ALJ’s decision to deny benefits. Obrien v. Bisignano,
142 F.4th 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2025). When there is no legal error, the denial of benefits will only
be overturned if the ALJ’s decision “is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal
quotation and citation omitted). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an
existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the
agency's factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citation omitted).

2 – OPINION AND ORDER
This is not a high bar; substantial evidence is relevant evidence that “a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). The court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the ALJ when the evidence could support either affirming or reversing
the ALJ’s decision. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION

A person is disabled when they are unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). When determining whether someone seeking
benefits is disabled, the ALJ applies a “five-step sequential evaluation process.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4). If at any point in the five-step process the ALJ determines that
the person is or is not disabled, the process stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4);
see also Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022).
At the first step the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has performed work at or

above the level of “substantial gainful activity” during the relevant period; if so, they are not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); 416.920(a)(4)(i). The second step focuses on the
claimant’s physical or medical impairment(s); a claimant is not disabled unless they can show a
severe impairment that has lasted or is expected to last at least a year or is expected to result in
death. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the ALJ evaluates
whether the severity of the impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the
Commissioner of Social Security. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If any
impairment or combination of impairments is equivalent to one of the listed impairments, the

3 – OPINION AND ORDER
claimant is presumptively disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If not,
the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Before proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual
function capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e); 416.920(e). This analysis determines the
most a claimant can do on a sustained basis despite their limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Then, the fourth step requires an analysis of the claimant’s past
work in conjunction with their RFC; if the claimant can still do their past relevant work, they are
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At the fifth step, the question is
whether given the claimant’s present abilities, there is another type of job they can do; if the
claimant can do another job, they are not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v);
416.920(a)(4)(v). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four of the
sequential analysis, after which the burden shifts to the ALJ to show a claimant can perform any
jobs that exist in substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2);
416.960(c)(2).

Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff satisfied the first two steps of the analysis. Tr.
20–21. At step three, though, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
equal one of the impairments listed by the Commissioner. Tr. 21. The ALJ then conducted the
RFC assessment and determined that Plaintiff could perform light work, with the following
additional limitations
[T]he claimant can lift, carry, push and pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently. The claimant can stand and/or walk for approximately six
hours and sit for approximately six hours, in an eight-hour workday. The claimant
cannot climb ladders, ropes and scaffold and can occasionally climb stairs and
ramps. The claimant can occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel and crawl. The
claimant can occasionally reach overhead with the left upper extremity. The

4 – OPINION AND ORDER
claimant can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and tasks.
The claimant can perform only low stress work, which is defined as requiring
only occasional changes in work setting, occasional changes in work duties, no
work on a moving conveyor belt and no work requiring hourly quotas. The
claimant can have no general public contact, occasional work-related coworker
interaction and frequent supervisor interaction. The claimant can have no
exposure to noise greater than at the moderate level and cannot perform work in
near proximity to moving mechanical parts, nor in high, unprotected places, all as
rated by the Selective Characteristics of Occupations of the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (SCO-DOT).
Tr. 23.
At the fifth step, the ALJ determined, with the aid of testimony from the vocational
expert (VE), that Plaintiff could perform their prior work as a housekeeper. Tr. 28. Alternatively,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform work as a marker (165,000 jobs in the national
economy), routing clerk (123,000 jobs in the national economy), collator operator (31,000 jobs
in the national economy), or any other job suiting Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,
and residual functional capacity. Tr. 29.
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in three ways: (1) rejecting the Plaintiff’s own subjective
symptom testimony; (2) finding the medical opinion of PA-C Ryan only partly persuasive; and
(3) failing to properly consider the lay testimony of Plaintiff’s spouse. Pl.’s Br. 2–3.
I. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for discounting
her subjective symptom testimony. Pl.’s Br. 8–14.
“An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s testimony
regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th
Cir. 2014). The ALJ must first determine “whether the claimant has presented objective medical
evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain

5 – OPINION AND ORDER
or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). If this first step is
satisfied, and the ALJ finds no evidence of malingering, the ALJ then must determine the
intensity and persistence of symptoms by considering “all of the available evidence from . . .
medical sources and nonmedical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1); 416.929(c)(1). “[T]he
ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [their] symptoms only by offering

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15 (emphasis
added) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Specific, clear and convincing reasons are those
which “identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
complaints.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81
F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony in part because it was inconsistent
with her ability to travel and attend events. Tr. 25. First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s decision to
stop working coincided with the timing she and her husband began traveling in their RV. Tr. 27.
While it is unclear when exactly Plaintiff stopped working as a paid caregiver,2 as of January 12,

2022, therapy notes state she was “looking forward to traveling across US in RV with her
husband hopefully starting in May, excited to see [G]rand [C]anyon and many other places she
has never visited.” Tr. 589. At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that she did not begin traveling until
May, but that she set out on the road in February 2022, and “moved to Vancouver for a little
while.” Tr. 44. In April 2024, Plaintiff was looking forward to going to Mount Hood for her

2 At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that she performed no work in January 2022. Tr. 43–44.
However, counseling notes from January 12, 2022, state she was still employed as a caregiver,
and had quit only her second job at a gas station because having two jobs was too stressful. Tr.
589.

6 – OPINION AND ORDER
birthday to “enjoy the amenities and time with family.” Tr. 1023, 1028. The ALJ did not err in
finding Plaintiff’s ability to travel inconsistent with her allegations of debilitating mental health
limitations. See Wilson v. Berryhill, 732 Fed. App’x 504, 507 (9th Cir. 2018).
The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff was able to attend a car show, even though she
reported an increase in her symptoms. Tr. 27. The ALJ noted Plaintiff downplayed her ability to

travel, but “the fact that she could attend a car show in August 2024 while reporting an increase
in mental health symptoms shows that even with an increase in symptoms she is not
incapacitated and can still tolerate some public contact.” Tr. 27. Moreover, during that same
period, Plaintiff reported symptoms so extreme that she was “unable to leave her home to walk
her dog” but was planning to go to the races in Boise. Tr. 1145. Although Plaintiff testified that
she attended the car show in 2024 only briefly, and only because she had already paid for the
tickets, this was Plaintiff’s second year attending a car show during the relevant disability period.
Tr. 53.
The ALJ also noted that the objective and other medical evidence in the record did not

support the level of severity of Plaintiff’s symptom allegations. For example, Plaintiff’s migraine
headaches were well controlled with over-the-counter medication. Tr. 1044. And although
Plaintiff experienced mental health ups and downs, on balance, the ALJ concluded there was
insufficient evidence to warrant a finding of disability. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff’s symptoms
waxed and waned throughout the relevant period, but she never required inpatient or emergent
treatment for her psychiatric symptoms. Tr. 27. Additionally, Plaintiff reported her symptoms
improved with traditional counseling therapy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(vii),
416.929(c)(3)(vii) (ALJs may rely on evidence of improvement in considering a claimant’s

7 – OPINION AND ORDER
record). By September 2024, Plaintiff began to report improved symptoms, and by October, her
moods had stabilized.
In sum, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence
in partially rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Because the ALJ provided a reasonable
reading of the record, her decision will not be disturbed.

II. Medical Opinion of Joeth Ryan, PA-C
A medical opinion, in the context of SSA claims, is a statement from a medical source
about what a claimant can still do despite their physical or mental impairment-related limitations.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2); 416.913(a)(2). In deciding whether a claimant is entitled to
benefits, an ALJ must articulate how persuasive they find each of the medical opinions in a
claimant’s file. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b); 416.920c(b). The most important factors in
evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinion evidence are supportability and consistency. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2); 416.920c(b)(2). An ALJ “cannot reject an examining or treating
doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by

substantial evidence.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 739 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Woods, 32
F.4th at 792). Supportability is evaluated based on the “relevant [] objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1);
416.920c(c)(1). As to consistency, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the evidence
from medical and non-medical sources in the record, the more persuasive the medical opinion
will be. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2); 416.920c(c)(2).
On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff’s mental health provider, Joeth Ryan, PA-C, submitted a
medical opinion form in support of Plaintiff’s disability application. Tr. 1183–88. PA-C Ryan

8 – OPINION AND ORDER
stated that she has treated Plaintiff one-to-two times per week since April 2023, specifically
focusing on psychiatric medication management. Tr. 1183. PA-C Ryan opined that Plaintiff’s
symptoms could impair her ability to perform full-time work without special accommodation. Tr.
1184. PA-C Ryan rated Plaintiff as having moderate limitations in her ability to understand,
remember, and carry out simple work-related instructions, and marked limitations regarding

complex instructions. Tr. 1186. PA-C Ryan opined that Plaintiff would be off-task for 10% of a
workday and would likely be absent from work three or more days per month due to her
symptoms of anxiety, panic, and mood dysregulation. Tr. 1188.
The ALJ found PA-C Ryan’s opinion partly persuasive “only to the extent that she finds
no more than moderate limitations in the ability to perform simple and law public work.” Tr. 27
(citing Tr. 1186). The ALJ found the remainder of PA-C Ryan’s opinion unpersuasive. To start,
the ALJ found PA-C Ryan “supports her opinion with very brief explanation of the claimant’s
subjective complaints but the limits she cites are mostly vague and undefined.” Tr. 27. By way of
example, the ALJ cited to Ryan’s statement that Plaintiff could “‘possibly’ experience panic,

anxiety, inattention and mood dysregulation in a simple, low stress job.” Tr. 27. And the ALJ
found PAC-Ryan’s descriptions of Plaintiff’s limitations did not amount to a statement relaying
the most Plaintiff can do despite her impairments. Tr. 27. Finally, the ALJ found PAC-Ryan’s
opinion was “generally inconsistent with her own treatment notes that indicate ‘mood has
stabilized and anxiety has decreased.’” Tr. 27 (citing Tr. 1212).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide substantial evidence to support her
conclusions regarding PA-C Ryan’s medical opinion. Pl.’s Br. 5–8. Plaintiff argues the ALJ
failed to consider the concrete restriction to being off task for 10% of a given workday and

9 – OPINION AND ORDER
would miss three or four workdays per month. Pl.’s Br. 7. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the
single chart note relied on by the ALJ in her consistency analysis does not amount to substantial
evidence.
The Court agrees with the ALJ that limitations predicated with caveats such as “possibly”
are equivocal and therefore not supported. And, although explained with less-than-ideal clarity,

the ALJ’s decision regarding PA-C Ryan is discernible and supported by substantial evidence.
See Triechler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that
even if an ALJ’s decision is explained with “less-than-ideal clarity,” any error is harmless so
long as the agency’s path may be reasonably discerned); see also Waldram v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
35893, 2023 WL 8433769, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023) (no legal error where the ALJ
adequately explained their decision).
The concrete limitations identified by PA-C Ryan, including that Plaintiff would be off
task up to 10% of a workday and would miss multiple workdays per month, were not supported
by the explanation in the opinion. PA-C Ryan does not provide objective evidence to support her

conclusions, nor does she provide explanations that support concrete restrictions proffered.
Instead, the checkbox form supplied by PA-C Ryan merely listed “ADHD, anxiety, mood” as
symptoms that would cause the time off task. Tr. 1188.
Additionally, as the ALJ pointed out, PA-C Ryan’s opinion is largely based on Plaintiff’s
subjective testimony. Tr. 27. Indeed, most of PA-C Ryan’s chart notes indicate Plaintiff’s
appointments are conducted solely by telephone, and symptomatic descriptions are entirely based
on Plaintiff’s reports. See, e.g., Tr. 907, 915, 919, 987, 996, 1011, 1033, 1143, 1151, 1152, 1197.
And, as discussed earlier in this opinion, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s symptom

10 – OPINION AND ORDER
testimony. Thus, the ALJ properly relied on this factor in discounting PA-C Ryan’s opinion. See
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An ALJ may reject a treating
physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been
properly discounted as incredible.”) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,
602 (9th Cir. 1999)).

As to whether the ALJ’s conclusion that PA-C Ryan’s opinion was inconsistent with her
treatment notes was supported by substantial evidence, this is a closer call. As Plaintiff points
out, the ALJ provided a reference to a single chart note to support her conclusion. See Pl.’s Br. 7.
But where, as is the case here, the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674-75
(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007)). While a single chart
note may not always amount to evidence of inconsistency, in this case, given the proximity in
time between the chart note in question and the medical opinion, the single note is substantial
evidence. The medical opinion was issued two weeks after Plaintiff reported marked

improvement in her symptoms based on her new medication regimen. Tr. 1212. “Substantial
evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla’ and means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, (9th Cir.
2020) (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103) (citation modified)). Considering the ALJ’s decision in
its entirety—which this Court must do—the ALJ provided sufficient evidence to discount PA-C
Ryan’s opinion. See Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting a reviewing
court must consider all pages in an ALJ’s decision).

11 – OPINION AND ORDER
III. Lay Witness Testimony
The ALJ failed to properly consider the lay witness testimony of Plaintiff’s husband
(Justin). Justin provided two identical written statements in support of Plaintiff’s disability
petition. Tr. 291-298; 323-330. He wrote that Plaintiff struggles with pain, anxiety, fatigue, and
memory problems. He wrote that they do everything together, but how much they do depends on

Plaintiff’s mood. Id.
“An ALJ must take into account lay witness testimony as to the claimant's symptoms or
how impairments affect the claimant's ability to work.” Gerde v. Berryhill, 717 F. App’x 674,
677 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)). Here, the
ALJ merely stated that she “reviewed and considered the supportive statements and observations
from the claimant’s spouse . . . concerning her impairments and associated decreased work
capacity when determining the above residual functional capacity.” Tr. 28. This statement
provides no insight as to what degree the ALJ accepted or rejected the lay witness testimony and
is therefore error.

However, this Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s error is harmful and warrants
reversal because the evidence supports the ALJ’s ultimate nondisability determination. See
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that even when the ALJ
commits legal error, a court will “uphold the decision where that error is harmless”) (quoting
Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099) (cleaned up). An error is harmless if “it is inconsequential to the
ultimate nondisability determination,” or when, “despite the legal error, the agency's path may
reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.” Id.
(citation modified). Justin’s testimony describes similar limitations to those identified in

12 – OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff’s testimony. Thus, although the ALJ failed to provide any insight into how she analyzed
Justin’s testimony, she provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony.
Where an ALJ provides “reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness,” the ALJ may rely on
those same reasons “when rejecting similar testimony by a different witness.” Molina, 674 F.3d
at 1114 (citing Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009)).

In sum, the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled is a reasonable reading of the
record and is supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this _2_2_n_d_ day of May, 2026.

/s/Amy E. Potter
Amy E. Potter
United States Magistrate Judge

13 – OPINION AND ORDER

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335348. Public record. Not legal advice.