# OLCOTT

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335336

## Case

- **Full name:** Chad Olcott v. Win Waste Innovations
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335336

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the fourth element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that his or her employer sought and/or filled that position with a similarly-qualified person

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAD OLCOTT,
Case No. 23–cv–21551–ESK–SAK
Plaintiff,

v.
OPINION
WIN WASTE INNOVATIONS,
Defendant.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
Defendant Win Waste Innovations (WWI) fired plaintiff Chad Olcott
because he failed to comply with safety rules and policies. There are no
material factual disputes. Olcott concedes that the record supports WWI’s
finding that he committed a high risk violation by entering a confined space
without a hole watch. He fails to point to any evidence that he was fired
because of his injury or retaliated against for requesting accommodations and
filing a workers’ compensation claim. Summary judgment in favor of WWI will
be entered.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Olcott was hired by WWI in July 2021 as a Class I Mechanic at its
Westville, New Jersey waste-to-energy facility. (ECF No. 53–4 (Saenz Decl.)2
¶¶1, 2; ECF No. 53–6 (Olcott Dep. Tr.) p. 11.3) As a Class I Mechanic, Olcott
performed maintenance and repair work on industrial equipment and reported
directly to maintenance manager Paul Curcio. (Saenz Decl. ¶4; Olcott Dep. Tr.
p. 11; ECF No. 53–5 (Saenz Dep. Tr) p. 10.) Ludwig Saenz was the plant
manager. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 6.)
WWI maintains safety policies and protocols. (ECF No. 53–7 (Jones Dep.
Tr.) pp. 78, 79.) Employees are required to wear personal protective equipment

1 WWI submitted a statement of material facts, to which Olcott filed a responsive
statement. While these statements of facts cite to the record, the fact section of the
parties’ briefs do not. This increased the Court’s burden. See Globespanvirata v.
Texas Instrument, No. 03–2854, 2005 WL 3077915, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov.15, 2005) (noting
that the purpose of a statement of material fact is to “clarify the issues for the Court,
not to increase the burden before it”). Also, Olcott’s legal argument has facts that are
not in his responsive statement of material facts or fact section of his opposition brief.
2 Olcott states he “is unable to concede or dispute” facts asserted in Saenz’s
declaration because it is an “unsworn declaration.” (See generally 54–1.) Local Civil
Rule 56.1(a) requires a responsive statement of material facts responding to each
paragraph of the movant’s statement, “and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in
dispute and citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with
the motion.” “[A]ny statement, or portion thereof, that is not clearly denied—in
substance, not merely with the label ‘disputed’—and with a proper citation to the record
in a responsive [Local Civil] Rule 56.1 statement is deemed admitted.” Juster
Acquisition Co. LLC v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., No. 12–03427, 2014 WL 268652, at
*1 n.1 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (providing that, if a party
fails to properly address an assertion of fact, a court may provide the party an
opportunity to properly address the fact, consider the fact undisputed, grant summary
judgment, or issue any other appropriate order). The Saenz declaration has the
correct jurat, see 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and Olcott failed to substantively dispute the facts
in Saenz’s declaration. Thus, the facts in Saenz’s declaration are deemed admitted.
3 Citations to pages of deposition transcripts are to the ECF page numbers, not
to the page numbers of the transcripts.
(PPE), such as earplugs. (Id. pp. 80, 81.) Pursuant to its Confined Space
Policy, WWI also requires all employees to obtain an entry permit before
entering a confined space. (Id. pp. 79, 80.) The permit provides that a
designated hole watch supervise and sign employees in and out each time they
enter and exit a confined space. (Id.) A violation of the Confined Space Policy
permits WWI to terminate an employee on the first offense. (Id.)
Olcott violated both policies. On July 7, 2022, WWI’s safety manager
observed Olcott working without earplugs. (Id. p. 71; Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 13–
15; ECF No. 59 p. 54 (July 2022 Progressive Discipline Form).) Olcott testified
that his earplugs were in his pocket, but he chose not to wear them because of
a medical condition. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 13, 14.) Olcott never sought an
accommodation for this condition, but “absolutely 100 percent agree[s] that [he]
should [have] be[en] written up for” this incident. (Id.) Olcott inserted his
earplugs at the safety manager’s instruction but was “written up” for the same
violation on July 16, 2022. (Id. pp. 13, 14; Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 45; July 2022
Progressive Discipline Form.) Olcott claims that the second incident was
accidental because his right earplug fell out when he was exiting a confined
space. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 13, 14.) Olcott was observed violating the PPE
policy on multiple occasions beyond these two incidents. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 45.)
On July 17, 2022, Olcott received a written warning for his repeated failure to
wear earplugs. (July 2022 Progressive Discipline Form.) The written
warning indicates that Olcott’s failure to remediate his behavior would result
in further discipline, including termination. (Id.) After receiving the written
warning, Olcott complied with the PPE policy. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 45.)
On September 23, 2022, Saenz initiated an investigation into an incident
in which Olcott allegedly sustained a shoulder injury. (Id. p. 25; Olcott Dep.
Tr. p. 17.) On that day, Olcott and Christoper Liwock, were assigned to repair
the incline and tail of a conveyor. (Olcott Dep. Tr. p. 18.) Joseph Wall was
assigned as the designated hole watch (Id. p. 25; ECF No. 53–10 (Wall Dep.
Tr.) pp. 9, 10.) Although Liwock observed Olcott to be physically okay, Olcott
indicated to Liwock and Curcio at the end of this shift that his shoulder was
“starting to bother [him] quite significantly.” (Liwock Dep. Tr. p. 12; Olcott
Dep. Tr. pp. 27, 28.) After speaking with Saenz about his injury, Saenz sent
Olcott home to rest his shoulder. (Olcott Dep. Tr. p. 28.) Although Saenz did
not say he doubted Olcott’s injury claim, Olcott alleges that he could infer from
Saenz’s attitude that Saenz did not believe him. (Id. p. 58.)
When Olcott returned to work on September 26, 2022, he was referred to
a workers’ compensation physician, who ordered Olcott to get an MRI. (Olcott
Dep. Tr. pp. 32, 33.) Saenz testified that he instructed Olcott that rather than
“do things on his own,” he should work with WWI’s safety manager and
company nurse to coordinate his medical care. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 38.)
Consistent with the physician’s examination, Saenz approved Olcott’s request
for light duty through September 30, 2022. (Id. p. 34; Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 26,
39, 6.) Olcott was allowed to remain on the clock while attending his MRI
appointment, and Curcio approved his request to clock out for the remainder of
the day. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 36, 59.)
On September 29, 2022, Olcott was prescribed physical therapy and
provided Saenz with his paperwork. (Id. pp. 37, 38.) Olcott’s intention was to
start physical therapy immediately so he could return to work as fast as possible
but Saenz told him that he would have to wait “until corporate approves it.”
(Id. pp. 37–39.) That same day, Saenz spoke with Wall and Liwcok about the
repair of the conveyor’s tail to understand how Olcott was injured. (Saenz
Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 50, 51.) Saenz learned that Liwock and Wall were not “really
present at the time of incident” and Wall was not hole watching. (Id. p. 29.)
When Olcott had entered the confined space at the conveyor’s tail, Liwock and
Wall were on the ground, off of the conveyor. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 20, 21.)
Liwock and Wall told Saenz that they became aware that Olcott entered the
confined space only after Olcott exited the space and announced that he
repositioned the chain at the conveyor’s tail. (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall
Dep. Tr. p. 9.) Wall provided Saenz with a written statement that same day
and Liwock provided his on October 4, 2022.4 (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall
Dep. Tr. p. 9; ECF No. 59 p. 4 (Wall Statement); Liwock Dep. Tr. p. 41; ECF No.
59 p. 6 (Liwock Statement).) Their written statements were consistent with
what they had told Saenz. (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall Dep. Tr. p. 9; Wall
Statement; Liwock Statement.) Saenz submitted the written statements to
human resources. (Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 29.)
Based on these discussions and nobody telling him otherwise, Saenz
determined that Olcott violated the Confined Space Policy. (Saenz Dep. Tr.
pp. 30, 40.) Given this high-risk offense and Olcott’s prior disciplinary history,
Saenz recommended to human resources that Olcott be terminated. (Id. p. 40.)
Human resources accepted Saenz’s recommendation and Olcott was fired on
September 30, 2022. (Id.; ECF No. 59 p.2 (September 2022 Progressive
Discipline Form).) Thereafter, Olcott used his workers’ compensation benefits
to attend physical therapy. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 38 51.)
Olcott concedes that Wall and Liwock’s statements support Saenz’s
conclusion that he entered a confined space without a hole watch. (Olcott Dep.
Tr. pp. 21, 31; Saenz Dep. Tr. p. 44.) But Olcott asserts that he did in fact tell
Wall before entering the confined space at the conveyor’s tail, and that Wall
affirmatively permitted him to enter the space. (Olcott Dep. Tr. pp. 21, 31.)

4 Liwock submitted his written statement after Olcott’s termination, but Saenz
explained that “[t]he written statements were to confirm and put everything on paper
that this is really, in fact, what took place.” (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 30, 31.) Saenz had
enough information without Liwock’s written statement to determine that Olcott
violated the Confined Space Policy. (Id.)
Olcott, thus, believes that WWI used his shoulder injury as a pretext to
terminate him. (See generally ECF No. 1–1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 26–30.)
Wall maintains that Olcott failed to comply with the Confined Space Policy
(see Wall Dep. Tr. pp. 9, 13), but Liwock testified at his deposition that he lied
to Saenz (Liwock Dep. Tr. pp. 9–11). Contrary to his verbal and written
statements, Liwock testified that he remembers Olcott calling out to Wall and
“pointing and using the physical arm and finger motion to tell [them] … [he’s]
going in.” (Id. p. 11.) Wall acknowledged Olcott and gave him affirmative
permission to enter the confined space. (Id.) Liwock explained that he can
now tell the truth because he no longer works for WWI and does not fear that
telling the truth will put his livelihood in jeopardy. (Id. pp. 41, 42.)5
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Olcott commenced this New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD)
action in the Superior Court of New Jersey on September 13, 2023. (See
generally Compl.) Olcott’s six-count complaint raises claims against WWI for
disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. (Id. pp. 6–
10.) Olcott also seeks equitable relief6 and common law relief pursuant to
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) for workers’

5 No testimony was elicited at Liwock’s deposition about whether he told Saenz
that he had lied. Liwock testified that his only statement to Saenz about this incident
was untrue and that he feared retaliation. It can therefore be reasonably inferred
that Liwock did not tell Saenz the truth, and Saenz had only Wall’s statement and
Liwock’s allegedly untruthful statement to rely on when recommending that Olcott be
fired. (See Liwock Dep. Tr. p. 41.)
6 A prayer for equitable relief is not an independent claim. Since such relief falls
within the other claims, I will not address Olcott’s request for equitable relief
separately. See Riconda v. US Foods, Inc., No. 19–01111, 2019 WL 4254389, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2019).
compensation retaliation. (Id. pp. 8–10.) On October 27, 2023, WWI removed
this action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) The parties proceeded with discovery,
and pursuant to the Court’s briefing schedule, WWI moved for summary
judgment on March 14, 2025. (ECF Nos. 44, 46.) I ordered the parties to
mediation, pending which the March 2025 motion for summary judgment was
administratively terminated. (ECF No. 48.) Mediation was unsuccessful.
(ECF No. 49). WWI filed the Motion on June 25, 2025. (ECF Nos. 53, 53–1
(Mov. Br.).) Olcott filed an opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 54–2 (Opp’n Br.)),
in response to which WWI filed a reply (ECF No. 61.) In further support of his
opposition, Olcott filed a letter objecting to the reply (ECF No. 62), to which WWI
filed a response (ECF No. 63). I directed the parties to refrain from filing
further submissions relating to the Motion. (ECF No. 64.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it will “affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A dispute is genuine if a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. The movant “bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental
Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). The party may satisfy its burden by
“produc[ing] evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”
or “by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the movant makes this showing, the
nonmovant must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must “point to
concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element
of his case.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
The Court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and decide the truth, but to
determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In
making that decision, “[a]ll facts and inferences are construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party,” and credibility determinations are for the
fact finder. Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998); Big
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. NJLAD
“The NJLAD prohibits ‘any unlawful discrimination against any person
because such person is or has been at any time disabled or any unlawful
employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of the
disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment.’”
Rich v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266, 278 (D.N.J. 2018) (quoting N.J.S.A. § 10:5–
4.1)). “The NJLAD is a remedial statute ‘deserving of a liberal construction,’
and the statutory definition a disability is very broad in scope.” Fitzgerald v.
Shore Mem’l Hosp., 92 F. Supp. 3d 214, 236 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Clowes v.
Terminix Intern., Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 802 (N.J. 1988)). “New Jersey courts
interpreting the statute have repeatedly emphasized that the NJLAD’s
definition of ‘disability’ is not restricted to ‘severe’ or ‘immutable’ disabilities.”
Id. Thus, “conditions that are ‘demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by
accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques’ have been accepted as
disabilities under the [NJ]LAD.” Id. (quoting Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace,
966 F. Supp. 312, 315 (D.N.J.1997)).
While “[t]he elements of an NJLAD claim vary based on the cause of action
alleged,” NJLAD claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden-shifting framework. Rich, 294 F. Supp. at 278–79.
“Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.” Sgro v. Bloomberg L.P., 331 F.
App’x 932, 937 (3d Cir. 2009). “If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of
production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer’s action.” Id. “Once the employer meets its relatively
light burden, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff, who must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s proffered reason is
pretextual.” Id. To demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff:
generally must submit evidence which: (1) casts sufficient doubt
upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so
that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a
fabrication; or (2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination
was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
adverse employment action.
Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir.1994)).
1. Disability Discrimination
“[T]to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the
NJLAD,” Olcott must demonstrate that he (1) “was handicapped or disabled
within the meaning of the statute”; (2) “was qualified to perform the essential
functions of the position of employment, with or without accommodation”; (3)
“suffered an adverse employment action because of the handicap or disability”;
and (4) was replaced by “another to perform the same work after plaintiff had
been removed from the position.” Rich, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 278 (quoting Victor
v. State, 952 A.2d 493, 501 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d as modified, 4
A.3d 126 (N.J. 2010)). Here, only the fourth element is disputed.7

7 WWI states a different standard for a prima facie showing of disability
discrimination under the NJLAD. (Mov. Br. p. 22.) While the first three elements
are the same and are not in dispute, WWI indicates as to the fourth element that Olcott
must establish that the adverse employment action he suffered gives rise to an
Olcott recognizes that he must demonstrate that after his termination,
WWI sought or hired a similarly qualified person to perform his role. (Opp’n
Br. pp. 6, 7.) Olcott’s failure to make such a showing justifies granting the
Motion as to this count. See Haines, 2023 WL 5623363, at *6 (granting the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s NJLAD
disability discrimination claim because the plaintiff failed to establish that the
defendant “sought a similarly qualified individual to replace [him] after his
termination”). The Complaint is devoid of any such allegation, and the record
makes no mention of whether Olcott’s job responsibilities were subsumed by
other employees or a replacement was hired.
Instead of addressing the fourth element, Olcott jumps to the conclusion
that his termination was pretextual. (See Opp’n Br. pp. 8–14.) He suggests
that because the first two elements of the prima facie standard are satisfied,
the burden shifts to WWI under McDonnel Douglas to provide a non-
discriminatory reason for his termination. (Id.) The McDonnell Douglas

inference of discrimination. (Id. pp. 22, 23 (first citing Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
636 F. App’x 831, 848 (3d Cir. 2016)). Consistent with the standard provided here,
Tourtellotte, like the majority of courts within this district, apply the standard set forth
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Victor. See Tourtellotte, 636 F. App’x at 848
(stating that the fourth element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that his or her employer sought and/or filled that
position with a similarly-qualified person); see also Haines v. Takeda Pharms. USA,
Inc., No. 20–04336, 2023 WL 5623363, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2023) (noting that prior
to Victor, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division had held that “the
appropriate fourth element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case [for NJLAD discrimination]
require[d] a showing that the challenged employment decision … [gave] rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination” (quoting Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Schs.,
733 A.2d 571, 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999))). Although courts may apply the
inference of discrimination element in limited situations, see Fitzgerald v. Glenn Ins.,
Inc., No. 20–14891, 2023 WL 2728818, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2023), I find that the
appropriate standard to apply to a discriminatory discharge claim is set forth in Victor
and noted above.
framework cannot proceed until all four elements of the prima facie case are
satisfied. Tourtellotte, 636 F. App’x at 848.
Even if Olcott could make a prima facie showing, the claim would still fail
because WWI offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
Olcott. (See September 2022 Progressive Discipline Form.) A violation of the
Confined Space Policy is grounds for termination. (Jones Dep. Tr. pp. 79, 80.)
The undisputed facts establish that WWI and Saenz believed Olcott entered a
confined space without a hole watch. (Saenz Dep. Tr. pp. 29, 30; Wall Dep. Tr.
p. 9; Liwock Statement; Wall Statement.) While Olcott points to evidence
suggesting that his termination was based on false information (Liwock Dep.
Tr. pp. 9–11), “it does not matter whether an employer was mistaken about what
an employee did to justify his termination.” Haines, 2023 WL 5623363, at *6
n.7; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that “to discredit
the employer’s proffered reason ... [a] plaintiff cannot simply show that the
employer’s decision was wrong or even mistaken, since the factual dispute at
issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether
the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent”); Kwiatkowski v. Merrill
Lynch, 2008 WL 3875417, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (applying the
rule in Fuentes to NJLAD discrimination claim). There is no evidence that
Saenz knew Liwock had lied to him. (Liwock Dep. Tr. pp. 9–11.) Saenz’s
recommendation to human resources to fire Olcott was based on the statements
Wall and Liwock provided to him at the time of the incident. (Saenz Dep. Tr.
pp. 29, 30, 40.) Since there is no evidence in the record showing that WWI did
not have an honest belief that he violated the Confined Space Policy, Olcott
cannot meet his burden of showing pretext.
2. Failure to Accommodate
To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must first satisfy
the prima facie elements of a disability discrimination claim. Tourtellotte, 636
F. App’x at 849. The plaintiff must then establish the following elements “to
show that an employer failed to participate in the interactive process:” (1) the
employer knew of the plaintiff’s disability; (2) the plaintiff requested disability
accommodations or assistance; (3) the employer made no good faith effort to
assist; and (4) that plaintiff “could have been reasonably accommodated but for
the employer’s lack of good faith.” Id. (quoting Victor, 4 A.3d at 145). “Once
a request for accommodation is made, both parties have a duty to assist in the
search for an appropriate reasonable accommodation.” Id. But “New Jersey
law places the duty on the employee to initiate a request for an accommodation.”
Fitzgerald, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 238. “Although there is no specific formula and
the request need not formally invoke the magic words ‘reasonable
accommodation,’ the plaintiff must ‘nonetheless make clear that the employee
wants assistance for his or her disability.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville
Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir.1999)); Linton v. L’Oreal USA, 2009 WL
838766 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2009) (“Something more is required of an employee ...
than merely apprising her employer that she is still injured to start the
interactive process for seeking an accommodation; the employee must arguably
seek assistance to survive summary judgment.”).
Olcott concedes that WWI initially provided reasonable accommodations
by assigning him to light duty work. (Opp’n Br. p. 21.) Yet, he takes issues
with WWI not following the “problem-solving approach” required in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.9 and having effectively rescinded his accommodation by firing him.
(Id. pp. 21, 22.) Considering Olcott failed to make a prima facie showing of his
disability discrimination claim, see supra pp. 9–11, Olcott’s failure to
accommodate claim also fails. See Tourtellotte, 636 F. App’x at 849.
3. Retaliation
Olcott argues that WWI fired him because he asked for a reasonable
accommodation and/or sought workers’ compensation benefits. “Retaliation
claims under the NJLAD require the plaintiff to “demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that” (1) the plaintiff “engaged in protected
activity—here, a request for a reasonable accommodation”; (2) the plaintiff
“suffered an adverse action”; and (3) “a causal connection exists between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Fitzgerald, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 239.
Olcott presents only conjecture and no evidence to establish a causal
connection between his termination and his seeking of accommodations or
workers’ compensation benefits. Although Olcott was fired shortly after
injuring himself, there is no dispute that Olcott was fired because of his
disciplinary history and failure to comply with WWI’s Confined Space Policy.
See supra pp. 9–11.
B. Workers’ Compensation Retaliation
Pursuant to Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., “New Jersey recognizes
a common law claim for retaliatory discharge when an employee is discharged
contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.” Morris v. Siemens Components,
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 486, 492 (D.N.J. 1996). “[T]he discharge of an employee in
retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim has been found to fall within
a ‘Pierce-type’ claim.” Id. “[T]o establish a prima facie case for retaliatory
discharge, the employee must prove that: (1) he or she attempted to make a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits; and (2) he or she was discharged for
making that claim” Id. If both elements are satisfied, the burden shifts to
the defendant under the McDonnell Douglas framework “to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge.” Id. “Ultimately,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant's proffered reasons for the discharge
are not worthy of belief and that the defendant acted with the intent to retaliate
unlawfully.” Id. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on such a
claim if the defendant “can demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff is unable to
establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge; or (2) if plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff cannot produce sufficient evidence of
pretext to rebut the defendant's asserted legitimate reason for discharge.” Id.
This claim, which largely mirrors Olcott’s NJLAD retaliation claim, fails for the
same reasons as Olcott’s other claims.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 11, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335336. Public record. Not legal advice.