# Frazier

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · March 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335304

## Case

- **Full name:** Eugene Frazier, Jr. v. Sheriff’s Office Sabine Parish, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

EUGENE FRAZIER, JR. CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-0182

SECTION P
VS.
JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

SHERIFF’S OFFICE SABINE MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
PARISH, ET AL.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Eugene Frazier, Jr., a prisoner at Morehouse Parish Detention Center proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately January 20, 2026, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following Defendants: Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Office, Deputy
Jesse Branam, Deputy Josiah Steinke, and Deputy Adam Nelson.1 For reasons that follow, the
Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
Background

Plaintiff claims that on May 24, 2021, a Sabine Parish officer, Deputy Jesse Branam,
conducted an illegal traffic stop on his vehicle. [doc. #s 1, p. 3; 7, p. 1]. He alleges that Branam
did not have probable cause for the stop because he did not commit any traffic violations. [doc.
# 7, p. 2]. Plaintiff also claims that Branam illegally searched his vehicle. [doc. # 7, p. 2].
Plaintiff claims that Deputy Branam then falsely arrested him and charged him with four
traffic violations and five felonies, including “safety belt use,” “operating vehicle while license

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under
28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.
suspended,” “reckless operation of a vehicle,” and possessing controlled dangerous substances.
[doc. #s 1, p. 3; 7, pp. 1-2].
Plaintiff states that on November 9, 2024, a state court judge found probable cause for the
charges. [doc. # 7, p. 2]. However, Plaintiff maintains that the judge dismissed all his charges

on April 17, 2025. [doc. #s 1, p. 3; 7, p. 2].
Plaintiff also claims that on November 9, 2024, while his criminal proceeding was still
pending, the Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Office illegally sold his 2003 Oldsmobile vehicle. [doc. #s
1, p. 3; 7, p. 2].
Plaintiff seeks compensation for the three years, 11 months, and 17 days he was in the
Sabine Parish Detention Center, as well as for the alleged unlawful sale of his vehicle. [doc. # 1,
p. 4].
Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a
prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is
subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d
578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his
Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)
provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is
frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks

2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any
facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations
of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.”
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is
“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id.
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies
somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of
the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.
In making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the
same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not
satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614
F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to
make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53
(5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim
if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A.
(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926
F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights
complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788
F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).
“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638
(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a
“[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional
conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. Statute of Limitations

District courts are authorized to dismiss claims as frivolous if “it is clear from the face of
a complaint filed in forma pauperis that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute
of limitations.” Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994); Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981
F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993). A district court may raise the limitation period sua sponte. See
Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 1999).
The statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is the same as the statute of limitations
in a personal injury action in the state in which the claim accrues. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.

261, 279-80 (1984). Thus, Louisiana’s one-year personal injury statute of limitations, under LA.
CIV. CODE art 3492, applies here.3 Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1980).
However, the date of accrual for a Section 1983 claim is a question of federal law.
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1995); Longoria v. City of Bay City, 779
F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1986). “Under federal law, the limitations period commences when the
aggrieved party has either knowledge of the violation or notice of facts which, in the exercise of
due diligence, would have led to actual knowledge thereof.” Piotrowski, 51 F.3d at 516 (quoting
Vigman v. Community National Bank and Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 (5th Cir. 1981)). In other
words, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is
the basis of the action.” Brockman v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just., 397 F. App'x 18, 22 (5th Cir.

2010).
A. May 24, 2021 Traffic Stop and Search
As above, Plaintiff claims that on May 24, 2021, Deputy Jesse Branam conducted an
illegal traffic stop. [doc. #s 1, p. 3; 7, p. 1]. He alleges that Branam did not have probable cause
for the stop. [doc. # 7, p. 2]. He suggests that Deputy Josiah Steinke and Deputy Adam Nelson

3 "The Louisiana Legislature has recently repealed its one-year prescription on delictual actions,
or torts, and substituted it with a two-year prescription." Sibley v. Touro LCMC Health, 2024
WL 5118489, at n.5 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3493.1 (2024)). "But that
amendment only applies prospectively to actions arising after July 1, 2024." Id. Because
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ relevant actions arose before July 1, 2024, the one-year period
applies. See Stanley v. Morgan, 120 F.4th 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 2025 WL
663720 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2025).
were present at the stop. Plaintiff also claims that Branam illegally searched his vehicle. [doc. #
7, p. 2].
Plainly, Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the alleged unlawful stop and unlawful
search the day the events occurred.4 Plaintiff had one year from that date, or until May 24, 2022,
to file his claims. As Plaintiff did not file this proceeding until, at the earliest, January 14, 2026,5

the statute of limitations bars the claims.
The limitations period is subject to state tolling and equitable tolling in certain
circumstances. “[E]quitable tolling preserves a plaintiff's claims when strict application of the
statute of limitations would be inequitable.” Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir.
1995) (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)). The plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that equitable tolling applies. Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892 (5th Cir.
1998); see also Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178, 183 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We have
found that equitable tolling may be appropriate when ‘the plaintiff is actively misled by the
defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his

rights.’”) (quoting Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2002)). Tolling can apply
where “extraordinary circumstance[s] prevent[]” a plaintiff from filing suit. Richards v.
Gonzales, 2022 WL 3226621, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2022).

4 See generally Manuel v. Lehmberg, 690 F. App'x 245, 246 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Manuel filed his
complaint on August 15, 2015. Because he alleges that his traffic stop occurred on April 9,
2011, his claim based on the unconstitutionality of the stop was barred by the two-year
limitations period.”); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Moore certainly
possessed the ‘critical facts’ concerning the allegedly unreasonable search of the car on the day it
occurred[,] . . . when he became ‘aware that he ha[d] suffered an injury or ha[d] sufficient
information to know that he ha[d] been injured.’”).

5 Plaintiff signed his initial pleading on January 14, 2026. [doc. # 1, p. 4].
Here, Plaintiff does not argue that any of his claims were tolled. He does not allege, for
instance, that any person’s affirmative conduct reasonably induced him to forego filing suit
within the limitations period.6
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss these claims as untimely.

B. May 24, 2021 False Arrest

The “statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins
to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.” Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). Detention “pursuant to such process” occurs, “for example, [when the
alleged victim] is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Id. at 389. Detention
“pursuant to legal process” also occurs when a judge finds probable cause to detain a defendant
pending trial. Villegas v. Galloway, 458 F. App’x 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2012); Manuel v. City of
Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 360 (2017) (observing that “the start of ‘legal process’ in a criminal
case” occurred “after the judge's determination of probable cause.”); Garcia v. San Antonio,
Texas, 784 F. App'x 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[A] judge first made a probable cause finding
when Garcia appeared in court the morning after his arrest. This is the point at which legal
process commenced.”).
Here, Plaintiff’s false arrest claim accrued at the latest on November 2, 2024, when he
states that the state court judge found probable cause. [doc. # 7, p. 2]. He therefore had one
year, or until November 2, 2025, to file his false arrest claim. As Plaintiff did not file his claim
until January 14, 2026, at the latest, the Court should dismiss his claim as untimely.

6 If Plaintiff contends that any of his claims were tolled for any reason, he may present his
contention in an objection to this Report and Recommendation.
3. Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Office
Plaintiff claims that on November 9, 2024, while his criminal proceeding was still
pending, the Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Office illegally sold his 2003 Oldsmobile vehicle. [doc. #s
1, p. 3; 7, p. 2].

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3) provides that the “[c]apacity to sue or be sued is
determined . . . by the law of the state where the court is located . . . .” Under Louisiana law, an
entity must qualify as a “juridical person,” which is an “entity to which the law attributes
personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 24.
Here, the Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Office does not qualify as a juridical person. See Cozzo
v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]
sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued . . . .”); Aucoin v. Terrebonne Par.
Sheriff's Off., 2022 WL 16657429, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022). Accordingly, the Court should
dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against this entity.

Recommendation

For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Eugene Frazier, Jr.’s
claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as untimely, legally frivolous, and for failing to
state claims on which relief may be granted.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by
this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation
to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another
party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or
response to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen
(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See
Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996).
In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 24 day of March, 2026.

ft Ae
Kayla Dye a
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335304. Public record. Not legal advice.