# Taylor

> District Court, S.D. Florida · May 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335229

## Case

- **Full name:** Elton Taylor v. Ricky D. Dixon, Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** May 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335229

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-CV-81481-ELFENBEIN

ELTON TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

RICKY D. DIXON,
SEC’Y, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR.,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

ORDER DENYING HABEAS PETITION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Elton Taylor’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”), ECF No. [1].1 Petitioner
challenges the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence, entered following a jury trial in
Case Number 2013-CF-011180 in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County,
Florida, for the following offenses: first-degree murder with a firearm (Count I); false
imprisonment (Count II); burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm (Count III); aggravated
assault with a firearm (Counts V-VII); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count
VIII). Id.; ECF No. [7-1] at 30.
On December 17, 2024, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing Respondent
to file a memorandum of fact and law to show cause as to why the Petition should not be granted.
See ECF No. [5]. On February 7, 2025, Respondent filed a Response to Order to Show Cause with
attached appendices. See ECF Nos. [7] and [8]. On April 8, 2025, Petitioner filed a Reply for

1 Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Taylor Correctional Institution Annex in Perry, Florida.
which he obtained leave of Court. See ECF No. [11]. The Court has carefully considered the
Parties’ submissions, the record, and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, the
Petition, ECF No. [1], is DENIED on the merits.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual Background
Petitioner and Watisha Wallace were married and resided together in Palm Springs,
Florida. See ECF No. [8-2] at 55. Over time, the marriage deteriorated, and Watisha obtained a
restraining order against Petitioner. Id. at 56. She thereafter moved into the home of her parents
— Herman and Ruby Wallace — in West Palm Beach, bringing her daughter, A.D., with her. Id.
at 57.
On October 21, 2013, Petitioner forcibly entered the parents’ residence while armed with
a firearm. Id. at 70–71. Once inside the residence, he pointed the firearm at Herman, Ruby, and
A.D. and threatened them. Id. at 70–71, 110, 167–68. He then located Watisha inside the home
and forced her outside into the backyard. Id. at 113–15. Moments later, Herman, Ruby, and A.D.

heard multiple gunshots coming from the backyard. Id. at 73–74, 117–22, 170–72. Law
enforcement officers responded to the scene and found Watisha deceased in the backyard from
multiple gunshot wounds to the head, torso, and arm. Id. at 199–203, 445–50. Petitioner was
found nearby with a self-inflicted gunshot wound and was transported for medical treatment. Id.
at 204. Petitioner concedes that he entered the parents’ residence and “shot and killed” Watisha.
See ECF No. [1] at 16. He further admits that he shot himself but survived. Id.
B. Procedural Background
A grand jury in the State of Florida returned an Indictment charging Petitioner with first-
degree murder with a firearm (Count I), kidnapping with a firearm (Count II), burglary of an
occupied dwelling with a firearm (Count III), aggravated battery with a firearm (Count IV), three
counts of aggravated assault with a firearm (Counts V-VII), and possession of a firearm or
ammunition by a convicted felon (Count VIII). See ECF No. [7-1] at 17–20. Following a jury
trial, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder with a firearm, the lesser-included offense

of false imprisonment, burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm, three counts of aggravated
assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See ECF No. [7-1] at 22–
28. The jury found him not guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm. Id. The state trial court
imposed the following sentences: life imprisonment for first-degree murder; five years’
imprisonment for false imprisonment; life imprisonment for burglary; fifteen years’ imprisonment
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and five years’ imprisonment for each aggravated
assault count, all to run consecutively to each other and to the murder sentence. See ECF No. [7-
1] at 30–45.
On direct appeal, Petitioner raised four claims of error: (1) the trial court erred in permitting
the prosecution to introduce testimony that Watisha had obtained a restraining order against him;

(2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s improper
closing arguments; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the definition of
premeditation as requested; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct a
sentencing error where it had not orally imposed consecutive sentences as reflected in the written
sentencing order. See ECF No. [7-1] at 47–88. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed Petitioner’s convictions but reversed in part the sentences, directing that the aggravated
assault sentences run concurrently with one another. See Taylor v. State, 276 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2019). Following the remand, on October 18, 2019, Petitioner was resentenced accordingly.
See ECF No. [7-1] at 129–32.
On October 27, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, alleging error
in the imposition of consecutive sentences and the failure to impose mandatory minimum
sentences for firearm offenses. See ECF No. [7-1] at 134–37. On November 1, 2021, the state
postconviction court summarily denied the motion. See ECF No. [7-1] at 139–42. Petitioner did

not appeal that ruling.
On July 21, 2021, Petitioner, through counsel, filed another Motion for Postconviction
Relief, which he later amended to comply with certain changes to the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See ECF No. [7-1] at 144-180. In this latest motion, he alleged that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to pursue an insanity defense, failing to investigate or call
witnesses in support of that defense, conceding guilt, and committing cumulative error. See ECF
No. [7-1] at 163–180. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the insanity-related
claims and summarily denied the third claim relating to Defendant’s concession of guilt. See ECF
No. [7-1] at 212–218.
Following the evidentiary hearing and post-hearing submissions, ECF No. [7-1] at 219–

241, the postconviction court entered a written order denying relief, ECF No. [7-1] at 243–252.
Petitioner appealed, and the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed
Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See Taylor v. State, 396 So. 3d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024).
The mandate issued on November 4, 2024. See ECF No. [7-2] at 50–51.
Petitioner then filed his Petition in this Court on November 23, 2024. See ECF No. [1]. In
his Petition, he raises three grounds for relief:
(1) The state court’s denial of his claim on direct appeal — concerning the prosecutor’s
allegedly improper comments on his right to remain silent — resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. See ECF No. [1-2] at 2.
(2) The state court’s denial of ground one of his Motion for Postconviction Relief, alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to pursue an insanity defense, resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in state court. See ECF No. [1-2] at 4.
(3) The state court’s denial of ground two of his Motion for Postconviction Relief, alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and call witnesses in
support of an insanity defense, resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court.
See ECF No. [1-2] at 9.
II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2254
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs a district
court’s review of a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. Ledford v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). “The purpose of AEDPA
is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher,
565 U.S. 34, 43 (2011)). This standard is “difficult to meet.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415,
419 (2014) (quoting Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 358 (2013)).
Section 2254(d) provides that a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner
on “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state court’s
decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). A state court decision is “contrary to” established

Supreme Court precedent when it (1) applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by
the Supreme Court; or (2) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
decision of th[e Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]
precedent.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). An “unreasonable application”
of clearly established federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Id. at
410. Consequently, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas corpus relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state
court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). If the last state court to decide a prisoner’s federal claim
provides an explanation for its merits-based decision in a reasoned opinion, “a federal habeas court

simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are
reasonable.” Wilson v. Sellers, 548 U.S. 122, 125 (2018).
If no explanation accompanies the state court’s merits determination, federal courts should
“look through the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a
rationale” and “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id.
Furthermore, a decision still qualifies as an adjudication on the merits when it “addresses some
but not all of a defendant’s claims.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 298 (2013). “The
Supreme Court [has] observed that there are good reasons why state courts do not address every
single argument made by a defendant, including ‘instances in which a state court may simply
regard a claim as too insubstantial to merit discussion.’” Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726
F.3d 1172, 1212 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Johnson, 568 U.S. at 299).
In sum, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings
and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S.

766, 773 (2010) (internal citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit “has stressed that in applying
AEDPA deference federal courts are not to take a magnifying glass to the state court opinion or
grade the quality of it.” Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1350 (11th
Cir. 2019). Accordingly, deferential review under § 2254(d) is generally limited to the record that
was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 182 (2011). “AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discourage” petitioners
from presenting new evidence and ensures that “federal courts sitting in habeas are not an
alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in
state proceedings.” Id. at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Exhaustion and Timeliness

Respondent acknowledges the Petition is timely but seeks dismissal of Petitioner’s second
ground based on his failure to fully exhaust that ground. See ECF No. [6] at 6–8. “Before seeking
a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations
of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “To provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present
his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of
discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[S]tate
prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by
invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”). “In Florida,
exhaustion usually requires not only the filing of a [Fla. R. Crim. P.] 3.850 motion, but an appeal
from its denial.” Nieves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 770 F. App’x 520, 521 (11th Cir. 2019)

(alteration in original).
To fairly present the federal nature of the claim, “[i]t is not sufficient merely that the federal
habeas petitioner has been through the state courts, nor is it sufficient that all the facts necessary
to support the claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was
made.” Kelley v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–76 (1971) and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). Rather,
federal courts “have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he
urges upon the federal courts.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. The Eleventh Circuit has further observed
that proper exhaustion “requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift needles
in the haystack of the state court record.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302–03 (11th Cir.

2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, exhaustion requires that state prisoners “give the
state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete
round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel
during criminal proceedings against them. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85
(1984). “[T]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it promises only
the right to effective assistance . . .” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 24 (2013). To prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) his counsel’s
performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness; and
(2) petitioner suffered prejudice resulting from that deficiency. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–
88.
To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that, considering all of the

circumstances, “counsel’s conduct fell ‘outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.’” Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The court’s review of counsel’s performance should focus on “not
what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.’”
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise non-meritorious
issues, see Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001); nor is counsel required to
present every non-frivolous argument, see Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1281 (11th Cir.
2013). Further, “[s]trategic decisions of counsel generally cannot establish deficient performance,
even if the strategy appears wrong in retrospect.” Ferguson v. Crews, No. 13-CV-60320, 2015

WL 13912233, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2015). “The decision is only considered ineffective if it
was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it.” Id. “Counsel’s
effectiveness is reviewed considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding his overall
performance.” Id. Petitioner bears the burden of proof that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
As for the showing of prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A court need not address both prongs of Strickland
if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. See id. at 697; Brown v.
United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). And, a Section 2254 petitioner must provide
factual support for his contentions regarding trial counsel’s performance — not simply bare or
conclusory allegations. See Boyd v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1333–34 (11th

Cir. 2012); Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1406–07 (11th Cir. 1987).
Combining AEDPA’s habeas standard and Strickland’s two-pronged test provides the
relevant inquiry in this case: to obtain habeas relief, a petitioner must show that the state court
“applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner” when it rejected
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002).
III. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One – Prosecutor’s Improper Comments on Petitioner’s Right to Remain
Silent

Petitioner argues the state court’s rejection of his direct-appeal claim concerning the
prosecutor’s allegedly improper comments on his right to remain silent was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law under Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976). In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated when
a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence is used against him for impeachment purposes. Id.
at 619. Petitioner contends the prosecutor crossed that constitutional line during closing argument.
At trial, defense counsel objected to the following remark as an impermissible comment
on Petitioner’s right to remain silent:
Does the witnesses testimony agree with the other testimony and
other evidence in the case?

Mr. & Mrs. Wallace, as well as [A.D.’s] testimony is consistent at
that particular time with the evidence that was collected by CSI, the
evidence that was collected and compared that Celynda Sowards
saw, it was consistent throughout. And like I said, you might not
have the defendant’s words, but you have his actions.

ECF No. [8-2] at 672–73.
The trial court sustained the objection and required the prosecutor to explain what she was
referring to. Id. at 673–74. When the prosecutor explained that she was referring to Petitioner’s
conduct at the time of the incident, rather than to his silence, the trial court instructed her to clarify
the point for the jury. Id. The prosecutor then stated:
I want you to remember that from the law that is applied in this case,
that you can look at his actions of how he came into the house, and
you recall his words of wanting and demanding his wife.

Id.
At the conclusion of closing arguments, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on
improper comments. Id. at 723. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 724. On direct appeal,
Petitioner argued, citing Doyle, that the prosecutor’s statement was fairly susceptible of being
interpreted as a comment on his exercise of the right not to testify and that the denial of the motion
for mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion. See ECF No. 7-1 at 73–75. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. Id. at 127.
The question before this Court is whether the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court
precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). On this record, it was not.
To begin, Doyle addressed the use of a defendant’s silence following Miranda warnings to
impeach an exculpatory story told for the first time at trial. 426 U.S. at 617–19. Doyle did not
provide a particular test for determining when a prosecutor’s statement amounts to a forbidden
comment on silence. On this issue, federal courts — including the Eleventh Circuit — have long
asked whether the statement was “manifestly intended” to comment on the defendant’s silence or
was of such a character that the jury would “naturally and necessarily” take it that way. United
States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1162–63 (11th Cir. 1995).
Measured against that framework, the prosecutor’s comment here does not warrant habeas
relief. The challenged statement must be evaluated in context, not in isolation. See Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986). “The relevant question is whether the prosecutors’
comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.’” Id. (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). When the remark
is placed back into the flow of the State’s closing argument, it is apparent that the prosecutor was
arguing that Petitioner’s intent and culpability could be inferred from his conduct during the
offense. Indeed, throughout closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized that
Petitioner’s actions, rather than any express declaration of intent, established the charged crimes.
For example, in arguing aggravated assault, the prosecutor told the jury:
So we have aggravated assault, at the time Elton Taylor appeared to
have the ability to carry out the threat. You see the law doesn’t say
that someone has to say to you that I’m going to kill you, or I am
going to hurt you, but we know often times actions speak louder than
words, and in this instance when he came back in the house and he
went upstairs, he pointed the gun at both of them.

ECF No. [8-2] at 656–57.
Similarly, while discussing the false-imprisonment and murder-related evidence, the
prosecutor argued:
This isn’t a situation where the defendant called her up and said hey,
let’s go somewhere. He forced her to go with him. And while he
might not have used words, his actions and demeanor rise to the
level of a threat.

Id. at 662.
While arguing premeditation, the prosecutor stated:
The law tells you that the decision must be present in the mind at the
time of the killing. What do we know right before he killed her? He
told her he was going to kill her. Did his moment to reflect happen
between shots? Yet still he shot her four more times. While we may
not have the words, you have his actions. And the logical is
undeniable, ladies and gentlemen, he intended to kill Watisha
Wallace. He went there for that purpose.
Id. at 669.
These comments are critical to the inquiry at issue. They show the prosecutor’s theme was
that the jury could infer Petitioner’s intent from what he did: entering the residence armed,
demanding his wife, forcing her outside, threatening the occupants, and repeatedly shooting
Watisha. In that context, the challenged statement that “you might not have the defendant’s words,
but you have his actions” was consistent with the State’s repeated contrast between spoken words
and observable conduct. The prosecutor was arguing evidentiary inference, not calling attention
to Petitioner’s decision not to testify.
The trial court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to make clear what
“actions” she meant, and the prosecutor did so by referring to Petitioner’s conduct inside the home
and his demands for Watisha. That immediate clarification substantially undercuts Petitioner’s
contention that the jury would naturally and necessarily have understood the original remark as a
comment on his failure to testify.
Nor was the remark manifestly intended to comment on Petitioner’s silence. The comment
arose during a discussion of the consistency between eyewitness testimony and the physical
evidence. Nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor was inviting the jury to draw an
adverse inference from Petitioner’s failure to take the stand.
Likewise, the remark was not of such character that the jury would naturally and
necessarily take it as a comment on Petitioner’s failure to testify. In ordinary usage, a contrast
between a defendant’s “words” and “actions” can refer simply to the absence of verbal statements
during the crime itself, as opposed to the physical acts proved at trial. That is especially true here
because the prosecutor had already used nearly identical phrasing prior while arguing
premeditation. Given that repeated theme, a reasonable jurist could conclude that the jury would

have understood the remark as referring to the evidence of Petitioner’s conduct during the offense,
not his silence at trial.
Petitioner likewise failed to establish prejudice. Even if there were error — which there
was not — to prevail on a constitutional claim based on improper comments, Petitioner must show
that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict. Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Petitioner has not made that showing. At trial, Herman,
Ruby, and A.D. each testified that Petitioner entered the residence armed with a firearm, demanded
Watisha, forced her outside, and threatened those present. Their accounts were consistent with —
and reinforced by — the physical and forensic evidence. Watisha was discovered deceased from
multiple gunshot wounds, and Petitioner was located nearby with a self-inflicted gunshot wound.

The firearms, DNA, and crime-scene evidence all aligned with the State’s theory. Petitioner
further concedes in his Petition that he shot and killed Watisha. On this record, Petitioner has not
shown that the challenged remark had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.
In sum, when the prosecutor’s statement is considered in the context of the closing
argument as a whole, the comment was not manifestly intended as a reference to Petitioner’s
silence, nor was it of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret it as
such. The trial court’s immediate intervention and the prosecutor’s prompt clarification further
dispelled any risk of constitutional error. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was
not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Doyle or any other clearly established Supreme
Court precedent. And even assuming error, Petitioner has not shown that the remark had a
substantial and injurious effect on the verdict under Brecht. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner
is not entitled to habeas relief on Ground One.
B. Ground Two – Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel for Failing to Pursue an
Insanity Defense

Next, Petitioner contends that the trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
investigate and pursue an insanity defense at trial. In state postconviction proceedings, Petitioner
asserted that he informed counsel he was experiencing delusions around the time of the offense,
that counsel was aware of these circumstances, and that an insanity defense would have been
viable. See ECF No. [7-1] at 166–70. The postconviction court rejected this claim, expressly
finding the testimony of trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing credible. Id. at 249–50. The court
concluded that counsel was not deficient because she investigated the possibility of an insanity
defense and reasonably determined that no good faith basis existed to pursue it. Id. Specifically,
the court found that multiple mental health experts had evaluated Petitioner and did not support an
insanity defense, and that counsel’s investigation of fact witnesses likewise yielded no support for
such a theory. Id. The court further found that counsel, after consulting with Petitioner, elected
to pursue a heat-of-passion defense and that Petitioner was aware that an insanity defense would
not be presented. Id. The court thus determined that counsel’s decision was a strategic one made
after a reasonable investigation. Id.

Petitioner first argues the state court’s denial of this claim is contrary to McCoy v.
Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018), which held that counsel may not concede a defendant’s guilt over
the defendant’s express objection. See ECF No. [1-2] at 5.2 He asserts that he wished to pursue

2 Respondent concedes that Grounds One and Three are properly exhausted but contends that Ground Two
is unexhausted because Petitioner’s reliance on McCoy was not fairly presented to the state courts. The
Court disagrees. To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must present both the factual and legal
an insanity defense and that the postconviction court failed to account for this preference when
deciding whether his counsel performed deficiently. See ECF No. [1-2] at 5-6; ECF No. [8-4] at
35. This argument is unavailing. McCoy draws a distinction between decisions reserved to the
client — such as the objective of maintaining innocence — and strategic decisions regarding how

to achieve that objective. 584 U.S. at 422. Here, the record shows that counsel elected to pursue
a heat-of-passion theory, which necessarily conceded guilt to a lesser offense, but Petitioner
expressly agreed to that strategy on the record to avoid the possibility of the death penalty. See
ECF Nos. [8-2] at 48–49; [8-4] at 29, 41–42. Under these circumstances, counsel’s decision falls
within the realm of permissible strategic judgment, not the type of autonomy violation addressed
in McCoy.
Petitioner next argues the postconviction court’s finding — that there was no factual basis
to pursue an insanity defense — was an unreasonable determination of the facts. See ECF No. [1-
2] at 6. He emphasizes that no expert affirmatively testified that he was sane. This argument
misapprehends both the record and the governing burden of proof. In Florida state court

postconviction proceedings, the defendant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to relief.
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(8)(B). And under Florida law, a defendant asserting insanity must
establish that he suffered from a mental infirmity, disease, or defect such that he either did not

basis of his claim to the state court and must alert the state court to the federal constitutional nature of the
claim. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F. 3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998). Upon review of the record, the
Court finds that Petitioner has met this standard. Ground Two arises from Petitioner’s claim that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, by failing to pursue an
insanity defense. Petitioner presented this same underlying claim to the state court, invoking his federal
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, ECF No. [7-1] at 166. Respondent’s argument —
that Petitioner’s reliance on McCoy transforms the claim into a new and unexhausted legal theory — is
unpersuasive. While McCoy addresses a defendant’s autonomy rather than counsel’s performance under
Strickland, Petitioner does not assert a standalone McCoy claim. Rather, he relies on McCoy as persuasive
authority informing the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct. This does not alter the fundamental nature of
the claim. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner fairly presented Ground Two to the state court
and has, therefore, satisfied the exhaustion requirement.
know what he was doing or did not know that what he was doing was wrong. Fla. Stat. §
775.027(1)–(2); Hall v. State, 568 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1990).
The record supports the postconviction court’s conclusion that counsel reasonably
determined this standard could not be met. Counsel testified that, prior to her involvement, the

defense had retained two experts to evaluate Petitioner for sanity and that neither supported an
insanity defense. See ECF No. [8-4] at 27–28. An attorney is entitled to rely on the opinions of
qualified mental health experts in determining whether to pursue such a defense. See Hendricks
v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition, counsel testified that she conducted
her own investigation by interviewing witnesses Petitioner identified. Those witnesses did not
corroborate the symptoms Petitioner reported, and no fact witness supported an insanity theory.
See ECF Nos. [8-4] at 30–31, 39–40, 44.
Although Petitioner presented testimony from his pastor indicating that Petitioner appeared
to experience spiritual distress, hallucinations, and beliefs involving witchcraft, that testimony
alone does not establish a reasonable probability that Petitioner could meet Florida’s clear-and-

convincing standard for legal insanity. Id. at 17–18; Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 10 F.4th
1203, 1212 (11th Cir. 2021). Nor does evidence of emotional distress or unusual beliefs
necessarily rise to the level of a legally cognizable mental infirmity that negates criminal
responsibility.
The evidentiary record further reflects that counsel did not simply accept prior counsel’s
assessment at face value. Rather, she discussed Petitioner’s reported symptoms with prior counsel
and co-counsel, reviewed the available information, and independently investigated potential
witnesses. She fully considered Petitioner’s statements that he was seeing things, experiencing an
uncontrollable urge for blood, seeking spiritual intervention, and lacking memory of the offense.
See ECF No. [8-4] at 36–38. She nonetheless found no expert or lay evidence that would support
a viable insanity defense. At most, the evidence suggested that Petitioner was distraught in the
months preceding the offense, not that he suffered from a qualifying mental infirmity at the time
of the crime. Id. at 45.

Petitioner faults counsel for not obtaining written reports from the evaluating experts. But
counsel testified that no reports were generated because the experts did not find Petitioner insane.
Id. at 27. More importantly, counsel did not end her inquiry there; she continued to investigate
through other sources and reasonably concluded that the evidence did not support the defense. The
Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to pursue every conceivable line of investigation where
the available information already demonstrates that a proposed defense lacks evidentiary support.
See Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[C]ounsel for a criminal defendant is
not required to pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers.”).
In light of this record, the state postconviction court reasonably concluded that counsel’s
decision not to pursue an insanity defense was a strategic choice made after a thorough

investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. Counsel instead pursued a heat-of-passion
theory aimed at avoiding the death penalty — a strategy consistent with the agreed-upon objective
of the defense. Without evidentiary support for insanity, counsel’s decision to forego that defense
did not constitute deficient performance. See Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 376 (Fla. 2004)
(“Counsel’s decision to forego the insanity defense was not unreasonable under Strickland since
she had no evidence that [defendant] suffered from a mental disease or defect.”); Whitfield v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Corr., No. 10-CV-1638, 2013 WL 6198855, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2013) (denying
defendant’s claim that counsel should have presented an insanity defense, noting that defendant
“has not shown that trial counsel’s actions amounted to deficient performance as counsel did
investigate [defendant’s] mental health.”).
Petitioner likewise cannot establish prejudice. Given the absence of expert support and the
lack of corroborating fact witnesses, there is no reasonable probability that a jury would have

found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner met Florida’s standard for legal insanity.
See Fla. Stat. § 775.027(1). Even if counsel had pursued the defense, Petitioner has not shown that
the outcome of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this
claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Strickland, nor was it based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record. Petitioner is, therefore,
not entitled to habeas relief on Ground Two.
C. Ground Three – Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel for Failing to Investigate and
Call Witnesses in Support of an Insanity Defense

Petitioner finally claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
investigate and call his pastor as a witness in support of an insanity defense. The postconviction
court rejected this claim, finding that counsel was not deficient because she was aware of the pastor
and reasonably determined that his testimony, standing alone, would not establish a viable insanity
defense. See ECF No. [7-1] at 250–51. Petitioner argues that this determination was unreasonable,
emphasizing that lay witnesses may provide evidence relevant to insanity. See Hixon v. State, 165
So. 2d 436, 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (“In a criminal prosecution, a lay or nonexpert witness may
be permitted to give an opinion regarding the sanity or insanity of the person whose mental
condition is in issue, but he cannot express general opinions as to sanity nor give opinions
independent of facts and circumstances within his own knowledge.”).
The record, however, supports the state court’s conclusion. Counsel testified that Petitioner
informed her about the pastor, ECF No. [8-4] at 29, and that she investigated all witnesses
Petitioner identified. None of those witnesses — including the pastor — provided information
sufficient to support an insanity defense. Id. at 30–31. Importantly, counsel further recalled that
the pastor’s interactions with Petitioner occurred approximately one week before the offense and
elected to present his testimony during the penalty phase rather than during the guilt phase. Id. at

30. Thus, the record reflects that counsel did not ignore the pastor as a witness but instead
considered his potential testimony and made a strategic decision regarding its use at the penalty
phase. That decision falls squarely within the wide range of reasonable professional judgment.
Thus, the state postconviction court’s finding that counsel conducted a reasonable investigation
and made a strategic choice is not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record.
Nor can Petitioner establish prejudice. As discussed, Florida law requires a defendant to
prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, including that he suffered from a mental
infirmity, disease, or defect and, as a result, did not know what he was doing or that his conduct
was wrong. Fla. Stat. § 775.027(1)–(2). The pastor’s testimony — that Petitioner appeared
discouraged, was experiencing hallucinations, and believed he was under a voodoo or witchcraft

spell, ECF No. [8-4] at 17–18 — does not, without more, establish a reasonable probability that a
jury would have found those elements satisfied. See Hayes, 10 F.4th at 1212.
Accordingly, the state court reasonably concluded that counsel’s performance was not
deficient and that Petitioner suffered no prejudice. Its denial of this claim was neither contrary to,
nor an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to habeas relief
on Ground Three.
IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Petitioner has not requested an evidentiary hearing, and, in any event, no hearing is
warranted on the merits of his claims. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “before a habeas
petitioner may be entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on a claim that has been adjudicated by
the state court, he must demonstrate a clearly established federal-law error or an unreasonable
determination of fact on the part of the state court, based solely on the state court record.” Landers
v. Warden, Att’y Gen. of Ala., 776 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015).

Even where that threshold is met, a federal court must then determine whether an
evidentiary hearing “could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if
true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474
(2007). However, “if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes
habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The burden rests
with the petitioner to establish that such a hearing is necessary. Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
834 F.3d 1299, 1318 (11th Cir. 2016).
Here, Petitioner has not made the requisite showing. As discussed, he has failed to
demonstrate any clearly established federal-law error or unreasonable determination of fact by the
state courts based on the existing record. Moreover, the state court record fully resolves and refutes

the factual allegations underlying each of his claims. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is
neither necessary nor appropriate in this case.
V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal but must obtain a certificate of appealability
(“COA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009). Courts issue a
certificate of appealability only if Petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
CASE NO. 24-CV-81481-ELFENBEIN

“Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits,” “the
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Here, reasonable jurists would not find the merits in this decision debatable. The Court, therefore,
does not issue a COA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, ECF No. [1], is DENIED on the merits. No Certificate of Appealability shall
issue. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on May 1, 2026.

==} ? ffi
MARTY FULGWEIRA ELFENBEIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: All Counsel of Record

22

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335229. Public record. Not legal advice.