# Davila

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335208

## Case

- **Full name:** Ivan Davila v. Kamil Stanislaw Pustul
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335208

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing the different standards after Kingsley
- holding that a correctional officer “responded reasonably” to an attack on a detainee when she waited for backup, “rather than jump into the fray herself”
- holding that a correctional officer “responded reasonably” to an attack on a detainee when she waited for backup, “rather than jump into the fray herself”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

IVAN DAVILA,

Plaintiff, NO. 1:23-CV-02933

v. Judge Edmond E. Chang

KAMIL STANISLAW PUSTUL,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Ivan Davila was assaulted by two detainees during his pretrial detention at
the Cook County Jail. R. 69, DSOF ¶ 2; R. 74, Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶ 8; R. 69-2, Def.’s
Exh. 2, Davila Dep. at 42:15–18, 56:5–58:8.1 He sues Kamil Stanislaw Pustul, a cor-
rectional officer, for failing to protect him from the assault.2 DSOF ¶¶ 3, 8; R. 26, Am.
Compl. at 4–5; R. 69-3, Def.’s Exh. 3, Pustul Dep. at 9:4–18. Pustul moves for sum-
mary judgment, R. 67, Def.’s Mot., arguing that his actions were objectively reasona-
ble and he is entitled to qualified immunity, R. 68, Def.’s Br. at 4–9. Because Davila
does not raise a genuine issue of fact that could lead a reasonable jury to find that
Pustul acted objectively unreasonably, and because Davila fails to overcome the de-
fense of qualified immunity, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,
a page or paragraph number.

2This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this Section 1983 case under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
I. Background
In deciding Pustul’s motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Davila. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court notes that
Davila objected to many of Pustul’s Statements of Facts without citing any evidence
in an attempt to raise a genuine dispute. See generally Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF; see also
R. 75, Def.’s Reply Br. at 2–3. But there are no real factual disputes here, given that
there is video evidence of the lead up to the assault and the assault itself,3 and Davila
also admitted all the material facts in his deposition. See generally Davila Dep.; R. 70,
Def.’s Exh. 5, Incident Video.

In April 2022, while in pretrial detention at the Cook County Jail, Davila was
transferred to a new division—Division 10, Tier 4C—that houses maximum-security
detainees. Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶ 8; R. 76, Def.’s Resp. to PSOF ¶ 5; Davila Dep. at
43:18–44:8, 44:21–45:7. About an hour after Davila arrived, Pustul began to facilitate
“med line,” during which a correctional officer releases detainees from their cells to
receive medication from a nurse. Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶¶ 10–11; Davila Dep. at 45:8–

12, 54:7–8; Pustul Dep. at 19:1–12. After the detainees received their medication,
Pustul did not immediately escort them back to their cells, so a group of detainees
gathered in the common area. Def.’s Resp. to PSOF ¶ 10; Davila Dep. at 54:13–17.

3Davila objects to Pustul’s video evidence because “no evidentiary foundation has been
laid.” Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶ 12. But Davila himself laid the foundation in his deposition by
admitting the material facts of the assault and specifically vouching for the accuracy of the
video. See Davila Dep. at 67:1–3, 71:6–8.
2
Suddenly, another detainee approached Davila and punched him. Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF
¶¶ 15–16; Davila Dep. at 56:6–8; Pustul Dep. at 30:24–31:7. A second detainee joined
the attack, and they both repeatedly kicked and punched Davila. Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF

¶ 8; Davila Dep. at 56:16–18; Incident Video at 00:21–01:30.
When the assault began, Pustul called on his radio for backup and ordered the
detainees to stop fighting. DSOF ¶ 17; Pustul Dep. at 31:11–22, 54:3–13. But the two
detainees continued to assault Davila. Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶ 18; Pustul Dep. at 54:22–
24. Pustul left the common area to make sure that the nurse was escorted safely away
by another officer. DSOF ¶ 18; Pustul Dep. at 33:11–34:10. He then waited for backup
in an adjacent holding area. DSOF ¶ 18; Pustul Dep. at 38:11–17. Davila says that it

felt like the assault continued for “a good five minutes,” but video shows that it ended
after around one minute (which was still no doubt a harrowing time for Davila).
DSOF ¶¶ 19, 22; Davila Dep. at 57:4–9; Incident Video at 00:21–01:30. Backup offic-
ers arrived in around three minutes and secured the detainees. DSOF ¶¶ 19–20;
R. 70, Def.’s Exh. 6, Backup Video at 19:54:56–19:56:30.
Davila’s eye, face, and back were injured in the assault. R. 74, PSOF ¶ 17;

Davila Dep. at 77:2–15. He also continues to suffer from migraine headaches. PSOF
¶ 17; Davila Dep. at 77:2–15.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
3
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating sum-
mary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determina-
tions, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011),
and must consider only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would be ad-
missible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judgment
has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d

451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the ad-
verse party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
III. Analysis
Pretrial detainees can bring a suit under the Due Process Clause against jail

staff who fail to protect them from physical harm by other detainees. Thomas v. Dart,
39 F.4th 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2022). The “objective-unreasonableness standard applies
to … Fourteenth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees, including failure-to-pro-
tect claims.” Id. To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must raise a genuine
dispute on four elements:

4
(1) the defendant made an intentional decision regarding the conditions of the
plaintiff’s confinement; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk
of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available
measures to abate the risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circum-
stances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved, making the
consequences of the defendant’s inaction obvious; and (4) the defendant, by not
taking such measures, caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Id. (emphasis added). “The third element requires an allegation that a specific de-
fendant was on notice of a serious risk of harm to the detainee.” Id. (cleaned up).4
Here, Pustul argues that Davila fails to raise a genuine dispute of fact on the
third element. See Def.’s Br. at 4–7. He argues that (1) he had no notice of the risk
that Davila would be assaulted by other detainees; and (2) once the assault began,
his actions were not objectively unreasonable. Id. Even giving Davila the benefit of
all reasonable inferences, the Court agrees that no jury can find for Davila.
First, Davila fails to produce any evidence that a reasonable officer in Pustul’s
position would have known—before the assault started—that Davila faced a serious
risk of assault. Davila had just been transferred to the division and did not know the
other detainees, including those who assaulted him. Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶¶ 10, 24;
Davila Dep. at 43:18–44:8, 50:23–24, 71:9–13. He spoke peacefully with one of the
attackers just before the assault. DSOF ¶¶ 13–14; Davila Dep. at 51:23–52:6; Pustul
Dep. at 43:23–44:16. Indeed, Davila says that the first punch came out of nowhere.
Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF ¶¶ 15–16; Davila Dep. at 56:6–8; Pustul Dep. at 42:13–16. And

4This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,
and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,
18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
5
because Davila himself did not predict the assault, he of course did not warn Pustul
or any other Jail staff that he would be attacked by the two detainees. Pl.’s Resp. to
DSOF ¶¶ 25–26; Davila Dep. at 71:14–22, 110:1–9. Thus, Pustul was not on notice of

any risk of serious harm to Davila that day. See Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491,
497 (7th Cir. 2022); see also Young v. Dart, 2021 WL 3633927, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
17, 2021).
Davila says, without offering specifics, that he told the Cook County Jail he
feared for his safety because he had left the Latin Kings gang and was owed a “whoop-
ing” for his departure that he had not yet received. R. 73, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 2–4; Def.’s
Resp. to PSOF ¶¶ 1, 4, 22–23, 28; Davila Dep. at 14:11–14, 38:18–39:9, 95:16–22,

96:8–12, 111:4–13. But he produces no evidence that the assault was related to his
former gang membership. Davila Dep. at 53:11–24; see Thomas, 39 F.4th at 843.
What’s more, even if Davila generally warned the Jail that he feared retaliation
(Davila does not say to whom he complained), there is no evidence that Pustul specif-
ically should have known of this risk when Davila was transferred to his division.
Perhaps if there was evidence that Jail staff have some way to track detainees’ gang

associations, and fights frequently occur between detainees associated with different
gangs, staff with access to that information would be on notice that there is a sub-
stantial risk of violence if those detainees are placed together. But there is no evi-
dence Pustul had that kind of information or should have known about Davila’s for-
mer membership in the Latin Kings and its associated risk. See Thomas, 39 F.4th at

6
843. On the record evidence, no jury could find that Pustul had notice that the assault
would take place before it happened.
Second, Davila’s claim also fails because he does not present any genuine dis-

pute of fact that Pustul’s actions were objectively unreasonable. Davila argues that
Pustul acted unreasonably by letting the two detainees who assaulted him stay out
of their cells during med line. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3. He presents evidence that this was
not the usual protocol: ordinarily correctional officers release detainees one-by-one to
receive their medication and immediately return them to their cells afterwards.
PSOF ¶¶ 9–10, 27; Davila Dep. at 94:19–95:15; Pustul Dep. at 19:1–12. But because
Pustul had no reason to anticipate that the two detainees would attack Davila, it was

not objectively unreasonable to allow them to stay out of their cells during med line.
See Young, 2021 WL 3633927, at *14 (holding that a correctional officer’s failure to
follow Jail policy when releasing a detainee from their cell did not give rise to a claim
where the officer was not aware of any threat to plaintiff).
Davila says that Pustul should have been suspicious that the detainees asked
to stay out of their cells. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3. In Davila’s experience, detainees usually

make this request when they wish to harm another detainee. PSOF ¶¶ 11, 21; Davila
Dep. at 55:8–19. But he presents no evidence to show that, beyond his limited deten-
tion experience (which he does not describe further), this is true for all detainees.
Indeed, Davila himself stayed outside in the common area, amongst the other detain-
ees, despite the supposed risk posed by an open med line. A reasonable officer could
very well believe that the detainees simply wanted more time outside of their confined
7
cells. So Davila’s contention it was unreasonable to allow the detainees to remain out
of their cells because Pustul should have anticipated the assault raises no genuine
issue of fact.

Davila’s remaining contention is that, once the attack began, Pustul failed to
take reasonable measures to stop it. It is undisputed that Pustul immediately called
for backup, verbally instructed the detainees to stop fighting (though they ignored
the instruction), walked to the adjacent holding area to make sure that the nurse was
safely escorted away, and then re-entered after three minutes when backup guards
arrived. DSOF ¶¶ 17–20; Pustul Dep. at 31:11–22, 33:11–34:10, 38:11–17, 54:8–24;
Backup Video at 19:54:56–19:56:30. Courts have repeatedly held that it is an objec-

tively reasonable response for a solo prison guard to call for backup rather than try
to immediately intervene in a fight between detainees. See Fields v. Guerrero, 2024
WL 3250444, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2024) (holding that it was not objectively unrea-
sonable for correctional officer to wait three minutes for backup to separate fighting
detainees); Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A prison guard,
acting alone, is not required to take the unreasonable risk of attempting to break up

a fight between two inmates when the circumstances make it clear that such action
would put her in significant jeopardy.”), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015); Giles v. Tobeck, 895 F.3d 510, 514 (7th

8
Cir. 2018) (holding that a correctional officer “responded reasonably” to an attack on
a detainee when she waited for backup, “rather than jump into the fray herself”).5
Davila contends that Pustul should have done something more, such as physi-

cally stand between the detainees or spray them with mace. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 4–6.
But Pustul was outnumbered: two detainees attacked Davila. Pl.’s Resp. to DSOF
¶ 8; Davila Dep. at 56:16–18; Incident Video at 00:21–01:30. And at one point, the
two detainees picked up lunch trays to use as a weapon against Davila. Def.’s Resp.
to PSOF ¶ 15; Davila Dep. at 57:19–20, 59:1–12; Pustul Dep. at 43:1–5; Incident
Video at 01:08–01:30. Under these circumstances, Pustul would have faced signifi-
cant risk of harm if he intervened alone, so it was reasonable to wait for backup. See

Guzman, 495 F.3d at 858; Giles, 895 F.3d at 514. Because Davila presents no evidence
that could lead a reasonable jury to find that Pustul acted objectively unreasonably,
he fails to overcome Pustul’s summary judgment motion.
Pustul also argues that he has qualified immunity from Davila’s claim. Def.’s
Br. at 8–9. “Once a government official invokes qualified immunity in a section 1983
suit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat the defense by showing (1) that a trier

5The cited Seventh Circuit cases apply the deliberate-indifference standard, which
governs Eighth Amendment claims by post-sentencing inmates (before the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kingsley, this standard also governed Fourteenth Amendment claims by pretrial
detainees). See Guzman, 495 F.3d at 856–57; Giles, 895 F.3d at 513; see also Kemp, 27 F.4th
at 495 (describing the different standards after Kingsley). Deliberate indifference “requires a
showing of both an objectively unreasonable deprivation of rights and subjective deliberate
indifference.” Kemp, 27 F.4th at 495. Because the first element is identical to the objective-
unreasonableness standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, these cases support the prop-
osition that Pustul’s actions were not objectively unreasonable.
9
of fact could conclude that the officer violated a federal right, and (2) that the unlaw-
fulness of the conduct was clearly established at the time the officer acted.” Est. of
Davis v. Ortiz, 987 F.3d 635, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2021). “If the plaintiff cannot do so, the

motion for summary judgment must be granted.” Id. at 639. As just explained, Davila
fails to present any genuine dispute of fact that could lead a reasonable jury to find
that Pustul violated his right to due process. And in his response brief, Davila cites
no cases with analogous facts to argue that it was clearly established that Pustul’s
actions violated the Due Process Clause; for example, he cites no cases showing that
a reasonable officer would have used mace to stop the assault. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at
5–6. Indeed, Davila cites no cases at all in responding to the qualified immunity de-

fense. See id. So qualified immunity does apply, and is another reason why the sum-
mary judgment motion must be granted. See Davis, 987 F.3d at 639.
IV. Conclusion
Pustul’s motion for summary judgment, R. 67, is granted. Although the motion
is granted, the Court expresses its gratitude to recruited pro bono counsel for ably
representing his indigent client.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: March 31, 2026
10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335208. Public record. Not legal advice.