# Evans

> District Court, S.D. Florida · April 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335046

## Case

- **Full name:** Brian Evans v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC and Steve Levine
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335046

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding unlike facial attacks, in a factual attack “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” (citation omitted)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-25484-CIV-GAYLES/D’ANGELO

BRIAN EVANS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CREATIVE ARTISTS AGENCY, LLC
and STEVE LEVINE,

Defendants.
___________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants Creative Artists Agency, LLC and
Steve Levine’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Diversity and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction filed on
December 16, 2025 (DE 34).1 Plaintiff Brian Evans filed a response in opposition on December
18, 2025 (DE 39). Defendants filed a reply on December 30, 2025 (DE 50). The Court held a
hearing on all pending motions on February 25, 2026, at which it addressed issues and motions
related to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE 106). On February 25, 2026, Defendants filed
sealed exhibits to their Motion to Dismiss that were inadvertently not filed sooner (DE 107). The
Court permitted Plaintiff to file a sur-reply to the Motion to Dismiss in order to present arguments
in opposition to the personal jurisdiction challenge over Defendant Levine, which Plaintiff timely
filed on March 4, 2026 (DE 108, 109). Having considered the Parties’ arguments, the relevant
legal authorities, and the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, for the reasons discussed below, it is hereby respectfully recommended that the Motion

1 This case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all pre-trial, non-dispositive
matters and for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matters (DE 42).
to Dismiss (DE 34) be GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that the Complaint
be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Fraudulent Inducement,

Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress, Fraudulent Concealment, Breach of the Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Declaratory Relief, Recission of Contract, and Tortious Interference
with Prospective Economic Advantage (see generally DE 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that he is a professional entertainer, producer, author, recording artist, and singer residing in
Florida (id. at 7). Defendant Creative Artists Agency, LLC (“CAA”) is a nationwide entertainment
and talent agency that represents artists who appear at high profile events (id. at 7-8). Defendant
Levine is an employee of CAA (id. at 8). Plaintiff alleges that he acted as a whistleblower in
reporting misconduct by one of CAA’s clients, which lead to subsequent retaliation by Defendants
(id. at 2). Plaintiff alleges that after a longstanding professional relationship with Defendants, he
reported to Defendants that he received “explicit, perverse videos from a CAA client,” and

Defendants then withdrew every promised opportunity from Plaintiff and tried to silence him
permanently (id. at 3).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants forced him to enter into a series of settlement agreements
when he was medically vulnerable and psychologically destabilized (id.). According to Plaintiff,
Defendants were not a party to the first settlement agreement but inserted themselves into later
versions of the settlement agreement (id. at 4-5). Plaintiff seeks recission of the Second Settlement
Agreement, declaratory relief establishing the invalidity of an undated dismissal, compensatory
and punitive damages, and injunctive relief, preventing Defendant from enforcing or relying on
the enforcement agreement and dismissals (id. at 5).
As to the Court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of Florida (id. at 5).
Plaintiff alleges that CAA is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware
with its principal place of business in California, and “[u]pon information and belief,” CAA has
no members who reside in Florida (id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Levine resides in

California (id. at 8). Therefore, Plaintiff claims that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1332(a), because the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000
and is between citizens of different states (id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that the Court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendants, because CAA conducts systematic and continuous business
operations in Florida, represents well-known entertainers who perform in Florida venues, and
maintains ongoing commercial relationships with Florida entities (id. at 6).
On December 16, 2025, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Parties
are not diverse, and the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant Levine (DE 34 at 2, 9).
Defendants filed an affidavit of Katerina Krumwiede, an employee of CAA (DE 34-1). The
Krumwiede Affidavit states that CAA is a Delaware entity owned by CAA Holdings, LLC, also a

Delaware entity that is owned by several members, including CAA Equity 5, LLC (id.). CAA
Equity 5, LLC is a Delaware entity that is owned by several members, including Perry M. Wolfman
(id.). Defendants also filed an affidavit from Mr. Wolfman, which states that he is a member of
CAA Equity 5, LLC, he has been domiciled in Florida since 2020, has been a resident of Florida
since 2020, has a Florida driver’s license and three vehicles registered in Florida, is registered to
vote in Florida, owns real property in Florida where he resides, works in a CAA office in Miami
Beach, pays taxes in Florida, and intends to remain in Florida permanently (DE 34-2). On
February 26, 2026, Defendants filed exhibits to their Motion that were inadvertently omitted from
the original filing (DE 107). The exhibits include a Cross Receipt showing Mr. Wolfman delivered
CAA Holding, LLC units of Project 33 LLC in exchange for his interest in the entity, Mr.
Wolfman’s Florida Driver’s License, and Mr. Wolfman’s Florida Voter Registration (DE 107-1,
107-2).
On January 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Serve Limited Jurisdictional

Interrogatories, in which he requested leave to perform limited discovery tailored to the
jurisdictional issues raised by Defendants (DE 54). On February 25, 2026, the Court held a
hearing, at which it heard the arguments of the Parties on this request for jurisdictional discovery
(DE 106). Notably, at the February 25, 2026 hearing, Plaintiff could not identify a genuine dispute
of fact related to the citizenship of the Parties (DE 108 at 3). Although Plaintiff was given multiple
opportunities to articulate any grounds to warrant jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiff was only able
to point to his distrust of Defendants’ assertions “because Defendants are untruthful” (id.). The
Court therefore denied Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery as to subject matter
jurisdiction and granted Plaintiff’s motion to file a limited sur-reply (id.).2
II. LEGAL STANDARD

“‘Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys’
and are liberally construed.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). “[A]lthough we are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, ‘we
nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.’” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d
826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)). “[W]e

2 With respect to his request for jurisdictional discovery related to personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Levine, however, Plaintiff articulated specific factual disputes that may warrant
discovery (DE 108 at 4). The Court denied that request without prejudice and stated, “Plaintiff
may re-file his Motion requesting jurisdictional discovery regarding personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Levine after the Court adjudicates the pending Motion to Dismiss, challenging subject
matter jurisdiction” (id.).
cannot act as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.”
Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that are “empowered to hear only those
cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution”
and entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999). “When a federal court acts outside its statutory
subject-matter jurisdiction, it violates the fundamental constitutional precept of limited federal
power.” Id. (citation omitted). “A federal court not only has the power but also the obligation at
any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction does not exist arises.”
Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Courts
must first determine whether there is subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the substantive
issues. OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“We first consider our jurisdiction.”).
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is appropriate if a plaintiff fails
to show that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Rule 12(b)(1) motions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be asserted on facial or factual grounds.
Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). Facial
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are based solely on the allegations in the Complaint.
McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).
When considering such challenges, the Court must, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, take the
complaint’s allegations as true. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
“‘Factual attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge ‘the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact,
irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits,
are considered.’” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]hen a court confronts a ‘factual’ attack, it needn’t
accept the plaintiff’s facts as true; rather, ‘the district court is free to independently weigh facts’

and make the necessary findings.” Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1340 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted). The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that the action falls within
the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Levine (DE 34 at 1-2). Defendants
assert that the only basis for jurisdiction alleged in the Complaint is diversity of citizenship, but
Defendant CAA and Plaintiff are citizens of Florida, destroying complete diversity (id. at 6).
Specifically, Defendants claim that Mr. Wolfman—a member of CAA Equity 5, LLC, which is a
member of CAA Holdings, LLC, which is the sole member of CAA—has been domiciled in

Florida since 2020, is a resident of Florida, works in a CAA office located in Miami Beach, pays
taxes in Florida, has a Florida driver’s license, has vehicles registered in Florida, and is registered
to vote in Florida (id. at 8-9). Defendants argue that because Mr. Wolfman shares Florida
citizenship with Plaintiff, there is no diversity jurisdiction in this case (id. at 9).
In response, Plaintiff states that Defendants’ jurisdictional challenge relies on affidavits
and internal LLC ownership materials uniquely within Defendants’ possession (DE 39 at 7).
Plaintiff further argues that Defendants have failed to conclusively establish complete diversity
between the parties, because they have not shown “the nature, timing, or scope of any alleged
Florida member’s interest within the multi-tier LLC structure at the time the Complaint was filed,
nor whether such interest constitutes controlling membership sufficient to confer citizenship” (id.
at 8). According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ diversity challenge fails, because Plaintiff had to rely
on the legal identity of CAA as sued and served through its registered agent, and Plaintiff was not
required to identify or plead the citizenship of every member within CAA’s ownership structure

(id. at 9). Lastly, Plaintiff claims that the Wolfman Affidavit establishes only Mr. Wolfman’s
personal domicile, not the details about his membership interest, and the Krumwiede Affidavit
fails to establish that CAA Equity 5, LLC was a member of CAA Holdings, LLC at the time the
lawsuit was filed (id. at 10).
The Court first turns to, as it must, the jurisdictional issue of whether there is complete
diversity among the Parties under Section 1332(a)(1), which gives district courts original
jurisdiction over actions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.3 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that CAA “is a
limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place
of business in California[,]” and “[u]pon information and belief, none of CAA’s members is a

citizen of the State of Florida” (DE 1 at 5, 7). With respect to himself, “Plaintiff is a citizen of the
State of Florida” (id. at 5). Defendants bring both facial and factual attacks on the jurisdictional
allegations in the Complaint, arguing the facts set forth are insufficient to establish the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction (DE 34 at 8). Defendants also present extrinsic affidavits and evidence
to show that Plaintiff and CAA are not diverse (id. at 8-9).

3 Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was untimely, because Defendants first filed
“a seventeen-month-old stipulation of dismissal in open court” (DE 39 at 2). But, the law is well-
settled that the Court can consider subject matter jurisdiction at any time. See Scarfo v. Ginsberg,
175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Under the law of this circuit, however, parties cannot waive
subject matter jurisdiction, and we may consider subject matter jurisdiction claims at any time
during litigation.”).
“[A] limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company
is a citizen.” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022
(11th Cir. 2004). “To sufficiently allege the citizenships of . . . unincorporated business entities,
a party must list the citizenships of all the members of the limited liability company . . . .” Id. “If

any of the members share citizenship with an opposing party, diversity jurisdiction is defeated.”
Ofer v. Millan, No. 24-CIV-20888, 2025 WL 213834, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 24-CIV-20888, 2025 WL 626022 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2025). For an
individual, “‘[c]itizenship is equivalent to ‘domicile’ for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.’ And
domicile requires both residence in a state and ‘an intention to remain there indefinitely . . . .’”
Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint fail to establish that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. First, Plaintiff does not specifically list the citizenship of all members
of CAA, as required. “Those omissions mean that, on its face, [the Complaint] fails to establish
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(2).” Millan, 2025 WL 213834, at *14 (citation omitted).

Second, Plaintiff alleges CAA’s citizenship based on information and belief. “It is never
appropriate to plead jurisdictional allegations upon information and belief.” Admiral Ins. Co. v.
VPRART, LLC, No. 21-CIV-21312, 2021 WL 1318223, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2021); see also
Jiangmen Benlida Printed Cir. Co. v. Circuitronix, LLC, No. 21-CIV-60125, 2021 WL 230178, at
*2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021) (“[A]llegations based ‘upon information and belief’ are not a substitute
for establishing jurisdictional facts.” (citation omitted)). Yet, even if Plaintiff was given an
opportunity to cure these defective allegations of citizenship, Defendants’ factual attack on the
Court’s jurisdiction is fatal to the Complaint.
Notwithstanding the failure to allege sufficiently CAA’s citizenship, Defendant provided
several declarations and exhibits that demonstrate a lack of diversity between the Parties. Indeed,
Defendants’ evidence convincingly shows that Mr. Wolfman is a member of CAA Equity 5, LLC,
which is a member of CAA Holdings, LLC, which is a member of Defendant CAA (DE 107-1).

Defendants’ evidence also shows that Mr. Wolfman is a citizen of Florida (DE 34-1, 34-2, 107-2).
In response, Plaintiff does not provide any facts or evidence to the contrary. Instead, Plaintiff falls
back on two erroneous arguments. First, Plaintiff claims that the Court must take all his assertions
as true and draw all inferences in his favor, but Plaintiff loses the benefit of those presumptions in
a factual attack. See Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 960 (“This circuit has explained that in a factual attack,
the presumption of truthfulness afforded a plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
does not attach, and the court is free to weigh the evidence . . . .”); see also Lawrence, 919 F.2d at
1529 (holding unlike facial attacks, in a factual attack “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to
plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court
from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” (citation omitted)).

Next, Plaintiff claims that “Defendants have failed to conclusively establish complete
diversity[,] because they have not shown the nature, timing, or scope of any alleged Florida
member’s interest within the multi-tier LLC structure at the time the Complaint was filed, nor
whether such interest constitutes controlling membership sufficient to confer citizenship” (DE 39
at 8). But, Plaintiff completely misapprehends that it is his burden to establish the Court’s
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, not Defendants’ burden. See McCormick v.
Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he party invoking the court’s jurisdiction
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the existence of
federal jurisdiction.”). And despite Plaintiff’s protestations, a member’s role or the size of his
interest is not determinative of that company’s citizenship – “a limited liability company is a
citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen.” Jacob v. Mentor Worldwide,
LLC, No. 20-CIV-10132, 2020 WL 13327503, at *1 (11th Cir. July 29, 2020) (citation omitted);
see also Sound Around, Inc. v. O'Donnell, No. 23-CIV-12479, 2025 WL 2887175, at *5 (11th Cir.

Oct. 10, 2025) (“Because it is ‘common for [a limited liability company] to be a member of
another’ limited liability company, the ‘citizenship of [limited liability companies] often ends up
looking like a factor tree that exponentially expands every time a member turns out to be another’
partnership or limited liability company.” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff has thus failed to meet his
burden of establishing complete diversity, as Defendant CAA and Plaintiff are both citizens of
Florida. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.4
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (DE 34) be GRANTED and that the Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is further respectfully

recommended that all pending motions be DENIED AS MOOT and that this case be CLOSED.
V. OBJECTIONS
The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommendation
to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Darrin P. Gayles, United States District Judge.
Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District
Judge of an issue covered in this Report and shall bar the Parties from attacking on appeal
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report, except upon grounds of plain

4 The undersigned does not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments for dismissal in light of the
conclusion that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to proceed.
error, if necessary, in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 US.
140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 30th day of April,
2026.
/ \ C
( ff
fbn Dale
ELLEN F.D’ANGELO °
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ce: Pro Se Plaintiff Brian Evans
All Counsel of Record

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11335046. Public record. Not legal advice.